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i
Abstract
The cyber threat to industrial control systems is an acknowledged security issue, but a
qualified dataset to quantify the risk remains largely unavailable. Senior executives of
facilities that operate these systems face competing requirements for investment bud-
gets, but without an understanding of the nature of the threat cyber security may not
be a high priority. Operational managers and cyber incident responders at these fa-
cilities face a similarly complex situation. They must plan for the defence of critical
systems, often unfamiliar to IT security professionals, from potentially capable, adapt-
able and covert antagonists who will actively attempt to evade detection. The scope
of the challenge requires a coherent, enterprise-level awareness of the threat, such that
organisations can assess their operational priorities, plan their defensive posture, and
rehearse their responses prior to such an attack.
This thesis proposes a novel combination of concepts found in risk assessment,
intrusion detection, education, exercising, safety and process models, fused with expe-
riential learning through serious games. It progressively builds a common set of shared
mental models across an ICS operation to frame the nature of the adversary and estab-
lish enterprise situational awareness that permeates through all levels of teams involved
in addressing the threat. This is underpinned by a set of coping strategies that iden-
tifies probable targets for advanced threat actors, proactively determining antagonistic
courses of actions to derive an appropriate response strategy.
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“Cybersecurity is the responsibility of senior leaders who are responsible
for creating an enterprise-wide culture of security. It is about aligning IT
with business competencies. It is about a well-informed board and C-suite
that make security decisions not based on the musings of a business show
talking head but from utilizing an informed, risk-based approach.”
Tom Ridge, former US Secretary of Homeland Security, 2014 [1].
1.1 Introduction
The cyber threat to industrial control systems (ICS) is an acknowledged security issue,
but a qualified dataset to quantify the risk remains largely unavailable. Senior execu-
tives of facilities that operate these systems face competing requirements for investment
budgets, but without an understanding of the nature of the threat, cyber security may
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not be a high priority. Operational managers and cyber incident responders at these
facilities face a similarly complex situation. They must plan for the defence of crit-
ical systems, often unfamiliar to IT security professionals, from potentially capable,
adaptable and covert antagonists who will actively attempt to evade detection.
The scope of the challenge requires a coherent, enterprise-level awareness of the
threat, such that organisations can assess their operational priorities, plan their de-
fensive posture, and rehearse their responses prior to such an attack. Research in the
field of cyber security has focused on discrete elements of the problem, rather than the
development of a cohesive framework to establish appropriate levels of cyber situational
awareness across all layers of an organisation.
1.2 Overview of Research
This research explores the use of experiential learning through serious games to progres-
sively build a common set of shared mental models across an ICS operation to frame
the nature of an adversary and establish enterprise situational awareness that permeates
through all levels of teams involved in addressing the threat. This is underpinned by a
set of coping strategies that identifies probable targets for advanced threat actors, and
proactively determines antagonistic courses of actions to derive an appropriate response
strategy.
Specifically, this research encompasses:
• Simulated Critical Infrastructure Protection Scenarios (SCIPS): An ex-
periential learning environment that introduces the nature of cyber attacks on ICS
and their impact on the continued operations and financial viability of an ICS
operator.
• ICS Cyber Defence Triage Process (ICS-CDTP): A pre-incident coping
strategy that assesses the processes and systems that would severely impact an
ICS operator if degraded or denied, and develops a defensive posture and incident
response playbook that can be used as the basis for exercising within a progressive
collective training framework.
• Progressive Collective Training: A framework for the delivery of progressive
experiential learning that integrates the SCIPS training scenarios with cyber range
and table-top exercises to build shared mental models, drive policy and procedural
change, build capable incident response teams, and develop pre-incident coping
strategies.
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1.3 Research Aims
This research aims to determine which characteristics of experiential learning contribute
to the establishment of enterprise situational awareness so that an ICS operator can
target its pre-incident planning and training, using serious games and cyber exercises,
to focus its defensive posture based on its operational priorities and the adversaries it
faces.
1.4 Research Questions
To validate the results of this research, and assess their efficacy, six questions are pro-
posed that can be answered through experimentation, described in Table 1.1.
No. Research Question Assessment Criteria
1. Which factors influence the develop-
ment of mental models to provide cyber
situational awareness?
An assessment of any demonstrated relation-
ships between mental models and specific
characteristics observed in experimentation
that shape situational awareness.
2. Does the adoption of coping strategies
increase situational awareness?
A demonstration, through experimentation, of
an observed increase in situational awareness
resulting from the use of coping strategies.
3. Can serious games change the risk per-
ceptions of participants and establish a
foundational level of situational aware-
ness?
An assessment of observed and recorded risk
perceptions before and after the playing of se-
rious games.
4. How can we increase the efficacy of the
serious games to deliver the change in
risk perceptions?
An assessment of results from experimentation
to identify which factors influence any changes
in risk perception observed in Question 3.
5. As a result of serious games, can partic-
ipants recognise the characteristics of a
cyber attack and determine the possible
intent and courses of action?
An assessment of participants’ recognition and
comprehension of the behaviours of threat ac-
tors, and their ability to identify possible an-
tagonistic intent and future courses of action.
6. Are participants of serious games able
to assess the immediate and longer-
term impacts of cyber attacks?
An assessment of participants’ ability to iden-
tify and quantify the consequences of the at-
tack behaviours observed in Question 5.
Table 1.1: Research questions
1.5 Structure of Thesis
To address the six research questions described in Table 1.1, this thesis is structured as
follows.
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1.5.1 Background
Chapter 2 sets the scene for the research to address the questions described in Section
1.4. It provides an explanatory background that reviews the cyber threat to ICS from
capable antagonists. It continues in Section 2.4 by characterising the nature of the
risks associated to the threat and proposes a requirement for an enterprise-level un-
derstanding of such risks in order to adequately prepare for, and defend against, cyber
attacks.
1.5.2 Related Work
Chapter 3 surveys and critically assesses the state of the art with regard to the domains
and disciplines associated with this research. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 describe the scope
of review and the methodology adopted. Section 3.4 then explores the characteristics
of ICS through the use of a reference architecture, then reviews the application of IT
security mechanisms to ICS and discusses the limitations of their use. The chapter
continues with a discussion in Section 3.5 of the techniques available to measure the
risk of cyber attacks in ICS, and the requirement for a qualified dataset on which to
base risk assessments. This provides the basis to consider how risks are perceived, as
an element of answering Question 3 - Can serious games change the risk perceptions of
participants and establish a foundational level of situational awareness?
Section 3.6 reviews research into education for cyber security awareness to deter-
mine how serious games can be used to change the risk perceptions, understanding,
and behaviours as asked in Question 1 - Which factors influence the development of
mental models to provide cyber situational awareness?, Question 3 - Can serious games
change the risk perceptions of participants and establish a foundational level of situa-
tional awareness?, Question 4 - How can we increase the efficacy of the serious games
to deliver the change in risk perceptions?, Question 5 - As a result of serious games, can
participants recognise the characteristics of a cyber attack and determine the possible
intent and courses of action?, and Question 6 - Are participants of serious games able
to assess the immediate and longer-term impacts of cyber attacks?. This includes an
assessment of serious games for experiential learning, the characteristics of an effective
serious game, and the strategies available to influence decision-making.
The detail of situational awareness is reviewed in Section 3.7 to further address
Question 1 - Which factors influence the development of mental models to provide cyber
situational awareness?, Question 3 - Can serious games change the risk perceptions of
participants and establish a foundational level of situational awareness?, Question 5 -
As a result of serious games, can participants recognise the characteristics of a cyber
attack and determine the possible intent and courses of action?, and Question 6 - Are
participants of serious games able to assess the immediate and longer-term impacts of
cyber attacks?. The section includes a consideration of exercises as a means to develop
situational awareness. This leads into a deeper exploration of cyber exercises in Section
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3.8.
To address Question 2 - Does the adoption of coping strategies increase situational
awareness?, Section 3.9 assesses incident response within ICS and Section 3.10 reviews
intrusion analysis techniques and their applicability to ICS.
1.5.3 The SCIPS Serious Game
Chapter 4 introduces the SCIPS game, describing its evolution from an initial proof of
concept during the author’s MSc project, to shape risk thinking in the minds of partic-
ipants, through the extended gaming framework used to deliver experiential learning to
develop situational awareness and mental models for incident responders. The SCIPS
game contributes to addressing Question 1 - Which factors influence the development of
mental models to provide cyber situational awareness?, Question 3 - Can serious games
change the risk perceptions of participants and establish a foundational level of situa-
tional awareness?, Question 4 - How can we increase the efficacy of the serious games
to deliver the change in risk perceptions?, Question 5 - As a result of serious games, can
participants recognise the characteristics of a cyber attack and determine the possible
intent and courses of action?, and Question 6 - Are participants of serious games able
to assess the immediate and longer-term impacts of cyber attacks?.
1.5.4 The Industrial Control System Cyber Defence Triage Process
Chapter 5 describes a coping strategy for ICS operators that allows them to address
cyber threats in an effective and cost-sensitive manner that does not expose their op-
erations to additional risks through invasive testing. It focuses on those ICS operators
facing the highest levels of impact from antagonistic cyber actions, but not yet at a high
level of cyber security maturity. The chapter addresses Question 2 - Does the adoption
of coping strategies increase situational awareness?.
1.5.5 A Framework for Progressive Collective Training
Chapter 6 acknowledges that incident response teams cannot prepare for every situa-
tion, or predict every crisis. The chapter explores the requirements for collective cyber
incident response training and proposes a framework to develop progressive individ-
ual and team SA to produce the levels of team cohesion and adaptability required to
respond to the variety of cyber attacks an organisation might face. It contributes to
addressing Question 1 - Which factors influence the development of mental models to
provide cyber situational awareness?, Question 3 - Can serious games change the risk
perceptions of participants and establish a foundational level of situational awareness?,
Question 4 - How can we increase the efficacy of the serious games to deliver the change
in risk perceptions?, Question 5 - As a result of serious games, can participants recognise
the characteristics of a cyber attack and determine the possible intent and courses of
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action?, and Question 6 - Are participants of serious games able to assess the immediate
and longer-term impacts of cyber attacks?.
1.5.6 Experiments
Chapter 7 describes the schedule and scope of the experiments that fused the SCIPS
game, the Industrial Control System Cyber Defence Triage Process, and the Framework
for Progressive Collective Training to generate data to allow an assessment of these
concepts to answer the six research questions in Table 1.1. In particular, Section 7.5.2
introduces a novel cyber exercise format to maximise training value to participants.
1.5.7 Experiment Results
Chapter 8 articulates the results of experiments. Section 8.2 explains the key research
method used, then discusses the results in Sections 8.4 - 8.12.
1.5.8 Analysis and Critical Assessment
Chapter 9 analyses the results from the experiments described within Chapter 8, as-
sessing their impact, critically reviewing their applicability and generalisability within
the cyber domain, and considers how they address the six research questions in Table
1.1.
1.5.9 Further Work
Chapter 10 summarises the areas where the analysis and critical assessment of the
experimental results highlights a requirement for further research.
1.5.10 Summary Conclusions
Finally, Chapter 11 provides a summary of the conclusions of this research.
1.6 Contribution
The research described in this thesis is novel in that it combines and extends concepts
found in risk assessment, intrusion detection, education and experiential learning, se-
rious games and exercising, with safety and process models that are recognised within
the operations of many ICS facilities. As such, this research:
1. Proposes a progressive collective training framework in Chapter 6 that incremen-
tally develops the content of the five mental models defined in Section 6.3 (with
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analysis in Section 9.3) necessary for SA and incident response to address Ques-
tion 1 - Which factors influence the development of mental models to provide cyber
situational awareness?
2. Characterises the results of a qualitative analysis in Chapter 8 within a set of
themes summarised in Section 8.12 that shapes the nature of experiential learn-
ing within a serious gaming environment, further addressing Question 1 - Which
factors influence the development of mental models to provide cyber situational
awareness?
3. Focuses on the identification and defence of critical ICS equipment from malicious
manipulation in Chapter 5, with results in Chapter 8, allowing ICS operators to
actively identify and attempt to thwart malicious attacks based on an incident
response ‘playbook’ developed from analyses of antagonistic intent, addressing
Question 2 - Does the adoption of coping strategies increase situational awareness?
4. Delivers a serious gaming environment in Chapter 4 with experimental results
described in Sections 8.5 and 8.10 that addresses Question 3 - Can serious games
change the risk perceptions of participants and establish a foundational level of
situational awareness?, Question 5 - As a result of serious games, can participants
recognise the characteristics of a cyber attack and determine the possible intent
and courses of action?, and Question 6 - Are participants of serious games able
to assess the immediate and longer-term impacts of cyber attacks? The game
allows participants to experience the simulated impact of a cyber attack on an
ICS enterprise, demonstrating how it can strategically affect shareholder value,
and support the development of mental models to frame wider cyber security
operations.
5. Provides a framework in Chapter 6, with experimental results described in Chap-
ter 8, that addresses Question 4 - How can we increase the efficacy of the serious
games to deliver the change in risk perceptions? It provides a progressive, cost-
effective establishment and maintenance of situational awareness and skills profi-
ciency through cyber range and table-top exercises that incorporate the scenarios
played out in the strategic serious game environment.
6. Introduces a novel cyber defence exercise structure in Section 7.5.2, with experi-
mental results in Sections 8.5 and 8.9, to maximise training value to participants
and further address Question 4 - How can we increase the efficacy of the serious
games to deliver the change in risk perceptions?
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2.1 Introduction
This chapter sets the scene for the detailed discussions that follow throughout this
thesis.
2.2 The Cyber Threat to ICS
A US executive order signed in 2013 stated that the “cyber threat to critical infrastruc-
ture continues to grow and represents one of the most serious national security chal-
lenges we must confront” [2]. This infrastructure is typically underpinned by industrial
control systems (ICS) that automate and manage electromechanical devices to provide
services essential to a nation’s wellbeing and prosperity, and as such, any antagonistic
action against these represents a significant threat to the continued security of these
countries [3]. ICS often use operating systems, applications and procedures that may
be considered unconventional by contemporary IT professionals, and have operational
requirements that include the management of processes that, if not executed in a pre-
dictable manner, may result in injury, loss of life, damage to the environment, as well
as serious financial issues such as production losses that may have a negative impact on
a nation’s economy [3, 4, 5, 6, 7].
While the total number of ICS installations is unknown, a 2012 commercial re-
search paper [8] estimated the global industrial automation market to be worth USD
152bn, suggesting a significant number of ICS facilities exist. In the same calendar year,
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the US ICS Computer Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) reported 138 incidents
[9] to which it responded. The total number of incidents involving critical infrastruc-
ture requiring ICS-CERT to respond in the United States between October 2014 and
September 2015 had increased to 295 [10]. With the costs involved in deploying ICS se-
curity, especially within critical systems, being high [11] the business case for investment
must be clearly articulated [12].
An analysis by an insurance company in 2015 exercised a simulated scenario of
malware causing an electricity blackout across 15 US states, leaving 93 million people
without power, with a total impact to the US economy estimated at USD 243bn, rising
to more than USD 1trn in one version of the scenario [13]. However, this study, and
another by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) [14], assessed
the possible frequency of these incidents as low. The NERC report also cited cyber
attack as only one of nine areas of concern facing the electricity sector in the period
2010-2018, and as such one must assume that there will be competing demands for
resources to address these issues which may affect the appetite for investment in cyber
defences.
2.3 Assessing the Risks to ICS
The potential for high-impact low-frequency (HILF) events to cause significant negative
effects on an ICS facility, combined with the small sample of qualified data complicates
the assessment of risks when prioritising budgets for investment. Even if the data
becomes available that describes the overall attack landscape of ICS, it is unclear how
to translate this into attack profiles in particular industry sectors, and more parochially,
attack profiles for individual facilities.
Large ICS are typically complicated, and this complexity may deter some oppor-
tunistic actors. Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) actors, however, pose a credible
risk [15]. In 2014, 55 percent of incidents investigated by ICS-CERT involved APTs
or sophisticated actors [10]. By their nature, APT attacks are covert and difficult to
detect, with a degree of tailoring available to the antagonist in order to achieve focussed
outcomes on the target network.
There is a growing consensus that cyber security is not achievable by solely focusing
on technological aspects, and that managing the risk of cyber attacks is a business
problem [16]. Hence, in addition to lowering the likelihood of cyber attacks through
mostly technical means, organisations can attempt to absorb losses incurred by such
attacks through insurance, either through setting aside funds, or through a third-party
policy. When it comes to pricing cyber risk, however, a principal problem is the scarcity
of data. Regardless of how accurate and sophisticated risk models become, if there are
no data to test the models against, they are of limited use [17]. Given the adaptive
nature of APTs and lack of data regarding HILF events, this might prove difficult or
even impossible. Faced with this ambiguity, business leaders need to decide how much
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they should invest and which strategy to follow. Business leaders require facts about the
risk of cyber attacks to determine possible mitigation strategies [16]. Firstly, then, they
require a viable definition of what should be categorised as a cyber risk. It is argued
by Biener et al. (2015) [17], from an insurance perspective, that an event on a network
or system must meet three criteria to be characterised as a cyber risk, as proposed in
Table 2.1.
1. A critical asset such as a company server or database needs to be affected.
2. A relevant actor needs to be involved in the cause of the cyber risk incident (e.g.,
hackers, employees, system).
3. A relevant outcome such as the loss of data or misuse of confidential data needs to
be present.
Table 2.1: Characteristics of a cyber risk, Biener et al. (2015)
However, this definition assumes an ability to assess and prioritise the critical assets
of an organisation, and understanding of the antagonists who would seek to adversely
affect them, along with a means to quantify the loss or misuse of data. This assessment
of critical assets is focused on an individual organisation, and does not provide a basis
for wider insurance policies. A central requirement for providing insurance against a
specific risk is independence of risks. Following the law of large numbers1, the larger
the number of mutually independent risks in the insurance pool, the more likely it
is that average aggregate losses correspond to expected losses. An empirical analysis
by Biener et al. (2015) [17], however, showed that only 16.8% of cyber incidents were
related to a loss in another firm. In other words, most cyber risk incidents in the sample
were not correlated with other cases. The challenge of independence of risks is further
exacerbated when unfamiliar technologies are employed, such as ICS. An analysis of
historical incident data could be misleading if the nature of the underlying risk is based
on technologies not reflective of the systems under consideration [17] and existing IT
security mechanisms are mistakenly assumed to be effective technology mitigations in
these environments [3].
2.4 Enterprise Understanding of Cyber Risk
In situations where the risk landscape is unclear, business leaders, operational man-
agers, and technologists require a common language to communicate information and
risk assessments. A frequent problem within the cyber security arena is the lack of
viable analogies, or mental models, to help users assess the threats they encounter [18].
In the case of ICS security, these cognitive abstracts are even harder to develop without
a dataset to quantify the risk, despite increased media coverage. Indeed, it has been
observed that in the absence of credible evidence of the threat, users perceive the pur-
1The law of large numbers is a principle of probability according to which the frequencies of events
with the same likelihood of occurrence even out, given enough trials or instances. As the number of
experiments increases, the actual ratio of outcomes will converge on the theoretical, or expected, ratio
of outcomes.
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ported risks to be overstated by the media [19], and until they believe themselves to be
in a situation where they are susceptible, they do not change their behaviours [20]. ICS
operators therefore require a foundational understanding of cyber situational aware-
ness. However, for such situational awareness to be raised to the level that individuals
take action, they must address the seven aspects of situational awareness proposed by
Barford et al. (2010) [21], as described in Table 2.2.
1. Acknowledge that a threat exists, and that it can be identified if it occurs.
2. Have assessed the immediate and longer-term impact of cyber attacks.
3. Be conscious of how an attack can evolve over time.
4. Understand the intent of an antagonist.
5. Recognise the circumstances under which an attack could occur.
6. Have appraised the quality of information required to make decisions during an attack.
7. Consider the possible actions an antagonist might take in order to achieve their intent.
Table 2.2: Seven aspects of cyber situational awareness, Barford et al. (2010)
To assess whether it is possible to raise ICS business leaders’, operational man-
agers’, and technologists’ understanding of the cyber threat by improving their aware-
ness, we must consider the influencing factors on cyber situational awareness. We shall
now review the work related to this core research theme.
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3.1 Introduction
To support adequate consideration of the scope of the research problem described in
Section 1.1 in the context of the wider background discussed in Chapter 2, this chapter
provides a literature review of related work.
Elements of this chapter have been peer-reviewed and published in the following:
• Allan Cook, Helge Janicke, Leandros Maglaras, Richard Smith “An As-
sessment of the Application of IT Security Mechanisms to Industrial Control Sys-
tems”, International Journal of Internet Technology and Secured Transactions (In-
derscience), Vol. 7, No 2, pp 144-174, 2017, DOI: 10.1504/IJIST.2017.10008030
• Allan Cook, Richard Smith, Leandros Maglaras, Helge Janicke “Mea-
suring the Risk of Cyber Attack in Industrial Control Systems”, Proceedings of
the 4th International Symposium for ICS & SCADA Cyber Security Research
(ICS-CSR 2016), Belfast, 23-25 August 2016, DOI: 10.14236/ewic/ICS2016.12
• Allan Cook, Richard Smith, Leandros Maglaras, Helge Janicke “Manag-
ing Incident Response in the Industrial Internet of Things”, International Journal
of Internet Technology and Secured Transactions (Inderscience), Vol. 8, No 2, pp
251-276, 2018
• Helge Janicke, Allan Cook, Andrew Nicholson, Kevin Jones “Risks,
Threats and Mitigation Strategies for SCADA Systems”, Cyber-Physical-Social
Systems and Constructs in Electric Power Engineering, (Siddharth Suryanarayanan,
Robin Roche, Timothy M. Hansen), IET, 2016, ISBN: 9781849199360
3.2 Scope of Review
This research encompasses a number of subject matter areas that have influenced the
direction of analysis and thesis development. Specifically, this has included;
• the characteristics of industrial control systems,
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• the measurement of risk,
• techniques for the delivery of cyber security education,
• the development of situational awareness,
• the nature of cyber exercises,
• incident response planning, and
• means by which a network intrusion can be analysed.
Accordingly, this literature review addresses each of these subject areas in turn.
3.3 Review Method
Although the security of ICS is an emerging research area, the multi-disciplinary aspects
of the specific subjects areas identified above were not sufficiently addressed in identified
publications within the cyber domain. An initial triage based on a keyword search from
open sources suggested irregular areas of research with an insufficient level of primary
studies that would form a reliable base for an analysis. It was, however, apparent that
primary literature was available in specific subject areas, although unrelated to ICS. A
mapping study [22] was therefore employed in order to cover the breadth of the related
subject matter publications to provide a basis for an analysis of this problem space.
The analysis approach assumed that a chronological sample of literature would
demonstrate an evolution of thinking and provide the necessary background on which
to base this research. As such, a snowballing methodology [22] was employed whereby
keyword searches of Google Scholar, ACM Digital Library, IEEE and Web of Science
were used in order to identify publications with a high number of citations, or appli-
cable subject matter coverage, then their references traced in order to provide subject
matter coverage. The following keywords, in a variety of combinations, were used:
cyber security, scada, industrial control system, incident response, intrusion detection,
incidents, forensics. protocols, anomaly detection, critical infrastructure, risk analy-
sis methods, process risk, safety risk, risk measurement, cyber education, situational
awareness, cyber exercises, table-top exercises. Although effective, the repeatability of
a keyword searching approach is limited, and it is probable that researchers in the same
field would not identify the same source materials if the exercise were to be indepen-
dently repeated [23]. Therefore external, independent peer-review was used to provide
an objective validation of the findings [22].
The literature review described in the following sections of this chapter surveyed
the subjects of ICS, risk assessment, cyber security education, situational awareness,
cyber exercises, incident response, and intrusion analysis, using existing works as a
starting point. The identified works each are analysed, with preliminary conclusions
proposed for each discrete research area.
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3.4 Industrial Control Systems
Industrial control systems (ICS) is a general term that encompasses a family of process
automation technologies including Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
systems and Distributed Control Systems (DCS). These control systems use Pro-
grammable Logic Controllers (PLC) or similar Intelligent Electronic Devices (IED),
Remote Terminal Units (RTU) and input/output (I/O) devices to manage electrome-
chanical equipment in either local or distributed environments. Several factors have
contributed to the escalation of risks specific to control systems, including the adoption
of standardised technologies with known vulnerabilities, connectivity of control systems
with other networks, use of insecure remote connections, and widespread availability of
technical information about control systems [3, 24, 25]. These systems provide essential
services for sovereign nation’s critical infrastructures, and as such, cyber attacks against
them represent a significant threat to the continued security of these countries [26].
As industrial businesses and critical national infrastructure (CNI) have evolved
to exploit the closer integration of services and data provided by the networking and
the Internet, the isolation that secured ICS has reduced [3]. The efficiencies offered
by real-time monitoring, peer-to-peer communications, multiple sessions, concurrency,
maintenance and redundancy mechanisms improve the quality of the services offered to
both operators and consumers [27]. As a result of this connectivity, the once isolated
systems are now susceptible to an emerging range of threats. These attacks can be
categorized into two classes [28]. The first class includes traditional IT attacks that
target vulnerabilities in general purpose IT systems which can be mitigated by adopting
IT countermeasures such as software patches, antivirus software and firewalls. The
second class encompasses ICS attacks that target the elements of ICS themselves. These
attacks can originate either locally, where the attacker has physical access to equipment,
or remotely, where the attack is directed via unsecured connections or through the
exploitation of a trusted link [28].
A review of ICS system cyber security standards by Sommestad et al. (2010) [29],
depicted in Figure 3.1, highlighted the number of occurrences of specific security coun-
termeasure keywords in the documentation. As can be seen, the most frequent terms
are all related to established IT security best practice, with the implication being that
IT mechanisms that support these are adequate and appropriate for ICS. By considering
the effectiveness of traditional IT security mechanisms within an ICS environment we
can consider areas of weakness within an ICS when traditional IT security mechanisms
are deployed and assess their applicability.
ICS operations generally must execute within strict performance and time-critical
boundaries, with near real-time control, requiring data to be transmitted, processed
and responded to within a defined latency [30]. Unlike IT systems, ICS have typical
response requirements of 1-10 milliseconds, and in motion control systems the range is
further constrained to between 250 microseconds - 1 millisecond with jitter less than 1
microsecond [31]. Moreover, the main operational objectives of an ICS are to maintain
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Figure 3.1: The focus of ICS standards and guidelines on countermeasure groups,
Sommestad et al. (2010)
availability, reliability and safety [32]. This focus drives the behaviours of system op-
erators to prioritise these factors when considering system change or downtime. Any
modifications to the operational environment carry risks to the availability, reliability
and safety of the system and as a result it is not always feasible to halt operations to
install upgrades or patches [33].
ICS generally comprise two types of components: information processing elements,
and field measurement and control devices. Information processing elements generally
co-operate with general IT applications within the organisation and provide manage-
ment information, scheduling and accounting data utilising traditional IT-based tech-
nologies. Field measurement and control devices run in the production or operational
environment, often referred to as Operational Technology (OT), typically using real-
time operating systems on proprietary hardware and communicate using many indus-
trial protocols, often in a mix of IP, bus and serial technologies. Different protocols
are frequently used at different levels of the ICS architecture, requiring gateways for
interoperability [30]. Unlike traditional IT systems which place a higher priority on the
confidentiality, integrity and availability of centralised servers (even if in a distributed
architecture) rather than edge devices, an ICS places equal importance on control de-
vices at the network or system perimeter, as these are the devices generally closest to
the physical elements under control [34].
3.4.1 ICS Reference Architecture
The Purdue model, described by Williams (1991) and illustrated in Figure 3.2, is a
reference architecture for control hierarchy. It describes six levels within an organisation
managing an industrial control system [35, 36], and is the de facto model within industry
[37].
ICS implementations often include a number of significant differences to traditional
IT systems [30]. Typically, ICS have a deeper architecture than typical enterprises, as
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Figure 3.2: Purdue model for control hierarchy, Williams (1991)
characterised by the Purdue hierarchy. It should be noted that in reality, ICS archi-
tectures rarely adhere to clear boundaries described by Williams (1991). However, the
Purdue Model provides a useful reference architecture against which we can consider
security provisions. The layers of the model are summarised below:
Level 5
Encapsulates the corporate or enterprise network with Internet access managed within
the layer where the centralised IT systems and function are located, along with business-
to-business (B2B) and business-to-customer (B2C) services [38]. The De-Militarised
Zone (DMZ) between levels 4 and 3 shows a clear demarcation between Internet-
connected elements and those isolated.
Level 4
Describes the functionality that requires access to services provided by the enterprise
network in Level 5. This level is more often than not viewed as an extension of the
enterprise network and it relies on standard IT services, including those provided by
wireless access[38].
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Level 3
Level 3, the plant level, represents the traditional highest level of control in an ICS, and
the highest level of OT, managing end-to-end operational functions and coordinating
the workflows to produce the desired end products or utility [38].
Level 2
Level 2 is the level of supervisory control within a site or a manufacturing process that
is usually responsible for controlling the end-to-end production or service, generally
through SCADA or DCS [39, 40, 41]. Facilities in Level 2 encompass alarm and alert
management, overall control functions and process history data collection.
Level 1 and Level 0
Although logically abstracted, it is often difficult to separate the functionality provided
at Level 1 and Level 0. Level 1 comprises controllers that direct and manipulate the
manufacturing process by interacting with the Level 0 devices (e.g., I/O, sensors, and
actuators) [38].
The use of differing protocols at each level of the architecture requires the common
use of gateway devices to transform messaging and data in order to maintain connectiv-
ity, although the adoption of IP is reducing this in new implementations. The control
information sent between devices is either the input or output of a control loop imple-
mented in a supervisory device, or diagnostic information used to monitor the health
of a device. The data packets transmitted in ICS are generally small, especially at
Levels 0 and 1 where only a single measurement or value may be sent. This traffic is
sent both periodically, in the case of sampled data, and aperiodically when events such
as a change of state or an alarm are generated. Clocks and bus contention protocols
are commonplace to ensure that all data transfers occur in a timely manner and are
temporally consistent [30].
3.4.2 ICS Protocols
There are between 150 and 200 different ICS protocols in use and each must be pro-
tected equally, with Modbus [42], DNP3 [43, 44], OPC [45], and the Ethernet industrial
protocol (Ethernet/IP) among the most widely adopted [46, 47]. In attempts to achieve
tighter integration with the upper layers of the architecture, legacy protocols such as
Modbus have been encapsulated in TCP/IP (Modbus/TCP), which often blurs the con-
trol architecture layers. Many of these protocols are inherently vulnerable by design,
operating without authentication mechanisms [33].
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3.4.3 Review of the Application of IT Security Mechanisms to the
ICS Architectural Model
Having explored the nature of ICS and its differences to IT systems, we now consider
how security may be applied to each of the architectural layers.
Level 5 Protective Measures
Protocols in this layer are usually limited to IP, and as such, traditional IT technologies
such as anti-virus suites, firewalls, deep packet inspection, host and network intrusion
detection system (IDS) and logging and auditing techniques are all valid mechanisms for
deployment within such an environment [3]. However, contemporary malware expects
these tools to be in use, and the corporate network is a common attack surface for
targeting OT.
The adoption of ISO 27001 and 27002 standards [48] provides frameworks in which
to consider access controls in this level of the architecture. The scope of such con-
trols should consider both preventative and detection measures and should include a
full assessment of risk not just in Level 5. It must consider its context within the
wider ICS, cognisant of the corporate network’s potential as a distribution vector for
malware to OT, and should not just focus on perimeter controls [49]. All access to cor-
porate networks should be tightly managed, with any external connectivity, especially
remote access, controlled by Virtual Private Network (VPN) technologies with Internet
edge firewalls and all authentication and authorisation via Access Control Lists (ACL)
maintained by the IT network operations or security teams. Separate authentication
mechanisms and credentials for users of the corporate and OT networks should be used,
and user accounts should not span the domains of IT and OT [3].
Level 4 Protective Measures
Level 4 shares many similarities with Level 5, and in many instances is treated as an
architectural layer that encompasses both, as the two layers are inherently IP-protocol
based. However, whilst Level 5 offers enterprise services and attaches to the Internet,
Level 4 sits on the upper-side of the firewalls proposed in the Purdue Architecture and
requires interactions with the OT [38].
The most prevalent protocol in this layer is Open Platform Communications (OPC)
[47]. OPC is often used to interact with OT to provide data to management information
systems such as Historians [50] and Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) [51], thus
bringing the IT and OT systems closer together. However, whilst OPC is critical to most
of these interactions in many organisations, it is an infrequently monitored protocol, but
a well-known pivot point for attackers [33].
Given the positioning of OPC within a layer of the architecture, these vulnerabili-
ties should be of concern, especially, as intellectual property theft, reconnaissance and
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industrial espionage, economic sabotage, and positioning for possible future exploitation
or attack activity are common threats to ICS [26].
Common IT best practices such as network segmentation and firewalling, regular
security patching, up-to-date antivirus software that runs regularly, security-aware soft-
ware development and acquisition processes are appropriate to this architectural level
[52]. Given the interstitial nature of Level 4, between Level 5 with Internet access,
and Level 3 and with significant OT deployments, it is essential that this layer forms a
bastion of best practice in order to prevent unauthorised access to the control system,
and does not provide an egress route for data from the OT to inappropriate external
entities.
Level 3 Protective Measures
Level 3 represents the highest level of OT within an ICS, and acts as the lower-side
boundary of De-Militarised Zone (DMZ) between itself and Level 4. The use of the IP
protocol, as in the upper layers, does not mean that the behaviour in the OT levels is
the same. However, in recognising the differences in OT from IT, we should not ignore
the vulnerabilities that the adoption of IT technologies bring to the OT domain. To
achieve adequate security at this level it is necessary to model the ‘normal’ operational
behaviour of an ICS in order to identify any deviations. This is often challenging as
there is rarely any real-time monitoring of network data in an ICS. This allows organised
cyber attacks to take place over a prolonged period of time without detection [27].
Much of the research into traffic deviation from known norms relates to intrusion
detection systems, as we expect ICS traffic to differ from traditional IT systems for
three reasons [53]:
1. ICS networks are expected to increase their stability over time
2. Traditional IT systems support a variety of protocols with changing applications
3. ICS traffic is expected to be periodic due to the traffic exchange mechanisms in
use
In consequence, traffic patterns should not be as dependent on human activity as
IT systems are. Once the traffic patterns of an ICS have been established, abnormal
activity can be detected as one of three changes in the frequency domain [54]:
1. New or missing periodic burst frequency
2. Change in periodic burst size
3. Increase in the surrounding traffic noise (protocol handshakes etc.)
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Level 2 Protective Measures
The theme of IDS and traffic analysis in OT continues into Level 2 where the operational
elements of a DCS are typically situated [55]. In such environments it is essential for
asset owners to identify the devices, applications and connections within the domain.
Without this understanding an organisation cannot determine new traffic patterns or
protocol interactions.
One area of research that is appropriate to this architectural layer, however, is
that of log analysis. IDS and other traditional security measures cannot, by them-
selves, detect or mitigate process-related threats [56]. The limitations of signature-
and anomaly-based detection systems do not identify threats that intend to target the
process under control, rather than the control system. These can only be detected by
analysing the data at a higher, semantic level. System logs capture information about
process activity, which depending on the size of the industrial plant can amount to
thousands of records per day, which may be valuable to attack detection. However,
these logs must be adequately protected, as an attacker could potentially manipulate
them by sending false data [57].
Level 1 and Level 0 Protective Measures
The primary threats to control systems in these layers include response injection, com-
mand injection or denial of service [58]. Devices in Levels 1 and 0 produce periodic
traffic patterns using protocols that are insecure by design, and are therefore suscepti-
ble to replay attacks, hijacking, spoofing and manipulation. As the devices in question
have limited processing resources and are inherently proprietary they will remain vul-
nerable until the vendors implement on-board security services, and even then, before
security is improved, ICS operators would still have to accept the risk of upgrading their
infrastructure.
Accepting the current limitations of the devices and protocols, security mechanisms
in Level 1 and 0 lend themselves to procedural security management and configuration
control. Therefore, whilst not specifically designed for ICS, the concepts of Information
Security Management Systems as defined in ISO 27001 [48] offer the procedural basis
for mitigations in these layers.
3.4.4 Analysis
As can be seen, the protection of ICS installations is complicated, with a range of
security issues across every layer of the architecture. However, whilst the problem can
be scoped and defined within an abstract concept such as a reference architecture, the
reality of many ICS is that they do not follow such rigorous design demarcations, with
systems and protocols crossing intangible layers at will. In recognition of this reality,
we shall now consider if, where and how IT security mechanisms can be applied to ICS,
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cognisant of such real-world constraints.
As discussed, ICS face the same attack vectors as IT systems. Connectivity to
the Internet allows reconnaissance activity around an ICS as well as an opportunity for
malware delivery. Spear phishing is as much of a threat to ICS as it is to networks
that incorporate IT [59]. Similarly, controls within a corporate network, or lack thereof,
provide an environment in which malware can propagate and extend its reach within
an organisation. However the range of attack vectors grows within an ICS as vendor
engineers access control equipment either remotely or locally, with little control over
the security of their devices or network connectivity [3].
In all of these scenarios, traditional IT security mechanisms are both appropriate
and effective means to defend the boundaries of an organisation. Firewall architectures,
email scanning, Deep Packet Inspection (DPI), VPN, Host-based IDS (HIDS), Network-
based IDS (NIDS) are all established ways by which an organisation can reduce the
opportunities for the ingress of malicious software into their environments [3]. As a
complementary measure, the practice of locking-down unused ports, USB devices, use
of access controls through corporate directories and the enforcement of least-privilege
access, all reduce the insider threat attack surface [60].
From this it is clear to see the advantages of properly implemented IT security con-
trols within the corporate and IP-enabled areas of the business, generally encompassed
within Levels 5 and 4 of the reference architecture. However, the penetration of IP into
the OT levels is common and not limited by doctrine [61]. OPC, in particular, spans the
ICS enterprise both horizontally as well as vertically [45]. Its use of IT technologies such
as IP, Distributed Common Object Model (DCOM) and Remote Procedure Calls (RPC)
[62, 63], offer the opportunity to exploit proven IT security technologies to protect its
use, but only if deployed using an understanding of the context of its implementation.
Without limiting access to the systems using the protocol, and increasing the security of
the underpinning technologies, any monitoring system, HIDS or NIDS, will be of limited
effect [64, 65, 66, 5, 67, 68, 6]. As OPC and other IP-enabled technologies reach to the
domain of OT, and therefore extend the reach of malware delivery, it becomes essential
for the IP elements to be seen as an opportunity to harden the perimeter security for
non-IP-enabled control devices further within the architectural layers [32, 69].
Once within OT it is necessary to acknowledge its inherent limitations from a
security perspective, at least when discussing legacy devices. The design focus of re-
liability and availability using proprietary technologies and protocols, with little or no
accompanying security capabilities, requires a pragmatic approach to their defence [3].
The hardening of the IP-enabled layers of the architecture will be of limited impact
unless these lower layers have some means by which they can contribute to an overall
defence-in-depth model. Traditional IT security mechanisms are generally not deploy-
able within OT, as the proprietary nature of the equipment also brings proprietary
warranty requirements which often preclude the addition of HIDS to any servers, for
instance. This requirement for pragmatism accepts that patching opportunities are
limited, and that these devices are insecure by design [33]. If authentication is not
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feasible within the devices then mechanisms to create whitelists of trusted connections
should be considered. Where protocols can be monitored without adversely impacting
the latency of the traffic, then passive tools and techniques can be considered. However,
these will only be effective if the patterns of normal behaviour of traffic are modelled,
as without these any deviations from the norm cannot be determined. Similarly, this
overall analysis must include the industrial processes under control, as any traffic must
be consistent with the proper functioning of the plant or utility. For instance, the overall
traffic behaviours of a SCADA system will differ significantly from those of a DCS.
Logging has a crucial part to play in monitoring OT [57, 70, 58]. Whilst the re-
sources within the devices often limit the maximum log size and can be overwritten as
a consequence, the status updates from a device can be amended and either routed di-
rectly, or indirectly, to a central log that can maintain an overall record of the behaviour
of the device. This allows for normal behaviour to be modelled, alerts to be generated
for deviations from this behaviour, and provides a forensic analysis dataset.
Although these mechanisms provide a sound basis for defending the OT of an
ICS, technology alone will not deliver the required results. It is necessary to define
and enforce a set of risk, security, configuration and asset management procedures in
order to ensure the operational activities of the plant or facility cannot be disrupted.
In this respect many of the established and mature IT security standards that exist
offer a basis for defining such procedures. The standards can describe the guidelines for
what needs to happen in a defence-in-depth model, whereas the pragmatic approaches
to IT and OT described above provide the limits and constraints of how these can be
achieved. It is important that any policies that derive from this approach span both
IT and OT, using expertise from each domain to take a holistic approach to security,
modelling the people, processes and technology from end-to-end. Supporting this should
be a rigorous approach to enterprise architecture, ensuring that every element of the
business is modelled, and forming the basis for overall asset and change control.
In order for an enterprise architecture to be properly defined, the assets managed
by the business must be identified. Historically this has proven to be a difficult task,
especially for geographically-dispersed SCADA systems with many thousands of field
devices [71]. Device scanning can expose the operation to unwarranted risk as it is com-
mon for devices to crash when having to deal with Internet Control Message Protocol
(ICMP) traffic, for example [71]. A full audit of all devices must be undertaken when
assessing an ICS’s security, as must the physical protection of those devices if deployed
outside of the organisation’s main operating facilities [3]. Once identified, some means
of capturing the current configuration of each device must be achieved, and procedures
implemented that prevent uncontrolled change. If, as in the case of some devices, backup
mechanisms are not an option, this capture of current configurations may be as simple
as recording a PLC configuration, including its Relay Ladder Logic (RLL), and plac-
ing it within a configuration management system. In the event of a security incident,
where a PLC or similar device is suspected of being compromised, it can be swapped
out for a new device with the original configuration deployed whilst the original device
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is analysed.
This configuration management should also encompass patch management of de-
vices. It has been seen in this analysis that patching presents a significant issue to
ICS operators as the risk of change and potential to invalidate warranties deters many
organisations from doing so. However, forward planning allows for testing ahead of de-
ployment, discussions and agreements with vendors about the impact of patching, and
contingency options such as rollback in the event of an issue.
A structure to approach the issues involved with ICS security are included in the
ISA/IEC 62443 series of standards [72]. These define procedures for implementing se-
cure ICS, providing guidance to asset owners, systems integrators, and equipment man-
ufacturers. The document set was originally proposed by the International Society for
Automation (ISA) as ISA 99, but was renamed to align to International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC) standards. The standards are organised into four categories:
1. General: Provides the foundational concepts, models and lexicon to describe ICS,
along with a set of security metrics and lifecycle.
2. Policies and Procedures: Addresses the aspects of implementing and maintain-
ing an effective ICS security programme within an ICS operator.
3. System: Describes the requirements and design guidance for the integration of
ICS into a secure architecture.
4. Component: Proposes the technical requirements of individual ICS components
for vendors to incorporate into their products.
IEC 62443 [72] provides a solid baseline for security, but requires the adoption of
contemporary ICS components, or a significant re-working of existing ICS architectures
to achieve its goals. This is likely to require significant financial investment as well as
exposing an ICS operation to risks involved with change.
The UK Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) ICS Good
Practice Guide (2011) [73] takes US DHS best practice for ICS cyber security assess-
ments and proposes this for adoption in the UK. In particular, it focuses on penetration
testing and the processes for remediating identified vulnerabilities. Whilst it highlights
the risks of such testing in ICS, it provides little advice for their mitigation.
3.4.5 Conclusions
IT security mechanisms offer the potential to increase the protection of an ICS if de-
ployed according to best practice into those areas of the architecture that support such
mechanisms. However, the deployment of these tools will not deliver the protection
necessary to an ICS unless they are supported by end-to-end processes and procedures,
along with measures deployed into the OT that are complementary to the IT mech-
anisms. IEC 62443 proposes a set of bast practices surrounding this, but requires
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substantial change to architectures to achieve its aims. The CPNI ICS Good Practice
Guide recommends penetration testing as a means to assess security, but does not pro-
vide sufficient means to assure the ICS operation is not exposed to unnecessary risks as
a result. In light of this landscape, ICS operators require a means by which they can
express the risks they face to their continued operations in light of antagonistic cyber
activities.
3.5 Measuring Risk
The term risk is often used when discussing the potential impact of a cyber attack on
an ICS, yet risk may have many alternative meanings when taken in different contexts,
such as business, national economics, or plant safety. In order to support rational
decision-making to protect ICS from cyber attack it is necessary to develop a common
vocabulary and definition of risk.
Risk is not uncertainty, nor is it a hazard. Rather, risk is a function of uncertainty
and consequences, Risk = f(Uncertainty, Consequences), and a hazard is a source of
danger and exists as a source of risk. Risk to an ICS therefore includes the likelihood of
converting a source of risk into damage, loss or injury. In order to mitigate the occur-
rence of a source of risk in an ICS, the hazard, one applies safeguards. Consequently,
Risk = Hazards/Safeguards, but highlights that whilst we might reduce the risk through
safeguards, we can never bring it to zero [74].
Expected Utility theory [75] also quantifies risk in terms of likelihood and loss:
R=Pr(c)C, where C is the consequence in terms of negative impact to an ICS, and Pr(c)
is the probability of a loss equal to C. When n independent events are possible, the risk
is the sum of all expected values: Pr(c1)C1+Pr(c2)C2+...Pr(cn)Cn. The consequences
to an ICS can be measured in terms of lost revenue, productivity downtime, injuries
and fatalities etc., but always in the same value as the risk itself [76], which requires
a risk analysis to consider what the key measures are out the outset. However, when
considering the probability and impact of loss as a quantitative measure, one should
avoid describing risk as “probability times consequence”. This definition is misleading, as
in the case of a single scenario this equation would equate a high-impact low-frequency
(HILF) scenario to a low-impact high-frequency (LIHF) scenario, which in the case of
an ICS are clearly dissimilar and require differing mitigation strategies [74].
Another term often used in the context of ICS risk is ‘vulnerability’. Conceptu-
ally, a vulnerability is a risk conditional on an event. Expressing an event as A, then
Vulnerability |A = Consequences + Uncertainty |occurrence of A [77].
As we have seen, the two main factors of risk are the consequences C and the
probability of C, Pr(c). The probability of C can also be expressed as the measure
of uncertainty Q. If we define a set of consequences of interest C’, we can express a
general description of risk as Risk description = (C’, Q, K) or alternatively (A’, C’, Q,
K) where K is the background knowledge upon which Q and C’ are based, including
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expert opinion, models, assumptions, datasets etc., and A’ is the set of possible events.
Consequently, a vulnerability to a given event can be expressed as: Vulnerability = (C’,
Q, K |A). These definitions, however, are based upon the accuracy and coherence of
the background knowledge K, on which the risk description is based [77].
Fenton and Neil (2012) [78] highlight the impact of K on risk assessment by de-
scribing the probability of an event as P(A|K), demonstrating that at least some degree
of subjective judgement is incorporated into an assessment, and that it is an expression
of a degree of belief rather than an absolute value.
Cyber attacks on ICS are, to date, HILF events that lack validated datasets for
analysis. This situation is similar to that faced by those responsible for quantifying the
likelihood and impact of terrorist attacks, and as such it is worthwhile considering how
such events are considered in terms of national security. Lewis (2014) [76] articulates
threats in the context of risk as Threat=Intent x Capability, where intent is the propen-
sity of an adversary to attack, and capability is a measure of an adversary’s ability
to launch a successful attack. The US National Research Council (NRC) [79], using
models based on the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) risk practices, also
incorporates threat, but uses a wider definition not limited to antagonistic actions, and
cannot be considered equivalent to Lewis’ description. The NRC model incorporates T,
vulnerabilities V, and capabilities C, as Risk=TVC. However, in a critical analysis of
this approach in light of terrorist attacks, the NRC highlight that defining the values of
T, V, and C poses a significant challenge as there is little validated data available and
poor reliable knowledge of adversary behaviours. This data fits the Zio et al. (2013)
[77] description of K. In this context the situation is similar to that of ICS. The NRC
analysis highlights that an intelligent adversary who may seek to actively defeat defen-
sive measures, causes T, V, and C to become interdependent, and as a consequence,
risk becomes a factor of T, V, and C, therefore Risk=f(T,V,C) [79], but does not include
any specific measure of antagonistic intent.
The level of uncertainty regarding both terrorist and cyber attacks requires us to
consider what US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, in 2002 described as “un-
known unknowns”[80], and how we might reduce this uncertainty. Kaplan and Garrick
(1981) [74] proposed that a risk could be described by answering three questions:
1. What can happen? (i.e., what can go wrong?)
2. How likely is it that it will happen?
3. If it does happen, what are the consequences?
In order to answer these questions it is necessary to consider a set of outcomes or scenar-
ios, which can be expressed as a triplet {si, pi, xi} where si is the scenario description,
pi is the probability of the scenario occurring, and xi is the measure of the consequences.
A table of such risk triplets would describe the overall risk: R={si, pi, xi} i=1, 2...N.
However, this approach is limited by the finite set of scenarios described in the triplet.
The actual list of scenarios is infinite, and as a result, any assessment made in this
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manner is based on incomplete data, as the model does not account for the scenarios
not included in the analysis. A method for addressing this is to account for all of the
scenarios not considered in the category sn+1. The resulting risk analysis is now the
set of triplets: R={si, pi, xi} i=1, 2...N+1, which includes all of the scenarios defined,
and provides an allowance for those not included. Whilst this might at first appear to
be a contrived logical construct, it allows us to consider what probability we should
assign to the residual category sn+1. This allows us to contemplate the problem within
a rational framework, and in particular, what elements of K are relevant, and what
evidence exists for the scenarios of type sn+1 that, by definition, have not occurred
yet but exist within the definition of A’. Ostrom and Wilhelmsen (2012) [81] list nine
criteria for consequences to be considered in context of what could be viewed as sn+1
scenarios, in order to assess their credibility. They conclude that one should “never
dismiss a consequence until it is proven not to be credible.”
These methods of describing risk are dependent upon qualified data or expert
opinion K, a known set of events A’, an accurate quantification of probability (Q, Pi),
and an ability to reduce the number of scenarios of type sn+1.
We shall now explore the viability of quantifying these variables in the context of
cyber attacks on ICS as a valid means of articulating risk.
3.5.1 Risk Techniques
The techniques discussed in this chapter result from a systematic review of decision sci-
ence, ICS safety and counter-terrorism research, resulting in a subjective, non-exhaustive
set of risk approaches based on the literature identified.
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), also referred to as probabilistic safety assessment
(PSA) and quantitative risk assessment (QRA) [82] is a scenario-based analysis method-
ology that systemises the knowledge and uncertainties about a system by answering the
Kaplan and Garrick (1981) [74] three risk questions relating to what can go wrong,
how likely is it, and what are the consequences? [82, 77]. The process identifies a set
of undesirable end states, then for each state it defines a set of initiating events that
describe disturbances to normal operation that can lead to the condition. Scenarios
are then generated based upon sequences of events that start with an initiating event
and conclude in an undesirable end state, allowing the evaluation of the probabilities of
these scenarios using all available evidence, past experience, and expert judgement. The
scenarios are then ranked according to their contribution to the frequencies of the end
states, as well as the systems, structures and components that also contribute [82, 81].
PRA is typically employed for accident analyses in systems that are highly reliable and
for which significant reliability data is available [83], whereas we are considering wilful,
malicious cyber attacks. The techniques do not preclude such an assessment, and the
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steps involved would accommodate the consideration of an attack against cyber-physical
systems such as ICS. The methodology allows for differing probabilistic methods to be
employed during the analysis, including Bayesian networks, Monte Carlo simulations
etc. [82, 77], in order to generate the probabilities of the scenarios. By itself, therefore,
PRA does not provide a means to mitigate the lack of available and verified ICS threat
data, previously described as K. As a scenario-based approach neither does it address
those threats defined by the type sn+1.
Bayesian Networks (BN)
Bayesian networks (BN) are based on the theory that belief is conditional and depends
on mounting evidence that either contributes to a belief or refutes it. BN describes a
belief system in terms of conditional probabilities, containing propositions that are either
true, partially true, or false [76, 84]. The subjectivity that BN supports allows us to
consider the probability of an attack without a frequentist approach to representative
data. Using BNs we start with a hypothesis H and describe a prior belief about H
expressed as P(H). Using observed evidence E we can revise our belief about H in light
of E and calculate a posterior belief about H by calculating P(H|E) in terms of P(E|H)
[78].
BN are flexible risk analysis tools as they allow the degree of belief in a hypothesis,
or a series of hypotheses, to evolve as new evidence emerges and allow greater detail to be
derived over time. As such, BN offer the potential to reduce K, and allow for additional
attack scenarios to be added to the model, thereby reducing sn+1. However, given the
lack of immediately available data regarding cyber attacks on ICS, consideration should
be given to how data for BN analysis will be obtained.
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a method primarily aimed at system safety and reliability,
although as a technique used within ICS communities it may offer a valuable insight
into the likelihood and impact of maliciously-caused equipment failure. It is a deductive
analysis technique focusing on one error at a time, intended to ensure that all aspects
of a system are identified and controlled in order to determine design aspects that
could lead to potential failures [85]. The events are generally considered as Boolean
representations, insomuch as they either will or will not occur [86]. FTA is often used
as an element of PRA, but can be used independently. Fault trees are a graphical
representation of the interaction of failures and other events in a system. The process
begins by supposing that a particular failure occurs, then uses deductive logic to step
through a system, considering the possible direct causes that could contribute to the
condition, forming a graphical tree-like structure as the analysis progresses [81]. Once
a fault tree has been developed, data regarding the failure rate for individual system
components can be analysed either in series or parallel, through the application of logic
gates, to estimate the likelihood of the failure event (referred to as the top event). The
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process drives the production of cut sets - the smallest number of system components
that, if they all fail, will lead to an overall system failure, then assesses the probability
of such failure [86].
According to Sutton (2014) [87], the quality of the failure rate data on which the
method is based are often unreliable, and subjective measures often substituted. These
measures are still considered of value as the method allows experts to contribute based
on their experiences in a structured manner, and enables subsequent deeper analysis
of areas where the data is deemed inconclusive. The approach has a reputation for
being resource-intensive, requiring significant expertise in the system under analysis. Its
resource requirements aside, FTA’s major advantage is that fault trees can accommodate
complex logical relationships and interdependencies between system components. It is
less dependent on human thought extrapolation to recognise the effects of changes in
system behaviours [86].
For the purposes of assessing the risk of cyber attack on ICS, the approach has
some merit. By starting at a system failure, in our case a maliciously-caused failure,
we can trace back through the components of an ICS, both OT and IT, to determine
scenarios under which the events could occur. By focussing on system components
and the chaining of events and connectivity to adversely affect them, as long as every
system component is considered, it is likely that the set sn+1 will be reduced, although
the method has no formal mechanism for measuring this. However, the approach is
still reliant on expert opinion and qualified data, as expressed in set K. Fundamentally,
the method is focused on predicting equipment failures rather than the behaviours of
malicious actors. It offers no means of determining threat actor capability or target
preferences, although it can contribute to a wider threat analysis process.
Event Tree Analysis (ETA)
Event tree analysis (ETA) uses the same mathematical and logical techniques as FTA,
but considers the impact of a failure of a particular component through inductive rea-
soning. Like FTA, ETA can also be used within other risk analysis techniques such as
PRA. Event trees model a sequence of outcomes which may arise after a particular initi-
ating event, focusing on paths or scenarios that lead to failure. As such, ETA considers
the three questions posed by Kaplan and Garrick (1981) [74] that form their risk triplet.
Following each event, ETA considers the occurrence or non-occurrence of all other pos-
sible events, with probabilities calculated conditionally on all previous outcomes in the
tree. The approach assumes that each event only has two outcomes; success or failure,
although separate event trees can be developed for each initiating event [86, 81, 87].
ETA allows analysts to consider one path or scenario at a time, and offers some use
when assessing the potential causes of an undesirable effect as it propagates through an
ICS. This may facilitate the identification of unexpected system conditions. Like FTA,
however, the approach is still reliant on expert opinion and qualified data K, and the
subjective set of initiating events does not reliably reduce sn+1.
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Bow-tie Analysis
The Bow-Tie analysis method combines FTA with ETA by considering an undesirable
event, then analysing deductively to the left using FTA, considering what could lead
to the event, then analysing inductively to the right using ETA to consider the conse-
quences of the event [87]. Whilst the approach does not address the shortcomings in
respect of K, it may generate scenarios previously not considered, and as a result may
possibly reduce the set sn+1.
Attack Trees
Attack trees [88] consider the paths by which an antagonist would attempt to reach
a particular target in a network, described as a root, with leaf nodes articulating the
chain of attack surfaces by which the attacker could reach that target. As such, attack
trees provide a similar analytic construct to FTA, ETA and Bow-tie analysis, and suffers
from the same limitations in respect of K [86]. However, whilst FTA, ETA and Bow-
tie approaches are primarily focused on failure scenarios, attack trees concentrate on
malicious attempts to manipulate a system, so the combination of these methods may
broaden the attack scenarios under consideration and potentially reduce the set sn+1.
Monte Carlo Simulations
When assessing the potential for an attack on ICS, so far we have only considered those
scenarios that we consider realistic. However, this bias does not address the set sn+1.
One option to attempt to reduce the set of unconsidered attack targets, and thereby re-
duce sn+1, is to adopt a stochastic model that includes every element within the system.
Monte Carlo analyses reflect the randomness of life, even in deterministic systems, by
assigning each system element an initial operating condition and a probability of failure.
A time sequence starts based on a given interval and a random number is generated
for each element within the system. If the random number falls within a defined failure
range, the system element transitions to a failed state. At the end of each iteration,
the cut sets are analysed to determine the system’s operability and availability and the
results aggregated to produce an overall model of the system [87].
Monte Carlo simulations are resource-intensive and require long run times in or-
der to achieve stable results. By itself it cannot determine the impact of a targeted
cyber attack, but the technique offers a useful model as it considers all elements within
a system in a random manner, possibly introducing failure conditions not previously
considered, thereby reducing sn+1. However, the assigned probability of failure requires
expert knowledge, and as such forms part of set K. Monte Carlo simulations alone will
not immediately address the qualitative improvement of K, but there is potential for
using Monte Carlo simulations to feed BN analyses.
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Markov Models
Another method to perform stochastic analysis is based on Markov models. These
represent all of the possible states of elements within an ICS, against which it performs
a series of transitions based on a defined time interval, or step in a batch process [87].
Each transition results in a system element either remaining in its current state, or
moving to a new one. As such, the probability of transition from one state into another
is dependent only on the current state, and not on the history of states that preceded
it. This property is usually referred to as the Markov property. Where the future state
of the system element is dependent upon both the current state and the immediate
past state, it is referred to as a second-order Markov process, and so-on for further
higher-order Markov processes [89].
The immediate transition between states may not accurately represent real-world
considerations for ICS, where states are not binary and can introduce an indeterminate
condition as large electromechanical devices execute instructions. That aside, Markov
models offer similar benefits to Monte Carlo simulations, as assuming they model the
complete system, may introduce failure scenarios to reduce the set sn+1, and perhaps
could be used in conjunction with BN analyses.
Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is an experience-based hazards analy-
sis approach based on expert opinion and engineering standards. The accumulated
knowledge allows hazards to be considered in light of experiential data and evaluated
against Recognised and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practice (RAGAGEP).
The method examines the ways in which equipment can fail and considers the con-
sequences of such failures. Device criticality can also be analysed, in which case the
method is described as Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA). Im-
portantly, FMEA/FMECA does not consider the causes of the failure, just the impact
of its occurrence. Neither is it concerned with the sequence of events that led to the
failure, or the actors or circumstances involved [87].
By focussing solely on failure modes and the resulting effects, without considering
the path that led to the event, FMEA and FMECA allows scenarios to be considered
based purely on impact. By itself the process will not address the quantification of risk
of cyber attacks within an ICS, but as it is a commonly produced engineering artefact
that many ICS facilities will already possess, it offers a means to qualitatively check
the background data and expert opinion, K, used to inform the assessment process. By
not limiting the impact of failure to potential cyber access routes, we may limit the set
sn+1. FMEA/FMECA should be considered in conjunction with FTA.
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Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Method
The Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) method is probably the most widely used haz-
ards analysis method in industry. Its widespread use and acceptance has led to a large
number of practitioners and supporting service providers. The method divides the sys-
tem under analysis into nodes, each of which represent a section of the process that
undergoes a significant change or transformation. Examples of nodes include pumps,
reactors, heat exchangers etc. The information is generally extracted from plant piping
and instrumentation diagrams (P&ID). The size of the node is a subjective decision
based on the nature of the industrial process and may group devices or system elements
together in order to consider an overall process change holistically [87].
A HAZOP analysis follows a consistent process whereby a system node is selected
and its purpose and safe limits defined. Next, one of a set of process guidewords are
selected, such as high flow, low/no flow, reverse flow, misdirected flow, high pressure,
high temperature, polymerisation, wrong composition etc., that describe the effect that
should be considered, and hazards and their causes are identified as a result. For each
hazard, the process considers it will be recognised should it occur and an estimation of
the consequences is reached. A set of safeguard requirements are then defined, as is the
estimated frequency of the hazard’s occurrence. Finally, the hazards are ranked and a
set of findings and recommendations is produced.
HAZOP analyses drive a rigorous assessment of the impact of undesirable events
on a process, decomposing to a detailed level. Conformance to established processes
and guidewords should provide a comprehensive set of potential areas of risk. Whilst
it may not be commonplace to consider these impacts from the perspective of cyber
attacks, a HAZOP should identify areas where change to the process will result in
adverse outcomes. The breadth of the process should reduce the size of the set sn+1
and by adhering to RAGAGEP, confidence in set K is arguably increased.
CARVER and MSHARPP
When considering the threat to an ICS, methods exist within the military community to
describe an intelligent adversary’s intent and capability. The US Department of Defense
(DoD) use the CARVER assessment method to determine criticality and vulnerability
in infrastructures. CARVER is an acronym for Criticality, Accessibility, Recuperability
(a system’s ability to recover from an attack), Vulnerability, Effect and Recognisabil-
ity. The method focuses on an adversary’s perspective of the infrastructure to enable
an analysis of the weaknesses of a target, or the means by which its operations can
be manipulated by an attacker [90]. In this manner, the capabilities of several threat
actors can be considered. The output of the CARVER assessment is a critical asset list
that defines a prioritised set of assets that are of value to an attacker based on their
importance, whereby the asset’s incapacitation or destruction would have a serious im-
pact on the military operation or facility. The use of CARVER matrices to consider
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threats to critical national infrastructure by civilian agencies when preparing for terror-
ist attacks is emerging, as it allows organisations to consider the relative desirability of
targets, although its use has been limited to the assessment of physical assets [91]. An-
other approach, encompassed in the acronym MSHARPP, describes the attractiveness
of a target due to its importance to an operation (the Mission), the perception that a
successful attack with generate (the Symbolism), the History of similar attacks, system
Accessibility, Recognisability of target, impact on the local Population, and Proximity to
other key assets. Like the CARVER approach, a matrix is derived using a numeric range
that represents the perceived vulnerability or likelihood of attack, from the perspective
of the defender. The respective numerical values are totalled to provide a relative value
as a target or the overall assessment of attractiveness to an attacker, and thereby a
prioritised list of assets to defend [90].
Game Theory
Studies of antagonistic attacks can be conducted using game situations rather than de-
cision models [92]. Game theory techniques involving sequential multi-player scenarios
such as Stackelberg Competitions allow players to decide upon actions that result in
the best possible rewards to themselves whilst anticipating the rational actions of the
other participants. The outcome of the game defines the optimal allocation of resources
and investment to minimise risk on the part of the defender and maximise risk for the
attacker [76, 93, 94]. In an evaluation of physical attacks against electric power net-
works using game theory, Holmgren et al. (2007) [92] illustrated the effectiveness of the
technique, but highlighted the need for a greater understanding of the attacker’s intent.
It is possible that the use of CARVER or MSHARPP may address this issue in some
way, as the attractiveness of a target may be used as a surrogate for intent. Holmgren
et al. (2007) [92] also acknowledged a wider issue; that the results of game theoretic
approaches depend upon how the scenario is framed, suggesting that it is dependent
upon the set K and that sn+1 is not necessarily reduced by its use.
3.5.2 Deep Uncertainty
If the techniques discussed thus far do not provide sufficient means to address K and
sn+1, we are faced with the area of decision science referred to as deep uncertainty. Cox
(2015) [95] describes three methods of combining models and datasets in order to reduce
the levels of uncertainty:
1. Using Multiple Models and Relevant Data to Improve Decisions
2. Robust Decisions with Model Ensembles
3. Averaging Forecasts
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Using Multiple Models and Relevant Data to Improve Decisions
When no validated data set is available, a good decision is one that assesses clearly higher
and lower probabilities of undesired outcomes based on a combination of existing models
that are consistent with available, albeit not directly relevant data. This combination
of alternative models is described as the uncertainty set.
Robust Decisions with Model Ensembles
Cox (2015) [95] proposes that when faced with decision-making decisions with deep
uncertainty, a technique that can be employed is to generate and analyse a large number
of scenarios. Of these, a set that performs well by some criterion for most scenarios is
more likely to also do well in reality, if reality is well-described by at least some of the
scenarios in the uncertainty set.
Averaging Forecasts
Simple arithmetic averaging of results from different methods is reported to usually
outperform an average of any single method, and by averaging across models one can
reduce the error between forecast and subsequently measured true values [95].
3.5.3 Eliciting Expert Opinion
If no valid data is available to inform set K then Ezell et al. (2010) [96] recommend that
the probabilities of different attacker options should be elicited from experts. However,
expert opinion is not necessarily a viable replacement, and care should be taken with
the validity of such judgement. In particular, Wallsten and Budescu (1983) [97] ask
whether the probabilities elicited provide a valid measurement related to the frequency
of the events? Merrick et al. (2015) [98] propose that calibration is one measure of
validity. When an expert assesses the probability P, on what basis is the judgement
that proposes that the event occurs P% of the time? Those who will act on the expert
advice would assume that P should be close to the observed frequency of the event, Pˆ.
However, P is simply a measure of the expert’s degree of belief [99], and in the case of
cyber attacks on ICS, no data is available to adequately describe Pˆ.
Merrick et al. (2015) [98] observe that a calibration curve formed by probability
judgements is usually more extreme than the relative frequency of events, and as such,
expert opinion may have a bias toward a negative perspective. Wallsten and Budescu
(1983) [97] point out that when faced with judgements based on complex events, it
is natural for humans to simplify the task by using heuristics, which also introduce
biases into analyses. According to Hora (2007) [100] the quality of judgements is based
on the background information used for the assessment, usually derived from their
experience, and is reliant on the expert’s ability to fuse this with other data sources.
Merrick et al. (2015) [98] discusses three heuristic techniques: representativeness in
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which the probability is based on the similarity to other observed events, availability
where humans overestimate the frequency of an event due to excessive media reporting,
and anchoring, where humans adopt a starting position then adjust away from that in
order to produce a probability. None of these methods serve to improve the accuracy of
the expert opinion in order to inform the set K. However, Ravinder et al. (1988) [101]
and Howard (1989) [102] demonstrate that decomposing complex scenarios into discrete
events improves the overall calibration and reliability of probability judgements when
eliciting expert opinion, and in this manner we may minimise the biases and errors
introduced.
3.5.4 Analysis
PRA remains the de facto standard for risk assessment in large-scale critical facilities and
provides an analysis framework that incorporates safety data and probabilistic methods
such as BN and Monte Carlo simulations [76]. For the immediate future there does not
appear to be a proven, viable alternative. Its strength lies in its scenario-based approach,
which from the perspective of ICS cyber threats allows malicious activity across the
electromagnetic spectrum to be included in the overall risk analysis. However, as ICS
cyber attacks remain low-frequency events, details of what an ICS attack scenarios may
look like are in short supply and as a consequence our ability to reduce the set sn+1
remains limited. PRA also requires expert opinion, which given the lack of quantifiable
data on ICS cyber attacks leaves the background information K open to the biases
previously described. As such, any PRA analyses undertaken using expert opinion
should require that any attack scenarios comprise a set of discrete events that aggregate
to form a potentially complex attack, rather than attempting to consider the incident
as a whole. Sommestad and Ekstedt (2009) [103] have demonstrated some success in
combining attack trees with Bayesian methods and expert assessment, but their analysis
did not include the industrial processes under control or their safety characteristics, and
as such does not address the holistic impact of a cyber attack on an ICS.
Red teaming and game theoretic approaches offer possible improvements on the use
of expert opinions, but their efficacy is currently limited by the cross-discipline team
of IT and OT staff, and a lack of common vocabulary and understanding, especially
when industrial engineering is also introduced. In order to address this issue it will be
necessary to describe the industrial processes and technologies using a language and
framework understood by all disciplines. Without such an analysis model it is unlikely
that a robust risk assessment could be produced.
Ultimately, however, the current options for assessing ICS cyber risk are limited
by the available data, and accordingly we should consider how such a dataset can be
produced.
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3.5.5 Options for Developing a Qualified Cyber Attack Dataset
Risk analysis is an established discipline, but for quantitative methods to work satisfac-
torily they require a validated dataset. The limited qualified reports of cyber attacks on
ICS do not satisfy this requirement, and as a consequence, risk analyses on ICS are cur-
rently dependent on subjective judgements and cannot adequately consider the breadth
of attack vectors. The US DoD advisory group, JASON, argues that predictive models
for rare events are unreliable [104], and like Ravinder et al. (1988) [101] and Howard
(1989) [102], recommend decomposing the rare events into smaller, well-bounded prob-
lems that can be tested. The Idaho National Laboratory [105] suspended research into
quantitative analysis into this field, in favour of subjective approaches more in line with
the criteria found in the CARVER and MSHARPP models. Whilst data exists to define
the risks of equipment failure in an ICS, the predicted rates of these events are based
on deterioration rather than intentional direction. It would also need to be proven that
safety cases have a direct relationship with security cases before using this data as the
sole basis for cyber attack risk analysis.
Background Information
Central to the issue of providing qualified risk analyses of cyber attacks on ICS is the lack
of available data, which we have referred to as the set K. Without validated background,
those responsible for identifying vulnerable elements cannot elevate the investment pri-
ority in this area against other, more clearly perceived risks to the business, such as
failure to meet regulatory targets, service outages through ageing equipment, and expo-
sure to financial markets. As such, an essential first stage of improving the quality of K
is to provide a means to portray the impact of HILF events in a manner recognisable to
senior stakeholders. At a more detailed level, however, malicious behaviour data needs
to be shared in order to allow ICS operators to gain a greater understanding of events
that are indicative of potential or actual attacks. Threat intelligence sharing offers a
key benefit to the whole ICS community as it allows a richer view of areas for protective
analysis within an industrial operation. Bayesian networks are potentially of value in
this analysis, as models for K could be constructed, tested and revised over time using
threat intelligence data, thereby improving the quality of background information on
which decisions are based.
Attack Vectors
The lack of available data also limits our understanding of attacker options and targets,
resulting in the possibility that the set of unconsidered scenarios that we have referred to
as sn+1 is unfavourable. Decomposing the scenarios into smaller, manageable analyses
offers clear benefits, but we are still largely reliant on expert opinion to define the
scenarios to begin with. Introducing Monte Carlo and Markov simulations to test all
possible failure modes may add a degree of objective data to the analysis to challenge
36
A. Cook 3.5. MEASURING RISK
any cognitive biases introduced during the scenario construction. The wealth of safety
information available, from HAZOP, FEMA, FTA and ETA, is potentially a sound basis
from which to start these analyses, and would allow the consideration of the relationship
between safety and security cases.
Intelligent Adversaries
Models developed for risk analyses cannot be static. Cyber attacks are conducted
by intelligent adversaries who will change their approaches dependent on the security
mechanisms deployed. Threat intelligence, Bayesian networks and game theoretic ap-
proaches will allow general attack behaviour to be modelled, not the specifics of an
attack against a particular facility. In considering intelligent adversaries in the context
of terrorist events, the NRC [79] recommend the introduction of Red Teams to probe
the defences of an organisation. This may prove problematic in an ICS, as they may not
be resilient to potentially destructive testing [3], and so some form of non-destructive
testing is required. This does not, however, preclude red teaming as a viable concept
should a safe, representative environment be made available for such activities. Sommes-
tad and Hallberg (2012) [106] demonstrated how cyber security exercises, conducted on
dedicated infrastructure, can generate valuable data for security research.
Non-destructive Testing Through Simulation
Many industrial facilities utilise simulation tools to model and predict the operations of
the processes under control within an ICS. This forms an essential part of the operations
of the facility, based on the steady-state behaviour of the process. These models could
be revised to allow boundary conditions to be introduced to predict where potential
negative outcomes can be generated [107]. The ICS elements responsible for controlling
the boundary conditions could then be considered as a discrete, testable scenario. This
could be used to develop synthetic environments, testbeds, or cyber ranges on which
representative architectures could be deployed using a mix of virtualised environments
and non-production physical devices. Attack scenarios by intelligent adversaries could
then be exercised and the results fed into background information models. In order to
support this, it would be necessary to produce an architectural model of the ICS that
supports the description of attack hypotheses and vulnerabilities, including security
events, state transitions, dependencies, and means to describe differing consequences in
various measures (financial, production loss etc.).
3.5.6 Conclusions
Quantitative risk analysis does not provide the sole means of addressing the problem,
and pragmatically, one may be forced to adopt a method best suited to the available
data, or by the combination of partially-suited models, until a suitable critical mass of
information can be derived.
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Raising awareness of a threat is an acknowledged risk safeguard, as it is argued that
through knowing that there is the possibility of a hazard, in this case a cyber attack, it
poses less risk than if we have no understanding of its potential impact [74]. Experts
within the ICS field bring domain knowledge to bear to raise awareness, but it has
been observed through experimentation that a calibration curve formed by subjective
probability judgements is usually more extreme than the relative frequency of events
[98]. This limits the credibility of the information provided by such experts, especially
in light of the low frequency of recorded antagonistic events. If senior executives within
ICS operators do not believe they are potential targets for malicious actors, they will
not prioritise cyber defences above competing requirements for investment budgets.
Similarly, if managers and technologists do not understand which elements are likely
targets for antagonists, they cannot prepare their defensive posture.
In light of this, we shall now review whether security education methods can provide
the basis for raising awareness of cyber threats.
3.6 Cyber Security Education
The majority of educational programmes within the cyber security domain have been
awareness campaigns [108]. These typically use lectures or presentations to articulate
the issues surrounding advanced actors to a wide audience, with little tailoring to specific
audiences. Results using this approach are mixed, with learning methods often designed
from the perspective of the presenter, focused on delivering as much information as
possible within the minimum time, instead of considering the audience and focusing
on how to effectively transfer the information [109] [110]. Education theories propose
that whilst the quality of the information delivering the message is important, it is not
necessarily sufficient. Communication does not necessarily imply increased awareness of
the part of the audience. Other influencing factors such as personal knowledge, beliefs,
attitudes, perception and the efficacy of coping strategies can also have a substantial
influence, as can social factors such as the responses of peers [108]. Even if training
has delivered an immediate increase in understanding, it has been demonstrated that
this does not necessarily reflect the long-term perspective of the audience [20]. The
issue, then, is not the content of the cyber awareness programme, it is the nature of its
delivery that must be considered.
We must therefore explore mechanisms to enhance didactic learning, or look to
alternatives.
3.6.1 Serious Games for Experiential Learning
Experiential learning [111] is an educational technique based on the assumed importance
of experimenting and involvement, proposing that active engagement in a scenario de-
velops personal experiences that form the basis of understanding. Subsequent iteration
of these experiences, followed by periods of reflection, promotes the formation of ideas,
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with the testing of these ideas solidifying the understanding in the mind of the partici-
pant [110]. Kolb (1984) [111] illustrates this learning cycle in Figure 3.3.
Serious Games are a form of experiential learning in which a mental contest is
played in accordance with specific rules, that uses entertainment to deliver specific
learning objectives [112, 113], encouraging the player to decide, choose, define priorities
and to solve problems [110].
Concrete 
Experience
Reflective 
Observation
Abstract 
Conceptualisation
Active 
Experimentation
G
rasp
          Exp
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Figure 3.3: Kolb’s experiential learning cycle (1984)
Whilst there are positive impacts of serious games [114], the results are inconclusive
[109]. Experimentation suggests that serious games are more engaging and effective than
presentations, although it is difficult to make generalisations about all serious games and
presentations since the effectiveness of each learning method depends on the learning
elements being included and the nature of the delivery [109]. One key observation from
this experimentation, however, is that experiencing failure is an important element of
learning, and that during a serious game, most of the learning occurred during debriefing
when participants had the opportunity to reflect on their experiences, allowing them
to develop the mental models of the situation, against which they could refine their
understanding. Indeed, the results show that the more they experienced failure during
the serious game, the larger the difference became in observed behaviour compared to
those participants that only attended a presentation. Players predominantly experience
failure when they are engaged and challenged to reach specified goals, where challenge
improves the entertainment value and competition by creating barriers between the
current state and the goal state. Feedback provides a tool for participants to learn from
their previous actions and adjust them accordingly [115]. The opportunity to experience
failure, therefore, and to reflect upon this during debriefings should be considered am
element of an effective serious game, as should the definition of an end goal for the
game.
3.6.2 A Review of Strategies to Influence Decision-Making
There are various personal, social and environmental factors that can influence risk
awareness, decision-making and behaviour, and these interact in complex ways [108]. It
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is therefore not unsurprising that a number of models and approaches have been devel-
oped to describe how these factors interrelate to influence thinking and behaviour [108].
In this analysis, a subjectively-selected subset of approaches that appeared appropriate
to shape the nature of serious games were reviewed.
The Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) proposes that beliefs and behaviour are
interconnected [116], and that an individual’s attitude, subjective norms, and perceived
behavioural control, together shape their intentions and subsequent behaviour [117].
Their attitude is shaped by their beliefs about the consequences of adopting a certain
course of action [116], whereas the subjective norms they perceive are influenced by those
peers or seniors whom the individual considers important [116]. Perceived behavioural
control is reflected in the level of governance an individual feels they may have in
executing a certain behaviour or course of action [118]. Understanding threat perception
is an important factor when considering how to shape an individual’s attitudes [119],
as well as ensuring that any influential messaging is underpinned by approval within an
appropriate peer group [120]. The individual must perceive that they have an ability
to influence the situation, or else their beliefs will not be translated into action [118].
Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) [121] postulates that individuals protect
themselves based on four factors:
1. The perceived severity of the threatening event
2. Their perceived vulnerability or susceptibility to the probability of the occurrence
3. The efficacy of the recommended preventative behaviour (the ‘response efficacy’)
4. Their perceived self-efficacy
PMT has been described as an effective theory for predicting an individual’s in-
tention to engage in protective actions through its use of fear appeals [122, 123]. A
fear appeal is a strategy for motivating people to take a particular action by arousing
fear. Protection motivation stems from both a threat appraisal and a coping appraisal
[108]. The threat appraisal assesses the severity of the situation, whereas the coping
appraisal considers the individual’s ability to respond to the situation. As such, the
coping appraisal consists of both the efficacy of the response to the situation (the re-
sponse efficacy), and the individual’s ability to execute the response (the self-efficacy).
Specific research into PMT in the cyber security domain [20] identifies further factors
of the coping appraisal to include a cost/benefit analysis of carrying out the response,
suggesting that the response efficacy must have some form of quantifiable return on
investment.
The Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM) [124] extends PMT and its use of fear
appeals, to model an individual’s reaction to a fear-inducing stimulus. EPPM proposes
that when faced with such a stimulus individuals will either attempt to control the
perceived threat through an assessment of its magnitude and consequences, or control
their fear about the threat by assessing the efficacy of their ability to cope, whether
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through response efficacy or self-efficacy [125]. It is therefore important to balance a
individual’s perception of their ability to cope with a threat with their perception of
their susceptibility to the threat. This ensures that they consider mitigating actions
rather than just acknowledging that the threat exists [108], and take no further action.
TPM, PMT and EPPM all require an appreciation of the threat and an ability
to cope with that threat. TPB highlights that an individual’s peer group influences
their perception of threat, and as such, educating the individual in a wider group of
his or her peers may prove beneficial if the nature of the threat can be articulated
effectively to, and acknowledged by, a wider audience. In the context of serious games,
this leans toward multi-player environments. Both PMT and EPPM promote the use of
fear appeals to develop mental models, and as such, it is appropriate for us to consider
these in greater detail to determine their applicability.
3.6.3 Fear Appeals
Fear, the emotional reaction that may be aroused when a threat is perceived [126], is
central to the motivational elements of PMT and EPPM, which use increased perception
of a threat as a call to action. The principle is that when individuals are more cognisant
of the risks they face, this should result in a greater level of engagement with the issue,
ultimately resulting in some form of mitigating activity [127]. However, for fear appeals
to be effective in a synthetic environment such as a serious game, we must understand
what levels of fear are believable and appropriate. It has been observed that when the
level of fear arousal increases from low to moderate, the level of persuasiveness of fear
appeals increases [128]. However, with high levels of fear arousal, instead of accepting
the position advocated in the fear appeal, individuals are likely to disengage rather
than consider options to manage the threat [128]. Similarly, any fear appeal must also
include strategies for self-efficacy and response efficacy to maintain the engagement of
the audience and avoid disengagement [127].
For a fear appeal to be effective, it must satisfy four conditions:
1. The described scenario must be realistic and generate a low-to moderate fear
reaction [128]
2. The message must be accompanied by specific recommendations on how to address
the threat [118, 121, 124, 129]
3. The individual to whom the fear appeal is being addressed must believe the rec-
ommended actions will work [118, 121, 124, 129]
4. The individual must believe they have the ability to execute the recommended
actions [118, 121, 124, 129]
These four conditions, therefore, should be considered within the overall charac-
teristics of an effective serious game for experiential learning.
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3.6.4 Characteristics of an Effective Serious Game
Central to any game is that players must have a meaningful decision-making experience
during the gameplay - they must have agency. Agency means being able to act on your
own behalf, or put in terms of behavioural change theory, being able to influence the
situation through coping strategies. Players who can only make decisions that do not
affect the state of the game do not have agency and are likely to disengage. The main
characteristic of an effective game is where players are given agency in areas where they
require it and to remove it in areas where they do not [130]. Of the many techniques
available to give agency to players, the most useful is the introduction of a trade-off
[130]. In a trade-off, the player is given two or more options, each with its own benefits
and drawbacks, where players have to relinquish something of value in exchange for
something else, and experience the consequences of their choices. Another effective
decision-making technique is to offer options with less certainty and higher pay-offs
pitted against options of high certainty and low pay-offs, referred to as a risk-reward
choice [130]. However, too much choice can overload the player [131], resulting in a
diminished player experience. An effective game, therefore, requires a range of choices
sufficient to provide meaningful agency to a player and support trade-offs, but without
too many choices to detract from the gameplay.
Game Theory
Game theory provides a theoretical framework for rational decision-making, but tends to
deal with highly idealised problems where the payouts are clear, information is shared,
and complexity is mediated to a reasonable level [130]. Its efficacy, however, is somewhat
limited in real-world games where ambiguous situations are commonplace and no clear
decision is preferable. Actual player behaviour can diverge from theoretical results
and players may be influenced by irrelevant information that has no bearing on their
likelihood of success [130].
Game Play
Successful games engage with players in terms of positioning their gameplay in the
following five spectrums [132]:
1. Collaborative to Competitive: The balance by which players are encouraged to
adopt a ‘winner-takes-all’ mentality versus a collegiate approach to team success.
2. Intrinsic to Extrinsic: Defines how players are rewarded for their successes in
the game.
3. Multiplayer to Solitary: The level to which players interact with each other, if
at all.
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4. Campaign to Endless: Describes the boundaries of the game, and whether it
has a natural conclusion or can continue indefinitely.
5. Emergent to Scripted: Determines whether the outcome of the game is known,
or evolves with the gameplay.
Motivation
Intrinsic motivation that encourages players to draw their own conclusions [133] is more
effective than extrinsic motivators such as points, badges, and achievements [130], al-
though punishment for failure should be avoided [134]. Rewards, therefore, are not
necessarily an effective motivator during a serious game, and intrinsic motivators such
as competition and the desire to win may prove more beneficial. Adaptation, control,
challenge, feedback and goal-setting are common elements of serious games.
Established Serious Games for Cyber Defence
Two serious games were identified in the literature as having established their utility
for cyber education; CyberCIEGE and Tracer FIRE.
CyberCIEGE is a video game that presents students with computer security dilem-
mas within an environment that encourages experimentation, failure and reflection.
The objective of the game is to demonstrate the functionality and limitations of cyber
security mechanisms. Participants’ adopt the role of a decision maker for a small busi-
ness, making decisions within a three-dimensional office environment populated by game
characters who require to access enterprise assets to achieve goals in order to progress
through the scenario. An in-game economy rewards the player when users achieve goals,
and punishes them for failure. Virtual assets within the game have associated motives
that drive the game’s cyber threats. Participants choices modify the system’s vulner-
abilities, thereby affecting the opportunity for the attacker to compromise the assets.
The participant is penalised the value of an asset should it be compromised or made
unavailable [135].
Tracer FIRE (Forensic and Incident Response Exercise) was originally developed
to provide assurance that cyber forensic analysts remained current with respect to
threats, tools and techniques. A Tracer FIRE exercise typically starts with a series
of lectures relating to cyber security, followed by a multi-day competitive event. For
the competition element, participants form teams that work collaboratively to solve
challenge problems. The challenges are presented using a board layout with categories
appearing in the columns and the number of points awarded for successfully solving
challenges in the rows. Participants are provided identical computers and a standard
suit of cyber security software tools that includes ENCASE Enterprise™, WireShark™,
IDA Pro™, Volatility™, Hex Workshop™and PDF Dissector™. The challenge involves an
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attack against an organisation involving multiple adversaries who have differing motives,
operating both independently and in coordination with each another. This is combined
with individual challenges that must be solved, with each puzzle providing a clue to the
overall scenario. The objective is to successfully complete the individual challenges to
receive points, while simultaneously trying to determine the overall scenario. During the
exercise, teams must allocate work across the members of the team, defining the order
in which they work and the time they commit to individual challenges. At any given
time each team member can work on an individual challenge, allowing teams to work
on multiple challenges simultaneously. Points are awarded for successful submission of
answers to each challenge, with point deductions for incorrect answers. The exercise
concludes with teams presenting their explanation of the overall scenario [136]. Tracer
FIRE has been used to measure human performance factors in cyber security forensic
analysis [137], and incident response teams [138].
3.6.5 Analysis
Whilst some evidence exists to support the view that serious games offer a feasible means
by which cyber education can be imparted, it remains difficult to make generalisations
about all serious games. Understanding the nature of the training audience is essential,
as personal knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, perceptions, peer group, and understanding
of coping strategies all have a substantial influence. It is therefore essential to consider
how the opportunity to fail is manifested within the game, and how this affects the
participants. Not only must failure be seen to be acceptable, the associated periods
of debriefing, reflection, and subsequent experimentation, must be linked to tangible
frameworks to ensure appropriate mental models are developed by the training audience.
The applicability of these models should be measured by their correlation to real-world
cyber threats, so that any fear appeals employed by the game will be judged as realistic
by the participants. Equally important is the nature of the response to the threats
within the game. If the threats are to be viewed as contemporary, the responses to
them must be correspondingly realistic. Accordingly, the provision of viable coping
strategies that can actually influence the outcome of a real-world network intrusion
must be considered an essential element of any cyber education programme.
Of the two established serious games reviewed, CyberCIEGE displayed many of
the key characteristics of an effective serious game, such as experimentation, failure and
reflection. The scale of its use suggests that serious games can deliver viable results for
cyber education, but the scenarios observed were not reflective of a real-world, capable
threat actor following an established network intrusion methodology. Tracer FIRE
was designed to ensure cyber forensic analysts remained current with threats, tools and
techniques, and to that end it provides the basis of a real-world problem space. However,
the game is biased towards forensic analysis, and therefore deals with elements of an
intrusion after the event. For an organisation considering how to proactively understand
and its adversaries and defend against them, it offers few coping strategies. Neither of
the games included ICS in their scope.
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3.6.6 Conclusions
For serious games to be a viable mechanism to deliver cyber education that relates
to real world cyber threat scenarios, the education must translate into a contempo-
rary understanding of the cyber threat landscape and provide coping strategies that
demonstrate an ability to protect an organisation and recover from an intrusion. For
ICS environments, this must encompass the characteristics of industrial control and the
consequences of a cyber attack on such services. Serious games should therefore be
tailored to the audiences they are addressing. Whilst a technical audience will require
a game that articulates the issues in a technical manner, a managerial or business lead-
ership game should present the cyber threat in the language of business. The game
should also allow the translation of the threat between the business and technical audi-
ences through the provision of shared metal models, thereby improving communication
between the two training audiences. A shared understanding will promote a common
Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) decision loop [139] across the business and tech-
nical organisational units of an ICS provider. This shared situational awareness is
therefore an area that requires further investigation as an element of a cyber education
programme.
3.7 Situational Awareness
Capable adversaries that are characterised by sophisticated levels of expertise and sig-
nificant resources are referred to as Advanced Persistent Threats (APT). Such APT
actors use multiple attack vectors, such as cyber, physical, and deception, to create
opportunities to pursue their objectives over an extended period of time and adapt to
defenders’ efforts to resist them, in order to achieve their objectives [140]. By their na-
ture, APT attacks are covert and difficult to detect, and organisations such as critical
national infrastructure (CNI) providers who present attractive targets to APT actors
face a dynamic, evolving threat landscape. As a consequence, they carry an associated
degree of business risk. Awareness of a risk is one of the main factors of a successful
risk management programme [141]. By proactively raising awareness of threats and
their impacts it poses less risk than if we have no understanding of its potential impact
[74]. Situational awareness (SA) models potentially provide a framework from which
risk managers can better understand the threat landscape, helping to shape the cogni-
tive processes of incident responders, allowing the tailoring of risk mitigations to better
fit the individual needs of the organisation requiring protection from APTs [142] [143].
Indeed, it is argued that a well-trained response team that understands the nature of
the adversary is critical to success in responding to APT incidents [144].
Since incident response teams cannot prepare for every APT situation, or predict
every crisis, training activities need to be provided to support operating in challenging
situations to develop concrete guidance, procedures and tools to help individuals to col-
lectively react in different, unpredictable situations [145]. To produce the level of team
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cohesion and adaptability required to respond to the variety of APT attacks an organi-
sation might face, the training environment should include simulations to contribute to
the progressive, cost-effective establishment and maintenance of situational awareness
and skills proficiency [146].
SA, defined by Endsley (1995) [147], is “the perception of the elements in the en-
vironment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and
the projection of their status in the near future” [147]. This definition comprises three
levels of SA:
1. Level 1 SA: Perception of the elements in the environment. The initial
step in achieving SA is to perceive the conditions, characteristics and dynamics
of relevant elements in the environment [147].
2. Level 2 SA: Comprehension of the current situation. A synthesis of the
disjointed Level 1 elements to form a holistic understanding of the environment
and the significance of particular objects, events, or gestalt patterns [147].
3. Level 3 SA: Projection of future status. Integration of the characteristics
and dynamics of the elements and comprehension of the situation (both Level 1
and Level 2 SA) to provide a projection of the future actions of the elements in
the environment to support decision-making [147].
Team SA, as illustrated in Figure 3.4, is the degree to which every team member
possesses the SA required for their own responsibilities, independent of any overlaps
in SA requirements that may exist. It is not sufficient that one team member knows
perfectly but the other not at all. Every team member must have SA for all of their
own requirements [147].
Sub-Team A
Sub-Team B Sub-Team C
Team SA
Figure 3.4: Team situational awareness, Endsley (1995)
A critical element of SA is understanding the rate at which information is changing,
or how much time is available until some event occurs or some action must be taken. The
dynamic nature of cyber incident response (IR) dictates that as the situation changes, so
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an individual’s and team’s situation awareness must also change or face being rendered
inaccurate. In highly dynamic environments this requires operators to adopt many
cognitive strategies for maintaining SA [148]. A common problem within the cyber
security arena is the lack of viable analogies, or mental models, to help people assess
the threats they encounter and maintain their SA [18].
Mental models allow people to predict and explain the behaviour of the world
around them, to recognise and remember relationships among components of the envi-
ronment, and to construct expectations for what is likely to occur next. Furthermore,
mental models allow people to draw inferences, make predictions, understand phenom-
ena, decide which actions to take, and experience events vicariously [149]. Shared
mental models help members of teams to to understand the roles and responsibilities
of other team members [150] and cope with difficult and changing task conditions [151]
[152]. The ability to adapt is an important skill in high-performing teams, and a shared
mental model is an essential element of a team’s adaptability and SA. It allows team
members to understand each others’ task demands to predict what their team-mates
are going to do, and what they require in order to do it. This requirement for shared SA
is amplified in situations with excessive workload and time pressures [149, 153]. This
manifests itself as four types of shared mental models, as proposed by Mathieu et al.
(2000) and illustrated in Table 3.1.
Type of Model Knowledge Content Comment
Technology/Equipment Equipment functioning, operat-
ing procedures, system limita-
tions, likely failures.
Likely to be the most sta-
ble model in terms of content.
Probably requires less to be
shared across team members.
Job/Task Task procedures, likely contin-
gencies, likely scenarios, task
strategies, environmental con-
straints, task component rela-
tionships.
In highly proceduralised tasks,
members will have shared task
models. When tasks are more
unpredictable, the value of
shared task knowledge becomes
more crucial.
Team Interaction Roles/responsibilities, informa-
tion sources, interaction pat-
terns, communication channels,
role interdependencies, infor-
mation flow.
Shared knowledge about team
interactions drives how team
members behave by creating ex-
pectations. Adaptable teams
are those who understand well
and can predict the nature of
team interactions.
Team Teammates’ knowledge, skills,
attitudes, preferences, and ten-
dencies
Team-specific knowledge of
teammates helps members to
better tailor their behaviour
to what they expect from
teammates.
Table 3.1: Types of shared mental models, Mathieu et al. (2000)
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Mental models are developed as a result of training and experience in a given
environment. A novice in an area may have only a vague idea of important system
components, and sketchy rules or heuristics for determining the behaviour he or she
should employ with the system. With experience, recurrent situational components
will be noticed, along with repeat associations and causal relationships [147]. Instruc-
tion should be structured such that new information or knowledge builds on existing
knowledge. This facilitates the development of SA, as personnel are able to develop
increasingly detailed mental models [154].
The requirement to develop experience-based understanding suggests experiential
learning may provide a suitable vehicle by which individuals and teams can develop the
mental models necessary for situational awareness in incident response situations.
3.7.1 Exercises for Experiential Learning to Develop Situational Aware-
ness
Exercises are a proven method for delivering experiential learning [155]. The term
‘exercise’ is fairly broad, however, and represents many different types of activities
from individual training through to large-scale, multi-team events, where teams can
familiarise themselves with tools, procedures, and rehearse working together as a unit
[156].
Whilst the concept and benefits of exercising are well-known and recognised [157,
156, 158, 159, 106, 160, 155], much of this is focused on table-top exercises (TTX)
[158] and military exercises [161]. Exercises are typically scenario-based environments
where there is a simulation of a conflict or competitive situation between a Blue Team
representing the friendly forces, and an opposing Red Team as the antagonist [156].
A TTX is a facilitated, structured scenario-based discussion in which decision makers
or responders work through a series of events or incidents in a low-stress environment.
TTX are not intended to address all problems or policy, but are targeted on identifying
areas that require resolution or further refinement. Their objective is both educational
and developmental in that disconnects, perceptions, processes and procedures can be
easily identified and then addressed [159, 162].
A more recent development in this field has been the emergence of cyber defence
exercises (CDX) where a synthetic exercise environment is used to provide a represen-
tative network containing physical and virtual elements, referred to as a ‘cyber range’
[156, 157, 158, 106]. A cyber range presents a real-life situation or hypothetical secu-
rity problem staged in a realistic manner, although typically in a condensed timeframe,
against a Red Team who may adopt a range of techniques or intrusion set personas to
improve the realism [157, 106].
Participants within a cyber exercising environment are usually described as mem-
bers of one of four teams.
1. Blue Team comprises the exercise participants responsible for the defence of a
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technology infrastructure from antagonistic actions. In a defensive exercise, the
Blue Team are the primary learning audience [158, 163].
2. Red Team is the antagonistic counter-play organisation that attempts to disable
or impair the functionality of the systems that the Blue Teams are protecting, by
emulating an adversary’s attack or exploitation capabilities against an enterprise’s
security posture. The Red Team’s objective is to provide a controlled antagonist
that delivers scheduled behaviours that the Blue Teams must defend against [158,
163].
3. White Team is responsible for the planning and management of the exercise, the
development of rules of engagement, and the direction of the Red Team via an
events list that is tied to the learning objectives of the Blue Team [158, 163].
4. Green Team provides and supports the technical exercise environment, ensuring
it provides a suitable infrastructure on which to deliver the Blue Team training
[158].
These exercises are forms of collective training, spanning any type of collective task
from the simplicity of two people working together in different roles, to large complex
tasks that span multiple teams and organisations and involve an integration of effort
between them to achieve specific objectives [161, 164]. This differs from individual
training, that focuses on the acquisition of skills for individual competence.
Military training emphasises a ‘crawl-walk-run’ approach that begins with elemen-
tary tasks and progresses through stages with increasing complexity, to develop the
training with progressive levels of realism [152, 165, 166]. This progression applies to
both individual and collective training. Fundamental skills are acquired at the crawl
stage, learning the individual components of the skill or task. During the walk phase,
the components are integrated at a slower than normal pace. Finally, during the run
stage, the skill or task is performed at normal speed in realistic conditions. This ap-
proach lends itself to the development of the mental models described in Table 3.1, as
the progressive complexity of tasks will allow models to be refined using experiential
learning to develop concrete experiences through reflection on performance, abstract
conceptualisation, and active experimentation [111]. However, whilst the crawl-walk-
run approach is applicable to both individual and collective training, personnel should
have a sound understanding of individual roles and responsibilities before working in a
group [151, 165].
The principal differences between individual training and team and collective train-
ing are associated with scale and complexity, and can be characterised by the [161]:
1. complexity of the task,
2. complexity of the context in which the task is conducted,
3. complexity of the start state of the training audience,
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4. complexity of exercise planning,
5. complexity of the instructional task,
6. complexity of evaluation,
7. scale of resource requirements,
8. costs of training.
Traditionally, the crawl-walk-run model is applied sequentially through a series
of training episodes. However, it has been demonstrated that providing progressive
training scenarios that deliver crawl-walk-run training opportunities that are cumulative
and grow in complexity, delivers far greater training benefit. Schaab and Moses (2001)
proposed that by placing the responsibility for learning on the trainee, requiring them
to solve problems during the scenario in a crawl-walk-run manner, experimental results
demonstrate that their learning was accelerated when compared to traditional methods
[152]. A comparison of the traditional and recommended methods using a crawl-walk-
run model is shown in Figure 3.5.
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Figure 3.5: Traditional and recommended methods of collective training, Schaab and
Moses (2001).
3.7.2 Analysis
Exercises are an established training mechanism for developing SA through experien-
tial learning for military audiences. None of the literature reviewed suggested that
prior military training was necessary for such education to be effective. Indeed, liter-
ature describing exercises in commercial and academic environments defines no such
pre-requisites for the exercises to be successful. The mental models of Matheiu et al.
(2000) [149] provide a basis to determine the scope of experiential learning for cyber SA
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in ICS environments across TTX and CDX. The models should support the develop-
ment of shared understanding and situational awareness across business and technical
audiences to ensure a common frame of reference to deal with an antagonistic actions
against an ICS operation. The crawl-walk-run framework for exercises lends itself to
an overall structure for progressive training, as well as progressively stretching partici-
pants within each exercise. No literature was identified in this review that articulated
what such a training programme or framework would look like. Similarly, no litera-
ture reviewed fused the subjects of exercises, cyber SA, mental models, or progressive
collective training.
3.7.3 Conclusions
The differing types of exercise allow for the delivery of many training scopes to a mul-
titude of audiences. If properly designed, these could be complementary, and part of
an overall training programme to build mental models. These models, however, must
be equally developed for business and technical audiences in order to ensure a common
frame of reference to deal with an antagonistic actions. This requires aligned scope for
business-oriented training and technical training to develop not just functional cyber
defence skills, but organisational processes and procedures to address APT activities.
The scope should also provide a framework for progressive collective training, following
the crawl-walk-run model, so that participants are incrementally introduced to more
complex and challenging scenarios as elements of an overall education programme. In
particular, this model should address collective training of incident response, both pro-
cedurally and technically, so that the first time an organisation experiences an APT
attack is not the first time it impacts their organisation. As such, this requires us to
further investigate the use of cyber exercises for such detailed training.
3.8 Cyber Exercises
We have discussed that the advantages of serious games lie in the provision of a safe
training environment, where users are able to play, test and reflect without serious
consequences. In a motivating, challenging environment, players acquire skills and
knowledge that are transferable to real world tasks. It is this realism that makes serious
games an appropriate training tool for SA skills [160, 158].
Exercises to reduce threats, risks, vulnerabilities and assess consequences in en-
vironments using ICS in CNI are vital in establishing a resilient society. The need,
therefore, for exercises to train organisational leadership, management and incident re-
sponders are clear [158]. Exercises can be a powerful tool for training. If properly
planned and executed, cyber exercises provide teams with the opportunity to prepare
in a safe environment, to identify training gaps and demonstrate operational readiness.
However, Kim and Goodall (2016) [156] point out that designing, planning, executing,
and assessing cyber exercises is a poorly documented process. No standard assessment
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methodology has been employed across all cyber exercises, and there is no common
lexicon for cyber exercise assessment.
Generally, cyber exercises have three different purposes [167]:
1. Awareness: To conduct a cyber-exercise for awareness, bringing individuals to-
gether to make them aware of possible security incidents that their organisation
might experience.
2. Education and Training: To prepare the individuals with the response tech-
niques that they may require when dealing with security incidents.
3. Assessment: To test the ability to detect and respond in a coordinated manner
in dealing with attack and cyber incidents.
Cyber exercises allow participants to evaluate potential scenarios and determine
their responses to the events. This can serve as both a situational awareness tool and
business process model evaluation technique. Therefore collaborative cyber exercises
are important aspect of cyber strategy in ICS and CNI protection. This promotes
the collaborative cyber exercise as a platform for situation awareness training, incident
information sharing, and cooperation in incident handling [167].
The educational benefit of cyber competitions across varying formats, including
vulnerability assessments, forensic challenges, offensive and defensive competitions, or
various combinations thereof, are well-established [168]. With defined goals, individuals
or teams compete for some extrinsic award or recognition. Competitions that engender
a cooperative learning environment within a team are more effective than individual
competitions [168]. There is a significant amount of literature discussing the efficacy of
cyber exercises as competitions [169, 170, 171, 168, 172, 173, 174, 106, 175, 136, 176, 177].
However, such competitions may misplace participant motivation to focus on winning
rather than learning. A review of literature of 14 formal cyber competitions [168]
noted that only one of the competitions had clear educational outcomes identified,
and concluded that a lack of defined educational outcomes leads to incoherent training
objectives and measures. As a result, consideration should be given to the rationale
behind participating in such exercises [174].
One clear objective that exercises can provide is to produce data for cyber secu-
rity researchers. The lack of empirical data makes it difficult to study the security of
operational systems, but competitions that represent realistic attackers, defenders, and
security processes may deliver tangible information for further analysis [106]. Sommes-
tad and Hallberg (2012) proposed five topics that can be used as for experiments in
cyber competitions [106]:
1. The process model of an attack: An investigation of the steps taken by the
antagonist.
2. The attributes of successful attackers and defenders: An assessment of
the competencies of antagonists and defensive personnel.
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3. The impact of security mechanisms on success: A measurement of the
effectiveness of selected defensive strategies to support a defence-in-depth protective
model.
4. The accuracy of detection and incident analysis methods: An analysis of
incident response and forensic examination techniques.
5. The accuracy of security assessment methods: An assessment of the validity
of quantitative metrics to assess vulnerabilities or weaknesses in a system.
However, most of these competitions primarily focused on the technical charac-
teristics of security such as memory corruption exploits, denial-of-service attacks, and
detection capabilities of intrusion detection systems etc. The results lacked the prop-
erties to provide support for decision makers in an operational scenario, who must also
test and develop security processes and procedures. It is this broader dataset that deci-
sion makers could potentially use to determine where to focus cyber security investment
and develop a coherent defensive posture.
Berninger (2014) [178] proposed that cyber exercises could be used to provide an
assessment framework to generate data for testing and measuring the efficacy of cyber
mitigation methods, such that they can be used as the basis for the shaping of cyber
investment plans.
In reviewing the nature of cyber exercises, two key aspects became apparent; ad-
versary understanding and progressive training.
Adversary Understanding
In order to be able to successfully defend a network or system, it is useful to have an
accurate appreciation of the cyber threat that goes beyond stereotypes. To effectively
counter potentially decisive and skilled attackers it is necessary to understand their
behaviour. Although the motives for attacks may remain unknown, a thorough under-
standing of their observable actions can still help to create attacker profiles to design
effective countermeasures. These attacker personas have been used to assess the overall
threat landscape for an organisation, and as such, form the foundation of any realistic
cyber exercise [157]. In a study in which participants received either training that fo-
cused on the functionality of security software and its application in various situations,
or a narrative description of software functions in the context of adversary tactics and
techniques, it was noted that the narrative description allowed participants to accurately
interpret intrusion events and contextualise them [179]. In particular, the study high-
lighted the importance of the ability of individuals to effectively work together during
a cyber incident. Similarly, in an analysis of Red Teams in a small-scale ICS exercise,
a team comprising ten individuals who had not met previously, were required to adapt
to situations caused by Blue Team defensive actions, or as a result of errors and limited
expertise [180]. The study concluded that by understanding how Red Teams cope with
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dynamic situations, that network defenders could better profile adversaries and antic-
ipate their movements on a network, and that cyber range exercises were appropriate
to produce this dataset.
Progressive Training
Cyber exercises must be progressively calibrated to the participants’ level of expertise
so that experienced personnel are sufficiently challenged, while ensuring inexperienced
players are not overwhelmed. Exercises may allow participants to assume roles involving
offence, defence or some combination thereof, while presenting extraneous events that
simulate real-world operational demands. As a result, a distinction should be made
between competition and training. Competition involves skills measurement of individ-
uals, and perhaps, teams, whereas training concerns improvement in performance [136].
There is limited research documenting the cognitive and performance factors that distin-
guish novice from expert cyber security analysts, and is necessary to understand how to
better structure the education and training of cyber security professionals [136]. A com-
mon challenge faced by researchers, however, involves gaining access to research samples
for data collection activities, whether in controlled experiments or semi-naturalistic ob-
servations such as exercises. These events frequently entail semi-realistic challenges
that may be modelled on real-world events, and occur outside normal operational set-
tings, freeing participants from the sensitivities regarding information disclosure within
operational environments.
3.8.1 Analysis
Cyber exercises allow participants to evaluate potential threat scenarios and determine
their responses, to serve as both a SA development tool and business process model
evaluation technique. If not overly competitive, this can be used to develop shared
mental models in a collaborative manner. This is an essential element of any training
programme, as the lack of empirical data makes it difficult to study the security of
operational systems. Exercises with realistic antagonists, defenders, and security pro-
cesses offers the opportunity to develop a tangible dataset focused on the needs of an
individual ICS operator. However, to achieve this, exercises require clear training ob-
jectives, with an assessment methodology to determine whether these objectives have
been achieved. These objectives may be technical in nature, but equally may be to test
and develop security processes and procedures, or to capture data to cost-justify cyber
security investment.
This requires significant planning on the part of the exercise planning and execution
team, as exercises will require:
1. An understanding of Blue Team individual skills and collective training to date.
2. Detailed training objectives that progressively develop the participants’ capabili-
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ties, both individually and as a team.
3. Attack behaviours that are based on a real-world understanding of the threat
landscape the exercise participants face in the real world.
4. A capable and disciplined Red Team to imitate the threat actors.
5. Realistic scenarios and supporting materials.
6. A representative exercise environment or cyber range.
7. A clear plan for the assessment of the exercise.
Most of the literature reviewed described how to run an efficient exercise, whilst
very little was observed that discussed how to run an effective exercise. No literature was
identified that focused on improving cyber SA and the development of shared mental
models. Similarly, none of the literature encompassed the characteristics of the seven
requirements above and their fusion into a coherent model for developing cyber SA and
IR skills.
3.8.2 Conclusions
Cyber exercises appear viable as a means to develop shared mental models for ICS
SA. However, these should be constructed as training programmes rather than overt
competitions. This is not to say that competition has no place in these environments,
rather it emphasises that competition should be linked to specific training objectives
with tangible educational outcomes. Whilst failure is an essential element of learning,
and competition provides mechanism for failure in a safe environment, without suitable
time for reflection and experimentation it appears unlikely that suitable SA or mental
models will be acquired. Exercises will need to be carefully planned, and fit within
an overall framework of progressive collective training, for them to be effective. In
particular, for incident response training, the framework will need to accommodate the
varying levels of individual training of the exercise participants. It will also be essential
for the incident response plans and processes of the organisation to be incorporated
into the exercises, to maintain the necessary levels of realism, and also to test their
applicability to real-world threat actors.
3.9 Incident Response
Preparing incident response processes, procedures and gathering data on an ICS is a
critical initial stage in dealing with an incident. To facilitate the derivation of realistic
scenarios, a series of circumstances should be modelled to represent the cause, the
impact and what is necessary to contain and remediate the situation. A key preliminary
stage in this overall approach is to determine the probable risks to a control system.
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The Control Systems Cyber Security Self Assessment Tool (CS2SAT) [181] is a self-
assessment tool methodology and tool to assist in the evaluation of the cyber-security
risks for ICS and provide recommendations to mitigate vulnerabilities. This allows
the ICS operator to consider best practices in addressing its perceived risks. The US
DHS [182] highlight that the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
has developed several guides and publications addressing cybersecurity, and that whilst
they focus on traditional IT, they provide guidance that could be used to shape ICS
incident response plans if the characteristics of control systems are considered. These
publications include [182]:
• NIST SP 800-40 “Creating a Patch and Vulnerability Management Program”
• NIST SP 800-61 “Computer Security Incident Handling Guide”
• NIST SP 800-83 “Guide to Malware Incident Prevention and Handling”
• NIST SP 800-86 “Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Re-
sponse”
• NIST SP 800-92 “Guide to Computer Security Log Management.”
Once the status of an ICS has been assessed, and the elements of the disaster re-
covery plan defined, and organisation should then consider the creation of a Computer
Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT). The composition of the CSIRT will vary
depending on the organisation’s size and structure, with responsibilities shared among
different departments that have not traditionally provided support to the ICS or OT
security teams. Vendor expertise can be sourced through service level agreements SLA
with equipment providers, as can consultants or other specialists, especially where or-
ganisations have limited resources [183]. The scope and responsibilities of the CSIRT
should include [182]:
• Providing expertise on threats and vulnerabilities to IT systems and ICS.
• Establishing facilities to serve as a clearing house for incident prevention, infor-
mation, and analysis.
• Developing the policies and procedures related to incident response.
• Understanding the safety systems implemented in the ICS.
• Identifying operational impacts to the organisation in the event of an incident.
• Creating and testing the incident response plan.
• Developing the channels to act as a single point of contact for all internally re-
ported or suspected incidents.
• Responding to incidents.
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• Reporting to key stakeholders and external agencies during and after the incident.
• Gathering the forensic information to support analysis and any legal recourse.
• Implementing the safeguards to prevent a recurrence of the incident.
• Remediating the ICS after an incident.
As the range of incidents with the potential to impact an ICS are broader than
traditional IT systems [3], it is necessary to document their nature in order to ensure
that equal, or prioritised, consideration is given to all, so that a proper response can be
formulated for each potential incident.
Whilst first responders in the physical and operational areas of critical infrastruc-
ture undergo rigorous training and evaluation, the same is not true for cyber incident
responders. Similar levels of training, however, can be achieved through cyber range
exercises, allowing the assessment of cyber incident responders [184].
As an element of incident response planning, organisations should assess their readi-
ness in terms of availability of resources, both prior to an initial event, and during the
average interval between the recovery time of an existing incident and the occurrence
time of a new incident [185]. When responding to a network intrusion incident, evidence
and analysis are required to determine if architectural and operational decisions affect
adversary behaviour. Alongside this, Bodeau and Graubart (2013) [186] articulate the
need for a vocabulary to describe the effects on cyber adversaries required to map cyber
resiliency techniques to the different phases of an attack campaign, and by doing so,
provide measures of defensive effectiveness against adversary activities.
The characteristics of effective performance amongst incident responders is not well
understood. However, several social processes and dynamics that contribute to incident
response effectiveness have been identified. A sophisticated, high-performing incident
response team, it is argued by Tetrick et al. (2016), is a closely-connected, collaborative
network of teams (or sub-teams) [187]. This manifests itself in ten areas of consideration
when developing incident response teams [187], as described in Table 3.2.
1. Social maturity of the teams.
2. Methods of performance evaluation.
3. Decision-making processes.
4. Communication effectiveness.
5. Information sharing.
6. Collaborative problem-solving.
7. Understanding of team expertise.
8. Trust between teams.
9. Sustainable attention management and focus over time.
10. Continuous educations in incident response
Table 3.2: Ten development areas for incident response teams, Tetrick et al. (2016)
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In research related to Tetrick et al. (2016) [187], it was identified that to improve
the performance of incident response teams, a focus should be placed on SA, collective
information processing, and forecasting [188]. Leaders, it was argued, can improve these
processes using strategies such as pre-briefing, debriefing, simulations, and providing
focused feedback.
Post-incident forensics offer an opportunity to incident responders to identify the
nature of an attack and potentially prevent its recurrence. However, during an incident
in an ICS, forensic opportunities to analyse evidence reduce as time goes by and volatile
data is lost. Therefore, developing a forensic readiness plan is essential to determine
which data sources are necessary to identify indicators of compromise, and calculating
the available window of opportunity to exploit this information [189].
3.9.1 Analysis
Exercises appear appropriate to test and improve IR procedures in a variety of scenarios,
especially in light of an adaptable adversary such as an APT. For ICS operators it allows
IT and OT personnel to work together, developing individual and team skills. For those
responsible for the development of incident response plans and procedures, it facilitates
the testing of their efficacy. For a wider crisis management team that interacts with
IR procedures, it allows the organisation as a whole to rehearse dealing with critical
cyber incidents. However, none of the literature reviewed identified the requirement for
developing mental models as an element of IR training.
3.9.2 Conclusions
Exercises provide a framework to improve the performance of IR teams’ situational
awareness, collective information processing, and forecasting, if they are suitably realis-
tic and focus on the breadth of responsibilities that exist within incident management.
As such, it is unlikely that a single exercise will provide sufficient coverage to address all
of the issues likely within such a scenario. A range of incidents should be planned within
a framework that progressively introduces complexity to the exercise scope. Alongside
this, the framework will need to introduce a vocabulary to consistently articulate intru-
sion events in a manner that will be understandable to all parties concerned.
3.10 Intrusion Analysis
There are various frameworks in use to articulate APT intrusion behaviours on networks
and systems. The frameworks are not mutually exclusive, and elements can be combined
if necessary. Their primary benefit is a common vocabulary and level of reporting
granularity that allows organisations to describe intrusion events, and forecast likely
subsequent antagonistic actions.
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3.10.1 The Diamond Model of Intrusion Analysis
The Diamond Model, defined by Caltagirone et al. (2013) [190], is an analysis frame-
work that defines atomic intrusion events and describes the four core features of an
antagonistic event, those being an adversary using a capability delivered over an in-
frastructure in order to target a victim and produce an outcome. This is illustrated in
Figure 3.6.
Adversary
Victim
CapabilityInfrastructure
Persona
IP address
Network assets
etc...
Malware
Exploits
Stolen certificates
etc...
Persona
IP address
Network assets
etc...
Network assets
Devices
Domain names
etc...
Meta-Features
Timestamp
Attack phase
Attack result
Resources required
etc...
Figure 3.6: The diamond model of intrusion analysis, Caltagirone et al. (2013)
These core features, or nodes, are connected by edges that define the relationship
between each. The nodes and edges are connected into a model that resembles a di-
amond. An intrusion event also has a number of meta-features that allow for further
details of an intrusion event to be modelled. All attributes have an associated confi-
dence level to allow for a weighting to be applied to decisions taken on the perceived
accuracy of data. The advantage of the model comes from the ability to analytically
pivot between the connected points on the diamond to reach other connected points.
This means that common capabilities being used in different intrusion events can be
correlated and identified.
A key component of the model is Activity Threads. An activity thread is a directed
phase-ordered graph where each vertex is an event and the arcs identify causal relation-
ships between the events along one or more paths. The arcs establish whether the path
is AND (necessary) or OR (optional). Arcs can be actual (i.e. modelled during or after
an event), or hypothesised, where future courses of action are predicted. The threads
are organised vertically to describe all of the causal events an adversary executed, or
may execute, against a specific victim, collectively aimed at fulfilling the adversary’s
intent.
Rather than being defined as a specific ontology or taxonomy for modelling attack
behaviours, the diamond model is intended to be an extendable framework that can
accommodate architectures and technologies as befits an environment. As a result, an
event in the model is a variable-sized n-tuple that allows a basic tuple to be extended
based on requirements. The basic diamond event, along with the standard victim
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definition, is depicted in Figure 3.7.
The Diamond Model provides a range of analytical methods to integrate threat
intelligence and predict antagonistic actions. It models attacker courses of action, and
assists with compensatory defensive activities once an intrusion has been detected.
E = <<Adversary, Confidenceadversary> 
         <Capability, Confidencecapability> 
         <Infrastructure, Confidenceinfrastructure> 
         <Victim, Confidencevictim> 
         <Timestamp-Start, Confidencetimestamp-start> 
         <Timestamp-End, Confidencetimestamp-end> 
         <Phase, Confidencephase> 
         <Result, Confidenceresult>
         <Direction, Confidencedirection> 
         <Methodology, Confidencemethodology> 
         <Resources, Confidenceresources>>
<Victim, Confidencevictim> = 
     <Organisation, Confidenceorganisation>
     <HostIPAddress, Confidence IP>
     <Hostname, Confidencehostname> 
     <Application, Confidenceapplication>
     <TCPPort, ConfidenceTCPport>>
Figure 3.7: Basic diamond event and standard victim definition, Caltagirone et al.
(2013)
3.10.2 Lockheed Martin Kill-Chain
Network defences can be improved by exploiting knowledge of adversaries by creating
an intelligence feedback loop that establishes a position of information superiority and
decreases the adversary’s likelihood of success with each subsequent intrusion attempt.
The Lockheed Martin™ Kill-Chain, proposed by Hutchins et al. (2011) [191], describes
the phases of a network intrusion, correlating antagonistic behavioural indicators to
defender courses of action, identifying characteristics that connect individual intrusions
to broader intrusion set campaigns. Through this intelligence-led approach to defensive
planning, the cyber security posture of an organisation can evolve at a tempo compa-
rable to that of an APT.
The model describes seven stages of APT actions within a cyber attack [191]:
1. Reconnaissance: Research, identification and selection of targets by antagonists,
using open sources to determine suitable attack surfaces.
2. Weaponisation: The exploitation of the information harvested during the recon-
naissance phase to tailor malware to the target environment.
3. Delivery: Transmission of the malware to the targeted environment to establish
an initial foothold.
4. Exploitation: The manipulation of the device or environment in which the
foothold was initially established, to escalate privileges or create a favourable situ-
ation for the continued covert execution of the malware.
5. Installation: The establishment of a persistent presence within the environment
to maintain continued covert access and freedom to operate.
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6. Command and Control (C2): The remote control of the malware from a C2
node typically outside the network boundary.
7. Actions on Objectives: Once persistence is achieved, the APT can progress to
execute the objective of their actions, either to exfiltrate information, manoeuvre
to another network, degrade or deny the operational capability of the environment
in which they now have access, or any combination thereof.
3.10.3 Mandiant Attack Lifecycle Model
Mandiant™maintain an Attack Lifecycle Model [15] that characterises the steps involved
in an APT intrusion, in a similar manner to the Lockheed Martin Kill-Chain. The
Mandiant model describes an attack in eight stages:
1. External Reconnaissance: Network scanning and associated research into the
target organisation and systems.
2. Initial Compromise: The methods by which an attacker infiltrates the security
perimeter of the target network.
3. Establish Foothold: Techniques and capabilities to establish two-way communi-
cations with implanted malware.
4. Escalate Privileges: The means by which an attacker elevates their permissions
to a greater set of resources.
5. Internal Reconnaissance: Scanning and device discovery within the target net-
work.
6. Move Laterally: Traversion of the target network across legitimate devices.
7. Maintain Presence: Ensuring continued control over key systems, nodes and
devices.
8. Complete Mission: The execution of the intent of the attack.
3.10.4 ICS Cyber Kill Chain
An ICS-specific kill-chain, developed by Assante and Lee (2015) [192], proposes that
attacks against ICS requires an adversary to undertake a two-stage attack process.
The initial planning phase comprises target reconnaissance, preparation, and the initial
intrusion into an ICS network. The second phase, the management and enablement
phase, establishes command and control of the payloads deployed on the ICS network
and exploits them to achieve the ultimate attack objectives.
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3.10.5 Analysis
The Diamond Model offers a rich set of analytical tools that can be used to anticipate
antagonistic cyber activities, both before and during an intrusion. Although it does
not directly provide support for ICS, its extendability suggests that such support is
feasible. The ICS Cyber Kill-Chain provides a framework that considers ICS elements of
a network, but there is little evidence of its adoption by industry. The Lockheed Martin
model is widely used, but to be fully effective it requires details of how the adversary
will ‘weaponise’ any gathered intelligence or capabilities. The Lockheed Martin Model
has also been previously integrated with the Diamond Model. The Mandiant lifecycle
is also adopted by various parts of industry, although at the time of review it had not
been integrated with the Diamond Model.
No literature reviewed had integrated any techniques to proactively model a cyber
attacker’s courses of action prior to an attack, and use this as a basis for interpreting
threat intelligence to determine a defensive posture prior to, and during, an attack on
an ICS. Neither had any attempts been made to determine which elements of an ICS
were likely targets for such attacks. These would be essential elements of overall cyber
SA for an ICS operator.
3.10.6 Conclusions
The requirement to understand an ICS to sufficiently determine systems or processes
attractive to an attacker provides a mechanism to determine the nature of a defensive
posture. Fused with threat intelligence data, it will allow a forecast of potential adver-
sary behaviour to be made prior to any intrusion events. Subject to a means by which
an ICS’s critical systems or processes can be identified, the Diamond Model offers a
potential analytical framework to support a pre-incident analysis and maintain an as-
sessment of antagonistic courses of action once an intrusion has been identified. Fused
with one of the lifecycle models, this would provide a powerful SA tool for ICS.
3.11 Overall Conclusions
The defence of an ICS operation requires more than just IT security measures. It
necessitates an understanding of OT and how it interacts with IT, and in particular
how IT provides an attack surface to pivot onto OT. The issue is acknowledged in many
published works, e.g. [27, 193, 194, 195], although the majority of these publications
focus on technical mitigations. ICS security literature largely recommends significant
changes to existing architectures, exposing the operator to the risk of change that has
been at the heart of the issues surrounding security upgrades in general. Of pragmatic
benefit to an ICS operator would be a process that allows the organisation to determine
which of its systems and processes are critical to their operations, and as a consequence,
which would be attractive to an attacker as a target of antagonistic cyber operations.
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This should not be based on probabilistic risk models, as the dataset of these does not
exist. No such process was identified in observed literature.
The process would require an understanding of the threat landscape to support
the determination of where ICS operators should focus cyber security investment. This
would require the organisation’s leadership to acknowledge that APT actors may target
their facilities and understand the circumstances under which this may occur. For the
leadership of these organisations to act upon this understanding of the threat landscape,
they will need to improve the quality of their background knowledge, K, and SA. In
particular, as proposed by Bodeau and Graubart (2013) [186], a vocabulary will be
required to describe the behaviours of cyber adversaries. Increased K and SA could
be achieved by fusing the CARVER method [90] with an attack lifecycle such as the
Mandiant™ Attack Lifecycle Model [15] or Lockheed Martin™ Kill-Chain [191], with the
Diamond Model of Intrusion Analysis [190], to provide a framework for understanding
the threat and developing a common vocabulary. The Activity Threads element of the
Diamond Model provide an adaptive alternative to Bayesian Networks [76] or Attack
Trees [88], in a framework that lends itself to cyber defensive planning.
This approach requires ICS operators to consider intelligent adversaries. The NRC
[79] recommend the introduction of Red Teams to probe the defences of an organi-
sation, but potentially destructive testing [3] is not feasible in such critical systems.
However, Sommestad and Hallberg’s (2012) [106] proposition that cyber security exer-
cises, conducted on dedicated infrastructure, could be extended to include ICS. This
would necessitate the fusion of industrial processes and technologies using a language
and framework understood by all disciplines. This would support the improvement of
background knowledge, K, and with continued exercising, potentially reduce the set
of unconsidered scenarios sn+1. However, as Kim and Goodall (2016) [156] point out,
designing, planning, executing, and assessing cyber exercises is a poorly documented
process. No standard assessment methodology has been employed across all cyber exer-
cises, and there is no common lexicon for cyber exercise assessment. A means to assess
the efficacy of cyber exercises is therefore required as a component of this process.
Serious games provide a vehicle by which a contextual understanding of the threats
and impacts of antagonistic actions can be structured to develop a set of mental models
to promote the development of K and SA. The use of ‘fear appeals’[122, 123] within the
games, using techniques derived from from PMT [121] and EPPM [124], offers a mech-
anism to engage participants and shape their understanding of the threat landscape.
The development of background knowledge, K, should not be limited to individuals. It
must be propagated across the entire ICS operation to anchoring enterprise-wide men-
tal models that can be established across the leadership, management, technology, and
incident response areas of a business. These games must be accompanied by coping
strategies to ensure that participants’ mental models are aligned to practical means to
address the risks highlighted. These should be embedded within training programmes to
progressively develop skills that are shaped by an understanding of the APT adversaries
an organisation may face. These skills should not just be technical, they should also
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include the procedural and operational aspects of defending an ICS. The establishment
of such enterprise SA and mental models to defend ICS from antagonistic actions was
not identified in any literature reviewed.
Cyber and table-top exercises, as examples of serious games, provide a means
to progressively develop an intelligence-led understanding of the adversary to drive
enterprise-wide K, SA, and mental models. The flexibility of exercise frameworks allows
a variety of dynamic scenarios to be tested, as well as the decomposition of complex
scenarios into discrete events, as recommended by Ravinder et al. (1988) [101] and
Howard (1989) [102]. This will provide a means to reduce the set of sn+1. It will allow
the various teams involved in IR to develop the cohesion and adaptability required to
deal with the variety of APT attack behaviours they may encounter. This will require
the training environment to include realistic simulations to contribute to the progressive,
cost-effective establishment and maintenance of SA, and skills proficiency. The adoption
of a ‘crawl-walk-run’ approach to training would potentially offer the most effective way
to deliver this skills development in a limited timeframe [152, 165, 166]. No literature
identified discussed this training in the context of cyber or ICS.
The reviewed literature does not address the six research questions posed in Section
1.4. The following three chapters describe the research undertaken to address these
questions and establish cyber SA within ICS operators.
Chapter 4 - The SCIPS Serious Game - articulates the nature of a means to
establish cyber SA within the leadership of an organisation, as well as form the basis
for establishing a set of enterprise mental models to anchor corporate understanding of
the cyber threat to ICS.
Chapter 5 - The Industrial Control System Cyber Defence Triage Process - de-
scribes a coping strategy that allows an ICS operator to identify which of its technology
assets are likely targets for APT actors, and proposes a means to develop an invest-
ment strategy and set of incident response playbooks for an organisation to coherently
respond to antagonistic actions on their networks.
Chapter 6 - A Framework for Progressive Collective Training - proposes an incre-
mental model for cyber defence and table-top exercises to develop situational awareness,
mental models, technical skills and operating procedures, to prepare for a targeted APT
attack on an ICS operation.
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4.1 Introduction
Simulated Critical Infrastructure Protection Scenarios (SCIPS) was initially developed
as a proof-of-concept by the author during his MSc project [196] to determine if it was
possible to create a serious game that exposed personnel involved in the operation of ICS
to a credible threat scenario in order to raise their situational awareness and promote an
understanding of the challenges involved in cyber security investment. Although only
implemented as a spreadsheet with some supporting materials, it provided encouraging
results.
This section describes the thorough examination of the SCIPS proof-of-concept
conducted during this research, and how it was re-evaluated and re-implemented as a
component of the experiential learning framework described in Chapter 6.
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• Allan Cook, Richard Smith, Leandros Maglaras, Helge Janicke “Using
Gamification to Raise Awareness of Cyber Threats to Critical National Infrastruc-
ture”, Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium for ICS & SCADA Cyber
Security Research (ICS-CSR 2016), Belfast, 23-25 August 2016,
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4.2 SCIPS
SCIPS raises cyber situational awareness through the use of fear appeals, played-out
in a safe environment that promotes self-learning, intrinsically motivating participants
and encouraging them to draw their own conclusions as a result [133, 197, 198]. Unlike
generic cyber security awareness campaigns, SCIPS is intended for stakeholders protect-
ing CNI organisations. Previous research into using serious games for cyber security
education has focused on developing technical incident response skills rather than at-
tempts to shift the perceptions of stakeholders impacted by such incidents [199, 200].
Elements of response planning training by the European Union Agency for Network
and Information Security (ENISA) [201] included attempts to quantify the costs as-
sociated with cyber incidents, but did so at an operational level on IT systems, with
financial impacts that could be mitigated through the purchase of insurance policies
[202] and could therefore potentially be de-prioritised by an executive of a CNI facility
facing competing demands for large-scale investment. In order to express the issues of
cyber attack on CNI to the game’s audience the scenarios illustrate an effect on the
strategic viability of a critical infrastructure business. The game specifically focuses on
the strategic risks facing a CNI facility, playing through scenarios in which participants
experience the financial implications of a cyber attack on an ICS. Instead of an arbi-
trary abstract measurement of cyber defensive success within the game, SCIPS uses
the currency of shareholder value and market sentiment [203]. It demonstrates that
antagonistic actions by a capable threat actor have the potential to severely degrade
share price in a publicly-quoted company. Players are required to balance the com-
peting priorities of shareholders and regulators with security requirements to defend
against a credible cyber threat. Each investment has a financial impact with associated
trade-offs, but can protect revenues that result in maintained share price and projected
dividend payments to investors, thereby promoting risk-reward considerations.
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4.3 Problem Statement
To bound the scope and objectives of the SCIPS game, a set of five overall high-level
requirements were produced to guide the analysis and development process:
1. Produce an educational game targeted at stakeholders to raise awareness of the
business-level impact of cyber security incidents. The players will be assumed
to have minimal ICS or IT security knowledge, but will understand the general
objectives of a business.
2. The game and its purpose should be understandable in a reasonable amount of
time (15 mins) and should not require detailed knowledge or previous experience.
3. The game should not follow a strict path and should keep the players focused on
a scenario where there are no immediately apparent winning solutions.
4. The game should encourage debate within a team and promote competition be-
tween teams.
5. The game should allow the development of new scenarios and gameplay options,
so that it can be repeated without significant re-working of the components.
4.4 Game Design Options
In order to achieve the game’s objectives, the requirements were reviewed against game-
play options, the medium of the game, and the nature of the game design.
4.4.1 Gameplay
For the game to appeal to the target audience it was necessary to ensure that the nature
of the gameplay lent itself to the players and the promotion of learning through self-
discovery. An initial investigation reviewed the gameplay activity options defined by
Knapp (2013), as described in Table 4.1.
4.4.2 Game Medium
The medium of the game play was analysed against the learning objectives and problem
statement, again using definitions described by Knapp (2013), illustrated in Table 4.2.
4.4.3 Game Design Approach
The gameplay and medium were considered in context together, resulting in the as-
sessment matrix shown in Table 4.3. Whilst subjective, the matrix highlighted that
role playing and exercises offered the closest fit to providing a platform on which to
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Matching: In a matching game the player must match one item with
another.
Collecting/Capturing: Where the goal is to acquire a certain number of objects.
The player with the largest collection wins.
Allocating Resources: The player is required to balance the allocation of resources
in order to achieve a working equilibrium. There is no com-
petition with other players in this approach.
Strategising: A player allocates resources in a similar manner to an ’Al-
locating Resources’ game, but is in competition with other
players.
Building: Players try to create objects out of given materials.
Puzzle Solving: Players are required to solve a puzzle.
Exploring: Players interact with an environment looking for objects of
value.
Helping: Involves one player assisting another player to accomplish
a task.
Role Playing: The player assumes the role of another person, with their
responsibilities defined within the confines of the game.
Table 4.1: Options for gameplay, Knapp (2013)
Board Game: A turn-based approach with players moving around a pre-
determined route through roles of dice.
Role Playing: A board-less, dice-based model where players interact with
a facilitator who has a predetermined number of options for
the players to explore.
Exercise: A scenario is presented with boundary conditions in which
players can manoeuvre freely.
Single Player PC Game: An automated environment where players interact via a
programmed interface with an algorithmic opponent.
Multi-Player PC Game: Similar to the single-player approach, but pitching player
against player rather than an algorithm.
Table 4.2: Options for game mediums, Knapp (2013)
address the overall problem statement and learning objective. The decision was taken
to combine the two approaches in an exercise format that requires players to adopt
leadership roles typical of a critical infrastructure facility running ICS operations. To
derive a scenario under which a cyber attack on a critical infrastructure facility would
appear feasible, it was decided to construct a fictitious sequence of events based around
UK foreign policy and military intervention in a fictitious country, with a nation-state
adversary that possesses an indigenous offensive cyber capability [204, 205].
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Board Game Role Playing (facili-
tated model)
Exercise Single Player PC Game Multi-Player PC Game
Matching Gameplay did not
lend itself to self-
learning
Gameplay did not
lend itself to self-
learning
Gameplay did not lend
itself to self-learning
Gameplay did not lend
itself to self-learning
Gameplay did not lend
itself to self-learning
Collecting/
Capturing
Gameplay was too
focused on a pre-
dictable outcome
Gameplay was too
focused on a pre-
dictable outcome
Gameplay was too fo-
cused on a predictable
outcome
Gameplay was too fo-
cused on a predictable
outcome
Gameplay was not vi-
able in a head-to-head
player environment
Allocating
Resources
Difficult to allow
players to allocate
resources in a fixed
board model
Viable: Players
could adopt a role,
but limiting the
playing time and
scope of decision
making could prove
difficult
Viable: Players could
face a given sce-
nario and attempt to
reach equilibrium of
resources. However,
a non-competitive
environment may not
be appropriate for
senior executives
Viable: Players could
face a scenario, but
the algorithm-based
approach without
other player inter-
action would limit
opportunities for
self-discovery
Viable: Players
could face a scenario
and play head-to-
head. However, the
computer environ-
ment would require
game-playing literate
competitors and may
stifle debate
Strategising Strategising on a
board game tends
to extend the time
required to play
Viable: Although
limiting the scope of
the decisions avail-
able to players may
prove challenging
Viable: Allows for
competitive decision-
making in a limited
scenario. However,
constraining the scope
of the decisions to
those appropriate to
the game may prove
challenging
The available develop-
ment time would not
fit into the project
timescale
The available develop-
ment time would not
fit into the project
timescale
Building Gameplay did not
lend itself to prob-
lem statement
Gameplay did not
lend itself to prob-
lem statement
Gameplay did not lend
itself to problem state-
ment
Gameplay did not lend
itself to problem state-
ment
Gameplay did not lend
itself to problem state-
ment
Puzzle Solv-
ing
Gameplay lends it-
self to reaching a
predetermined out-
come, which is not
appropriate
Gameplay lends it-
self to reaching a
predetermined out-
come, which is not
appropriate
Gameplay lends itself
to reaching a predeter-
mined outcome, which
is not appropriate
Gameplay lends itself
to reaching a predeter-
mined outcome, which
is not appropriate
Gameplay lends itself
to reaching a predeter-
mined outcome, which
is not appropriate
Exploring Gameplay did not
lend itself to prob-
lem statement
Gameplay did not
lend itself to prob-
lem statement
Gameplay did not lend
itself to problem state-
ment
Gameplay did not lend
itself to problem state-
ment
Gameplay did not lend
itself to problem state-
ment
Helping Gameplay did not
lend itself to prob-
lem statement
Gameplay did not
lend itself to prob-
lem statement
Gameplay did not lend
itself to problem state-
ment
Gameplay did not lend
itself to problem state-
ment
Gameplay did not lend
itself to problem state-
ment
Role Playing
(assuming
a role or
persona)
Role playing on a
predefined board
game did not
appear feasible
Viable: Role play-
ing would limit the
scope of the de-
cisions available to
players, but overall
game scope man-
agement would be
challenging
Viable: Role play-
ing would limit the
scope of the decisions
available to players,
but overall game scope
management would be
challenging
The available develop-
ment time would not
fit into the project
timescale
The available develop-
ment time would not
fit into the project
timescale
Table 4.3: Game options assessment matrix
4.5 Player Experience Design Process
To drive the gameplay through the player experience, a seven-step development process
from Burke (2014) [132] was adopted. These steps, and the decisions taken therein, are
illustrated in Figure 4.1 and described below.
4.5.1 Outcomes and Success Metrics
In the process defined by Burke (2014) [132], the intended outcomes and measures of
success must be defined at the outset to ensure the subsequent design steps adhere to
the intentions of the game and player experience. As such, it was defined that the
intended outcome of playing the game would be that participants realise that:
1. There are circumstances under which a cyber attack could impact a CNI facility.
2. The drivers for the attack may come from actions beyond their control.
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Outcomes and Success Metrics
Target Audience
Player Goals
Engagement Model
Play Space and Journey
Game Economy
Play, Test and Iterate
Figure 4.1: Player experience design process, Burke (2014)
3. Cyber attacks can have a direct impact on share price and shareholder value.
4. Investment in cyber security before an attack is the best way of preparing for this
potential situation.
4.5.2 Target Audience
The game is intended for stakeholders involved with the protection of CNI organisa-
tions. Typically these should be participants who, during the course of their normal
working activities, would not be required to balance investment decisions or interface
with shareholders. In this way, technical personnel are exposed to business issues,
thereby broadening their enterprise understanding.
4.5.3 Player Goals
In the SCIPS game, players are required to make a series of investment decisions based
around the maintenance of a CNI facility that operates ICS equipment. In the initial
version of the game this is based around an electric power generation plant. Subsequent
implementations of the game are planned to address other industries within the CNI
sector, supporting a broad spectrum of cyber-related scenarios.
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Players are required to balance the competing priorities of shareholders and regu-
lators with the security requirements to defend against a credible cyber threat. Each
investment has a financial impact with associated trade-offs, but can protect revenues
that result in maintained shareholder value. Players of the game adopt one of five roles
within an organisation that operates a Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) electricity
generation plant. Their objective is to maximise shareholder value, expressed as share
value and anticipated dividend per share. The winner is the team with the highest share
value, and the loser is the CEO of the team with the lowest share value.
The business objectives of the game are to meet, as closely as possible, the in-
vestments stated in their annual report and to maintain market confidence. Figure 4.2
illustrates how the shared goal of each team is to maximise the share price, whilst indi-
vidually, players try meet personal goals by preserving their bonuses which are impacted
by the reallocation of funds within the business.
The exception to this is the Security Director. To create a player role who was
more likely to champion the required security investments it was decided that the Se-
curity Director would have no bonus, and therefore have no external influences on their
behaviours when considering the need for cyber protection mechanisms.
Meet
Annual
Report
Commitments
Maintain
Market
Confidence
Maximise
Shareholder
Value
Preserve
Personal
Bonus
Business
Outcomes
Player 
Goals
Shared
Goals
Figure 4.2: SCIPS player goals
4.5.4 Engagement Model
Burke (2014) [132] describes the ways that games engage with players in terms of posi-
tioning their gameplay on the following spectrums described in Table 4.4.
Figure 4.3 illustrates the current SCIPS engagement model, shown as black cir-
cles, and the extended engagement model that potential further iterations of the game
framework will support, as white.
The SCIPS game is essentially collaborative with intra- and inter-team competitive
elements that drive debate between players about how to reallocate budgets in order to
mitigate the cyber threat. Each round of the game is time constrained to drive instinc-
tive behaviours from the executives participating [206]. A leader board is maintained
throughout the game so that teams can see where their share price sits with respect to
other teams.
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Collaborative to Competitive: The balance by which players are encouraged to adopt a
‘winner-takes-all mentality’ versus a collegiate approach to
team success.
Intrinsic to Extrinsic: Defines how players are rewarded for their successes in the
game.
Multiplayer to Solitary: The level to which players interact with each other, if at
all.
Campaign to Endless: Describes the boundaries of the game, and whether it has
a natural conclusion or can continue indefinitely.
Emergent to Scripted: Determines whether the outcome of the game is known, or
evolves with the gameplay.
Table 4.4: Game engagement models, Burke (2014)
Collaborative Competitive
Intrinsic Extrinsic
Multiplayer Solitary
Campaign Endless
Emergent Scripted
Figure 4.3: SCIPS player engagement model
Rewards within the game are intrinsic, focused on maintaining the fictitious organ-
isations’ financial targets and the personal compensation packages of the player roles
within each team.
The game is multiplayer, with multiple players within teams, and multiple teams.
Players primarily interact with the other members of their team, but are influenced by
the financial performance of the other teams via the leader board.
The flow of the game follows a campaign that models a series of incidents based
on a typical cyber attack adversary lifecycle or ‘kill-chain’ [191]. Versions of the game
planned for later releases will support a shift in gameplay towards an endless model
based on attacker-defender [79] games that will support cyber warfare and ‘capture the
flag’ functionality.
The current iteration of SCIPS is scripted to provide a credible scenario that leads
to the cyber attacks. The initial version uses a US-UK coalition intervention in an over-
seas conflict to underpin the emerging cyber threat, and alternative scripted scenarios
are also under development following a discussion between De Montfort University and
the UK Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-UK) [207]. Additionally, later
versions of the game will support more emergent scenarios such as attacker-defender
models.
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4.5.5 Play Space and Game Journey
Play Space
The play space of the game is based around a game board, role cards, security cards,
video feeds, newspaper ‘cuttings’, a tablet player interface and an overall leader board.
All of the components of the play space interact, using a mix of soft and hard (physical)
game play elements.
Game Board
The game board provides an illustration of a CCGT power plant to set the scene for
the players, and to act as a focal point around which they can gather. It provides
placeholders for purchased security cards to act as a quick reference for their increasing
defensive capabilities.
Role Cards
The role cards, picked at random by the players, describe their responsibilities within
the organisation and their compensation packages.
Chief Executive Officer (CEO): Ultimately responsible to the shareholders of the
organisation and likely to see the cyber threat as an ongoing risk, but not an immediate
priority that will affect the share value of the business.
Chief Operating Officer (COO): Responsible for the operations of the facility. The
COO is likely to be aware of the possibility of a cyber threat, but likely to see the
requirement for high availability and reliability as a higher priority issue.
Compliance Director: In regulated markets the Compliance Director will be re-
sponsible for ensuring that all regulatory and legal mandates are met. The role holder
is not likely to focus on the cyber threat unless it corresponds to a stated requirement.
Plant Director: Responsible for the day-to-day operations of the facility and likely to
report to the COO. The plant director will have detailed knowledge of the OT and the
risk of any modifications or testing on plant operations. However, the Plant Director is
also likely to be closer to the issues surrounding OT and the reality of the cyber threat.
Security Director: Responsible for IT and OT security and required to balance the
management of both, although is unlikely to have the mandate to enforce changes on
the operational environment.
Security Cards
The security cards within the game are configurable depending upon the scenario
adopted. The initial version of the game uses the following:
External Firewalls: Protects the network perimeter and will limit the deployment of
malware.
Email Filters: Detects potential phishing attempts.
Anti-Virus: Installs regularly updated anti-virus software to contain attempts at
malware propagation.
Intrusion Detection: Identifies abnormal behaviour on networks and servers and
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alert systems administrators to potential malicious cyber activity.
Virtual Private Network: Securely extends the network to trusted business part-
ners, preventing attackers from intercepting and manipulating data to deploy malware.
Deep Packet Inspection: Monitors the traffic flowing into and out of the network to
identify malicious activity.
Risk Assessment: A comprehensive analysis of the threats to the business, their like-
lihood and subsequent impact on operations to quantify the exposure the organisation
has to service disruption through security incidents, and to allow the development of a
qualified security plan.
Server Hardening: Disables all non-essential services on servers that expose known
security vulnerabilities.
Patch Management: Initiates a programme to determine the current patch levels
required for all devices and implements a pre-deployment environment to test them,
ensuring they will not adversely affect operations.
Penetration Testing: Starts an ongoing penetration test regime to regularly test the
environment for security vulnerabilities.
Operational Technology (OT) De-Militarised Zone (DMZ): Installs a DMZ be-
tween the IT and OT networks to minimise the risk of malware deployed in the IT
environment propagating to industrial control systems.
Incident Response Process: Initiates an enterprise-wide programme to analyse the
cyber threats to the business and develops plans to address them.
Segment IT Networks: Structures the IT networks of the organisation so that traffic
is limited to the areas it needs to traverse, and limits the ability for malware to route
to wider systems.
Create an IT/OT Security Team: Pulls together a team of experienced profession-
als from both the IT and OT domains in order to consider and defend the organisations
technology assets from cyber attack in a coordinated, holistic manner.
Profile OT Traffic: Initiates a programme of OT traffic capture and analysis so that
intrusion detection systems can be configured to recognise abnormal activity on the OT
network.
Limit User Account Permissions: Implements a policy of enforcing the least priv-
ileges required for each user account, so that users only have access to the information
they require, thereby limiting the ability of cyber attackers to access data and services.
Document Operational Processes: Produces a comprehensive set of documents
that define the operational processes of the ICS systems and the control equipment
that underpins them to determine which are critical to maintaining operational capa-
bility, and determine measures to mitigate the impact of their loss.
Limit External Accesses: Implements a process of continual review of external ac-
cesses to the network so that connections are only permitted from trusted partners and
only allowed to exist for the minimum time required.
Protect Designs: Identifies all of the intellectual property and documentation key to
the operational business and re-locates this to a repository where access is limited and
audited.
74
A. Cook 4.5. PLAYER EXPERIENCE DESIGN PROCESS
Segment OT Networks: Structures the OT networks, buses and serial communica-
tions in a manner whereby the ability to traverse from one device or protocol to another
can be limited, thereby restricting the ability of malware to propagate to ICS devices.
Configuration Management Processes: Introduces a set of processes to ensure that
the configuration of all known devices is recorded, and any requests to modify them are
properly assessed prior to changes being made.
Secure Operational Procedures: Implements a complete review of all operations
across IT, OT and associated operations and develops policies for all aspects of person-
nel, processes and use of technology, then introduces programme of change to establish
their use.
Catalogue Assets: Implements a programme to identify and catalogue all IT and OT
assets within the organisation so that they can be properly managed.
Videos and Press Cuttings
At the beginning of each round a video is played to the teams via their tablet
interfaces. It presents a simulated news broadcast that explains the initial scenario
that will subsequently develop as the game progresses. The videos are supplemented by
newspaper cuttings that summarise the news broadcasts so that players can refer back
to salient points.
Tablet Player Interface
The players within the teams interact with the game and leader board through
the tablet player interface. In the example screenshot in Figure 4.4, a team purchases
security cards.
Figure 4.4: An example of the SCIPS tablet interface
Leader Board
The game also uses a leader board that interacts with the tablet devices to display
the financial positions of each of the teams, providing a comparative evaluation of their
performance at the end of each round.
Game Journey
At the start of the game the players are presented with the investment budgets com-
mitted to in their fictitious CNI company’s annual report. These include provisions for
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upgrades to physical infrastructure, regulatory compliance, and efficiency improvements.
No provision is made for increased cyber security in their plans for the forthcoming fi-
nancial year. ‘Agency’ is provided through the purchase of a limited number of security
cards that can apply defensive mechanisms to an ICS. Each card has an associated cost
and implementation timescale. Players must trade-off the purchase costs from their in-
vestment budgets. Any reduction in committed inward investment results in the overall
share price falling. The business objectives of the game are to meet, as closely as pos-
sible, the investments stated in their annual report and to maintain market confidence.
Whilst trying to preserve the share price, players also try to maintain their personal
bonus, which is also impacted by investment decisions, resulting in a tension between
shared and personal objectives (Figure 4.2).
As the six rounds of the game progress, participants experience the recognised
phases of an APT attack lifecycle. The game aims to provide experiences to inform
a mental model for the players, with which they can assess the implications for their
own ICS operations. It requires participants to work in teams, thus reinforcing the
experience amongst their peers, and developing a similar understanding across the teams
of players. The game uses a two-fold approach to fear appeals. Firstly, it presents a
developing cyber attack scenario that results in catastrophic damage to a CNI facility,
with significant resulting impact on share price and market confidence. Secondly, it
stimulates a fear of losing by placing teams and individual players in a competitive
scenario, where loss is visible to their peer group.
The journey that players experience through the game starts at onboarding, then
progresses through the game rounds until the game close and the final evaluation of its
effectiveness.
Onboarding
Prior to commencing the game, connectivity between the tablets and the leader
board is established. At the start of the session players are introduced to the rules of
the game by a facilitator. In later versions of the game this step will be automated
and displayed on the tablet interface. Members of each team then pick a role card at
random and enter their name against the role on the tablet.
Game Rounds
The game currently comprises six rounds, each representing a two-month period
in a twelve-month financial year from April to March. In each round a new video
broadcast is played, explaining the ongoing situation in the fictitious country. In the
current version of the game, the players witness a UK-US coalition employing economic
sanctions and military intervention resulting in hacktivists from the region threatening
to retaliate against UK energy infrastructure. The CEO of the fictitious company starts
with his individual bonus reduced to 80% of its possible maximum value as a result of
market sentiment reducing the team’s company share price by 10% in response to the
threat. After watching the video at the beginning of each round, players have a limited
amount of time to decide which cyber security protection cards to purchase, and which
of their existing budgets to transfer the funds from. Initially the scenario is baselined
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with none of the security cards selected, and a total investment budget available that is
allocated between infrastructure, regulatory and generation upgrades. As the budgets
are decremented, players can see the impact on their overall share price and projected
dividends to shareholders, as well as their own personal bonus. As the rounds progress,
cyber incidents escalate from initial reconnaissance activity to effects against the energy
production capabilities of the power plant, the impact of which can be limited by the
purchase of security cards in previous rounds. Each of the security cards has four values
assigned to it, used in the calculations regarding its impact:
1. Active?: This determines if the security card is active, based on the difference be-
tween its date of purchase and the current date, and the implementation timescale
associated with the functionality.
2. Protection: Defines the maximum level of protection afforded by the security
card.
3. Potential Impact: Defines the maximum impact that a cyber attack will have if
that card is not purchased. This is defined as a numeric value and may be higher
than the maximum Protection figure. This is to allow for realistic scenarios such
as firewalls not detecting all attacks.
4. Actual Impact: If the security card is not active then this defaults to the Po-
tential Impact figure, however if it is active then the value is set to the difference
between the Potential Impact and Protection variables.
The Protection and Potential Impact figures change from round to round, as certain
security cards afford better protection against each of the stages of the cyber attack. For
instance, the ‘Traffic Profiling’ security card in Round 1 has no impact on preventing
external IP network reconnaissance of the IT systems, whereas in subsequent rounds it
offers the ability to detect traffic abnormalities in the OT space. The sum of all Actual
Impacts of all of the security cards is calculated and a percentage presented back to
the players to indicate how much, or little, their infrastructure was protected, as does a
textual description of the impact. In later rounds the summations of the Actual Impacts
is divided by an impact factor to feed into the cumulative impact of attacks that reduces
share price and impacts personal bonus figures.
Game Close
At the close of the game the players will have experienced the impacts of a cyber
attack on the ICS in their power generation plant, the extent of which will have been
limited, or not, by their cyber security investments. The leader board will display the
overall performance of the teams, presenting the team with the highest share value as
the winners, and the player in the role of CEO of the team with the lowest share price
as the loser.
Evaluation
The purpose of the game is to change the perceptions of senior stakeholders in CNI
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organisations who possibly perceive investment in cyber security as an ongoing line on
an IT budget that should be contained, to a strategic, top-line investment that protects
shareholder value. Throughout the game, players develop their understanding of the
impact of a well-executed cyber attack and form their own opinions as to the necessity
of planned, defensive measures deployed in advance of such an incident. As players will
come to the game with differing levels of experience and understanding of ICS and CNI,
it is necessary to identify any shift in their views in order to evaluate its effectiveness.
Players are encouraged to complete a feedback questionnaire that establishes their initial
perceptions and measures any shifts in view as a consequence of the game.
4.5.6 Game Economy
At the start of the game the players are presented with the investment budgets commit-
ted to in their fictitious company’s annual report. These include provisions for upgrades
to physical infrastructure, regulatory compliance, and power generation equipment. No
provision was made for increased cyber security in their plans for the forthcoming fi-
nancial year. To purchase security cards to protect their infrastructure, players must
decrement these budgets to fund their investments. A reduction in committed inward
investment results in the overall share price falling. Overall market sentiment [203] is
reflected in an initial 10% fall in share price as a result of the threats by hacktivists,
with further changes to market confidence as a result of investment decisions and public
awareness of cyber attacks. Whilst trying to preserve the share price, players also try
to maintain their personal bonus, which is impacted by investment decisions, resulting
in a tension between corporate and personal value.
Game Theory
Game-theoretic models are not used in SCIPS, as when one is called upon to defend
against a cyber threat from an adaptable antagonist there are rarely situations where
decisions result in a binary outcome. Zero-sum structures, or more complex models
involving rational actors, fail to convey the essential message that an organisation cannot
guarantee 100 percent security. Instead, the purchase of security cards decreases the
impact of certain aspects of the attack during certain phases of the APT campaign,
but does not entirely negate them. This adds to the risk-reward decisions players must
consider.
4.5.7 Play, Test and Iterate
An analysis of the effectiveness of SCIPS as an element of this research is is discussed
in Section 11. However, a cycle of play, test, and iterate was used to assess the early
versions of the game. Although this early data was captured during the author’s MSc
project, it was not analysed in great depth. However, to drive the development of
SCIPS, it was subjected to further scrutiny to direct the evolution of the framework as
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a part of this research.
As the intended outcomes were aimed at directing a change in individual per-
ceptions, the associated success metrics were subjective. A player feedback sheet was
completed at the end of the early versions of the game that asked nine key questions
[196], all scored using a consistent numeric range. The use of the feedback form allowed
participants to measure the shift in their understanding, and also to reinforce their
changed perceptions through positive affirmation [208].
SCIPS was initially evaluated using three separate audiences [209, 210, 211] com-
prising a range of technical and business experience. After the first two evaluation
sessions [209, 210] participants were offered the optional opportunity to complete a pa-
per questionnaire to augment their verbal feedback. A limited number of participants
chose to take-up the offer of completing the questionnaire. The third evaluation session
[211] dispensed with structured questioning, instead offering participants the option to
provide unstructured feedback.
Each of the sessions followed a slightly different format, tailored to the audience.
The first [209] was played with an audience with cyber security knowledge, but without
any ICS experience. The game was preceded by a presentation introducing ICS, using
the Purdue Model (Figure 3.2), to develop visual representation of an ICS and create
an initial mental model. The presentation explained ICS security vulnerabilities and
how these might be exploited. The participants played a complete cycle of the game
over six rounds, allowing 15 minutes per round. The second workshop [210] was played
by an assembled audience with both ICS and cyber security experience. They played
only three rounds of the game, with the round time restricted to 10 minutes. The
audience received no ICS presentation. Finally, the third session [211] was presented to
an audience of mixed ICS and cyber security expertise. They played the full six rounds
of the game, allowing up to 15 minutes for each round. The audience received no ICS
presentation beforehand.
Based upon the feedback questionnaires, which asked participants to respond on
a scale of 1-10 (1=low to 10=high), the audience from the first workshop [209] had a
low initial understanding of ICS and ICS security, with a mean of 4.8 (n=10, σ=2.51).
The second audience had a far higher understanding, with a mean of 8 (n=5, σ=1.58).
However, both audiences understood ICS security to be a strategic issue irrespective
of their experience level, with mean values of 1) 7.2 (n=10, σ=2.31) and 2) 9.4 (n=5,
σ=0.89) respectively. By the end of the sessions, the perception that ICS security was
a strategic issue in the first workshop had risen to 8.9 (n=10, σ=1.22), representing
a mean increase of 1.7. The mean increase was less in the second workshop, with
only a 0.4 rise to 9.8 (n=5, σ=0.45), but their overall mean suggested a high level of
understanding of the strategic significance of ICS cyber security to begin with.
Both audiences felt the tension between shared and personal goals, reflected in the
maintenance of share price versus personal bonus, was realistic, with responses of 1) 8.1
(n=10, σ=1.16) and 2) 7.2 (n=5, σ=1.92). The efficacy of the fear appeal was borne
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out in the effectiveness of the game, with mean values of 1) 7.9 (n=10, σ=1.83) and 2)
9.4 (n=5, σ=0.89).
The unstructured feedback from the third session [211], which had no initial pre-
sentation, requested that any introductory briefing provided before the game should
include an explanation of the vulnerabilities of ICS as well as the conventional attack
cycle of an APT actor, and that this APT attack methodology should be referred to af-
ter each round to demonstrate to the audience the progression of the antagonist. There
were also a number of requests for supporting literature for the security cards, as the
benefits and impacts of their use were not adequately articulated to a non-technical
audience on a small playing card.
4.6 Evolution of SCIPS
Following the feedback from the early evaluations, the game evolved to incorporate a
series of security presentations at the start of the education session which introduced
the risks to an ICS, as well as articulating the APT threat using an adversary lifecycle
framework (or ‘kill-chain’) and the Purdue Model. The imagery used to articulate
adversary behaviour and the Purdue Model in this initial presentation is subsequently
used as the basis of interaction with the players to allow them to assess the progress of
the antagonist, as well as support their Level 3 SA analysis of the likely courses of action
the antagonist may follow. This inter-round period is also used to allow each team to
present a summary of the rationale behind their investment decisions and an assessment
of their effectiveness against the current phase of the APT attack. Players also discuss
the type of information that would be required to improve their decision-making. As
part of this focus on improving the quality of information used for decision-making,
participants are also provided with a brochure that describes how the security cards
available for purchase defend against the antagonist, articulating the technical effects
of the security features, as well as their impact on reducing the operational risk to the
CNI facility.
4.7 Initial Conclusions
Each evaluation session ideally requires 20-25 players in order to fully exercise the com-
petitive nature of the game, although competition can be achieved with two teams of
five players. However, the numbers of participants required limited the early experimen-
tation opportunities. Similarly, by making the completion of a feedback questionnaire
optional, the sample size of data collected was restricted. However, the early results of
SCIPS were promising and warranted further experimentation. The increase in strate-
gic awareness of ICS security by the players of the first workshop demonstrated the
effectiveness of serious games as a means to deliver complex messages to an audience.
However, the request for presentations to accompany the game from the audience of the
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third workshop suggested that serious games are not necessarily alternatives to didactic
learning techniques, but complementary to them. The combination of the game with a
presentation reinforces the mental models developed by participants. This allows play-
ers to picture the progression of the attacker through the architecture, augmented by
the inter-round feedback sessions to discuss the antagonists progress through the ICS
architecture.
The APT scenario used illustrates the reality of a capable antagonist. The game
delivers a realistic fear appeal to motivate the audience, who subsequently acknowledge
that a threat exists, understand its impact, have seen how it can evolve over time, what
the intent of an attacker might be, and experienced the circumstances under which
an attack could occur. The security cards illustrate the coping mechanisms available,
and serve to demonstrate how an attack could be contained. The early versions of
SCIPS only contributed to five of the seven aspects of cyber situational awareness that
were defined in Table 2.2. It did not address the quality of information required to
make decisions during an attack or consider the many alternative possible actions an
antagonist might take in order to achieve their intent (aspects 6 and 7). The inclusion
of inter-round interactive discussions with the game participants addressed these issues,
allowing feedback and reflection to shape their thoughts on information requirements
and Level 3 SA. The current version of SCIPS, as illustrated in Table 4.5, now satisfies
all seven of the aspects of cyber situational awareness.
1. Acknowledge that a threat exists, and that it can be identified if it occurs. X
2. Have assessed the immediate and longer-term impact of cyber attacks. X
3. Be conscious of how an attack can evolve over time. X
4. Understand the intent of an antagonist. X
5. Recognise the circumstances under which an attack could occur. X
6. Have appraised the quality of information required to make decisions during
an attack.
X
7. Consider the possible actions an antagonist might take in order to achieve their
intent.
X
Table 4.5: SCIPS Alignment to the ‘aspects of cyber situational awareness’ defined by
Barford (2010)
SCIPS, as an element of this development programme, and through the realism of
the game, contributes to Question 1 -Which factors influence the development of mental
models to provide cyber situational awareness? of the six research questions posed in
Section 1.4, that considers which factors influence the development of mental models
to provide cyber SA. The nature of the scenario of the game, and its focus on strategic
issues, further contributes to Question 3 - Can serious games change the risk perceptions
of participants and establish a foundational level of situational awareness?. By providing
agency, SCIPS also provides a potential increase in the efficacy of the manner in which
risk perceptions are changed, thus contributing to Question 4 - How can we increase
the efficacy of the serious games to deliver the change in risk perceptions?. Finally, by
including an end-to-end cyber attack in the game, and the requirement for participants
81
A. Cook 4.7. INITIAL CONCLUSIONS
to assess the intent, impacts and future courses of action of the antagonist, SCIPS also
contributes to Question 5 - As a result of serious games, can participants recognise
the characteristics of a cyber attack and determine the possible intent and courses of
action?, and Question 6 - Are participants of serious games able to assess the immediate
and longer-term impacts of cyber attacks?.
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5.1 Introduction
The Industrial Control System Cyber Defence Triage Process (ICS-CDTP) is a coping
strategy for ICS operators that allows them to address cyber threats in an effective and
cost-sensitive manner that does not expose their operations to additional risks through
invasive testing. It is intended to develop SA through progressive training, developing
the necessary mental models to prepare an ICS operator for antagonistic actions on
their networks.
There is evidence [212, 107] that targeted attacks from capable actors look beyond
an IT system focus, and instead target the industrial processes under control in order to
create an effect that impacts on the operations of an industrial facility. This attack on
the critical processes represents the highest level of threat to an ICS operator, especially
when perpetrated by a highly capable actor such as a nation state [213]. Any approach
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to security of ICS hence should assume an intelligent, adaptable adversary that will
focus on high-value targets.
Traditional approaches to systems vulnerability assessment rarely focus on antag-
onistic intent. Instead they review penetration and exploitation options, highlighting
what is vulnerable as a result. A complete review of a facility using the guidance in
ISA-99 [195], soon to be replaced by IEC 62443 [72], and the CPNI ICS Good Practice
Guide [73] should result in a comprehensive defence-in-depth approach to cyber secu-
rity. However, such comprehensive reviews are expensive, resource-intensive activities
that often cannot be justified solely based on a cost-benefit analysis.
In order to deliver the maximum return on investment for an initial cyber review,
and establish the basis for a subsequent complete assessment of the operations, the
potential financial and safety impacts of malicious attack activity should be modelled
to determine where the manipulation of industrial processes and process data have the
greatest impact. It is only once the process vulnerabilities in the operational industrial
processes have been identified that it is possible to establish which of the many devices
within a large ICS installation are responsible for the control of the vulnerable process
steps. Triage then identifies which are the highest priorities to defend from cyber attack,
and against which an incident response ’playbook’ can be built to deny the attacker
access to critical system assets.
The ICS-CDTP described within this chapter is focused on those ICS operators
facing the highest levels of impact from antagonistic cyber actions, but not yet at a high
level of cyber security maturity. The intent of ICS-CDTP is to be a coping strategy
for ICS operators to begin a progression of informing and realising a set of ICS security
controls that will form the basis of subsequent, holistic analyses of the entire industrial
facility using established best practices.
The majority of this chapter has been peer-reviewed and published in the following:
• Allan Cook, Helge Janicke, Richard Smith, Leandros Maglaras “The In-
dustrial Control System Cyber Defence Triage Process”, Computers and Security
(Elsevier), Volume 70, September 2017, Pages 467-481,
DOI: 10.1016/j.cose.2017.07.009(IF: 2,85)
The ICS-CDTP framework is novel in that it combines and extends concepts found
in risk assessment and intrusion detection techniques with safety and process models
that are known within the operations of many ICS facilities. As such, ICS-CDTP:
1. Focuses on the identification and defence of critical ICS equipment from malicious
manipulation. It models and characterises attack behaviours and supports the
development of a set of potential intrusion models that significantly improve the
readiness of incident responders.
2. Complements IEC 62443 [72] and the CPNI ICS Good Practice Guide [73]. It ex-
tends the Diamond Model of Intrusion Analysis [190] and integrates the CARVER
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Matrix [90] to support a fundamental change from reactionary, blanket protection
to targeted and focussed defence.
3. Allows ICS operators to actively identify and attempt to thwart malicious attacks
based on an incident response ‘playbook’ developed from analyses of antagonistic
intent.
5.2 ICS-CDTP Overview
As discussed in Section 3.5, there is a lack of validated data against which we can apply
established risk models to ICS cyber threats [214]. The ICS-CDTP assumes that the
courses of action an adversary will pursue when attacking an ICS are unknown to the
defender. Whilst some opportunist antagonists may attempt to cause disruption with-
out any conscious targets, highly capable attacks will develop elaborate and coordinated
attacks against the highest value targets. By assuming a highly capable attacker the
ICS-CDTP framework considers a worst-case scenario driving the risk assessment and
SA.
Regardless of the premeditation of an attacker, an assessment of which systems
are critical to the continued operation of an industrial facility is required. This in-
cludes the assessment of the vulnerabilities of the specific control devices used and the
infrastructure that underpins them with the aim to establish attractive targets.
ICS-CDTP defines an attractive target as one that is:
1. Poorly protected, either through inherent flaws in the device or weaknesses in
surrounding security mechanisms.
2. Critical to the correct and profitable execution of an operational process.
3. Used in processes that, if manipulated, would result in the local population or
general public becoming aware of the intrusion.
4. Easily accessible via Internet-enabled devices, or poorly protected from insiders
through inadequate physical security.
These characteristics focus on the adversary’s perspective of the ICS infrastructure,
and their attack intent. Targets that satisfy these criteria would offer a means by which
a capable antagonist could achieve significant impact on an ICS [213].
ICS-CDTP iteratively assesses the attractiveness of a device to an antagonistic
actor and provides a process to remediate any vulnerabilities, as well as describing any
residual risk and informing security monitoring techniques for mitigation. However,
analysis alone is not sufficient to adequately defend an ICS, it must also support ongo-
ing security monitoring to better identify intrusions and underpin subsequent incident
response. As a result, ICS-CDTP addresses the eight questions listed in Table 5.1.
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1. Which devices are attractive to an attacker?
2. Can we better protect these devices?
3. What routes exist to these devices?
4. What events would occur in an attempt to access and manipulate these devices?
5. Where can we deploy sensors to detect these events?
6. How will we determine which of the alternate routes to a device are being used by an
attacker?
7. How can we predict an attacker’s next activity?
8. What does our incident response plan need to describe and test in order to mitigate
residual risks identified in the analysis?
Table 5.1: The eight questions that ICS-CDTP addresses
5.3 ICS Cyber Defence Triage Process
The scale of ICS installations often complicates the cyber security analysis process, as
it is not cost-effective to defend all systems equally in such a complex environment.
Given the number of devices installed it is desirable to prioritise the defence of those
that support critical functionality. This should include assessments from both offensive
and defensive perspectives, which are both facilitated by ICS-CDTP. Figure 5.1 depicts
the ICS Cyber Defence Triage Process.
1. Attack 
Behaviour 
Modelling
2. Investigation 
of Deployed 
Architecture
3. Antagonistic 
Target 
Determination
4. Attack 
Options 
Analysis
5. Security 
Testing and 
Remediation
7. Incident 
Response 
Planning
6. Security 
Monitoring
Figure 5.1: ICS cyber defence triage process (ICS-CDTP)
Capable threat actors tend to follow established Advanced Persistent Threat (APT)
approaches to targets [15]. In 2014, 55 percent of incidents investigated by ICS-CERT
involved APTs or sophisticated actors [10]. In order to maintain a focus on such antag-
onists we must first decide how to represent the behaviours of an attacker. The triage
process illustrated in Figure 5.1 begins in Step 1 by deciding upon an attack lifecy-
cle model that best suits the perceived threat and available data. It then proceeds to
gather documentation on the ICS network architecture in Step 2. Whilst information
obtained from network enumeration is always more accurate, ICS devices are known
to react unpredictably to such exercises. This will expose the operations of the facility
to unnecessary risk. The network design documentation is used as a foundation for all
subsequent analysis in Steps 3-7.
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In Step 3 an assessment is made regarding the impact and attractiveness of key
processes to an antagonist, and the underlying ICS devices, followed by a review of the
possible attack threads that could permit access to the ICS in Step 4. These attacker
courses of action are constrained by the characteristics of the ICS architecture imple-
mented within the facility [215]. Accordingly, we consider the deployed infrastructure
to increase the specificity of the analysis. By combining the analyses of critical devices,
attacker behaviours, and the deployed ICS architecture, we produce a triage of the op-
tions available to an antagonist. This drives the detailed security analysis of the critical
devices in Step 5, leading to remediation of vulnerabilities. Where this is not possible,
indicators of compromise and the locations where network- and host-based sensors are
identified to support targeted security monitoring in Step 6. Both options feed into the
overall incident response planning process of Step 7, to underpin effective cyber defences
against malicious attacks.
We will now consider each of the triage framework steps in greater detail and
provide examples of their application.
5.3.1 Step 1 - Attack Behaviour Modelling
The first step of the proposed framework defines how antagonistic behaviour will be
described, as a basis for subsequent analysis, by extending the Diamond Model of In-
trusion Analysis [190] and integrating it with the Mandiant Attack Lifecycle [15, 216].
The Diamond Model [190] is an analysis framework that defines atomic intrusion events
and describes the four core features of an antagonistic event, those being an adver-
sary using a capability delivered over an infrastructure in order to target a victim and
produce an outcome, as illustrated in Figure 3.6. These core features, or nodes, are
connected by edges that define the relationship between each. The nodes and edges are
connected into a model that resembles a diamond. An intrusion event also has a number
of meta-features that allow for further details of an intrusion event to be modelled. All
attributes have an associated confidence level to allow for a weighting to be applied to
decisions taken on the perceived accuracy of data. The advantage of the model comes
from the ability to analytically pivot between the connected points on the diamond
to reach other connected points. This means that common capabilities being used in
different intrusion events can be correlated and identified. Rather than being defined as
a specific ontology or taxonomy for modelling attack behaviours, the diamond model is
intended to be an extendable framework that can accommodate architectures and tech-
nologies as befits an environment. As a result, an event in the model is a variable-sized
n-tuple that allows a basic tuple to be extended based on requirements.
The basic diamond event, along with the standard victim definition, is depicted in
Figure 3.7.
There are many ways to express an antagonistic cyber attack. Two commercial
methods were considered during this analysis; the Lockheed Martin™ ‘Kill-Chain’ [191]
and the Mandiant™ Attack Lifecycle [15, 216]. Both techniques fitted within the pro-
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cess, but in this example we used the Mandiant method, as the ‘Weaponisation’ phase
of the Lockheed Martin model would be opaque to a defender. The Mandiant lifecycle
comprises eight stages:
1. External Reconnaissance: Network scanning and associated research into the
target organisation and systems.
2. Initial Compromise: The methods by which an attacker passes the security perime-
ter of the target network.
3. Establish Foothold: Techniques and capabilities to establish two-way communica-
tions with implanted malware.
4. Escalate Privileges: The means by which an attacker elevates their permissions
to a greater set of resources.
5. Internal Reconnaissance: Scanning and device discovery within the target net-
work.
6. Move Laterally: Traversion of the target network across legitimate devices.
7. Maintain Presence: Ensuring continued control over key systems, nodes and de-
vices.
8. Complete Mission: The execution of the intent of the attack.
The lifecycle offers the ability to model the attack methods of an antagonist in a
uniform manner to allow for an assessment of behaviours towards the intended target
devices. In order to consider the feasibility of these attacker options we must also take
into account the deployed architecture of the ICS under analysis.
5.3.2 Step 2 - Investigation of Deployed Architecture
Security can be reduced through poor systems integration or inadequate control over
communications. As a result, the ICS devices cannot be considered in isolation from
the network on which they are deployed. The second step of the proposed framework
investigates this deployed architecture. Whichever way the architecture has been de-
fined within the ICS operation, whether that be through layering, grouping, functional
separation etc., it must feature in the triage framework so that we can review its impact
and determine common vulnerabilities that arise as a consequence of the design. ICS
are typically not deployed in a consistent manner, and therefore ICS-CDTP does not
prescribe any defined abstractions. For the purposes of this article we use the Purdue
Model of Control Hierarchy [38] as an illustrative architecture.
The Purdue model, a reference architecture for control hierarchy [38] describes six
levels within an organisation managing an industrial control system, illustrated in Figure
3.2. ICS implementations often include a number of significant differences to traditional
IT systems. Typically, ICS have a deeper architecture than typical enterprises, as is
characterised by the Purdue model.
Extensions to the Diamond Model: To accommodate the idiosyncrasies of ICS
into the process we must extend the definition of an event within the Diamond Model.
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Whilst no mandatory elements are prescribed in the model, the infrastructure and victim
nodes should include the following levels of granularity to support a detailed analysis
of attack options.
Input Protocol: The protocol used to access the device.
Input Bearer: The bearer over which the input protocol runs, in order to determine
if it is shared.
Output Protocol: The protocol exiting the device, to accommodate protocol trans-
formations.
Output Bearer: The bearer over which the output protocol runs, in order to deter-
mine if it is shared.
Network Segment / Identifier: Which network or bus segment, or serial identifier,
is used to transit traffic over the bearers.
Architecture Layer: Which layer or zone the segment sits within.
Target Device: The make and model of the device.
Target Device Address: Its address, whether IP, MAC or otherwise.
Target Device Port / Identifier: What port, or other identifier is used to commu-
nicate with the device.
Hardware Revision: The hardware revision of the device.
Firmware Revision: The firmware revision of the device.
OS Revision: The operating system revision of the device.
Process: Which process the device is used within.
Process Step: Which specific step of the process.
Process Impact: The impact, potential or real, of manipulating the device.
Loss: The associated, assessed financial loss through manipulation.
Extensions to the Infrastructure and Victim nodes are represented in Figure 5.2.
Integration of the Diamond Model with the Attack Lifecycle: The Diamond
Model then needs to be integrated with the selected attack lifecycle (or ‘kill-chain’ ), in
this case the Mandiant Attack Lifecycle [15].
Figure 5.3 shows a set of Activity Threads from the Diamond Model [190] with in-
trusion events modelled as diamonds. Activity Threads [190], however, lend themselves
more to intrusion analysis activities, whereas we require a mechanism to develop attack
routes prior to the event, in order to develop understanding of the potential attack
paths.
Figure 5.4 uses Activity Threads from a single adversary to model the various
options available to attack a victim device. The resulting Activity-Attack Graph allows
the various possible routes to the target, and the associated events, to be modelled. The
graph models, in a simple format, the alternative paths that can be considered when
assessing how to defend the target device. It drives the definition of sensor and log alerts
to inform on such behaviour. Should an intrusion occur, the analysis is already mature
as a consequence of these models, and the attacker’s next steps can be considered.
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<Victim, Confidencevictim> = 
   <<TargetDevice, Confidencetgtdevice>
   <TargetDeviceAddress, Confidencetgtdevaddress>
   <TargetDevicePort/Identifier, Confidence tgtdevID> 
   <HardwareRevision, ConfidenceHWrevision> 
   <FirmwareRevision, ConfidenceSWrevision>
   <OSRevision, ConfidenceOSrevision>
   <Process, Confidenceprocess>
   <ProcessStep, Confidenceprocessstep>
   <ProcessImpact, Confidenceprocessimpact>
   <Loss, Confidence loss>>
<Infrastructure, Confidenceinfrastructure> = 
<<InputProtocol, Confidence inputprotocol>
<InputBearer, Confidenceinputbearer>
<OutputProtocol, Confidenceoutputprotocol> 
<OutputBearer, Confidenceoutputbearer> 
<NetworkSegment/Identifier, Confidencesegment>
<ArchitectureLayer, Confidencearchitecturelayer>>
Figure 5.2: Extensions to the definition of victim infrastructure nodes
Victim1 Victim2 Victim3
Adversary1 Adversary1Adversary1
Initial Reconnaissance
Initial Compromise
Establish Foothold
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Internal Reconnaissance
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Complete Mission
Thread1 Thread2 Thread3
?
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Figure 5.3: Activity threads, Caltagirone et al. (2013)
The third step of the proposed framework considers the intent and target of an
attacker.
5.3.3 Step 3 - Antagonistic Target Determination
In a forensic examination of the Stuxnet malware [212] that affected uranium enrichment
centrifuges, it was highlighted that the attack did not just target the vulnerabilities of
the control systems in use, it also targeted the process parameters in order to create
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Figure 5.4: Activity-attack graph, Caltagirone et al. (2013)
an effect in the physical world. The analysis showed that unlike cyber attacks on IT
systems, cyber-physical attacks involve the use of IT systems to spread malware and
the manipulation of ICS elements to influence the process under control that results in
damage to industrial equipment. This highlights the interdependencies of the process
and the control systems in use, and how one cannot be considered in isolation from
the other. Many industrial facilities utilise simulation tools to model and predict the
operations of the processes under control within an ICS. This forms an essential part of
the operations of the facility. These models also offer the possibility to test boundary
conditions of process variable and determine which ones, if maliciously manipulated,
could introduce misbehaviour within the industrial process [107].
Most simulations are focused on a model of the control strategy for the process and
ensure the coherence of the overall plantwide process control [217]. However, if condi-
tions outside of this expected system state are introduced, unanticipated consequences
may be observed. For example, a change in input flow into a recycle loop can result a
‘snowball effect’ [218] with outputs increasing by such a significant level that it leads
to a state whereby an entire plant may have to be shutdown in order to rectify the sit-
uation. This demonstrates that if the control equipment responsible for the input flow
could be maliciously manipulated, the impact on the plant could be significant. The
control device therefore becomes a key asset to defend, as an attacker with knowledge
of the industrial process under control may also determine the efficacy of the device as
a target [107]. Such semantic attacks can lead to long-term degradation of product or
services that impede the effectiveness and profitability of the operation.
Once the key vulnerable processes are defined, a further analysis of the feasibility
of interfering with the control elements that are used to manage the parameters of
the process is undertaken. This will determine those elements requiring remedial or
protective measures to prevent the occurrence of such misuse. One method to identify
areas of vulnerability that are potentially attractive to an antagonist is the CARVER
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Matrix [90].
The US Department of Defense use the CARVER assessment method to deter-
mine criticality and vulnerability in enemy infrastructures. CARVER is a mnemonic
for Criticality, Accessibility, Recuperability, Vulnerability, Effect and Recognisability.
The method focuses on an adversary’s perspective of the infrastructure to enable an
analysis of the weaknesses of a target, or the means by which its operations can be ma-
nipulated by an attacker [90]. In this manner, the capabilities of several threat actors
can be considered. The output of the CARVER assessment is a critical-asset list that
defines a prioritised set of assets that are of value to an attacker based on their impor-
tance, whereby the asset’s incapacitation or destruction would have a serious impact on
the military operation or facility. The use of CARVER matrices to consider threats to
critical national infrastructure by civilian agencies when preparing for terrorist attacks
is emerging, as it allows organisations to consider the relative desirability of targets,
although its use has been limited to the assessment of physical assets [91].
Criticality describes the level of importance the target has and its relative value to an
attacker in order to achieve a desired outcome, usually a denial or degradation in the
ability of a target to function.
Accessibility is an assessment of how an attacker could reach an asset and the com-
plexity of reaching the desired target.
Recuperability considers the time and resources required to repair or replace the target,
or whether viable alternatives exist.
Vulnerability is a measure of the ability of attackers to deny or destroy the targeted
asset.
Effect articulates the impact of the loss or degradation of the target.
Recognisability is the extent to which a critical asset can be recognised by an attacker,
whether this be an understanding of its existence through to knowing the detail of its
location and configuration.
Each of the categories of the CARVER acronym are assessed for an asset, using
guidelines for a subjective assessment of the ratings, based on consistent criteria de-
scribed at the initiation of the analysis [90]. CARVER has a standard set of criteria
based on physical assets that have been modified by the author for ICS triage. This
allows an ICS operator to determine their level of exposure. These modifications to
the criteria have remained close to the original intent of the CARVER process, but
have been extended to accommodate the characteristics of ICS architectures. In the
explanations of how we have applied CARVER within ICS-CDTP we have highlighted
where we have used standard or modified CARVER criteria.
The example in Table 5.2 illustrates how criticality is typically considered using
the CARVER method.
Each of the six domains of CARVER are considered in an unweighted assessment,
with the overall measure of their exposure based on a simple arithmetic addition of
the six values applied [90]. Using the criticality criteria above we can see how, if the
processes of an industrial or critical infrastructure facility were considered, the impact
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Criticality Criteria Score Rating
Immediate termination of outcome; target cannot function with-
out it
9-10
Loss would reduce operational performance considerably, or two-
thirds reduction in outcome
7-8
Loss would reduce operational performance, or one-third reduc-
tion in outcome
5-6
Loss may reduce operational performance, or 10 percent reduction
in outcome
3-4
No significant effect on outcome 1-2
Table 5.2: A CARVER criticality assessment using standard criteria
of their loss would become readily apparent. Take, for example, a water supply utility
[76] that takes its supplies from local rivers, treats the water to remove impurities using
standard control technology, maintains a four-day storage capacity of treated water
and distributes to a local population via proprietary control technology. A CARVER
analysis of the processes may result in the assessment described in Table 5.3.
Process Name C A R V E R Total
Collection of water from rivers 7 4 3 5 7 5 31
Treatment of water 7 8 8 7 8 8 46
Storage of treated water 9 5 6 5 8 5 38
Distribution of water 8 7 6 5 8 3 37
Table 5.3: An example of completed CARVER matrix for a water utility
The storage of treated water appears a higher priority based on its criticality,
but the lower criticality of the treatment of water is amplified by its apparent ease
of access and use of standard technology that requires little industry-specific expertise
to understand. This triage process allows the processes at the highest risk of being
compromised to be addressed first.
Once the critical processes have been identified, the same approach can be used
to identify the control devices that manage and automate them. In this manner, the
scope of the analysis is immediately constrained to those systems that support the
vital operational processes and provides a necessary triage. The CARVER method
allows for existing, proven security methods to be brought together in a complementary
framework that allows the various facets of the denial or degradation of an industrial
control element to be consistently evaluated. By analysing the control logic within
the device it is possible to determine which of the individual control elements, or the
interactions between elements, are responsible for the key aspects of the process under
control. Such analysis allows an assessment of the ability of the process to withstand
variations in conditions and data during its lifetime. This measure of robustness allows
for the consequences of loss to be assessed [219].
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Criticality
The criticality of a device depends upon its involvement with a key process and whether
or not it executes process logic or utilises process variables. Either can be manipulated
to result in adverse effects on the process. These impacts can be assessed in two ways;
firstly using safety analysis data; and secondly, using plant simulation data.
The Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) method is probably the most commonly
used hazards analysis approach in industry [87]. Its widespread use and acceptance has
led to a large number of practitioners and supporting service providers. The method
divides systems under analysis into nodes, each of which representing a section of the
process that undergoes a significant change or transformation. Examples of nodes in-
clude pumps, reactors, heat exchangers etc. This information is generally extracted
from Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&ID) [87]. The size of a node is a sub-
jective decision based on the nature of the industrial process and may group devices or
system elements together in order to consider an overall process change holistically. The
groupings used for safety purposes are appropriate for antagonistic cyber analysis pur-
poses as they describe malfunctions, and allow an assessment of impact and criticality
should such conditions be wilfully caused.
A HAZOP analysis follows a consistent process whereby a system node is selected
and its purpose and safe limits are defined. Next, one of a set of process guidewords are
selected, such as high flow, low/no flow, reverse flow, misdirected flow, high pressure,
high temperature, polymerisation, wrong composition etc., that describe the effect that
should be considered, and hazards and their causes are identified as a result. For each
hazard, the process considers how it will be recognised should it occur, and an estimation
of the consequences is reached. A set of safeguard requirements are then defined, as
is the estimated frequency of the hazard’s occurrence. Finally, the hazards are ranked
and a set of findings and recommendations is produced.
HAZOP analyses drive a rigorous assessment of the impact of undesirable events on
a process, decomposing it to a detailed level. Their availability as a mechanism to assess
criticality provides a rich dataset on which to base triage decisions. Where this data is
not available, or when it has not covered sufficient breadth for cyber defence purposes,
plantwide simulations used to model the behaviour of the processes under control can
be considered as a basis for study. A study of a Vinyl Acetate Monomer (VAM) process
[220] assessed the vulnerabilities using an impact vocabulary that resembled a subset
of the HAZOP guidewords. The full use of the HAZOP vocabulary, however, offers a
structure by which the inputs, outputs, reaction vessels etc. of an industrial facility can
be analysed, using the simulation to visualise and quantify the impact. Modification of
the simulation to introduce financial variables will also allow the monetary impact of
manipulation to be quantified.
Once the key processes have been determined, the ICS control devices that control
the vulnerable process steps can be further analysed. Within control systems, distur-
bances in the process result in changes to process variables (PV) and represent the value
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sampled for control. The measurement of the PV for the purposes of process control
is described as the Controlled Variable (CV), which is provided by a Primary Element
such as a sensor. The CV is compared to a setpoint within the controller, generat-
ing an error, e, representing the deviation from the desired state. Based on this data
the controller determines the necessary corrective action, represented as a Manipulated
Variable (mv) that drives the behaviour of Final Control Elements (FCE) such as a
valve, that manipulate the mass or energy entering the process. Those control devices
that act upon CV and provide logic to drive mv in the vulnerable process steps are
deemed most critical [221].
Accessibility
In order for a cyber attack to be successful, the targeted control device must be ac-
cessible. Activity Threads [190] provide a formal way of representing the routes to a
targeted control element. These are used to allow an assessment of their ease of use.
A set of CARVER accessibility criteria, modified for applicability to ICS triage, is
described in Table 5.4. As with all of the CARVER factors described in this process,
they provide guidelines to shape the consistency of the assessor’s thinking, but support
a subjective measure that can be derived in relatively short timescales. The accessibility
criteria, modified from the original process that focusses purely on physical access to
a target, guides the assessor to consider the ease with which an attacker might gain
access to a critical system of device, and the likelihood of existing security mechanisms
detecting such an event.
Accessibility Criteria Score Rating
Remote or insider access with no means of identifying the attacker 9-10
Remote or insider access with limited means of identifying the
attacker
7-8
Remote or insider access is possible with limited auditing and
logging
5-6
Remote or insider access is possible with extensive auditing and
logging
3-4
Remote or insider access is extremely difficult and will be identi-
fied
1-2
Table 5.4: CARVER accessibility criteria modified for ICS cyber security assessment
Recuperabilty
Recuperability is a measure of the control system element’s ability to be replaced or
repaired, and is a factor of the processes and procedures in place to provide a working
alternative to the original device. This includes not only the replacement of the physical
device, but the ability to load and execute a verified copy of the configuration necessary
to operate the process. The recuperability measure can, if necessary, be tailored to the
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specifics of the industry under analysis. Standard CARVER recuperability criteria is
applicable to ICS, and is described in Table 5.5. It guides the assessor to determine
how long it would take to remediate the loss of a critical system or device.
Recuperability Criteria Score Rating
Replacement, repair, or substitution requires 1 month or more 9-10
Replacement, repair, or substitution requires 1 week to 1 month 7-8
Replacement, repair, or substitution requires 72 hours to 1 week 5-6
Replacement, repair, or substitution requires 24 to 72 hours 3-4
Same-day replacement, repair, or substitution 1-2
Table 5.5: Standard CARVER recuperability criteria
Vulnerability
The vulnerability of a control device can depend on a number of factors. Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) databases provide a library of known issues with
control devices that can support an initial triage of potential avenues for exploitation.
A modified set of accessibility criteria that considers the capability of an antagonist is
described in Table 5.6 in order to provide accommodation for industrial equipment.
Vulnerability Criteria Score Rating
Requires no industrial expertise; uses open source tools 9-10
Requires limited industrial expertise; uses open source tools 7-8
Requires extensive expertise; uses open source tools 5-6
Requires extensive industrial expertise and custom tools 3-4
Requires detailed knowledge of industrial facility and custom tools 1-2
Table 5.6: CARVER vulnerability criteria modified for ICS cyber security assessment
Effect
The effect of any cyber attack must be considered in the context of the process and the
physical elements involved. This is a factor of the simulation and safety documentation
review conducted in the criticality step of the CARVER method, and is reviewed based
on the criteria in Table 5.7, modified for a critical infrastructure facility.
Recognisability
In order for an attack to be enacted upon a device it is necessary for the threat actor
to be aware of its existence and be able to identify it within the control network. In
order to assess the risk of knowledge of existence, it should be ascertained how much of
the control system architecture has been made available on open source resources such
as websites, and how much is freely discussed in communications by members of the
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Effect Criteria Score Rating
Large-scale impact on services and revenues; noticeable to public 9-10
Limited impact on services and revenues; noticeable to public 7-8
Minor impact on services; minor impact on revenues; noticeable
to public
5-6
Minor impact on services; minor impact on revenues; public un-
aware
3-4
Minor impact on services; no impact on revenues; public unaware 1-2
Table 5.7: CARVER effect criteria modified for ICS cyber security assessment
facility’s supply chain or maintenance service. The risk of identification of the device
once on the control network is dependent on the control environment’s ability to identify
device enumeration behaviours, and upon a knowledge of the control network’s traffic
profile [54, 53].
A modified set of recognisability criteria is described in Table 5.8.
Recognisability Criteria Score Rating
Requires no expertise to identify target device 9-10
Requires limited technical expertise to identify target 7-8
Requires moderate technical expertise to identify target 5-6
Requires significant technical expertise to identify target 3-4
Deception tactics deployed to minimise recognition 1-2
Table 5.8: CARVER recognisability criteria modified for ICS cyber security assessment
The modified criteria of the CARVER matrix, criticality, accessibility, recuperabil-
ity, vulnerability, effect and recognisability permits the identification and comparative
ranking of ICS targets that would be attractive to a capable, antagonistic actor, in order
to focus the efforts and resources of defensive activities.
5.3.4 Step 4 - Attack Options Analysis
For the extent of the attack options to be considered, the fourth step of the proposed
framework takes each identified course of action and decomposes it further. This analysis
must also take into account the deployed architecture.
Figure 5.5 graphically presents a single Activity Thread, derived from an Activity-
Attack Graph, in a novel visualisation that incorporates the deployed architecture. The
usual two-dimensional representation of an Activity Thread is augmented by a third axis
that shows the same attack distributed across the layers of the deployed architecture,
described using the Purdue Model. The strength of this extension of the original model
is that it allows common vulnerabilities or exploits to be considered over architectural
layers, identifying areas of security weakness, or a concentration of potential attack
behaviours, in individual layers. The standard Diamond Model approach to this uses
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a two-dimensional model, but this is again insufficient for an ICS. To allow for the
characteristics of a deployed ICS architecture to be accommodated, a third axis is
added to accommodate the architectural layers. This allows the defensive planners to
review how to either detect, delay, disrupt, degrade or deceive the attacker at each layer
of the architecture, considering the additional attributes defined in our extension of the
infrastructure and victim nodes of the diamond event.
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Figure 5.5: Extended activity graph incorporating the deployed architecture
The example shown in Figure 5.5 models the following APT attack behaviour:
1. External reconnaissance of internet boundary devices locates an internet-facing
Third-party Access Server in the Enterprise Network.
2. An open, unprotected port is located and used to deliver an initial malware im-
plant onto an unprotected File Server on the Site Business Planning and Logistics
Network.
3. The malware communicates with an external command and control server and a
fully-staged malware implant is deployed.
4. The malware uses a known operating system vulnerability to escalate its privileges.
5. Internal reconnaissance of the network identifies an Enterprise Resource Planning
(ERP) [222] system in the Site Business Planning and Logistics Network.
6. The malware exploits the local network infrastructure to navigate to the Manu-
facturing Execution System (MES) [223].
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7. A beacon is deployed to the MES.
8. The beacon communicates with the command and control server via the previously
compromised internet-facing server and a fully-staged implant, tailored to the
device configuration, is deployed.
9. The malware performs reconnaissance of the OT network and identifies a DCS
that manages processes within the plant.
10. The malware exploits the network infrastructure to reach the DCS.
11. An initial implant is deployed on the DCS that beacons to the command and
control server.
12. The command and control server, communicating via the chain of compromised
devices, delivers a fully-staged implant, tailored to the device configuration.
13. The malware exploits a vulnerability in the DCS’s operating system to escalate
its privileges.
14. The malware modifies the configuration of the DCS in order to keep its processes
continually active.
15. The malware performs reconnaissance of the PLCs connected to the DCS and
exfiltrates this information.
16. The malware receives instructions from the command and control server and forces
a shutdown of a targeted PLC in order to stop a critical node in the plant’s
processing.
The results of the Attack Options Analysis feed into the final steps of ICS-CDTP,
supporting security testing and remediation, security monitoring, and incident response
planning.
5.3.5 Step 5 - Security Testing and Remediation
For most large ICS it is not cost-effective to hold a pre-production environment for
the whole facility on which to test changes [3]. This presents a challenge when testing
against a representative system is required, as any use of the live environment can
result in unforeseen consequences. In order to assess the levels of security available to
the devices highlighted by the CARVER matrix analysis, it is necessary to define a
means by which testing can be performed without risk to the operational environment.
Step 5 of the process presented in this paper proposes a three-stage approach to security
testing:
1. Simulated.
2. Isolated.
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3. Synthesised.
Simulated: A process-centric approach to security testing that uses a simulation
of the control device, modelling its logic, in order to assess the behaviours of the control
strategy if the measured values, process variables, setpoints or sensor data are manipu-
lated. The intent is to exceed normal operating parameters to test boundary conditions,
and observe their impact on the process under control. The objective of this testing is
not to test the security of the device, but its resilience to abnormal data and assess the
error and boundary checks of the logic itself.
Isolated: A device-centric view of security that isolates a device identified as
critical or attractive to an attacker, and assesses its inherent vulnerabilities. Preparation
for isolated testing includes interrogating CVE databases to identify security testing
performed elsewhere. Isolated testing should assess whether the recorded vulnerabilities
are present within the device under test. However, not all vulnerabilities are identified or
recorded within ICS equipment communities, so isolated testing should systematically
test the device to assess its security. Techniques such as STRIDE (Spoofing, Tampering,
Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, Elevation of Privilege) threat
modelling approach [224, 225] allow various methods of driving a vulnerability, especially
those enabled by devices that are insecure by design. Depending on the licensing of the
device, techniques such as fuzzing may also be adopted.
Synthesised: An integration-centric set of test scenarios that assesses any vul-
nerabilities introduced as a consequence of the integration of critical or attractive ICS
devices and components. A synthetic environment such as a cyber range should be
used to assess the device or interrelated devices in an architecturally representative en-
vironment that takes the output from the simulated and isolated stages to produce the
requirements for testing at the synthesised stage. This allows the human aspect of con-
trol systems to be considered, as the range permits operational procedures to introduced
to assess the operator’s response to various situations and industrial process conditions.
It also offers the additional benefit of supporting red teams to further analyse the attack
options available to an antagonist, with the option to extend this to a CDX to assess
the organisation’s ability to respond to the targeting of the device or component.
As the testing iterates, the results feedback into the ongoing analysis of the De-
ployed Architecture, Antagonistic Target Determination, and Attack Options Analysis
steps, allowing remedial means to address security vulnerabilities of be assessed. It also
drives the development of Security Monitoring strategies and Incident Response Plans,
and can feed the scenarios for a progressive collective training programme, as proposed
in Section 6.
5.3.6 Step 6 - Security Monitoring
Many older ICS devices are inherently insecure [3] and hardening may not be viable.
At this point the defensive analysis must move from the consideration of protection to
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that of active defence.
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Figure 5.6: The Diamond Model Course of Action Matrix integrated with the Mandiant
Attack Lifecycle
A Course of Action (COA) Matrix [190] (Figure 5.6) is developed from the Activ-
ity Threads and Activity-Attack Graphs. It determines how to detect, deny, disrupt,
degrade or deceive an attacker, and assists in the analysis of where sensors should be
deployed to identify antagonistic behaviours.
5.3.7 Step 7 - Incident Response Planning
Hardening of devices and strengthening the perimeter of a networked system are es-
sential steps towards defending an ICS from malicious activity. However, protective
measures only serve to reduce the attack possibilities. When dealing with an intel-
ligent, adaptive adversary, it is necessary to consider defensive plans to support any
intrusion to allow incident responders to anticipate the antagonists’ next steps. The
use of Activity-Attack Graphs and COA matrices [190] considers the options available
to an attacker, and describes the characteristics of each attack event using a diamond
model representation, developing a set of ‘competing hypotheses’ [226]. This provides a
basis to build an incident response ‘playbook’ that can be iteratively improved through
table-top exercising and determine the most efficient means to deny the attacker access
to the critical system assets. These playbooks can be assessed for the efficacy in a
progressive collective training programme, as proposed in Section 6.
5.4 Analysis
As the simulation steps of the process have been demonstrated by Krotofil et al. (2014,
2015) [220, 107], and require detailed process engineering specialisms, recreating these
experiments was deemed unnecessary. Isolated testing of ICS devices has been widely
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acknowledged as a viable means of assessing vulnerabilities of individual ICS devices
[227, 228, 229], and again it would not have enhanced the evaluation of the framework
by repeating analyses undertaken elsewhere. CDXs, however, provided a means by
which the synthesised elements of the process could be evaluated, as well as simulating
antagonistic actions against an ICS. During a large-scale CDX in July 2016 [230] it was
observed that the use of the CARVER Matrix in Step 3 of an early iteration of the ICS-
CDTP, with the modified assessment criteria described in this article, identified critical
systems to the continued operations of ICS facilities. However, this was initially limited
to systems that provided operational functionality, as opposed to technical infrastruc-
ture systems such as domain controllers etc. The Diamond Model Activity Threads
and Activity-Attack Graphs in Step 4 of ICS-CDTP successfully tracked antagonistic
events, using COA Matrices to determine multiple attack options, and demonstrated
how analysis of Activity Thread models (a vertical analysis of the model) identified at-
tacker progress through the networks being defended. Similarly, the horizontal analysis
of the Activity Models and Activity-Attack Graphs identified common attack techniques
across target networks, supporting the sharing of threat intelligence across Blue Teams.
This did not prevent all Red Team activities, as systems were still compromised, but the
freedom of Red Teams actions was limited to systems not assessed as critical. Red Team
progress toward these systems was observed to be slower than towards non-critical sys-
tems that had not been proactively hardended, with an increased deployment of network
and host sensors.
However, whilst the techniques used in the CDX demonstrated their effectiveness,
they were largely paper-based, and required a significant investment of resources and
effort. As the CDX progressed, the manual maintenance of paper-based data repositories
became an increasing drain on the Blue Team resources, suggesting that support tools
would be necessary to implement the triage process at scale.
In summary, of the eight questions posed in Table 5.1 that this framework should
address, Table 5.9 describes how the various components described in this paper interact
to provide a coherent model for triaging ICS.
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Question Framework Compo-
nents
Comments
1. Which devices are at-
tractive to an attacker?
CARVER Matrix The CARVER model supports the assessment of de-
vices that would have the most significant impact on
an ICS facility, and therefore those most attractive to
a capable APT actor.
2. Can we better protect
these devices?
Process simulation, device
testing, synthetic environ-
ments
Process simulation identifies process variable vulner-
abilities, which subsequently drives the isolated and
integrated security testing of the devices responsible
for using these variables.
3. What routes exist to
these devices?
Activity Threads,
Activity-Attack Graphs,
Extended Activity Graphs,
COA Matrix
The modelling of event threads and graphs supports
the assessment of routes towards the identified critical
devices.
4. What events would oc-
cur in an attempt to access
and manipulate these de-
vices?
Activity Threads,
Activity-Attack Graphs,
Extended Activity Graphs
The same event threads and graphs that determine
the viable route towards a critical device are also used
to determine the antagonistic events that would occur
as a result of an attack.
5. Where can we deploy
sensors to detect these
events?
Security monitoring and
incident response planning
The positioning of sensors and IDS would be guided
by the event threads and graphs. The responses to
such event detection would then form the basis of an
incident response plan.
6. How will we deter-
mine which of the alter-
nate routes to a device are
being used by an attacker?
COA Matrix The sensor and IDS deployment would be based on
the possible routes to critical devices. Any alerts
would be cross-referenced to the COA Matrix to as-
sess which of the many possible COAs is likely to be
followed.
7. How can we predict an
attacker’s next activity?
Activity Threads,
Activity-Attack Graphs,
Extended Activity Graphs,
COA Matrix
With the possible COAs established, the event
threads and graphs can be used to assess where along
the attack path the antagonist is currently positioned,
and therefore which steps must be achieved before the
critical device is compromised.
8. What does our inci-
dent response plan need to
describe and test in order
to mitigate residual risks
identified in the analysis?
CARVER, Process simula-
tion, device testing, syn-
thetic environments, secu-
rity monitoring and inci-
dent response planning
The CARVER Matrix will highlight the initial attrac-
tiveness of a system or device, and simulation and
testing will determine the extent of the associated
risks. This will shape the security monitoring posture
and incident response plans based on the ascertained
residual risk.
Table 5.9: ICS-CDTP mapped to the questions posed in Table 5.1
5.5 Initial Conclusions
ICS-CDTP provides a framework to assess the attractiveness and criticality of ICS
devices that underpin industrial processes. As a validated dataset describing the nature
of cyber attacks on ICS is unavailable, ICS-CDTP is based on subjective assessment of
likely antagonistic targets. However, the use of safety data and simulations to drive the
criticality assessment of key processes focuses on their impact on the industrial facility’s
ability to operate, and is based on a proven military and counter-terrorism methodology,
extended for ICS. This drives the identification of those ICS devices responsible for
the critical data measurements, calculations and control element manipulations that
could be altered to achieve antagonistic aims, and therefore which should be triaged for
immediate security testing and remediation. The approach to testing, focusing on non-
destructive means that do not require access to the production environment, does not
expose the ICS operator to risks that arise as a consequence of unintended consequences
of security activities. As such, it provides a viable coping strategy for ICS operators
establishing initial cyber situational awareness.
ICS-CDTP accepts that whilst we might define the attractiveness of a target, and
identify the many routes towards it for exploitation, we cannot know a priori which
precise route the attacker will take, or how his behaviours will change based on our
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defensive actions. By modelling the many courses of action available to an antago-
nist and overlaying this onto the deployed architecture, ICS-CDTP can determine the
characteristics of malicious behaviour in each segment or layer and define the neces-
sary signatures or heuristics by which our sensors can identify the attack. ICS-CDTP
security responders can be provided with a pre-incident assessment of the courses of
action available to an attacker, preventing antagonists from reaching or affecting the
devices critical to the key processes of the industrial facility. This understanding and
associated procedures can form the basis of a progressive series of TTX and CDX to
measure efficacy and drive the development of enterprise mental models and SA.
ICS-CDTP provides a coping strategy, addressing Question 2 - Does the adoption
of coping strategies increase situational awareness? of the six research questions posed
in Section 1.4. It contributes an integrated process that combines the Diamond Model of
Intrusion Analysis [190], the Mandiant Attack Lifecycle [15], and the CARVER Matrix
[90]. It includes novel extensions to the Diamond Model event description and activity
modelling to accommodate ICS. It further provides novel contribution by modifying the
CARVER assessment criteria to support cyber impact on ICS. ICS-CDTP provides an
effective triage of attack vectors and likely targets for a capable antagonist, identifying
key ICS processes and their exposure to cyber threats, with the view to maintaining
critical operations. These are essential elements of Question 5 - As a result of serious
games, can participants recognise the characteristics of a cyber attack and determine
the possible intent and courses of action?, and Question 6 - Are participants of serious
games able to assess the immediate and longer-term impacts of cyber attacks? posed in
Section 1.4.
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6.1 Introduction
Capable APT adversaries are characterised by sophisticated levels of expertise and sig-
nificant resources used to exploit opportunities to pursue objectives over an extended
period of time, adapting to defenders’ efforts to resist them [140]. Organisations such
as critical national infrastructure (CNI) providers using ICS face a dynamic, evolving
threat landscape as a result. Consequently, they carry an associated degree of oper-
ational risk. As we discussed in Section 3.5, to address this threat, literature asserts
that we consider three questions; 1) what can happen? (i.e., what can go wrong?), 2)
how likely is it that it will happen?, and 3) if it does happen, what is the impact? [74].
However, as also discussed in Section 3.5, the level of incident reporting available has
not produced a sufficiently quantified and observable set of metrics for cyber attacks
on ICS to answer these questions or inform generally-accepted risk models, and there is
limited value in the probability judgements based on such techniques. Indeed, given the
adaptability of the antagonists, preventing intrusions from well-resourced APT actors
presents CNI operators with a significant challenge. Awareness of a risk is one of the
main factors of a successful risk management programme [141]. By proactively raising
awareness of threats and their impacts it poses less risk than if we have no understand-
ing of its potential impact [74]. SCIPS promotes an understanding of this risk at the
conceptual level, and the ICS-CDTP offers a structured process to develop a focused
defensive posture. However, without a wider appreciation of the dynamic nature of the
APT adversary and the necessity to maintain a trained incident response capability
against such antagonists, ICS operators still carry residual risk.
SA models potentially provide a framework to better understand the landscape
and raise awareness of the threats, helping to shape the cognitive processes of incident
responders, and allowing the tailoring of risk mitigations to better fit the individual
needs of the targeted organisation [142, 143]. It is argued that a well-trained response
team that understands the nature of the antagonist is critical to success in responding
to APT incidents [144].
Since incident response teams cannot be prepare for every APT situation, or predict
every crisis, training activities must be provided to support operating in challenging
situations to develop concrete guidance, procedures and tools to help individuals to
collectively react to network intrusions [145]. To produce the level of team cohesion
and adaptability required to respond to the variety of APT attacks an organisation
might face, the training environment should include simulations to contribute to the
progressive, cost-effective establishment and maintenance of SA and skills proficiency
[146].
This chapter explores the requirements for collective cyber incident response (IR)
training and proposes a framework to develop progressive individual and team SA.
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6.2 Situational Awareness
To recap our appraisal from Chapter 3, SA, as defined by Endsley (1995) is “the per-
ception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the
comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future”
[147]. This definition comprises three levels of SA, as described in Section 3.7 and
illustrated in Figure 6.1.
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Figure 6.1: A model of situational awareness in dynamic decision making, Endsley
(1995)
Figure 6.1 describes SA within the context of a decision-making process. An indi-
vidual’s perception of the constituent parts of the environment, from whichever sources
they take their information from, forms the basis of their SA. Importantly, the selection
of a decision derived from SA is separate from the resulting performance of the selected
actions. There are many factors that influence the decision-making process. Key within
these are the individual’s innate abilities to process information, their prior training,
and previous experiences. These may be further influenced by their preconceptions that
can introduce a bias that affects their development of SA [147].
As discussed in Section 3.7, a critical element of SA is understanding the rate
at which information changes. The dynamic nature of cyber IR dictates that as the
situation evolves, so an individual’s and team’s SA must adapt. In rapidly changeable
environments this requires operators to adopt many cognitive strategies for maintaining
SA [148]. Mental models allow people to predict and explain the behaviour of the
world around them, to recognise and remember relationships among components of the
environment, and to construct expectations for what is likely to occur next [18, 149].
SA therefore becomes a function of the processes and systems that provide and process
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information before, and during, a cyber incident. In this situation the features of
the task environment, including task complexity, individual workload, and stress, may
also influence SA. It is important to acknowledge that SA does not encompass an
individual’s complete knowledge or expertise. It only refers to the elements pertinent to
the dynamic environment [147]. Accordingly, it is necessary to consider the volatility of
the information within the environment where SA must be established and maintained.
By separating SA from decision-making and performance of actions, we can con-
sider the ability to comprehend the environment and project future statuses as distinct
from the proficiency of response to the situation. Even experienced decision makers will
make the wrong decisions if they have inaccurate or incomplete SA. Conversely, a person
who has perfect SA may still make the wrong decision if they lack appropriate training
and experience to comprehend the situation, or may exhibit poor performance if they
do not possess the skills technical to remediate the situation. SA, decision-making,
and performance, are therefore different stages within an overall process, with different
factors influencing them. We therefore require a training construct that develops the
mental models necessary to establish SA, along with procedural and technical skills to
shape performance, that allows a set of coping strategies to be practiced and rehearsed
prior to an APT event. This must look beyond individual SA, and address SA across
an entire team or enterprise.
Team SA, as illustrated in Figure 3.4, is the degree to which every team member
possesses the SA required for their own responsibilities, independent of any overlaps in
SA requirements that may exist. It is not sufficient that one knows perfectly but the
other not at all, every team member must have SA for all of their own requirements
[147].
6.3 Mental Models
Shared mental models help teams to cope with difficult and changing task conditions
[151, 152]. The ability to adapt is an important skill in high-performing teams, and
a shared mental model is an essential element of a team’s adaptability. We shall now
consider the types of mental models we require to inform SA as the basis for incident
response.
By their nature, APT attacks are covert and difficult to detect, with a degree of
tailoring available to the antagonist in order to achieve focussed outcomes on the tar-
get network. However, it has been demonstrated that APTs follow a common attack
lifecycle, performed in several phases, that can be broadly characterised as reconnais-
sance, preparation, execution, gaining access, information gathering and connection
maintenance [231], as characterised by the Lockheed Martin™ Kill-Chain and Mandi-
ant™ Attack Lifecycle Model. Such lifecycles allow a mental model to be constructed
that encompasses the adversary behaviour discussed in Section 3.8, using an under-
standing of a representative antagonist’s observable actions to create attacker profiles
108
A. Cook 6.3. MENTAL MODELS
so that effective countermeasures can be designed.
Another factor that may contribute to SA and shared understanding is a model
that assists each member of a team to understand the roles and responsibilities of
other team members and their patterns of interaction [150]. This would need to be
augmented with an understanding of the skills, expertise, attitudes and preferences of
the individuals that comprise the team, to assist everyone involved to anticipate their
colleagues’ reactions to certain situations.
Incident responders across the enterprise require a shared mental model that de-
scribes the operational priorities of the organisation, so that their efforts are aligned
to ensuring the mission-critical aspects of the operation are maintained throughout the
attack. This would require a mental model that describes the operating environment of
the ICS, encompassing processes under control as well as the technology estate.
These requirements manifest themselves as five shared mental models, derived from
the four models proposed by Mathieu et al. (2000) [149], extending them to accom-
modate the characteristics of the cyber environment, recognising the volatility of the
underpinning information. This extended model is presented in Table 6.1.
Type of Model Knowledge
Content
Model
Volatility
Comment
APT Attack Be-
haviours
Attack methods,
threat actors, in-
trusion sets, cam-
paigns, malware
High A shared knowledge of antagonistic cyber behaviours allows
teams to apply this understanding to the operating environ-
ment and operational priorities. However, the adaptability of
APTs requires a continual analysis of the threat landscape and
recognised intrusion sets. As a consequence, this mental model
is unlikely to ever be complete, and the accuracy of the model
is not likely to be high.
Team Interaction Roles and re-
sponsibilities,
information
sources, inter-
action patterns,
communication
channels, role in-
terdependencies,
information flow
High Shared knowledge about team interactions drives how team
members behave by creating expectations. Adaptable teams
are those who understand well and can predict the nature of
team interactions. The team interaction will be driven by the
nature of the threat facing the organisation, and as the re-
sult of APT adaptability, team interactions and roles/respon-
sibilities will be required to be continually refined in line with
emerging threats. The model will have a strong basis on es-
tablished IR practice, so although specific elements of the in-
formation requirements and flows will be highly volatile and
dependent on mechanisms to detect and respond to incidents,
the major elements will be stable.
Team Under-
standing
Teammates’
knowledge, skills,
attitudes, pref-
erences, and
tendencies
Medium Team-specific knowledge of teammates helps members to bet-
ter tailor their behaviour to what they expect from teammates.
Personality traits are likely to be a low-volatility, the training
requirement and relative knowledge of teammates skills will
maintain a higher level of volatility.
Operational Pri-
orities
Key business and
operational pro-
cesses, key opera-
tional and infras-
tructure systems
Low Relatively stable model, but subject to changing business pri-
orities. However, it is expected that these will be regularly
communicated to the team and used for pre-incident planning,
so the volatility is expected to be low as a result.
Operating Envi-
ronment
Technical envi-
ronment, operat-
ing procedures,
system limita-
tions, known
vulnerabilities
Low Likely to be the most stable model in terms of content, as the
operating environment will have to follow established change
control processes for modifications to occur. It is probable that
a high degree of model stability can be achieved.
Table 6.1: Types of shared mental models for cyber SA, adapted and extended from
Mathieu et al (2000)
Mental models are developed as a result of training and experience in a given
environment. With experience, recurrent situational components will be noticed, along
with repeat associations and causal relationships [147]. Instruction should be structured
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such that new information or knowledge builds on existing knowledge. This facilitates
the development of SA, as personnel are able to develop increasingly detailed mental
models [154]. The requirement to develop experience-based understanding suggests
experiential learning may provide a suitable vehicle by which individuals and teams can
develop the mental models necessary for SA in incident response situations.
6.4 Experiential Learning for Developing Situational Aware-
ness
As discussed in Section 3.7.1, the crawl-walk-run approach to training is typically ap-
plied sequentially through a series of training episodes. However, it has been demon-
strated that providing progressive training scenarios that deliver crawl-walk-run training
opportunities that are cumulative, and grow in complexity, delivers far greater train-
ing benefit [152]. By placing the responsibility for learning on the trainee, requiring
them to solve problems during the scenario in a crawl-walk-run manner, experimental
results demonstrate that learning is accelerated when compared to traditional meth-
ods [152]. Adapting the model proposed by Schaab and Moses (2001) [152], previously
discussed in section 3.7.1, to accommodate the three levels of SA defined by Endsley
(1995) [147] we can provide a series of progressive crawl-walk-run developments to de-
velop SA within a framework of increasingly complex scenarios. This is illustrated in
Figure 6.2. In this way, individuals and teams can develop in a progressive manner,
building their understanding, information processing mechanisms, long-term memory
stores, and automaticity, as required for SA.
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Figure 6.2: Traditional and recommended methods of collective training, adapted from
Schaab and Moses (2001) to accommodate the three levels of SA from Endsley (1995)
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6.5 A Framework for Progressive Collective Training to
Develop Situational Awareness
Using this progressive approach, we shall now consider its application to collective
training exercises, as a form of serious game. The literature review of works pertaining to
collective training in Chapter 3 highlighted that much of the research in this field related
to military skills development. Whitney and Vozzo (2012) [151] performed a review
of experimental studies, interviews with subject matter experts, reports on military
collective training, and psychological research in learning and training. They produced
a set of recommended content for collective training. Zipperer et al. (2003) [165]
compiled results from training questionnaires and interviews with experienced military
instructors, supplemented by interviews with subject matter experts. They highlighted
the evidence of the effectiveness of the crawl-walk-run approach to training. Pike and
Huddleston (2011) [161] conducted a training needs analysis for team training, using
a systematic process of analysing established training tasks and identifying suitable
training options. They concluded the inherent complexity and scale of collective training
puts it beyond the analytical reach of the techniques normally employed for individual
training. Lemmers et al. (2004) [164] evaluated collective training in a distributed
simulation exercise, focussing on the issues surrounding the evaluation of exercises that
use synthetic environments. Schaab and Moses (2001) [152] investigated how soldiers
acquire new skills, individually and collectively, using a combination of observations,
surveys, and analysis of performance on practical exercises.
By combining and consolidating the concepts and results of the research by Whit-
ney and Vozzo (2012) [151], Zipperer et al. (2003) [165], Pike and Huddleston (2011)
[161], Lemmers et al. (2004) [164], and Schaab and Moses (2001) [152], a set of 17
requirements for progressive collective training for the development of SA were derived.
These are proposed in Table 6.2.
A workshop facilitated by the author [232] with the leadership of a team of experi-
enced incident responders from the research sample used for the experimentation in this
research (described in section 7) reviewed the requirements in Table 6.2. The output
was the definition of a framework of five levels of progressive steps to incrementally pro-
vide realistic incident response training. It introduces increasingly capable threat actors
through the levels, and an associated requirements for improved SA, in an environment
intended to promote learning and development. The framework spans both table-top
(TTX) and cyber defence (CDX) exercises, providing common, integrated goals across
the exercise types. They start at Collective IR Training (CIRT) Level 1, focusing on
the development of interactions between members of sub-teams within an overall team,
facing a low-level threat actor in a simple scenario, through to CIRT Level 5, where
multiple incident response teams must coordinate to respond to high-level threat actors
in a complex scenario. The summary of each level is provided in Table 6.3. Whilst the
training objectives are common across exercise types, the assessment characteristics are
specific to TTX and CDX. Accordingly, we shall now discuss the detailed use of the
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Req. Overview Description
1. Approach Follow a crawl-walk-run structure.
2. Composition Be easily broken-down into component tasks.
3. Understanding Provide appropriate mental models to allow compre-
hension of the environment.
4. Situational Awareness Enhance situational awareness across levels 1 to 3.
5. Review Allow ample opportunity to review performance.
6. Feedback Provide regular feedback and opportunities for re-
flection.
7. Learning Environment Provide a learning environment in which it is safe to
fail.
8. Individual Skills Take into account personnel’s existing knowledge
and skill levels.
9. Skill Development Build on previous knowledge and experiences.
10. Participation Provide opportunities for hands-on experience or ac-
tive participation.
11. Skill Maintenance Provide sessions for ongoing maintenance of skill and
knowledge.
12. Environment Resemble a realistic environment.
13. Vocabulary Develop a common lexicon for team interaction.
14. Interactions Drive team interactions and incident responses pro-
cesses.
15. Role Definitions Drive greater clarity in the definition of team roles
and responsibilities.
16. Progressive Threat Model Progressively introduce capable threat actors.
17. Metrics Facilitate metrics to measure improvements in capa-
bilities and situational awareness.
Table 6.2: Requirements for progressive collective training to develop situational aware-
ness.
CIRT levels as a progressive training framework.
6.5.1 Table-Top Exercises (TTX)
Table-top exercises (TTX), within this framework, are intended to test the completeness
of operating instructions for the team, and the overall command of control (C2) during
an incident. Whilst members of a response team may be individually highly-skilled,
their effectiveness must be within a structure that ensures that wider Team SA is
maintained, and so that individuals may be replaced if necessary. This requires complete
documentation of incident response plans and techniques to address defensive cyber
activities.
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Collective
IR Training
(CIRT)
Title Description Scenario
Complexity
Threat Actor
Capability
Level 1 Sub-Team Review Assessment of the ability of a sub-team,
within an overall incident response team, to
understand and execute their required func-
tions efficiently and effectively
Simple Low
Level 2 Team Review Bringing together each of the sub-teams into
an overall operating unit, to test the efficacy
of the C2 of the team and their ability to
work cooperatively.
Simple Low
Level 3 Team Validation Assess the ability of the team to deal with
a realistic scenario that contains business
or operational priorities, facing a competent
threat actor.
Medium Medium
Level 4 Team Stress Test Progression to a complex realistic scenario
supporting multiple stakeholders, whilst still
facing a competent threat actor
Complex Medium
Level 5 Multiple Teams
Testing to Failure
A complex scenario involving more than one
organisation, with incident response teams
required to interact with outside agencies in
order to deal with a large-scale, highly ca-
pable threat actor delivering coordinated at-
tacks against all exercise participants. The
intent of this level of testing is to assess at
which point the teams fail to address the
complexity of the situation.
Complex High
Table 6.3: Summary of progressive collective training levels for cyber incident response.
TTX CIRT Level 1
Within a TTX, the intent of CIRT Level 1 (CIRT1) training is to assess the coherence
of the operating processes and instructions used at the sub-team level within an overall
incident response team. This allows any gaps in the documentation to be identified,
addressed and re-evaluated. The scenario within the CIRT1 TTX should follow the
crawl-walk-run model by progressively introducing more complex reports of attack ac-
tivity from a low-level threat actor, to increase the requirement for SA. This necessitates
the sub-team to project which antagonistic courses of action an attacker might take,
and therefore which procedures are applicable to proactively defend the network.
Assessment of the sub-team within the TTX is via a measure of adherence to
approved operating procedures, and the identification of gaps in the documentation
that are required to be addressed for the sub-team to be effective within the overall
team.
TTX CIRT Level 2
The second level of CIRT involves bringing together all of the sub-teams to assess how
the operating procedures of the team and sub-teams interoperate, and how overall C2
and SA is maintained during an incident. Whilst the training at TTX CIRT1 will focus
on coherence within the roles and responsibilities of a sub-team, training at CIRT2
tests the interfaces between sub-teams, and the ability to maintain shared SA in the
face of a low-level threat actor within a simple scenario. Assessment at this level, as
with CIRT1, is through measurement of adherence to approved operating procedures,
and the identification of gaps in the documentation.
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TTX CIRT Level 3
At level 3, the TTX introduces a background exercise scenario as well as an operational
or business owner with dynamic priorities that extend beyond technical availability of
systems. The exercise requires the incident response team to report to a management
structure at regular intervals, requiring greater SA from the team, as well as the need
to forecast defensive activities to respond to a mid-tier actor with the capability to
manoeuvre covertly around a network and adapt to the incident responders’ actions.
At this level, the assessment of the team focuses far more on SA and C2 than operational
procedures. It measures the adaptability of the team to manage a dynamic situation
and interact with business stakeholders.
TTX CIRT Level 4
The TTX at Level 4 further increases the complexity of the scenario and the level of
information to be processed by the incident response team, including external threat
intelligence feeds. A greater number of malicious activities will be reported at this level,
forcing the team to prioritise their activities against a set of mid-tier actors acting in a
coordinated manner. This will be set in a mission-critical environment with reporting
required to outside agencies such as national cyber centres and governmental regulatory
bodies, as well as interacting with the press. This reporting requirement will also shape
the internal stakeholder requirements for the incident response team’s planned activities
to mitigate the initial impacts of the attack, balanced against defending against the
attackers’ wider intent.
Assessment at this level is focused on C2, balancing competing priorities, and
maintenance of SA in an information-rich environment.
TTX CIRT Level 5
Level 5 CIRT exercises are intended to test the participants to the point of failure. This
is intended to determine at which point the C2 of the team cannot cope, and as such
the scope of such an exercise may exceed the conditions anticipated for a real incident.
Level 5 exercises are intended to simulate incidents that extend beyond individual or-
ganisational boundaries, such as national crises, which will involve many organisations
on which the incident responders may depend, and in turn, on whom other organisations
are dependent. A coordinated set of high-tier threat actors will deliver multiple, overt
and covert attacks on defender’s networks, forcing them to prioritise where and how
to respond, interacting with other incident response teams, threat intelligence feeds,
governmental and regulatory bodies, and the press. The scenario will be purposefully
complex, with competing requirements and priorities for which there are no clear re-
sponses. Assessment at this level is based on individual teams’ ability to maintain
control and SA in a dynamic environment.
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6.5.2 Cyber Defence Exercises (CDX)
Within CDX, the progressive levels of complexity described for TTXs are maintained,
but as the exercises are executed on a cyber range the focus is on technical responses
and the associated detail of network operations.
CDX CIRT Level 1
CDX collective training at Level 1 (CIRT1) requires minimal range infrastructure, as it
is designed to train the functions of the sub-teams within an overall incident response
team. As such, the training is role-specific. For instance, for a sub-team responsible for
network hardening, the range provided would need to offer weakened Virtual Machines
(VM) or ICS devices for the team to test their operating procedures in a realistic
technical environment. Crawl-walk-run progression is offered through the level to which
hardened VMs or ICS devices are tested. This does not necessarily require an in situ
Red Team, as the evaluation of the VMs or devices could be managed via automated
test scripts, although at this level they are intended to be assessed based on a low-tier
threat actor. Similarly, for security analysts, scripted malicious traffic of increasing
complexity could be replayed over a network, and a measure of success be defined by
how much of the activity is recognised. CDX CIRT1 should assess how individuals
trained in specific areas of technology can work together prior to integration into a
larger incident response team.
CDX CIRT Level 2
At CIRT Level 2 (CIRT2), the entire incident response team is brought together to
exercise on a cyber range. This training is based around a simple scenario featuring a
low-tier actor, and provides an opportunity for the team to deal with an incident at a
slower pace than in the real-world. The Red Team should be provided with a playbook
of network attacks that are appropriate to this tier of threat actor. This allows the
realities of incident response to be mapped against the management of SA and C2, and
how information flows in a technical sense within the team. This should include how
teams triage the elements of network to assess which are a defensive priority. Assessment
at this level should review the progressive complexity of the network attacks and the
information available to the team to determine their effectiveness and efficiency.
CDX CIRT Level 3
At this level (CIRT3), far more realism is introduced to the exercise. The exercise
scenario will contain more depth than at CIRT1 and CIRT2, and as with the TTX
CIRT3, a business influence will be provided via stakeholders who will dynamically
define the operational priorities of the network. Much more simulated background
network traffic will be generated at this level of training, providing a suitable noise floor
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for the mid-tier threat actor to mask activities within. The incident response Blue Team
will be required to work more interactively with their sensors and logs than at CIRT1
and CIRT2, as they adapt to a dynamic adversary. At CIRT3, the C2 and SA of the
team will be tested with a complexity more aligned with a real-world incident, albeit
within the time constraints of a training exercise. Assessment of the team will be based
upon how many of the Red Team attacks are identified and/or prevented by the Blue
Team incident responders, and how well they maintained control of the situation as a
cohesive team.
CDX CIRT Level 4
At CDX CIRT Level 4 (CIRT4), more external relationships are introduced to the
scenario, and the scale of the range and associated network traffic levels is increased.
External threat intelligence feeds will be integrated, as will the need to produce tech-
nical information for regulatory and governmental bodies. A larger Red Team will
be provided to deliver coordinated attacks on the range, and whilst still acting in the
character of a mid-tier actor, the frequency and breadth of attacks will be designed to
progressively stress test the technical cohesion of the team, and the overall C2. Busi-
ness users will be added to the scenario to bring further non-technical complexity and
require the Blue Team to respond to incidents guided by business needs. This will re-
quire the maintenance of SA across both business and technical domains to ensure the
overall attack is proactively defended against. Assessment at this level is based upon
the incident response Blue Team not only technically defending the network, but also
predicting the Red Team’s malicious courses of action, to allow them to pre-empt their
attacks and restrict their ability to manoeuvre on the network.
CDX CIRT Level 5
As with Level 5 CIRT TTX, the Level 5 CIRT (CIRT5) CDX is intended to test partic-
ipants to the point of failure, and designed to determine at which point the C2 of the
team cannot cope. In a CDX, the scenario will be based upon a complex crisis, and will
involve multiple incident response Blue Teams on a range that can accommodate the
defence of multiple networks from a coordinated Red Team acting as a high-tier threat
actor. Blue Teams will be required to cooperate, sharing detailed threat intelligence to
defend their networks. As with the TTX, assessment at this level is based on individual
teams’ ability to maintain control and SA in a dynamic environment.
6.6 Analysis
The requirements for a progressive collective training intended to develop SA, as de-
scribed in Table 6.2, are discussed within the context of the progressive collective train-
ing framework, with comments made on the implications for TTX and CDX.
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6.6.1 Approach
Within a TTX the approach will progressively increase the exercise information flow
and interrogation of detail in incident response processes to provide a coherent crawl-
walk-run model. In CDX the framework will provide a crawl-walk-run model across
CIRT1-CIRT5, and within each of these levels the Red Team will provide the ability to
progressively increase complexity as a response to the Blue Team performance.
6.6.2 Composition
CIRT1 and CIRT2 within TTX will focus primarily on component tasks, whilst CIRT3-
CIRT5 will provide the ability to refine the efficacy of the components in increasingly
complex situations. For CDX, the basic technical component tasks will be developed
in CIRT1 and CIRT2, with greater depth of understanding of the technology required
in CIRT3-CIRT5. Improvements in the technical depth required for CIRT3-CIRT5 will
be achieved through more complex CIRT1 and CIRT2 exercises, executed in an overall
training cycle.
6.6.3 Understanding
Mental models will be introduced during TTX that operate at a low tempo. This will
allow the mental models to consolidate prior to being tested at a greater pace. Ideally,
mental models will be developed on TTX prior to progression to CDX. Mental models
introduced on CDX that have not been ‘walked-through’ on a TTX are likely to be less
developed at CIRT3-CIRT5.
6.6.4 Situational Awareness
This will be achieved on TTX through the exercise White Team using questioning
techniques to assess the Blue Team’s perception, comprehension, and projection of
adversary activities so they can be progressively enhanced. This will be fused with the
mental models, and ideally is rehearsed on TTX prior to CDX. On a CDX, SA will be
necessary to interpret the adversary activities on the network to project antagonistic
courses of action. Without this understanding the Blue Team will only ever catch-up
with where the Red Team have already been. The development of information flows
and mental models to enhance SA are required to have been consolidated at CIRT2 and
CIRT3 prior to undertaking more complex CDX.
6.6.5 Review
Where the TTX identifies gaps in operating procedures, subsequent exercising should
not be undertaken until all remedial actions have been undertaken, and the team pro-
vided with time to reflect on the consequences of new operational tasks. For CDX,
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post-exercise reports or assessments should be a key mechanism to record any lessons
learned, and highlight areas for improvement. These comments should be reviewed
and remedial actions undertaken and tested before returning to a CDX at the same, or
greater CIRT level.
6.6.6 Feedback
TTX will provide an opportunity for interactive feedback from the White Team to allow
the Blue Team to reflect on their actions and adjust accordingly. On CDX, regular,
detailed feedback from Red Team will be required to develop Blue Team improvements
on CIRT2-CIRT5.
6.6.7 Learning Environment
A non-judgemental White Team will be essential on TTX to allow an open discussion
of deficiencies in operating procedures, to identify opportunities for improvement. For
CDX, a mix of regular feedback from the Red Team, along with coaching from the
White Team in response to Red Team feedback, will provide an environment where
failure to detect a Red Team activity was seen as a learning opportunity.
6.6.8 Individual Skills
Across both TTX and CDX, those with a greater understanding of component tasks
are likely to perform better. It would be prudent to use those personnel with greater
experience to mentor junior staff, to bring the less experienced members of staff up to
a common level of expertise.
6.6.9 Skill Development
Technical skills are likely to be less of an issue within the TTX, but knowledge of the
Blue Team’s processes and procedures are essential. For CDX, progression through
the CIRT levels will be most effective when sequential. CDX at CIRT4 and CIRT5,
in particular, will likely require iterative cycling between CIRT1-CIRT3 for maximum
effect.
6.6.10 Participation
In TTX, participants should be encouraged to actively participate in their role and
develop the formal interactions between teams, sub-teams and individuals. CDX will
provide opportunities to test individual skills and component tasks in a hands-on man-
ner, identifying areas for improvement as a result.
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6.6.11 Skill Maintenance
The CIRT1-CIRT5 construct for TTX allows for ongoing maintenance of skills and
testing of the applicability of processes and procedures in an evolving threat landscape.
The provision of a cyber range for CDX, along with the progressive levels of CIRT1-
CIRT5, allows for maintenance of individual and team technical skills.
6.6.12 Environment
The scenarios for the TTX should provide realistic context to consider the efficacy of
processes and procedures. For CDX, a well-architected cyber range should provide a
realistic, representative environment to rehearse incident response.
6.6.13 Vocabulary
The slower tempo of a TTX will provide an opportunity to assess how language is
interpreted by team members, and develop a common terminology. CDX will ideally
build upon the lexicon developed in the TTX, although existing, established technical
language is unlikely to require any adjustment.
6.6.14 Interactions
TTX will provide a mechanism to test team interactions and assess incident response
processes at a slower tempo than on CDX. However, CDX will likely drive a greater
understanding of technical information flow between team members.
6.6.15 Role Definitions
TTX will likely be the main vehicle for driving the definition of roles and responsibilities,
whereas CDX will verify and refine these, driving greater detail in the nature of team
interactions.
6.6.16 Progressive Threat Model
Threat actors can be progressively introduced on the TTX through increasing the re-
ported impact of antagonistic activities. The threat actors on the CDX, likely to be
APT in this research, will be characterised by a progression of covertness and complexity
of attacks across the lifecycle of an attack delivered by the Red Team.
6.6.17 Metrics
Qualitative or quantitative methods, or a mix thereof, can be used to capture data to
assess the effectiveness of the exercises, capability development, and SA, across both
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TTX and CDX, as dictated by the learning objectives.
6.7 Initial Conclusions
SCIPS provides an initial experience of an end-to-end attack where it is safe to fail.
This is sufficient for some training participants for whom change in risk perceptions is
desirable. However, for those responsible for planning or executing defensive policies,
procedures or capabilities, the SCIPS scenario should be used as the basis for subsequent
TTX and CDX. This will take advantage of the embryonic mental models established
as a consequence of playing SCIPS, and progressively reinforce the developing models
in the minds of participants. It therefore becomes essential to consider how scenarios
developed for SCIPS will transition into TTX and CDX, to deliver a holistic training
experience. Similarly, the ICS-CDTP provides a structure for defensive cyber operations
within ICS operators to underpin a foundation for refinement of these mental models.
This will be assessed in the experimentation described in Chapter 7.
The APT Attack Behaviour mental model can be developed through the fusion
of cyber threat intelligence (CTI) with the use of an attack lifecycle model such as
the Lockheed Martin Kill-Chain™ or Mandiant™ Attack Lifecycle Model to frame the
understanding of exercise participants. The adherence to such a structure by the Red
Team will allow this experience to solidify in the minds of the Blue Team.
A Team Interaction model will be derived from the definition of roles and responsi-
bilities primarily within TTX, then refined on CDX in a higher tempo environment. The
Team Understanding model is likely to come about as a result of time spent together,
gelling as a coherent unit.
The Operational Priorities mental model will need to be based on an assessment of
the operational needs of the ICS operator, and fused with the Operating Environment
model to determine which systems and processes are essential. These models will require
a coping strategy to assist in their development, especially in light of the adaptable
nature of APT adversaries, and to ensure these models translate into response actions
in the event of a network intrusion.
These mental models provide a structure against which experimentation can ad-
dress Question 1 - Which factors influence the development of mental models to provide
cyber situational awareness? of the six questions posed in Section 1.4. The progres-
sive training framework described in this chapter also provides a construct in which
the contribution of coping strategies can be assessed, as required by Question 2 - Does
the adoption of coping strategies increase situational awareness?. The crawl-walk-run
approach to training offers a mechanism by which the risk perceptions of participants
can be progressively focussed to establish SA, thereby contributing to Question 3 - Can
serious games change the risk perceptions of participants and establish a foundational
level of situational awareness? and Question 4 - How can we increase the efficacy of the
serious games to deliver the change in risk perceptions?. This progressive development
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of an understanding of adversary characteristics, and the optimising of incident response
team performance through experiential learning within the framework, provides a basis
to drive the comprehension and projection of APT attack behaviours required by Ques-
tion 5 - As a result of serious games, can participants recognise the characteristics of a
cyber attack and determine the possible intent and courses of action?, and Question 6 -
Are participants of serious games able to assess the immediate and longer-term impacts
of cyber attacks?
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7.1 Introduction
ICS exhibit different operational characteristics to IT systems, and the threat posed
by advanced, capable antagonists cannot be fully addressed by existing IT security
mechanisms (see section 3.4.3). The available data relating to cyber attacks on ICS
does not adequately articulate the risks faced by an ICS operator, so the potential
impact cannot be demonstrated, and as a result their SA is limited. This research
has proposed a number of mechanisms to develop SA to address these risks, using
a mix of experiential learning, serious games, and coping strategies to establish the
means to address the antagonistic threat from APT actors, encompassed in SCIPS, the
Framework for Progressive Collective Training, and ICS-CDTP.
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SCIPS provides an environment in which participants of the game can build the
initial mental models necessary to raise awareness that a risk exists, thereby satisfying
the safeguard recommended by Kaplan and Garrick (1981) [74] that it poses less risk
than if we have no understanding of its potential impact.
The Framework for Progressive Collective Training proposes a set of incremental
training levels constructed around TTX and CDX, described in Table 6.3 to develop
coherent mental models described in this research (Table 6.1). These models extend the
concepts described by Matheiu et al. (2000) [149] to underpin the three levels of SA and
Team SA described by Endsley (1995) through a crawl-walk-run model adapted from
Schaab and Moses (2001)[152] and extended to form the requirements for progressive
collective training proposed in Table 6.2.
ICS-CDTP provides a coping strategy for organisations to focus on the identifi-
cation and defence of critical ICS equipment from malicious manipulation. It uses a
modified CARVER Matrix model described in Tables 5.2 - 5.8 to identify key network
terrain, and an extended version of the Diamond Model of Intrusion Analysis, described
in Figure 5.2, integrated with the Mandiant Attack Lifeycle (Figures 5.3 and 5.4) and
the Purdue Model (Figure 5.5) to forecast antagonistic activities to develop a focused
defensive posture and cyber incident response playbooks, shaped by the COA Matrix
depicted in Figure 5.6.
This chapter discusses the approach proposed to address the six research questions
posed in Section 1.4. It is structured as follows:
1. Design of Study: A description of the approach to the study, the rationale for
adopting a qualitative methodology, and within that, the selection of Thematic
Analysis as the method to analyse the data.
2. Data Analysis: A summary of the Thematic Analysis process used to analyse
the data.
3. Sample Selection: The selection criteria for the sample required for the study,
and a description of the sample adopted.
4. Data Collection: An explanation of the methods used to collect data.
5. Validity and Reliability: The strategies used to ensure the trustworthiness of
the results of the study.
6. Researcher Bias and Assumptions: An analysis of the biases of the researcher,
the sample, and a statement of the principles, assumptions and constraints that
shape the study.
7. Scope and Schedule of Experiments: A description of the schedule of exper-
imentation undertaken, and the scope of each experiment.
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7.2 Design of the Study
Early evaluations of SCIPS focused on quantitative metrics, as described in Section
4.5.7. However, a review of the results from the experiments [209, 210] demonstrated
that although the game effected a clear change in the risk perceptions of the partici-
pants, it only demonstrated that a change occurred, it did not address why participants
viewed the risk differently after playing the game. So whilst we demonstrated a posi-
tive answer to research question 3 from Section 1.4 can serious games change the risk
perceptions of participants and establish a foundational level of SA?, we were unable to
address the remaining questions, in particular how can we maximise the efficacy of the
serious games to deliver the change in risk perceptions? and which factors influence the
development of mental models to provide cyber SA? The unstructured, open question
format of the third evaluation of SCIPS [211] elicited a richer narrative as to why the
game influenced the audience, and forced a review of the research methods in use. No
quantitative methodologies were identified that could provide a framework in which we
could assess why the changes occurred. Based on the encouraging results gathered from
the unstructured responses, a review of qualitative research methodologies was therefore
undertaken.
Quantitative approaches are appropriate for examining who has engaged in a be-
haviour or what has happened. Whilst experiments based on quantitative measures
can test particular interventions, the techniques are not designed to explain why cer-
tain behaviours, or changes in behaviours, occur. Qualitative research, however, places
more emphasis on the study of phenomena from the perspective of insiders, and are
typically used to explore new phenomena and to capture individuals’ thoughts, feelings,
or interpretations of meaning and process, asking questions about knowledge and how
knowledge is acquired [233, 234]. Rather than determining cause and effect, predicting,
or describing the distribution of some attribute among a population, qualitative research
uncovers the meaning of a phenomenon for those involved by understanding how people
interpret their experiences, how they construct their worlds, and what meaning they
attribute to their experiences [235].
“Qualitative research is an inquiry process of understanding based on distinct
methodological traditions of inquiry that explore a social or human problem.
The researcher builds a complex, holistic picture, analyzes words, reports
detailed views of informants, and conducts the study in a natural setting.”
[236]
In reviewing the methodologies available, we reviewed five types of qualitative
research, comparing them across five dimensions proposed by Creswell (1998) [236] that
distinguish their characteristics, as shown in Table 7.1. We shall now review these
methodologies and assess their applicability.
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Dimension Biography Phenomenology Grounded Theory Ethnography Case Study
Focus Exploring the
life of an indi-
vidual
Understanding
the essence of ex-
periences about a
phenomenon
Developing a theory
grounded in data from
the field
Describing and
interpreting a
cultural and
social group
Developing an in-
depth analysis of
a single case or
multiple cases
Discipline
Origin
Anthropology,
literature, his-
tory, psychol-
ogy, sociology
Philosophy, soci-
ology, psychology
Sociology Cultural anthro-
pology, sociology
Political science,
sociology, evalua-
tion, urban stud-
ies, other social
sciences
Data Collec-
tion
Primarily in-
terviews and
documents
Long interviews
with up to 10
people
Interviews with 20-
30 individuals to sat-
urate categories and
detail a theory
Primarily obser-
vations and in-
terviews with ad-
ditional artefacts
during extended
time in the field
(e.g. 6 months to
a year)
Multiple sources
- documents,
archival records,
interviews, obser-
vations, physical
artefacts
Data Analy-
sis
Stories,
epiphanies,
historical
content
Statements,
meanings, mean-
ing themes, gen-
eral description
of the experience
Open coding, axial
coding, selective cod-
ing, conditional ma-
trix
Description, anal-
ysis, interpreta-
tion
Description,
themes, asser-
tions
Narrative
Form
Detailed pic-
ture of an
individual’s
life
Description of the
essence of the ex-
perience
Theory or theoretical
model
Description of
the cultural
behaviour of
a group or an
individual
In-depth study of
a case, or cases
Table 7.1: Dimensions for comparing five methodologies in qualitative research, Creswell
(1998)
Biography
In a biography, a researcher studies a single individual [236]. This focus was not appro-
priate for the number of participants in the research sample.
Phenomenology
The philosophy of phenomenology is based upon the experience itself and how experi-
encing something is transformed into consciousness. Rather than attempt to develop
abstract laws or theories, phenomenology focuses on “lived experience” [235, 237]. Pat-
ton (2015) proposes that the methodology is based on the assumption that “there is an
essence or essences to shared experience. These essences are the core meanings mutually
understood through a phenomenon commonly experienced. The experiences of different
people are bracketed, analyzed, and compared to identify the essences of the phenomenon,
for example... the essence of being a participant in a particular program” [238]. The
role of the researcher, then, is to depict the essence, or basic underlying structure, of
the meaning of the experience, using phenomenological reduction to continually return
to the interpretation of the experience to derive its inner structure and meaning [235].
Grounded Theory
Grounded theory, like other forms of qualitative analysis, uses the researcher as the
primary instrument of data collection, assuming an inductive posture to derive meaning
from the data. The result of this type of enquiry is a theory that emerges from, or
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is grounded, in the data. Grounded theory promotes iterative collection, coding and
analysis of data in order to decide what data should be collected next, and a constant
comparative method involving comparing segments of data with each other to determine
similarities or differences to build a substantive theory connected by a core category, a
main conceptual element through which all other categories and properties are connected
[235].
Ethnography
Ethnography originated in the field of anthropology [235]. The method requires the
researcher to immerse themselves with the target sample [235], primarily using obser-
vations and interviews to describe and interpret a cultural or social group [236]. Such
studies provide extensive data as a result of sustained exposure, often using pre-existing
category schemes of social and cultural behaviours and characteristics to present their
findings [235].
Ethnography has been used in software engineering as a method to elicit unstated
or implicit requirements from users through observation [239] as well as developing an
in-depth understanding of the socio-technological realities surrounding software devel-
opment practices [240].
Case Study
A case study is an in-depth description and analysis of a bounded system, although
the scope of such studies can become confused by the conflation of the unit of study
(the case) and the product of this type of investigation [235]. Yin (2013) [241] defines a
case study as “an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the
‘case’) within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon
and context may not be clearly evident” [241]. However, Merriam (2015) [235] argues
that it is the unit of analysis, not the topic of investigation that characterises a case
study [235]. This position is supported by Stake (2013) who proposes “A case is a noun,
a thing, an entity; it is seldom a verb, a participle, a functioning”, arguing that “training
modules may be our cases - amorphous and abstract, but still things, whereas ‘training’
is not” [242].
Analysis of Qualitative Methodologies
Both phenomenology and grounded theory gather data from participants involved in
the phenomenon being studied, and both use iterative cycles of coding to develop an
understanding of the experience. Phenomenology focuses on developing a narrative to
explain the shared essence of the experience, whereas grounded theory develops a theory
from data. As the focus of this study is to address the six research questions described
in Section 1.4, the focus on developing a theory does not support our prime focus. The
iterative interviewing of the same research sample in grounded theory also limits its
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applicability, as a result of limited access to the sample, without guarantee of the same
membership between experiments.
Ethnography requires extensive period of intimate study and co-location with the
research sample, with a deep reliance on intensive work with a few informants from the
setting [235]. This level of integration with the subjects of the study has been noted
to increase the likelihood of bias affecting the study [235]. As the interactions with the
sample for the research is limited to specific periods of exercise execution (albeit over
an extended elapsed period), the level of immersion required for an ethnographic study
is not available. Also, as discussed later in Section 7.4.2, a common background shared
by the author and the research sample increases the risk of familiarity bias.
The definition of a case study by Stake (2013) [242] as focusing on a “noun”, and his
example of “training modules” as cases, but “training” as not, appears to be in conflict
with questions 5 and 6 of our research questions described in Section 1.4 (5. As a result
of the serious games, can participants recognise the characteristics of a cyber attack
and determine the possible intent and courses of action?, 6. Are participants of serious
games able to assess the immediate and longer-term impact of cyber attacks? )
Of the four methodologies, phenomenology best suits our analysis requirements
and sample group.
Using Thematic Analysis within Phenomenology
Thematic analysis is a method for identifying, analysing, and interpreting patterns of
meaning (‘themes’) within qualitative data, that supports a number of methodologies
[243, 244] including phenomenology [245, 246].
Thematic analysis provides a systematic method for generating codes and themes
from qualitative data, consistent with the intent of phenomenology. Codes are the
smallest units of analysis that capture salient features of the data relevant to the research
question. Codes are the building blocks for themes and patterns of meaning, providing
a framework for organising and reporting the researcher’s analytic observations. The
aim of thematic analysis, as with phenomenology, is not simply to summarise the data
content, but to identify and interpret the essence of the data, guided by the research
questions. The thematic analysis process has in-built quality procedures such as a two-
stage review process, where candidate themes are reviewed against the coded data and
the entire data-set to promote analytical rigour [244, 247, 248, 249].
This study used thematic analysis as its phenomenological research tool. This was
supported by the QSR NVivo™ qualitative analysis tool that offers functionality for
thematic analysis.
7.2.1 Data Analysis
The process for analysing data using thematic analysis is outlined below.
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Phase 1: Data Familiarisation
The first phase of thematic analysis requires the researcher to completely re-read all of
the acquired data to ensure familiarity with the depth and breadth of the content. The
repeated reading of the data supports the early identification of patterns, meanings,
patterns and initial concepts within the data [243].
Phase 2: Generate Initial Codes
Once familiar with the data, and an initial set of ideas and concepts within the data
has been created, the next phase of the thematic analysis process builds upon these to
generate an initial list of codes from the data. Codes identify features within the data
that appear interesting to the analyst, and refers to “the most basic segment, or element,
of the raw data or information that can be assessed in a meaningful way regarding the
phenomenon” [250]. These codes will differ from themes, which are often broader, and
are developed later in the process [250, 243].
Phase 3: Search for Themes
Phase 3 begins when all data have been initially coded and collated, and combines codes
into overarching themes that depict the data at the broader level of themes. The phase
concludes with a collection of candidate themes, and sub-themes, and all extracts of
data that have been coded in relation to them [243].
Phase 4: Review Themes
With a set of candidate themes available, this phase involves the review of the data to
support the definition of the themes, and their refinement based on whether there is
sufficient data to support them. During this phase, candidate themes may be revised,
discarded, decomposed further, or may collapse into large themes [243].
Phase 5: Theme Definition and Naming
With a substantiated set of themes emerging from Phase 4, this phase further refines
the themes into those that will be presented in the overall study results. This involves
describing the essence of each theme, as well as the overall structure and relationship
of the themes, determining which aspects of the data the theme captures. Each of
the themes is developed into a detailed analysis that relates to the research questions,
ensuring that the naming of the themes fits within the overall study narrative [243].
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Phase 6: Produce Report
Phase 6 begins with set of fully defined themes, and results in the final analysis and
documentation of the study. Within a thematic analysis study, the focus of the docu-
mentation is to present the complicated story of the data in a manner that convinces
the audience of the merit and validity of the study findings in a concise, coherent, logical
and non-repetitive manner. It must present sufficient evidence of the themes within the
data, with extracts to demonstrate the prevalence of a theme, along with a compelling
analytical narrative to that relates the data to the research questions [243].
7.3 Sample Selection
A review of the research questions described in Section 1.4 highlighted that as the intent
of the game is to change the risk perspectives of the participants, a convenience sample
would be acceptable. For the participants who would take part in the TTX or CDX, the
sample must contain a mix of individuals with some experience of cyber exercises, TTX
and CDX, as well as those new to exercising, and would be participating in exercises
subsequent to the study. For the second group, a purposeful sample was required. The
nature of convenience and purposeful sampling is discussed below.
Convenience Sampling
Convenience sampling is a type of non-probability or non-random sampling where mem-
bers of the target population that meet certain practical criteria, such as easy accessibil-
ity, geographical proximity, availability at a given time, or the willingness to participate
are included for the purpose of the study. The main assumption associated with con-
venience sampling is that there will be no difference in the research results obtained
from a random sample, a nearby sample, a co-operative sample, or a sample gathered
in some inaccessible part of the population, i.e. the assumption is that the members
of the target population are homogeneous. As a result, it is necessary to identify how
the sample would differ from one that was randomly selected, as well as to describe
the subjects who might be excluded during the selection process or those who might be
overrepresented in the sample. It is also necessary to identify outliers within the sample
who may skew the results. The key disadvantage of convenience sampling is that it is
likely to be biased, and accordingly, the results should not be considered representative
of the wider population [251].
Purposeful Sampling
Purposeful sampling is a technique widely used in qualitative research for the iden-
tification and selection of information-rich cases for the most effective use of limited
resources. This involves identifying and selecting individuals, or groups of individuals,
that are knowledgeable about or experienced with a phenomenon of interest, with the
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ability to communicate experiences and opinions in an articulate, expressive, and reflec-
tive manner. Despite its wide use, there are a number of challenges in identifying and
applying the appropriate purposeful sample for a study. Of these, the fact that range
of variation in a sample from which purposive sample is to be taken is rarely known at
the outset of a study must be addressed when interpreting the results [252].
Sample Selection Criteria
In order to address the biases introduced by convenience sampling, participants were
asked to describe their knowledge of industrial control systems prior to playing SCIPS,
as well as to articulate their understanding of the strategic issues surrounding the cyber
security of ICS. This allowed the breadth of the sample to be assessed during the analysis
of the data, and any limitations on the results to be articulated. Accordingly, there was
no selection criteria for the convenience sample other than accessibility and availability.
This allowed us to use the purposeful sample for the TTX and CDX as our convenience
sample for SCIPS.
For the purposeful sample, where a mix of individuals with some experience of
cyber exercises, TTX and CDX, as well as those new to exercising, and who would be
participating in exercises subsequent to the study was required, a representative sample
was identified within the British Army. The Army Cyber Protection Team (CPT)
regularly engages in cyber exercises, and due to the rotation of the posting cycle within
the armed forces, at least 30% of the team would be new to cyber exercises during any
two-year cycle. The participants were asked to describe their technical and exercise
experience when providing data so that the breadth of the sample could be assessed. A
further purposeful sample from UK Armed Forces was also identified to augment the
CPT for the latter experiments described in this chapter, who met the same selection
criteria.
As the entirety of the sample were from a military background, this bias was
considered when interpreting the results.
7.4 Data Collection
This study used three data collection methods; interviews, questionnaires, and obser-
vations.
Interviews
The interviews employed an informal, semi-structured format, focusing on those within
the purposeful sample. The first round of interviews covered previous experiences of
cyber exercises, and the participants’ positive and negative views of exercising. These
then progressed onto their experiences on the exercises run as part of the experimenta-
tion for this study, and encouraged them to compare and contrast. For those without
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any previous exercise experience, the interviews focused on anticipated expectations
versus the experimentation exercise itself.
As the series of experiments progressed, the leadership of the CPT were re-interviewed
to see how the behaviours and SA of the CPT had changed as a result of their experi-
ences.
All interviews were recorded and transcribed.
Questionnaires
Questionnaires were the primary data collection method across SCIPS games and exer-
cises. These contained a set of open questions intended to elicit the thoughts and feelings
of the participants, based on their experiences on the experiments. These questions are
included in Appendix A.
Observations
During the experiments, the behaviours of the sample were observed and recorded.
The observations focused on the team interactions and SA of the participants during
the experiments, and their use of coping strategy techniques. These observations were
articulated as memos, extracts from which are included in Section 8 and Appendix C.
7.4.1 Validity and Reliability
To ensure that the study was trustworthy, the author maintained the following disci-
plines [235]:
1. Methodological Rigour: Through adherence to the processes prescribed by the-
matic analysis to develop the themes from data coding.
2. Interpretive Rigour: Through the triangulation of data from interviews, ques-
tionnaires, and observations.
3. Analytical Rigour: Through the maintenance of an audit trail of data, and
decisions based upon that data.
4. Reflexivity: Through critical-reflection as a researcher, attempting to identify
assumptions, worldview, biases, theoretical orientation, and relationship to the
study that may affect the investigation.
7.4.2 Researcher Bias and Assumptions
This section provides an audit of self-perceived researcher biases and assumptions.
These include:
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1. The author has been a participant in many cyber exercises, and this may influence
the nature of the questioning of exercise participants during the experimentation.
2. The author entered into this research with the belief that experiential learning
offers a potentially viable means to establish cyber SA in the minds of participants.
3. The author is an Army Reserve Officer who has worked with the Army CPT, and
may introduce a familiarity bias.
4. As an Army Officer, it is likely that the author shares many of the cognitive biases
of the purposeful sample as a result of a shared military training syllabus, doctrine
and operational experiences.
7.5 Scope and Schedule of Experiments
To evaluate the concepts articulated within Chapters 4, 6, and 5 of this thesis, a schedule
of training programmes, SCIPS gameplay, TTX and CDX was executed over an 11
month period. The scope of the evaluation was primarily governed by access to the
purposeful samples, or in one instance of a TTX, accessibility to a convenience sample
via a commercial TTX that the author participated in. This required the evaluation
to prioritise those exercises that would act as significant use cases to allow the concept
of progressive collective training to be evaluated against the requirements defined in
Table 6.2. It was decided that TTX Collective Training Level 2 (TTX CIRT2) and
TTX Collective Training Level 3 (TTX CIRT3) provided sufficient coverage against the
scope of the requirements to evaluate the progressive training framework’s TTX efficacy.
For CDX, CIRT2 and CIRT3 events were run at De Montfort University (DMU) to test
the framework on a cyber range. For CDX CIRT4 and CIRT5, the author was invited
to participate with the purposeful sample on exercises run by external organisations.
The schedule of experiments is summarised below in Figure 7.1.
Month
Ex
er
ci
se
 L
ev
el
1
2
3
4
5
CDX (Observation)
SCIPS and CDX TTX (Observation)
CDX (Observation)
CDX
TTX
SCIPS and TTX
CDX (Evaluation)
Figure 7.1: Experiment schedule
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7.5.1 Cyber Defence Exercise, February 2017
The author joined 12 members of the purposeful sample on a 10 day CDX [253] involving
over 150 participants. No opportunity was available to provide questionnaires to capture
feedback from the sample, however, the author was allowed to record observations.
An assessment of the scope, complexity and scenario of the exercise indicated that it
fitted the criteria of a CIRT4 CDX, in that it required external relationships for each
Blue Team that included threat intelligence feeds and the requirement to interact with
governmental bodies. The CDX also integrated 10 Blue Teams into a large-scale cyber
range with generated background traffic. A Red Team was provided to act as a mid-tier
actor, with a frequency and breadth of attacks intended to progressively stress-test the
teams.
Exercise constraints dictated the purposeful sample, the CPT, could not use their
full team on the CDX, and other demands on their time meant that they could not
attend any of the exercise preliminaries that allowed teams to deploy and configure
sensors. The exercise afforded an opportunity to observe the CPT in an adverse sit-
uation, for which they did not have the opportunity to undertake specific training, or
prepare for. As such, it allowed a baseline assessment of the sample, against which
future experiments could be scoped and measured.
7.5.2 SCIPS and Cyber Defence Exercise, April 2017
This experiment was designed as a result of the observations and outcomes from the
previous exercise, described in Section 7.5.1. The experiment adopted a novel exercise
format and structure that combined SCIPS and a new way to conduct CDX, intended to
provide the opportunity for iterations of experiences, followed by periods of reflection,
to promote the formation of ideas and development of the mental models, with the
testing of these ideas solidifying the understanding in the mind of the participants to
establish cyber situational awareness. The experiment lasted five days, and comprised
26 Blue Team participants, an exercise facilitator (the author), and a five-person Red
Team. It began by providing classroom training in:
• Industrial Control Systems: A half-day introduction to ICS centred around
the Purdue Model.
• APT Adversary Lifecycle: An hour-long introduction to adversary lifecycle
modelling.
• ICS-CDTP: A two-hour fusion of the above, demonstrating the ICS-CDTP, and
an unpublished military variant developed specifically for the CPT by the author
that integrates ICS-CDTP with existing Military Intelligence processes, referred
to as Intelligence Preparation of the Cyber Environment (IPCE). An overview of
IPCE is included in Appendix D.
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Web Server Mail Server File Server
Domain Controller
HR Subnet
Finance Subnet
R&D Subnet
Firewall
Red Team
Web Server
Red Team C2
Redirectors
Internet DNS Greyspace DNS
Red Team Attack 
Subnet
Red Team Server
GREYSPACEINTERNET BLUE NETWORK
Industrial Control Subnet
Figure 7.2: Experiment cyber range, April 2017
Following the training, the exercise participants played SCIPS, experiencing an
APT attack end-to-end within the game. Each round of the game ended with teams
describing their assessment of where the attackers were in the adversary lifecycle and
Purdue Model, intended to develop their APT Attack Behaviour, Team Understanding,
and Operational Priorities mental models.
A Novel CDX Format
The experiment then progressed to the CDX [254], using the criteria for a CIRT3 CDX
within the progressive training model defined in Table 6.3. To anchor the development
of all five of the mental models defined in Table 6.1, the SCIPS scenario was used as
the scenario for the CDX, with participants being made aware that they were going
to experience the same attack from the game, but in a detailed range environment
(illustrated in Figure 7.2) that included ICS. This was accompanied by a Red Team
playbook of attack techniques and attacker characteristics, along with a strict timeline
for attack delivery that constrained the activities of the Red Team to a strict set of
Rules of Engagement (RoE). This allowed a crawl-walk-run model to be applied that
accommodated the performance of the Blue Team. The exercise comprised three days
of attack activity, split into six half-days that corresponded to the activities played out
in the six rounds of the SCIPS game. The Blue Team were briefed at the start of each
half-day session which activities the Red Team would be undertaking against them.
The Blue Team were then encouraged to discuss how these attacks would manifest
themselves, and a flipchart was populated describing how they thought the Red Team
would behave. These were aggregated into common themes, as shown in Figure 7.3.
The exercise then transitioned into the execution phase of that round where the
Red Team would attack the network and associated ICS. Each phase was time-bound,
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Figure 7.3: Network reconnaissance perspectives before and after Red Team activities,
April 2017
and at the end the Red Team would discuss with the Blue Team which of the activities
they had detected and which they had not. After a period of reflection, the Blue
Team repopulated the flipchart with a description of their revised understanding of
antagonistic behaviours, as well as an assessment of where the Red Team were in terms
of both the adversary lifecycle and Purdue Model. This process was repeated for all
six rounds of the exercise, as illustrated in Figure 7.4. At the end of the SCIPS game,
and at the end of the CDX, participants were asked to complete questionnaires. Also,
a subset of participants with prior cyber exercise experience were interviewed.
7.5.3 Table-Top Exercise, June 2017
The author was invited to participate in an exercise that fitted the criteria for a CIRT3
TTX with a UK CNI provider [255] that included a background scenario as well as
an operational business owner with dynamic priorities that extended beyond technical
availability of systems. The exercise required the organisation’s crisis management team
to report to a leadership structure at regular intervals, requiring accurate SA from the
team, as well as the need to forecast defensive activities to respond to a mid-tier actor
with the capability to manoeuvre covertly around their ICS network and adapt to the
incident responders’ actions. The intent of the exercise was to assess the organisational
agility to deal with such a situation, and to test the adaptability of the leadership to
manage a dynamic situation and interact with their wider regulatory community.
The exercise scenario related to a fictitious data breach and loss of customer data.
The author provided the set of questions, summarised in Figure 7.5 and detailed in Ap-
pendix E, to drive the conversations with the leadership team as the scenario unfolded.
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Figure 7.4: Experiment Structure and Mental Model Development, April 2017
No feedback questionnaires were completed. Only the author’s observations were
included as experiment results.
7.5.4 Cyber Defence Exercise, June 2017
The author joined 20 members of the CPT on an international exercise [256] involving
over 1000 people across the Red, Blue, White and Green Teams, executed over 14 days.
The purposeful sample (the CPT) was split between two teams, the first comprising
solely personnel from the CPT, the second integrating staff from other nations. The
criteria of the exercise fitted that of a CIRT5 CDX, in that it was intended to test the
participants to the point of failure, and designed to determine at which point the C2 of
the team could not cope. The scenario was based on an international crisis, involving
Blue Team incident response teams from a number of countries, all operating within a
shared threat intelligence environment. The exercise was structured on a large, complex
cyber range that included significant elements of ICS, with each Blue Team assigned a
network to defend from a Red Team emulating high-tier, nation-state actors. The CPT
intended to further test the techniques taught the experiment described in Section 7.5.2,
especially the ICS-CDTP, on which they had received further training. Their intent was
to drive the development of standard operating procedures (SOP) so that new members
joining the team would have a documented framework in which to integrate. It was
also planned to test the new organisation structure they had adopted as a result of the
experiment in Section 7.5.2 that resulted in the creation of a new team role of Blue
Terrain Manager, that drew heavily on the concepts of the ICS-CDTP to triage and
assess network terrain based on threat intelligence.
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Theme People Process Technology Information Compliance
1. What is the extent of the 
incident?
1.1.1 Which customers have been 
affected?
1.1.2 Which staff will undertake 
the analysis of the extent of the 
incident?
1.2.1 Does a documented process 
exist to determine the extent of 
the incident?
1.2.2 Has the process been 
rehearsed or exercised?
1.2.3 How long will it take to 
determine the extent of the 
incident?
1.3.1 Which sensors, mechanisms 
or logs will determine the affected 
systems?
1.3.2 Which data repositories have 
been affected?
1.4.1 What data has been 
exfiltrated?
1.4.2 What forensic data is 
available for investigation?
1.4.3 Does the published customer 
information match the data held in 
corporate repositories?
1.5.1 Has any DPA sensitive data 
been exfiltrated?
1.5.2 Is there a resulting risk to 
personal safety, or, of fraud?
2. How will the incident be 
contained?
2.1.1 Who are the members of the 
technical incident response team?
2.1.2 What training have the 
technical incident responders 
received?
2.2.1 Does a documented incident 
response containment process 
exist?
2.2.2 Are critical systems identified, 
prioritised, and documented, 
including policies on permissible 
downtime?
2.2.3 What service levels apply 
during an incident?
2.3.1 Which systems or tools will 
be used to prevent further data 
exfiltration?
2.3.2 How will persistent malware 
be identified across the corporate 
technology infrastructure?
2.4.1 How will access to the data 
repositories be limited during the 
incident response?
2..5.1 To what standards does the 
incident response process comply?
3. How will the incident be 
remediated?
3.1.1 What is the required recovery 
effort?
3.1.2 How are technical personnel 
split across the investigation, 
containment and remediation 
functions?
3.2.1 How does the incident 
response process guide incident 
remediation?
3.2.2 How does the incident 
response process determine if the 
organisation remains vulnerable to 
the same attack?
3.2.3 How will the affected systems 
be restored to a known state?
3.3.1 Which tools are available to 
analyse the logs?
3.3.2 Are stand-by servers and 
devices available to provide 
operational continuity whilst 
affected equipment is 
investigated?
3.4.1 What metrics are captured 
during an incident response to 
measure the effectiveness of the 
processes and teams?
3.5.1 How will the remediated 
systems be assessed for 
compliance to standards the 
organisation is required to comply 
with (e.g. PCS-DSS)?
4. How did the incident 
occur?
4.1.1 Was the attacker operating 
remotely, or was it an insider?
4.2.1 Does the incident response 
process include steps to determine 
methods used to access and 
compromise the data repository?
4.2.2 Does a log retention policy 
exist?
4.3.1 Are the clocks across the 
corporate technology 
infrastructure synchronised to 
provide consistent timestamps for 
forensic analysis?
4.4.1 Does the data in logs record 
querying of corporate data 
repositories?
4.4.2 Would the data exfiltration 
show up in any network traffic 
logs?
4.5.1 Which external organisations 
should be informed of the 
incident?
Figure 7.5: TTX Questions Matrix, June 2017
The author, along with the leadership of the CPT, observed the behaviours of the
sample on the exercise, and recorded their assessment of their performance. No feedback
questionnaires were completed.
7.5.5 Table-Top Exercise, August 2017
This experiment [257] was derived following a review of the performance of the CPT on
the exercise described in Section 7.5.4. It was acknowledged by the team in a review of
their performance that overall SA was an issue, and that their Team Interaction mental
model and associated processes were poor. As with the exercise described in Section
7.5.2, the SCIPS scenario was used as the basis of the TTX. The familiarity with the
scenario allowed the team to focus on how they work work and interact, rather than have
to deal with a new set of circumstances within the exercise. A modified set of facilitation
questions, based on those described in Section 7.5.3, and detailed in Appendix E, were
used to drive the detail of inclusions or identification of omissions in the team’s SOPs.
The CIRT2 TTX was planned as a one-day exercise, and was attended by 12 of the
purposeful sample. The TTX was designed to bring together representatives of the
sub-teams within the CPT to assess how the operating procedures of the team and sub-
teams interoperate, and how overall C2 and SA were maintained during an incident. In
particular, it looked at how the elements of ICS-CDTP could be further embedded in
their processes. The TTX was intended to test a proposed new SA Manager role, to
sit alongside the Blue Terrain Manager, to ensure Team SA across concurrent network
activities.
Feedback questionnaires were completed at the end of the exercise.
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7.5.6 Cyber Defence Exercise, August 2017
As a follow-on training activity from the exercise described in Section 7.5.4, and to
test the emerging SOPs emerging from the TTX described in Section 7.5.5, 16 mem-
bers of the sample attended a four-day CDX designed to further build their mental
models of APT Attack Behaviours, Team Understanding, and Team Interaction. Using
the crawl-walk-run approach to training, the experiment was designed to focus on a
constrained area of incident response for the CPT, and drive a greater understanding
of its characteristics, thereby solidifying the APT Attack Behaviour mental model, and
increasing the teams understanding of individual’s capabilities (the Team Understand-
ing mental model), and the necessary C2 and information flows (the Team Interaction
mental model). A review of the exercise described in Section 7.5.4 highlighted that al-
though the CPT correctly prioritised the defence of their network’s Domain Controllers
using the ICS-CDTP, they struggled to identify covert activities of the Red Team on
the devices. To address this, a CIRT2 CDX was developed with a subset of the SCIPS
scenario that focused on a low- to mid- tier threat actor in the early stages of a network
intrusion, attempting to create new users on a Domain Controller. The CDX involved
the Blue Team repeatedly defending the Domain Controllers in the network described
in Figure 7.6, from the same attack. The intent was that the Blue Team would start
to identify the attack behaviour in their sensors and logs, and with progressive use
of covert techniques using a crawl-walk-run approach, the CPT would improve their
understanding of how an APT takes control of a Domain Controller, and what such
activities look like when interpreted via sensors and logs. Using the novel approach to
CDX described in Section 7.5.2, the Red Team briefed the Blue Team on their planned
attack activities. Following the attack, the Red Team discussed their actions with the
Blue Team to help them interpret the data from their sensors and logs and prepare for
the same attack the next day.
No feedback questionnaires were provided, but the team leader wrote a post-
exercise report that assessed the Blue Team performance.
7.5.7 Cyber Exercise Training Programme, November 2017
The author was requested to develop a training programme for three cohorts of poten-
tial CPTs drawn from across the Army, as preparation from the exercise described in
Section 7.5.8. The Defensive Cyber Operations (DCO) Mission Specific Training (MST)
(DCO MST) was delivered to 38 attendees, in a mix of whole eight-man teams, part-
teams, and individuals. It included the classroom elements delivered in the experiment
described in Section 7.5.2, as well as the TTX described in Section 7.5.5, as part of a
wider defensive cyber syllabus. The intent of the training was to sufficiently develop
the five mental models and overall Team SA for a subset of the participating teams in
the planned exercise. By only training a subset of the teams attending the exercise,
it was envisaged that a tangible comparison of trained and untrained teams would be
possible. The training comprised three five-day courses, covering the following:
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Figure 7.6: CDX Range, August 2017
1. ‘Why DCO Fails?’: A review of the results from the interviews described in
Section 7.5.2 and the observations of the exercises describe in Sections 7.5.1, 7.5.2,
7.5.3, 7.5.4, 7.5.5, and 7.5.6. This specific element of the training comprised a
discussion of SA and the use of mental models as a means to proactively defend a
network, rather than simply react to intrusion events.
2. Baseline assessment of DCO capability and identification of skills gaps:
It was acknowledged that DCO teams would be attending the exercise with differing
levels of individual technical skills. This element of the training reviewed the skills
required for the exercise and determined the delta.
3. Industrial control systems: It was recognised in the exercise planning that
many DCO teams would have no ICS knowledge or experience. An introduction
to the technology area was provided.
4. Threat actor characteristics and behaviours: A description of Red Team
intrusion and evasion techniques, and the technical methods to detect them.
5. Intelligence Preparation of the Cyber Environment (IPCE): A descrip-
tion of the elements of ICS-CDTP integrated into existing Military Intelligence
processes (described in Appendix D) to provide an understanding of the Blue Ter-
rain that the DCO teams must defend, combined with training in the CARVER
matrix to allow teams to triage the key terrain within their networks that would
present high value targets for Red Teams.
6. Adversary lifecycle analysis: An specific focus on the use of adversary lifecycle
models as a SA technique as part of ICS-CDTP (that were not included in IPCE)
139
A. Cook 7.5. SCOPE AND SCHEDULE OF EXPERIMENTS
that allows Red Team intrusion behaviours to be modelled and forecast, then in-
tegrated into an assessment of likely Red Team COAs using the ‘Diamond Model
of Intrusion Analysis’, along with a demonstration of how specific visual aids can
enhance Team SA.
7. DCO Team C2: A recommended organisational structure (illustrated in Figure
7.7) describing roles, responsibilities, information flows, and daily routine for a
viable eight-man DCO team, based on the SOPs that had been developed by the
CPT over the experimental period.
8. Development of situational awareness: The participants played SCIPS to
experience a simulated end-to-end attack on a network and consider how they
would maintain SA and manage their response. The gameplay followed the SCIPS
format described in Section 7.5.2.
9. Exercise rehearsal TTX: A CIRT2 TTX based on the TTX described in Sec-
tion 7.5.5, that allowed training participants to take part in a ‘walk-through, talk-
through’ (crawl phase) of the first three days of the exercise, to refine their SOPs
and immediate team activities when taking possession of a network.
In addition to the above, it was was observed in the baseline assessment of DCO
capabilities that the levels of individual skills were not consistent across the trainees.
A review of skills gaps highlighted the following areas for remedial training, that were
addressed through extra-curricular classes for the attendees:
1. Network traffic capture and analysis.
2. Intrusion detection systems.
3. Firewall configuration.
4. Network monitoring tools and techniques.
Feedback questionnaires were completed for the SCIPS and TTX elements of the
training.
7.5.8 Cyber Defence Exercise, December 2017
Following on from the training provided in Section 7.5.7, the author attended the 10
day CIRT4 CDX that the DCO MST was provided for, to evaluate the performance of
the Blue Teams, and compare the levels of SA achieved by those who attended the MST
versus those who did not. The exercise comprised over 200 participants, spanning Blue,
Red, White and Green teams. The exercise was already designed to be measured using
a quantitative set of metrics by a third party. As such, the assessment performed in this
experiment, wherever possible, fitted within the established evaluation metrics, although
qualitative observations were made and recorded for the purposes of this research. The
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Team Leader
Responsible for team 
operations, system triage, 
and intelligence analysis
Hunt x2
Proactive threat-hunting on 
network and hosts
Harden x2
Device hardening and
firewall configuration
Monitor x2
Deployment of sensors and 
interpretation of acquired 
data
Blue Terrain and
SA Manager
Coordination of Blue Terrain 
activities and Situational 
Awareness Management
Figure 7.7: The recommended team structure for the exercise described in Section 7.5.8.
overall exercise White Team quantitative metrics assessed the Blue Teams against five
criteria, on a 0-10 scale, with 10 representing the maximum positive score:
1. Service Availability: A measure of the levels of availability of systems defined
as critical by the exercise White Team.
2. Procedures: The adherence of the Blue Teams to procedures defined within the
exercise.
3. Red Team Evaluation: A measure, by Red Team, of the levels of defence pro-
vided by an individual Blue Team.
4. Mission: An evaluation of each Blue Team’s overall cognisance of the changing
exercise scenario and its impact on DCO priorities.
5. Out of Game: A measure of altruistic or extra-curricular activities by Blue
Teams that benefited the exercise overall.
These measures were gauged by the exercise assessments team, with scores medi-
ated by the White Team to maintain consistency throughout the exercise. Each day, a
baseline score was assigned to each criteria, then each team’s performance was mediated
against this to determine how far above or below the standard score their performance
was judged to have been.
To align with this approach, an assessment of Blue Teams’ SA, and their use of
a set of mental models with associated team structures and information management
techniques taught on the Defensive Cyber Operations Mission Specific Training (DCO
MST) was also measured using a mediated model, with a complementary 0-10 scale.
The assessment considered the three levels of SA, plus overall Team SA, to appraise
the Blue Teams’ abilities to maintain a coherent understanding of a rapidly changing
situation. A qualitative measure was also used to assess the teams’ use of the five mental
models developed on the DCO MST. Specifically, this measurement addressed:
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• Team SA
• C2
• Information flows
• Understanding of adversary activities and intent
The exercise comprised 12 Blue Teams, operating within a daily six-hour exercise
period. This limited the interaction time with each team to 30 minutes per day.
The cyber range contained a significant number of ICS elements to be defended by
the Blue Teams.
No feedback questionnaires were provided.
7.6 Summary
The experimentation period that extended across the 2017 calendar year provided an
opportunity to work with a consistent, purposeful sample, to drive the development and
refinement of the use of SCIPS, TTX, and CDX as a means to deliver SA training within
a progressive collective training framework, supplemented by the use of ICS-CDTP
(and the IPCE variant) to provide a coping strategy for addressing the complexity of
APT attacks on ICS. The DCO MST training programme provided an opportunity
to refine the delivery of the training to three separate cohorts of participants, all of
whom then attended the final CDX in December 2017. This allowed an assessment of
the effectiveness of the training, using the exercise participants who did not attend the
training as a control group.
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8.1 Introduction
The experimental phase of this research involved exercises in which the author either
observed, facilitated, or both. Those exercises that the author observed were used
to shape subsequent exercises, especially where the exercise included the purposeful
sample. As such, those exercises which were only observed will only reference the
author’s observations in this chapter. However, the influence of these observations on
subsequent exercises will be clearly articulated.
Wherever possible, questionnaires were provided to gather feedback from partici-
pants for subsequent thematic analysis. Such questionnaires were not always possible,
as in some instances the sample declined to complete them. In those circumstances,
alternative observation data was captured.
The results of the thematic analysis were assessed in the DCO MST training pro-
gramme undertaken in November 2017, and the subsequent CDX in December 2017.
This chapter discusses the thematic analysis process used to develop the qualita-
tive themes that emerged from the experiments described in Sections 7.5.2, 7.5.5, and
7.5.7. The emerging themes are summarised within this chapter, with further detail
at Appendix A. Additional observational analysis of the results from the experiments
described in Sections 7.5.1, 7.5.3, 7.5.4, 7.5.6, and 7.5.8 is also included, with further
detail at Appendices B and C.
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8.2 Thematic Data Analysis Process
Wherever participant feedback was received, either through questionnaires or interviews,
it was analysed for the emergence of themes to develop a qualitative assessment of
the data. As the experimental period spanned a calendar year, and each experiment
shaped the nature of the next. Phases one to five of the thematic analysis process were
iterated and refined as the year progressed. The data were compiled and analysed using
QSR NVivo™, using the process described in Section 7.2. The use of this process is
summarised below.
8.2.1 Phase 1: Data Familiarisation
After each experiment, all of the acquired data was transcribed and re-read to ensure
familiarity with the depth and breadth of the content.
8.2.2 Phase 2: Generate Initial Codes
Initial codes were generated with each iteration of experimentation, based on an analysis
of the basic segments within the raw data.
8.2.3 Phase 3: Search for Themes
As the analysis of the data progressed, a total of 226 initial themes were identified.
These were based on the coded data, which were combined into overarching themes and
associated sub-themes. The phase concluded with a set of 12 candidate themes, with
128 sub-themes.
8.2.4 Phase 4: Review Themes
The candidate themes were then reviewed against the data to support the definition
of the themes, and refined refinement based on whether there was sufficient data to
support them. The themes were merged based on an identification of centres of gravity
in the language, and merged based on the semantic relationships between words and
phrases.
8.2.5 Phase 5: Theme Definition and Naming
The substantiated set of themes that emerged from phase four was then further refined
into the nine final themes and sub-themes, with names that conveyed their essence.
This included an analysis of the relationships between the themes to identify their
interdependencies. A narrative was then developed to articulate the nature of the
themes, with representative quotes identified that conveyed the sentiment of the content.
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8.2.6 Phase 6: Produce Report
With the fully-defined themes available, the findings were assembled in the main body
of this chapter to present the story that underlies the data, elaborated at Appendix A.
The results are reviewed against the research questions in Section 11.
8.3 Trustworthiness of Thematic Analysis Results
For thematic analysis results to be accepted as trustworthy, researchers must demon-
strate that the data analysis has been conducted in a precise, consistent and exhaustive
manner [258]. Lincoln and Guba (1985) [259] proposed that trustworthiness in qualita-
tive research could be improved by introducing the criteria of credibility, transferability,
dependability, and confirmability. Each of these criteria will be assessed in turn, fol-
lowed by a discussion of how possible biases were managed.
8.3.1 Credibility
Guba and Lincoln (1989) [260] claimed that the credibility of a study can be subjec-
tively assessed by the readers if they can recognise the experience. They proposed that
if a researcher could present sufficient engagement with the sample, along with sup-
porting observations and triangulation, they could present the “fit” between the sample
members’ views and the researchers interpretation of them [258].
Along with the techniques adopted to maintain triangulation, as described in Sec-
tion 7.4, the elaboration of the thematic analysis results in Appendix A contains a
record of the number of sources and frequency of the references relating to the inter-
preted theme that emerged. This data was maintained in QSR NVivo™.
8.3.2 Transferability
Transferability, in the context of qualitative research, refers to the generalisability of
the enquiry [258]. The researcher is responsible for providing a sufficient narrative from
the sample so that those who wish to use the findings elsewhere can make their own
assessments of the contents [259].
This chapter contains a representative example of such narratives, with greater
depth of comments presented in Appendix A.
8.3.3 Dependability
For results to be considered dependable, they must be presented in a logical manner,
with clear explanations [258]. Thematic analysis follows a repeatable process, although
the subjective nature of the method may not deliver repeatable results. The focus, then,
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is therefore not on the repeatability of the themes developed, but that their structure
and content must adequately represent the data.
As discussed above, the themes presented in this research in Sections 8.4 to 8.12,
provide descriptions of each theme and the sub-themes they comprise, using the narra-
tive taken from interviews and questionnaires to justify their structure and content.
8.3.4 Confirmability
The confirmability of research focuses on establishing that the themes developed are
derived from the data. Confirmability is achieved when credibility, transferability, and
dependability are demonstrated [258].
These criteria, as discussed above, are presented through the detail of the themes
and the data used to derive them, presented in Sections 8.4 to 8.12 and elaborated in
Appendix A.
8.3.5 Managing Biases
As with all forms of qualitative analysis, the researcher is the primary instrument for
data collection and analysis [235]. However, humans have shortcomings and biases that
may have an impact on the study. It is unlikely that these such subjective views can
be eliminated from the study, therefore it is necessary to identify and monitor them.
To address this, initial potential biases were identified and recorded in Section 7.4.2.
As these indicated that the common background that the author and the sample shared
may influence the analysis of the data, the decision was taken to adopt an inductive
approach to the development of the themes [250]. In this manner, the themes were
developed solely from the data. This was assessed as preferable to a deductive approach
that would attempt to fit the results to pre-existing models or theories, as any biases
may have been amplified in both the selection of the theories and the interpretation of
the data’s fit to the models.
Additionally, when interacting with the research sample, open questions were used,
with any subsequent inquiry avoiding points of detail that may influence the respon-
dents. Where biases were recognised in the questioning, follow-on questions attempted
to approach the subject from a different perspective to triangulate the answers.
We shall now explore the results of the experiments conducted.
8.4 Cyber Defence Exercise, February 2017
The author joined 12 members of the purposeful sample on a ten-day CIRT4 CDX
[253] involving over 150 participants. No opportunity was available to provide ques-
tionnaires to capture feedback from the sample, however, the author was allowed to
record anonymised observations. Exercise constraints dictated the CPT could not use
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their full team on the CDX, and other demands on their time meant that they could
not attend any of the exercise preliminaries that allowed teams to deploy and configure
sensors.
The exercise afforded an opportunity to observe the CPT in an adverse situation,
for which they did not have the opportunity to undertake specific training, or prepare
for. As such, it allowed a baseline assessment of the sample, against which future
experiments could be scoped and measured.
The team were observed to possess a mid- to high-level of individual technical skills,
and an operating structure that on first appearances, appeared adequate. However, as
the exercise progressed it became apparent that operations within the team structure
were largely on an ad hoc basis, with individuals responding reactively to identified
network intrusion behaviours. Communications within the team were poor, and this
limited SA. This was despite the adoption of a number of visual representations of
network intrusion activities on whiteboards and large video screens, and a triage of
priority systems to defend based upon an early version of the ICS-CDTP. It was observed
that team members largely ignored the SA representations, and as a result, perpetuated
their individual focuses. This was assessed to be as a result of the time pressures of
the exercise, as well as there being no vehicle within the team to stimulate information
exchange at anything above Level 1 SA.
Further investigations of the team performance highlighted that the team members
were not correctly identifying intrusion behaviours on the network. It was observed that
whilst the team possessed the technical expertise to interpret their logs and sensors, they
did not have a sufficient understanding of APT attack behaviours to translate the data
into an assessment of antagonistic intent.
The team’s performance was assessed against the five mental models proposed in
Table 6.1, with their performance described in Table 8.1.
As can be seen, the team performed well in ‘Team Understanding’. This was
assessed to be as a result of previous military training and unit cohesion. However,
against the other four models their performance was not as effective, and resulted in a
poor outcome on the exercise. This was assessed to be as a result of the following four
issues:
1. A lack of understanding of APT attack techniques and how these manifest them-
selves in logs and sensors.
2. Poorly defined roles and responsibilities, and no defined vehicles or mechanisms
within the team to promote information sharing, communications, or SA.
3. No processes to translate the understanding of the network terrain (achieved
through the use of an early iteration of ICS-CDTP) into prioritised activities
within the team.
4. Although the team arrived late to the exercise, they did not have any formalised
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Type of Model Observed Team Performance
APT Attack Behaviours Whilst the team’s individual skills using defensive monitoring
tools were assessed as high, they did not appear to possess an
understanding of how an adversary would traverse a network, or
how to predict attack behaviours.
Team Interaction The roles and responsibilities of team members appeared loosely
defined, and interactions between them were on an ad hoc basis.
Communications and information flows were not formalised into
a defined set of operating procedures.
Team Understanding The understanding of the skills and personality traits amongst
members of the team appeared high, as was their general morale.
Despite a stressful situation, the team maintained an ordered
calmness to operations.
Operational Priorities The team had adopted an early iteration of the ICS-CDTP and
triaged the high-priority systems that required defence. Upon
further investigation, however, it was identified that the triage
was based on an ad hoc assessment of priorities, rather than using
a formalised approach such as the CARVER matrix.
Operating Environment Due to circumstances beyond their control, the team arrived late
to the exercise, and did not have time to establish a baseline before
the Red Team started attacks. As a result, the team did not
achieve an acceptable level of understanding of their network until
almost halfway through the exercise.
Table 8.1: Observed team performance against shared mental models on the February
2017 CDX.
processes that defined the immediate activities that should be undertaken to
rapidly understand the network they must defend.
These observations drove the development of the detail of the subsequent experi-
ment schedule.
8.4.1 Experiment Outcomes
Based on the observations described in Table 8.1, it was agreed with the CPT that the
priorities for improving the team’s mental models would be:
1. APT Attack Behaviour: The team required an increased understanding of how
APTs behave on networks. This should include a means by which the attacker
could be tracked through a network, how their behaviours would be represented in
logs and sensors, and a means to assess future antagonistic courses of action.
2. Operational Priorities: An improvement in the ability to determine operational
priorities, and use these as a basis for incident response operations, was identified
as a key area for improvement. This was to include mechanisms to translate an
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understanding of key network terrain, identified using ICS-CDTP, into prioritised
activities for the CPT.
3. Team Interaction: A definition of clear roles and responsibilities within a recog-
nised team structure was assessed to be required to improve the overall performance
of the team. This was to include means by which individual understanding of in-
formation or events could be propagated throughout the team to develop Level 3
SA and improve overall Team SA.
4. Operating Environment: Improved techniques to understand the operational
environment were identified as an opportunity to improve team efficiency. Stan-
dard operating procedures were targeted for development to reduce the time taken
to understand a network, its associated ICS devices, and their exposure to possible
APT activities.
5. Team Understanding: This model required the least development, and was not
targeted for specific improvement within the experimental period.
8.5 SCIPS and Cyber Defence Exercise, April 2017
This experiment was designed as a result of the observations from the exercise described
in Section 8.4. The experiment comprised 26 participants, and adopted a novel exercise
format and structure that combined SCIPS and a new way to conduct CDX (described in
Section 7.5.2) intended to provide the opportunity for iterations of experiences, followed
by periods of reflection, to promote the formation of ideas and development of the APT
Attack Behaviour, Operational Priorities, and Team Interaction mental models.
8.5.1 Pre-Exercise Questionnaire Results
Participants were asked to complete a pre-exercise questionnaire. This provided the
first of the thematic analyses of data. It highlighted the following initial themes, which
are elaborated in Appendix A.2:
• ‘Adversary Understanding’
• ‘Defensive Operations’
• ‘Defensive Planning’
Adversary Understanding
The adversary understanding theme focused the participants’ comprehension of the
‘intent’ of the adversary, and the ‘attack methods’ employed.
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Attack Intent: This sub-theme discussed the intent of the antagonist. It was char-
acterised by broad, general statements that focused on generic actors, as opposed to
those who would specifically target ICS. Adversaries were stereotyped as:
“A person who is trying to gain information from an organisation for profit
or malicious use. This can be gained initially through social engineering to
target a weak point in an organisation”
Attack Methods: The attack methods sub-theme concentrated on the nature of the
network intrusion. The descriptions ranged from general, non-specific statements, to
those that demonstrated at least a theoretical understanding of antagonistic techniques:
“Able to move quietly, using existing network capabilities or configuration
issues to move laterally and escalate privileges. 2. Ability to maintain per-
sistence, using volatile memory and injection. 3. Has a defined motive – a
reason to get in and be determined to stay there. 4. Can conduct reconnais-
sance quietly so the network boundary penetration is not discovered”
Defensive Operations
This theme focused on cyber defence operations, and almost exclusively discussed the
need for establishing and maintaining SA when responding to a complex incident.
Situational Awareness: The comments focused mainly on communications within
the team:
“For a Team Leader situational awareness is maintained by constantly re-
ceiving updates from the various sub-teams and integrate with intelligence
and known methodologies”
Defensive Planning
The defensive planning theme considered those activities that should be undertaken
prior to an incident, and concentrated on two sub-themes; ‘preparatory actions’ and
‘security architecture’.
Preparatory Actions: This focused on the actions an organisation could undertake
to prepare itself for a network intrusion incident. The commentary largely focused on
technical activities:
“Good system hardening. SIEM [Security Information and Event Manage-
ment]/log correlation across all systems. Well-trained incident response
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team. Regular incident response drills and wash-ups of past incidents. Threat
intelligence team in-house”
Security Architecture: This sub-theme described the elements of an overall secu-
rity architecture that would improve an organisation’s security posture. As with the
preparatory actions, the language focused on technical design:
“The basics of cyber security are the best. For example, keeping the systems
patched, hardened, users trained and tested on good cyber security hygiene.
Defence-in-depth: defender with the right tools and skills to keep ahead of
threat actors”
8.5.2 Post-SCIPS Questionnaire Results
After completing the pre-exercise questionnaire, the exercise participants undertook a
period of classroom training, then all played SCIPS, experiencing an APT attack end-
to-end within the game. Each round of the game ended with teams describing their
assessment of where the attackers were in the adversary lifecycle and Purdue Model,
intended to develop their APT Attack Behaviour, Team Understanding, and Operational
Priorities mental models. Following SCIPS, all of the participants were asked to answer
a further questionnaire.
The four themes that emerged from the questionnaire, elaborated in Appendix A.3
were:
1. ‘Adversary Understanding’
2. ‘Stakeholder Priorities’
3. ‘Defensive Planning’
4. ‘Network Understanding’
Adversary Understanding
This was the strongest of the themes, and encapsulated the participants’ understanding
of the APT actor represented in the SCIPS game. Five related sub-themes to the theme
were apparent within the theme, those of attack ‘intent’, ‘impact’, ‘methods’, ‘lifecycle’,
and ‘threat intelligence’.
Attack Intent: The understanding of the antagonist’s intent altered from the pre-
exercise questionnaire and demonstrated a strategic understanding of attacks on ICS:
“To force political change through disruption of public infrastructure”
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Attack Impact: Like the growth in comprehension of attack intent, the assessment
of attack impact demonstrated a greater understanding of the strategic consequences of
an attack on ICS.
“to disrupt, damage or destroy ICS which will create panic, distrust in the
industry or government, as well as financial impedance”
Attack Methods: This sub-theme continued to focus on the detail of technical attack
methods and the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) they would adopt. It
demonstrated an increased understanding of APT behaviours:
“This might involve (living off the land) using tools already available on the
targeted network. Such as compromising user without creating new ones.
Manipulating malicious traffic to look as normal, such as exfiltration using
DNS”
Attack Lifecycle: Participants demonstrated an understanding of how the use of
an attack lifecycle model, or kill-chain, could be used to determine past actions, and
project future activities:
“you can build up a hypothesis of what and where the attacker has been”
Threat Intelligence: Feedback from the questionnaire highlighted a growing recog-
nition of the use of threat intelligence to inform a defensive posture:
“You can only be effective with the collection of relevant, accurate, and up
to date information about the threat”
Network Understanding
The need to understand a network and its associated systems, as a prerequisite for
cyber defence, emerged as a strong theme. The questionnaire respondents described
this theme in two forms; ‘network baselining’ and ‘network monitoring data’.
Network Baselining: This sub-theme of network baselining focused on establishing
a network pattern of life against which deviations from the norm could be determined:
“Network baseline and information flows. Network ingress/egress points.
PLC/ICS process flows and critical points. Zone 0-5 boundaries and cross-
boundary information flows”
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Network Monitoring Data: This sub-theme of network understanding was strongly
related to supporting incident response, but the language focused on the exploitation
of information acquired from sensors and logs:
“Any info relevant to the attack. What systems were affected? How were the
systems attacked?”
Defensive Planning
The requirement to proactively defend an ICS network, and plan ahead, emerged as a
theme that encompassed both ‘preparatory actions’, and the development of a ‘security
architecture’.
Preparatory Actions: This considered the need to plan ahead of a cyber incident,
and ensure that appropriate plans were in place to address such a situation:
“I think early planning does make a big impact on the upcoming incident.
So many things we would have done in the earlier stages won’t work after
certain time because the enemy is already in and implementing those systems
is a waste of time and money”
Security Architecture: As many of the participants playing the game had a tech-
nical background, it is unsurprising that a consideration of security architecture was
discussed:
“In an ideal world: Secure-by-design architecture”
Stakeholder Priorities
The priorities of the leadership within an organisation emerged as a theme, demon-
strating an increasing understanding of wider business issues. The theme encompassed
‘financial constraints’, ‘return on investment’, and ‘direction of investment’.
Financial Constraints: Participants recognised, many for the first time, the financial
constraints imposed by the necessity to maintain a viable, profitable business, and the
limits this places on cyber security investment:
“had not deeply considered financial balancing act required of executives”
Return on Investment: In a similar vein, participants started to acknowledge the
requirement to demonstrate a return on security investments:
“Assess the risk in order to identify the best return on investment for money
spent”
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Direction of Investment: Some participants started to see the value of using ad-
versary understanding to direct investment to mitigate the threats of cyber attack:
“Spend wisely. Try to predict the worst attack and find a solution for it.
Find the vulnerability in the system and think from the attacker’s point of
view”
8.5.3 Post-CDX Questionnaire Results
The experiment then progressed to the CDX [254], using the criteria for a CIRT3
CDX within our progressive training model. To anchor the development of all five
of the mental models, the SCIPS scenario was used as the scenario for the CDX, with
participants being made aware that they were going to experience the same attack from
game, but in a detailed range environment. The exercise comprised three days of attack
activity, split into six half-days that corresponded to the activities played out in the six
rounds of the SCIPS game. The Blue Team were briefed at the start of each half-day
session which activities the Red Team would be undertaking against them. Each phase
was time-bound, and at the end the Red Team would discuss with the Blue Team which
of the activities they had detected, and which they had not.
Following the CDX, all of the participants were asked to answer a questionnaire
(detailed in Appendix A.5). These questionnaires were completed at the end of the week-
long experiment, by the same sample who completed the pre-exercise questionnaire. The
responses discussed the participants’ understanding of ICS, APT actors, and the nature
of SCIPS and the CDX.
The questionnaire data was used to identify eight key themes, elaborated in Ap-
pendix A.5:
• ‘Adversary Understanding’
• ‘Defensive Operations’
• ‘Defensive Planning’
• ‘Incident Response Training’
• ‘Exercise Management’
• ‘Cyber Range Quality’
• ‘Red Team Provision’
• ‘Stakeholder Priorities’
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Adversary Understanding
The adversary understanding theme focused on the ‘attack lifecycle’ and the ‘attack
methods’ employed, reflecting on the concepts and ideas articulated after the SCIPS
game.
Defensive Operations
The theme of defensive actions extended the context emerged from the SCIPS question-
naire. It elaborated four sub-themes; ‘command and control’, ‘operational priorities’,
‘communications’, and ’operating procedures’.
Command and Control: This focused on the impact of poor leadership during exer-
cise, and incident response in general, and reflected on issues that the team experienced
during the early stages of the CDX:
“Too many people shouting out identified ‘threats’ with only a cursory inves-
tigation into that incident having being done at that point”
Operational Priorities: The sub-theme of operational priorities discussed how an
incident response team would determine where to focus resources and effort:
“Prioritise defence based on commander’s mission, critical assets and valu-
able assets, and likely enemy intent drawn from threat intelligence. Solution
may not defend all, but would defend most critical assets”
Communications: Respondents commented on the need for effective communica-
tions between team members, reflecting changes in the effectiveness of their interactions
as the CDX progressed:
“Communicate more regularly within the different areas of the team”
Operating Procedures: The sub-theme identified the requirement for clear, de-
tailed, SOP to guide incident responders:
“It would be advisable to have a clear, concise ‘threat analysis’ SOP, some-
thing easy to follow, especially useful to new members of the team”
Defensive Planning
Within the defensive planning theme, two further sub-themes emerged, ‘ICS under-
standing’, and ‘triage priorities’. These extended the sub-themes of ‘preparatory ac-
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tions’ and ‘security architecture’ already identified, but with no substantive change in
their content.
ICS Understanding: The requirement to accurately understand the nature of ICS
was highlighted as a key defensive planning requirement, reflecting how the ICS elements
of SCIPS and the CDX influenced the participants:
“There are many threats to ICS, such as external threats (politically mo-
tivated, industrial espionage etc.), internal threats (employees with an axe
to grind), human error, security challenges, securing ICS networks. Most
ICS were built prior to cyber threats existing and therefore not designed with
built-in security controls”
Triage Priorities: The need to triage critical systems was identified as a key element
of defensive planning, with respondents focusing on system availability:
“Threat to availability is more critical for ICS than for standard computer
networks. Threat actors include: nation-states, individuals, criminals, po-
litical/activist groups (all with varying levels of sophistication)”
Incident Response Training
The nature of incident response training emerged as exercise participants reflected how
to effectively deliver learning outcomes. The sub-themes that arose discussed the need
for a ‘learning environment’, a focus on ‘training structure and pace’, time for ‘feedback
and reflection’, and the advantages of ‘progressive training’.
Learning Environment: A clear sub-theme of Incident Response Training was the
nature of training environment, and its conduciveness to learning. In particular, it
contrasted traditional military techniques:
“Good to work in an academic, non-military environment, as this promotes
learning”
Training Structure and Pace: Linked to the nature of the learning environment,
the structure and pace of the training emerged as a consistent sub-theme, and in par-
ticular the management of time to allow for improved learning outcomes:
“The staged approach has allowed a better learning experience”
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Feedback and Reflection: Experiment participants also commented on the benefi-
cial aspects of feedback and periods of reflection across SCIPS and the CDX:
“non-judgemental, structured learning environment. Sensible pace and reg-
ular discussions/debriefs. Collaboration with new individuals and academia
enriches our knowledge and understanding”
Progressive Training: This sub-theme of incident response training discussed the
need for a programme that included individual training that develops into a series of
progressively complex scenarios, as a means to target learning appropriately:
“able to focus in a progressive way on each phase of the attack cycle”
Exercise Management
The management of CDXs emerged as a strong theme, encompassing ‘exercise objectives’
in terms of positive outcomes, and ‘exercise duration’, with a focus on requests to extend
the exercise execution window.
Exercise Duration: Exercise participants, whilst apparently enjoying the exercise,
felt that greater training benefit could have been achieved if a longer exercising period
was adopted:
“Longer time period for all (2 weeks would be great)”
Exercise Objectives: Participants reflected that the exercise had clear training ob-
jectives that delivered a positive learning outcome:
“this was a very good exercise with much better training value. The exercise
was, in my view, Blue Team focused, not just how good the Red Team is.
Work and getting a better understanding of each stage of the kill chain en-
hanced our understanding of the required procedures in security/defending a
network”
Cyber Range Quality
Feedback from participants described issues with the range. Their comments focused on
three sub-themes; ‘range stability’, ’range discrimination’, and ‘activity visualisation’.
Range Discrimination: The sub-theme of range discrimination refers to the conse-
quences of using a heavily virtualised architecture, and the inability of the Blue Team to
determine whether characteristics of the network are as a result of a network intrusion,
or simply a feature of the infrastructure:
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“Accurate network diagram. Documented configuration”
Range Stability: The comments on range stability largely referred to period of re-
mediation on the network as a result of a power outage:
“Test stability of range more prior to exercise”
Activity Visualisation: Participants requested the ability to record and replay at-
tack traffic, to aid learning:
“Also, some sort of video replay of what the Red Team have done would be
beneficial”
Red Team Provision
The provision of a Red Team for cyber exercises, their ‘discipline’, frequency of ‘feedback’
to the Blue Team, and their ‘rules of engagement’, were discussed.
Red Team Discipline: Feedback from participants focused on the benefits of the
discipline of the Red Team on the exercise at DMU, as compared to previous exercises
they had experienced:
“The exercise was, in my view, Blue Team focused, not just how good the
Red Team is”
Red Team Feedback: Participants considered the feedback provided by the Red
Team to the Blue Team on the exercise at DMU, and its positive impact on learning
outcomes:
“Each phase then concludes with feedback so Blue Team know if their actions
had an effect (good or bad)”
Rules of Engagement: The constrained rules of engagement for the Red Team on the
DMU exercise were reflected upon by the participants, and its effect on their experience:
“Usually the Red Team will go out of scope or advance too quickly for any
benefit to be gained. The constrained rules of engagement (ROE) for the Red
Team allowed us to gain more from the exercise by understanding more at
each phase”
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Stakeholder Priorities
The priorities of the leadership within an organisation again emerged as a theme, this
time with two sub-themes; ‘financial constraints’ and ‘strategic viewpoint’. The view of
financial constraints did not differ substantially from the previous narrative. ‘Strategic
viewpoint’, however, added a new facet to the theme.
Strategic Viewpoint: Participants discussed how SCIPS, in particular, shaped their
understanding of the strategic issues surrounding cyber security, beyond just financial
issues:
“The SCIPS game gave a high-level understanding of how security is viewed
by COs [commanding officers] and company directors”
8.5.4 Past Exercise Experience Interviews
During the exercise, a subset of participants who had prior cyber exercise experience
were interviewed. A series of eight interviews were conducted with seven individuals.
This highlighted seven themes, elaborated in Appendix A.4:
1. ‘Incident Response Training’
2. ‘Exercise Management’
3. ‘Red Team Provision’
4. ‘Defensive Operations’
5. ‘Adversary Understanding’
6. ‘Cyber Range Quality’
7. ‘Defensive Planning’
Throughout this section, the names of the exercises that the interviewees have
attended have been obfuscated. This does not detract from the intent or understanding
of the comments.
Incident Response Training
The theme of incident response training emerged as the strongest theme from the inter-
views. It encompassed the need for ‘adversary training realism’, a ‘consistent toolkit’,
time for ‘feedback and reflection’, the need for the provision of a suitable ‘learning envi-
ronment’, the advantages of ‘progressive training’, and the use of ‘table-top exercises’.
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Adversary Training Realism: This sub-theme discussed the requirement for adver-
sary understanding to translate into a realistic adversary that incident responders can
train against, to allow for response techniques and processes to be thoroughly tested
against specific threat actors:
“we’ll go on an exercise and maybe it’s a case of them starting off with
hacktivists then evolves into an APT in that classic way that is always kind
of predictable, rather than having separate training periods where you discuss
a threat from X adversary”
Consistent Toolkit: This encompassed the need to train as the team would respond
in real life. Specifically, it addressed the requirement to use the tools that they would
have access to should an incident occur, rather than the ‘freeware’ usually deployed on
training infrastructures:
“for example, have Cisco firewalls – we never train with Cisco firewalls..., so
it’s usually PFSense or Vyatta on exercises. So people are tested on different
tools to those we need in the real world, and it also increases the number of
tools people have to learn, and we already have overload on that”
Feedback and Reflection: Interviewees discussed the requirements for time to re-
flect on the events that have unfolded within an exercise, to make sense of them, and
adjust their behaviours as a consequence:
“It gives us an opportunity to go back and look at things like the logs and
see when that happened, what it looked like on the sensor. So then, from
a sensor perspective, see what it looked like if it happens again, potentially
write signatures for it, and stuff like that. And then also, from a Harden
[Hardening Team] perspective, what can we do to remediate against it should
they come in? What can we do to remediate to stop that data from being
exfilled? What can we put on the firewall, what can we do on the server?”
Learning Environment: The interviewees commented on the learning environment
at DMU, and drew comparisons to previous exercises:
“I do think you could significantly improve individual’s abilities by putting
them in a more academic environment; a non-adversarial, mentored envi-
ronment”
Progressive Training: The sub-theme of incident response training further elabo-
rated the need for a programme that included individual training that develops into a
series of progressively complex scenarios for teams:
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“So, in general terms, we have been doing CT1 through to CT5 [collective
training levels 1 to 5] in one exercise, so we never get to train as individuals
or as a team before [the exercise]. We tend to be doing our individual and
team training on a CT4 or CT5 level exercise , so either an international or
national exercise, where it’s high tempo. Even if you’re not being formally
validated, there’s an understanding that it’s a test, and that it’s a reflection
on the capability or readiness of the team and the individual, which is not
ideal because we’ve not had prior opportunity to iron-out any issues, or even
to rehearse or exercise basic things”
Table-Top Exercises: In discussing options for incident response training, the ap-
plicability of table-top exercises emerged:
“I think we could get a huge amount of value out of just table-topping and
just taking away all that technical expense issue and just discussing, verbally,
how you would deal with issues. It forces us to think, as well. Even in this
scenario today, we’ve got sucked straight into “are the sensors working?”,
it’s always the engineering issues that suck up the first few days or week, or
however long, of an exercise. If that was taken away and we were just speak-
ing in theory about how you would recognise and defend against particular
kinds of threats it would force us to focus on the theory, and a more rigorous
approach, and we could focus on documenting those lessons and putting them
into our SOPs, rather than always just going on an exercise and just fighting
through, and just trying to keep our heads above water, and then breathing
a sigh of relief and going home”
Exercise Management
All of the interviewees had experience of previous cyber exercises, and reflected on
the issues they had encountered. The theme comprised four sub-themes; ‘objectives’,
‘preparation’, ‘realism’, and ‘control’.
Exercise Objectives: The subject of exercise objectives was emotive, as the inter-
viewees had experienced unclear objectives in the past, with confusion over who the
training audience were. This led to the perception that the Blue Team were never going
to be put in a position where they could adequately defend against the Red Team:
“So you’re put into that environment, yes, the attacks are escalating, but if
you’re not training toward a defined objective, how do you get there?”
Exercise Preparation: The exercise preparation sub-theme is closely associated with
the consistent toolkit sub-theme of the incident response training theme. Interviewees
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cited how the preparation of exercises had not considered the requirement for the Blue
Team to baseline the network they were defending, or supply the tools necessary for
their objectives:
“Other exercise points; probably another point would be admin stuff lead-
ing up to deploying – there’s either not enough information, or we get in-
formation too late to act on it. For example, [EXERCISE], it’s probably
unavoidable because it’s international so we’re at the behest of our [INTER-
NATIONAL] partners’ decisions, but not only do we not often get to choose
and deploy our own tools, we don’t even know what tools we’re going to have
until we get there”
Exercise Realism: For cyber exercises to be of benefit to incident responders, the
interviewees commented on the need for realism, in terms of scenario, and the aspects
of the network that can be modified to improve their defensive posture:
“So there’s always been that unrealistic aspect where we’ve had to make all
these network changes, and engage with these people, that either don’t exist
in reality or would not give you permission in reality. So it makes you wonder
what the point is, because what would you do in the real world?”
Exercise Control: The control of the exercise by the White Team on previous exer-
cises emerged as a strong sub-theme, with interviewees highlighting the need for strong
management of the exercise to deliver the training objectives:
“there’s a lack of a management layer that understands both the requirements
of the training serials and the Blue Teams, the training audience, and has
enough knowledge of Red Team activity that they can actually control it”
Red Team Provision
The provision of a Red Team for cyber exercises, and their rules of engagement, was
a point of contention for the interviewees. This theme encompassed the ‘discipline’ of
the Red Team, their ‘capability’, and the nature of how they provide ‘feedback’ to the
Blue Team.
Red Team Discipline: The sub-theme of Red Team discipline on previous exercises
encompassed both the positive and negative aspects of Red Team behaviour, and the
requirement to play within the agreed rules of engagement:
On the positive side, interviewees commented:
“Red Team activity was scripted to match the intelligence function, which
means that training audience getting realistic, managed serials”
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However, on the negative side, interviewees cited:
“Because there was no-one reigning them in, they weren’t staying within
their arcs [agreed limits of responsibility], and were doing things they really
shouldn’t be doing. Because there was no control of the Red Team that then
meant that they were able to go and do it. Not so much the guy sat at the
keyboard’s fault, there was no overarching layer of control to reign people in”
Red Team Capability: This sub-theme focused on the capabilities of a Red Team,
including their availability, skillset, and agreed attack playbooks:
“At the moment, if we do that ourselves, and we tried it, it’s very much
‘script kiddy’ because we don’t concentrate on the same sort of skills. People
say ‘you’re Blue Team you can do Red Team’ – I disagree entirely. It’s a
completely different point of view, I think, in the way you look at your net-
work. A different set of skills really. It absolutely is. I want good network
engineers, whereas a good pen tester doesn’t actually have to be a good engi-
neer himself. He just needs to know how he can exploit stuff and understand
more coding and underlying structures rather than understanding what he
needs to make the service work”
Red Team Feedback: This covered the requirement for the Red Team to provide
feedback to the Blue Team, so that the Blue Team have the opportunity to learn from
their experiences. In particular, the comments of the interviewees focused on the need
for a shotval on previous exercises, a military term that describes a period evaluation
and reflection period delivered immediately after the end of a day’s play on the exercise
range:
“We didn’t have any shotval wash-up with the Red Team players, so it almost
felt like we were sailing into the wind. We didn’t know where we were going”
Defensive Operations
The defensive operations theme encapsulated the ‘roles and responsibilities’, ‘commu-
nications’, and ‘situational awareness’ of the incident response team. Although no
substantive additional narrative was provided to the ‘roles and responsibilities’ and
‘communications’ sub-themes, important aspects of developing ’situational awareness’
were discussed.
Situational Awareness: Underpinning the whole of the defensive operations theme
was the requirement for situational awareness, and how this was maintained. It included
not only the techniques to maintain situational awareness, but also how the layout of
the room used by the incident response team affects such cognisance:
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“Another very useful thing to do is every hour or two, force everyone to have
hands-off keyboard and the TL [Team Leader] or watchkeeper if necessary,
would point at individual respective teams and they would brief quickly what
below was going on. Very often we would find that two teams that were work-
ing in the same room, suddenly someone would join the dots all of a sudden
and realise that actually they were working on the same thing. Arguably,
every hour or so, just that five minutes to chance have a chat rather than
people going down a certain, specific tasking can be very useful”
“So what we find is there’s a couple of factors that will affect how infor-
mation passes around the team and overall situation awareness. The first
one is where everyone’s sitting. So if you look at [INTERNATIONAL EX-
ERCISE], everyone will sit facing each other in a circle [open square]. The
layout of that room [the room at DMU used for the April 2017 exercise] is all
these little islands, and you’ll find that the people will naturally drop into the
macro problem, they’ll start looking at their logs, they’ll work on the Splunk
server, but they won’t talk across each other”
Adversary Understanding
Within the context of understanding the threat actors that face an organisation, the
sub-theme of ‘threat intelligence’ was discussed. This did not substantially add to the
previously identified content of the sub-theme.
Cyber Range Quality
The interviews highlighted the dependency of cyber exercises upon the quality of the
ranges that they operate. It focused on two distinct sub-themes, those of ‘range stabil-
ity’ and ‘range discrimination’, although it did not significantly change the previously
identified sub-theme content.
Network Understanding
The theme, in this instance, focused on network terrain analysis.
Network Terrain Analysis: The network terrain analysis highlighted the need to
proactively assess the valuable network assets that would be attractive to an attacker:
“and that evolves into integrating a genuine Cyber IPE [ICS-CDTP] key
terrain analysis”
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8.5.5 Experiment Outcomes
As a result of the experiment, the CPT added the role of the Blue Terrain Manager
(BTM) to their organisational structure. The role of the BTM was to coordinate all
activities across the network the team are defending, to ensure that the network terrain
has been analysed and prioritised, and to focus defensive efforts based on an under-
standing of the adversary.
8.6 Table-Top Exercise, June 2017
The author was invited to participate in an exercise that fitted the criteria for a CIRT3
TTX with a UK CNI provider [255]. The exercise required the organisational crisis
management team to report to a leadership structure at regular intervals, requiring
accurate SA from the team, as well as the need to forecast defensive activities to respond
to a mid-tier actor with the capability to manoeuvre covertly around a network and
adapt to the incident responders’ actions. The intent of the exercise was to assess
the organisational agility to deal with such a situation, and to test the adaptability of
the leadership to manage a dynamic situation and interact with their wider regulatory
community.
No feedback questionnaires were completed. Only the author’s observations are
included.
This was the first time the leadership had been brought together for such an ex-
ercise, and it was observed that whilst the individuals responsible for managing each
operating component had proven response processes, the integration of these to deal
with a significant cyber event had not been tested. It was assessed that this may have
been as a result of not progressively exercising the scenario.
It was assessed that leadership had established mental models for the ‘Operational
Priorities’ and ‘Operating Environment’, based on their in-depth understanding of the
business. However, their ‘APT Attack Behaviours’, ‘Team Understanding’ and ‘Team
Interaction’ mental models were poor, no doubt as this was their first exposure to such
a scenario.
8.6.1 Experiment Outcomes
It was observed that no processes were in place to establish the triage of systems during
a crisis, which contributed to the leadership’s lack of focus. Similarly, no processes were
defined to establish and maintain SA, which provided the information available to base
decisions upon. The outcome of the exercise was a review of the processes, and the
planning of a further exercises to drive-out the necessary improvements.
These observations shaped the scope of the TTX facilitated by the author in June
2017, the results of which are reported in Section 8.8.
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8.7 Cyber Defence Exercise, June 2017
The author joined 20 members of the purposeful sample, the Army CPT, on an interna-
tional exercise [256] involving over 1000 people across the Red, Blue, White and Green
Teams that was executed over 14 days. The sample was split between two teams, the
first comprising solely personnel from the CPT, the second integrating personnel from
other nations. The exercise fitted the criteria of a CIRT5 CDX, in that it was intended
to test the participants to the point of failure, and designed to determine at which point
the C2 of the team cannot cope.
The CPT intended to further test the techniques from Section 8.5, to drive the
development of SOPs so that new members joining the team would have a documented
framework in which to integrate. It was also planned to test the new organisation
structure they had adopted as a result of the experiment in Section 7.5.2 that resulted
in a new team role of Blue Terrain Manager, that drew heavily on the concepts of the
ICS-CDTP.
The author, along with the leadership of the CPT, observed the behaviours of the
sample on the exercise, and recorded their assessment of their performance. No feedback
questionnaires were completed by the exercise participants.
It was commented by the team leader that, as a result of the exercise described in
Section 8.5, that on this exercise:
“the [intrusion detection] and [network hardening] aspects of the [team] dis-
played a high level of confidence”
He further commented that:
“the slow time walk through and red team feedback received at DMU was
directly correlated to the actions of the red team on [this exercise]. As the
red team progressed along the cyber kill chain we anticipated, as a team, the
next steps they would take”
The personnel from the sample were split across two teams. Those that were
integrated into a multi-national team comprised a smaller subset of the more experienced
members of the CPT, with the majority remaining in the UK team.
It was observed that the multi-national team, led by the most experienced member
of the CPT, operated with greater efficiency than the UK team. However, neither team
were using detailed operating procedures. It was highlighted that most of the processes
of the CPT resided in the heads of a few individuals. This resulted in ad hoc approaches
to responding to incidents. The more experienced the individual leader, the better the
response, but it was assessed that this was not a repeatable process. This inefficiency
was in some way mitigated by the high levels of individual skills observed, but the team
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interactions were far from optimal, suggesting a weak ‘Team Interaction’ mental model.
Similarly, SA across the teams was inconsistent.
Although the introduction of the Blue Terrain Manager, as discussed in Section
8.5, provided a sound triage of critical systems, and coordinated the activities of the
team across the network to prevent ‘blue on blue fratricide’, team SA remained poor.
It was observed that no formal processes to maintain SA had been developed.
It was further observed by the Red Team in their feedback, that the CPT had
failed to correctly interpret key attack behaviours on the network. In particular, the
team had not seen attempts to compromise the Domain Controller. It was assessed by
the Team Leader that this was as a result of having to interpret covert activity from logs
and sensors, and that this would be a key learning activity for the immediate future.
8.7.1 Experiment Outcomes
It was decided, as a result of the analysis of the exercise, that:
1. SA processes would be developed for the team.
2. A new role of SA Manager would be introduced in the short-term to ensure these
processes were adhered to.
3. The new SA processes would be tested on a TTX to assess their completeness and
effectiveness, along with the wider set of standard operating procedures in use by
the team.
4. A CDX would be planned to target the development of detecting covert adversaries
on networks, and assess the effectiveness of standard operating procedures.
5. Consideration should be given to developing software tools to support the tech-
niques within ICS-CDTP.
8.8 Table-Top Exercise, August 2017
This experiment [257] was derived following a review of the performance of the CPT on
the exercise described in Section 8.7. It was acknowledged by the team that overall SA
was an issue, and that their ‘Team Interaction’ mental model and associated processes
were poor. In line with the training priorities identified in Section 8.7.1, a TTX was
developed to assess the effectiveness of the team’s processes.
The SCIPS scenario was used as the basis of the CIRT2 TTX, as the familiarity
with the scenario allowed the team to focus on how they work and interact. A modified
set of facilitation questions, based on those summarised in Section 7.5.3 and detailed
at Appendix E, were used to drive out the detail of what was included, or omitted, in
the team’s SOPs. The TTX was executed as a one-day exercise that was attended by
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12 of the purposeful sample. The TTX was designed to bring together representatives
of the sub-teams within the CPT to assess how the operating procedures of the team
and sub-teams interoperate, and how overall C2 and SA was maintained during an
incident. In particular, it looked at how the elements of ICS-CDTP could be further
embedded in their processes. The TTX was intended to test the proposed SA Manager
role, to sit alongside the Blue Terrain Manager, to ensure Team SA was maintained
across concurrent network activities.
Feedback questionnaires were completed at the end of the exercise. A total of 12
questionnaires were received. Unsurprisingly, all of the responses focused on the theme
of defensive operations.
Defensive Operations
The theme encompassed ‘communications’, ‘information flow’, ‘roles and responsibili-
ties’, ‘situational awareness’, and ‘operating procedures’.
Communications: The TTX participants emphasised the need for effective commu-
nications, and how the assumption of a ‘Team Understanding’ mental model does not
always equate to its realisation:
“It has highlighted parts we take for granted that we perceive people should
already be aware of – how ‘things’, ‘tasks’ are carried out. Also that we need
to feed or record all events so they can be correlated for the bigger picture”
Information Flow: The TTX highlighted shortcomings in the informations flows
around the team as a result of poor, or non-existent procedures and proceses:
“Better understanding of sub-team information dependencies”
Roles and Responsibilities: Questionnaire respondents highlighted an increased
understanding of team roles and responsibilities as a result of driving out operating
procedures:
“It has clarified who sits under what team and how they are likely to operate
in an operational/exercise environment”
Situational Awareness: Situational awareness again emerged as a sub-theme, and
in particular, the team leader and sub-team leads commented on the need to maintain
SA:
“Has made me think a great deal more as to what the processes should be. I
will need to have oversight on all areas, as well as the big picture, and ensure
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that communications up and down happen regularly to keep an all-informed
net”
Operating Procedures: As the focus of the TTX was to drive-out the detail of the
team’s operating procedures, it emerged as a strong sub-theme, and resulted in the
scoping of seven new standard operating procedures:
“Our SOPs [standard operating procedure] are massively outdated and mostly
unfit for purpose -> the new seven consolidated SOPs will be much more
appropriate and useful for new teams starting up”
8.8.1 Experiment Outcomes
The TTX highlighted a number of deficiencies in the team’s operating procedures. It
also highlighted seven new operating procedures that should be written, and confirmed
the role of SA Manager as essential to their incident response capability.
8.9 Cyber Defence Exercise, August 2017
As a result of the priorities described in Section 8.7.1, a three-day CDX was facilitated to
improve the team’s ability to identify covert attack behaviour on a network, and assess
their ability to maintain SA. A day’s preparation was included (Day 0) that preceded
the three days of exercise execution, to allow the range to be assessed, to set up Blue
Team tools, and trial team operations. The Blue Team was split into four sub-teams:
1. Hunt: Responsible for active threat hunting on the network.
2. Monitor: Monitoring the security tools deployed on the network and inspecting
for possible malicious activities.
3. Harden: The sub-team responsible for hardening all of the network devices.
4. Intelligence: Responsible for threat intelligence fusion and the Blue Terrain
triage.
A Red Team was assembled that would repeatedly run the same set of attacks
over the three days to allow the Blue Team to improve their effectiveness at detecting
them. The primary attack was the delivery of an implant that would beacon out to
a Red Team C2 node in greyspace, and from there, receive instructions to laterally
move to the network Domain Controller (DC). The Red Team rules of engagement
restricted the beacons to Reverse HTTP and HTTPS, with the Server Message Block
(SMB) protocol as the only permitted mechanism to laterally move on the network.
The use of Mimikatz™ was permitted to harvest credentials from memory, as was the
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manipulation of Microsoft Windows™ Management Instrumentation (WMI) events to
create persistence on devices. It was an acknowledged limitation of the experiment that
no dedicated malware or forensic examination tools were available to the CPT, and the
timeframes limited the opportunities to identify memory-resident malware.
As with the CDX described in Section 8.5, the Red Team briefed the Blue Team
on the planned activities at the beginning of each day, and provided feedback to the
Blue Team at the end of the day. The Red Team logged their activities in the Red
Team server. The Blue Team recorded their activities in an event logging system that
was updated by each team member at least once an hour. This allowed the progress of
Blue Team activities to be tracked. Along with voice communications, the Blue Team
also used a chat application to interact.
The event logs were used to assess Blue Team activity and determine the time
between the deployment of a Red Team effect and Blue Team detecting it. They were
also used, along with the chat logs, to analyse the nature of the communications, and
characterise the interactions as Levels 1, 2 or 3 of SA.
Observations were made regarding the levels of SA achieved by the team, and the
effect of the role of SA Manager.
The durations of each of the days of the exercise were as below:
1. Day 1 - 6.5 hours
2. Day 2 - 5.75 hours
3. Day 3 - 3.0 hours
8.9.1 Red Team Activity Detection
The activities of both Red and Blue teams were compiled into a single log for analysis,
detailed at Appendix B. The activities are summarised below.
Day 1: Two client devices were implanted with malware that beaconed out to C2
servers in the greyspace of the range. The compromised devices were used to laterally
move to a SharePoint (SHPT) server, before reaching the target devices of DC1 and
DC2 Domain Controllers, as depicted in Figure 7.6. Finally, DC2 was then configured
to communicate directly with the greyspace C2 servers to see if the Blue Team would
detect this.
The Blue Team took 97 minutes to identify one of compromised devices beaconing
via HTTP talking to SHPT and DC1 over SMB. They took 178 minutes to detect the
second compromised device beaconing to greyspace, as well as communications via SMB
to the first compromised device. A total of 169 minutes were required to identify DC2
interacting directly with greyspace C2 nodes.
171
A. Cook 8.9. CYBER DEFENCE EXERCISE, AUGUST 2017
The Blue Team did not identify Mimikatz running on any devices, or malicious
WMI events on DC1.
Day 2: Two distinct streams of attack activity were conducted, with no interrela-
tionships between the attacks until they reached their ultimate target of DC1. The
first stream compromised a subset of client devices that subsequently took control of
SHPT before navigating to DC1. The second stream created a similar chain of separate
compromised client devices, with extensive use of malicious WMI events, before finally
reaching DC1.
It took the Blue Team 11 minutes to detect the first compromised device in the
first chain communicating to a greyspace C2 node, and to DC1. The team then took
25 minutes to detect a device in the chain of the second stream, correctly identifying a
Reverse HTTPS beacon. A malicious file running Mimikatz and communicating with
greyspace was identified 71 minutes after deployment.
Day 3: Additional beacons were dropped onto client devices late in Day 2 to prepare
for Day 3. Covert malicious DLLs were injected into existing processes on a chain of
client PCs to establish SMB communications between devices and to DC1. Password
data from DC1 was exfiltrated to greyspace C2 nodes.
The Blue Team took 20 minutes to identify the first reverse HTTP beacon, and a
total of 60 minutes to identify the chain to DC1.
A separate Blue Team stream of activity was established after identifying the com-
munications chain, to identify the malicious processes. This process took 180 minutes.
Assessment: The Blue Team demonstrated a marked improvement between Day 1
and Day 2 of the exercise, which was observed to be as a result of the detailed feedback
provided at the end of Day 1. By Day 3 the team had become proficient in identifying
the intrusion activity, so the investigation of malicious processes was undertaken as a
‘stretch target’. The time taken to identify the malicious processes was probably affected
by the lack of analysis tools available to the team.
8.9.2 Situational Awareness Observations
One of the key objectives of the exercise was to assess the team’s ability to maintain
SA. Observations of the team started at Day 0, to review their starting position, and
any changes in behaviour and effectiveness as the exercise unfolded.
Day 0: The pre-exercise day saw the team configure the room into an ‘open square’
configuration, as discussed in Section 8.5.4. A four-hour window was provided to set-up
security monitoring tools. The Red Team deployed two implants onto client devices,
with one chaining the other, so that only one beaconed to greyspace C2 nodes using a
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Reverse HTTP connection. Neither of these implants were detected by the Blue Team.
The team’s new, incoming Team Leader assumed the role of the SA Manager. It was
observed that team cohesion was initially poor, with a visible lack of SA and little sub-
team communication. It was further noted that the Blue Team were not completing the
event logs that would be used to record their understanding of Red Team behaviours
and assess SA. At this point the team had not setup a chat service. It was also noted
that the team were not adhering to the hourly ‘heads-up’ brief, as mandated by the
team’s new SA SOP, where they would stop work for five minutes each hour to brief
the rest of the team. As a result, it was agreed that the Blue Team would have hourly
exercise ‘freeze points’ where the event logs would be updated, and the SA briefs given
to the team.
Day 1: The outgoing Team Leader started to mentor the incoming Team Leader,
which provided guidance to shape the day’s operations. The Intelligence sub-team did
not produce a triage of the Blue Terrain until the afternoon, which left the Blue Team
without a strategic direction for half of the day. The Monitor sub-team were focused
on finalising the installation of their network monitoring tools and were not focusing
on the attacks that the Red Team had told them they would deliver. It was observed
that the Monitor sub-team identified SMB traffic between a client PC and a DC, but
did not understand it was potentially malicious. This suggested a lack of Level 2 SA.
The Hunt sub-team did not focus on the client PCs, where the Red Team had told
them their implants would land, or the DCs, which they were advised would be the
attack targets. They also did not acknowledge the critical systems defined in the Blue
Terrain analysis by the Intelligence sub-team that was delivered in the afternoon. This
included the SHPT server in the list of priority devices, that again, went ignored by
Hunt.
Overall, despite the hourly freeze point, team SA was assessed as poor by midday.
This was fed back to the Blue Team, with a noticeable improvement in communications
and SA in the afternoon. A significant increase in the use of whiteboards and other
visual material was noticeably apparent, and a clear flow of information between sub-
teams was observed. Similarly, the Hunt and Monitor teams improved their focus and
performance after the midday feedback. By the end of the day, the Monitor sub-team
had sensors deployed on all of the critical systems. The day-end feedback by Red Team
demonstrated how the implants were delivered, and how lateral movement to the SHPT
and DC servers was achieved.
Day 2: The precursor to the day’s proceedings included a review of the previous day’s
performance. This included the key point that whilst individual SA started to emerge
by midday, team SA only started to coalesce at the end of day feedback on Day 1.
Day 2 started with a far better team understanding of Red Team attack techniques
and the detection of compromised devices and lateral movement. Initially, the hourly
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briefs were not adhered to, but this was addressed mid-morning. These briefings started
out very much at Level 1 SA, focusing on what had occurred, without providing any
Level 2 SA contextualisation. This was balanced, however, by the Intelligence sub-team
briefs that used visual aids, demonstrating activities within the adversary lifecycle and
using the Diamond Model. These focussed exclusively on Level 3 SA and the forecast of
Red Team likely courses of action. Discussions ensued that demonstrated the emergence
of Level 2 SA and overall Team SA, shaped by the Intelligence sub-team Level 3 briefs.
Towards the end of the day the team were demonstrating high levels of Team SA,
with discussions becoming far less focused on the details of Level 1 SA, and far more
about Level 2 SA contextualisation and Level 3 SA projection.
The day-end feedback session started with a review by the Red Team, who ex-
plained the two attack streams that had been undertaken, highlighting where the CPT’s
increased understanding from Day 1 had been effective. A subsequent review of overall
SA focused on how it had improved once visual aids and graphical representations had
been used, and how the whole team used these to understand the entirety of what was
being detected on the network.
Day 3: The final day of the exercise started with the Red Team again briefing the
Blue Team on the day’s planned attacks. From the start of the day’s activities, the Blue
Team demonstrated far greater confidence and cohesiveness, with increased communi-
cations between the sub-teams and a far greater emphasis on maintaining Level 3 SA
individually and across the team. Much more effective use was made of visual aids, with
the adversary lifecycle and the Diamond Model being used as common frames of refer-
ence for the whole team. Hourly briefs were maintained (although the day’s activities
only lasted three hours) with each sub-team operating far more efficiently.
The day-end review contained positive feedback from Red Team on the speed and
efficiency with which Blue Team had identified and countered their attack activities.
Feedback from the Blue Team on the exercise included a consensus that they were
operating far more effectively and with greater confidence than at the beginning of the
experiment.
8.9.3 Situational Awareness Log Analysis
Two logs were maintained over the course of the exercise; an event log used to record
Blue Team observed network events, and a log of all chat conversations between team
members. These logs were reviewed after the exercise.
Event Logs: The event logs recorded observed network and host events over the full
thee days of the exercise. The recorded commentary was analysed and classified based
on the categories below:
• Level 1 SA: Where the technical identifiers of an attack were observed, without
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any discussion of their relevance or context.
• Level 2 SA: Where Level 1 identifiers were fused to provide a greater compre-
hension of network attack activity, or where the recorded narrative highlighted the
significance of an identified activity.
• Level 3 SA: Commentary that fused Level 1 and Level 2 events or information to
provide a projection of the future activities of the Red Team, or where an individual
analysis of acquired data forecast possible antagonistic courses of action.
• Miscellaneous: General commentary with no relevance to SA.
As can be seen from Figure 8.1, on Day 1, whilst Level 1 and Level 3 SA records
were identified, Level 2 understanding was low. This may have accounted for the mis-
interpretation of Red Team activities, i.e. the contextual understanding of Level 1
indicators was not fully comprehended, resulting in inaccurate assessments at Level 3.
By Day 2, the number of Level 1-only comments reduced significantly, with parity
almost achieved between Level 2 and Level 3. This coincided with in an increase in
observed Team SA.
On Day 3, the Blue Team were far more confident in their understanding of iden-
tified attack behaviours, and this was reflected in the high number of Level 3 records.
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Figure 8.1: Event Logs
Chatroom Communications: Due to technical issues, the chat service was only
available for two days of the exercise. The chats were classified using the same definitions
of Level 1 to 3 SA as used to assess the Event Logs. However, the definitions were
extended to filter out chat acknowledgements, requests for information that had no
relevance to SA, status updates that had no relevance to SA, and general administrative
conversations.
As can be seen, the majority of chats focused on Level 1 and Level 2 SA, with
very little Level 3 observed. This, it was assessed, was due to the real-time nature of
175
A. Cook 8.9. CYBER DEFENCE EXERCISE, AUGUST 2017
chat, and the use of the Event Logs to record the projection of Red Team activities,
supplemented by the voice communications of the hourly SA briefs.
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Figure 8.2: Chatroom Communications
Team Leader Feedback
The outgoing Team Leader provided some insightful feedback regarding the performance
of the team, and the effectiveness of the exercise. He commented that at the start of
the exercise the:
“Overall direction and leadership was lacking, individuals lacked context for
their technical skills and communication was poor”
He reflected on the improvement made by the team as the exercise progressed:
“As the serial [period of training] progressed, sub-teams improved their inter-
nal communication and processes as they were able to place context around
their activities. With assistance, they were able to improve cross-team com-
munication and information flows which, in turn, developed overall CPT sit-
uational awareness. Implementing an hourly update/team brief, supported
by a J2 [Intelligence sub-team] update ensured that the sub-teams were aware
of what the other teams were doing and able to place their activities into the
big picture. The management team were able to maintain control of their
assets and re-direct resources or activities when the situation changed. The
overall improvement was evidenced by a comparison of the noise level in the
trg [training] room on day 1 [Day 0] and on day 4 [Day 3]. In the beginning,
the room was quiet with analysts focussed on their screens. By day 4 [Day
3] there was a noticeable difference, with analysts talking to their sub-team
leads, sub-teams talking and sharing information between each other and the
management team were visibly interacting with the team as a whole, par-
ticularly during the hourly briefs. There is still a tendency when the tempo
176
A. Cook 8.9. CYBER DEFENCE EXERCISE, AUGUST 2017
increases for the hourly briefs to slip as the team is drawn to their respec-
tive screens. The TL [Team Leader] and Situational Awareness Manager
(SAM) are responsible for maintaining the battle rhythm [operational cycle
of activities] of the CPT and should therefore ensure that these updates are
conducted. The relationship can be seen as similar to a commander and chief
of staff (COS). The commander may get drawn into a particular scenario
or problem and the COS is there to pull them out when required so that the
overall mission functions are completed.”
He discussed the use of whiteboards and the graphical representations of Red Team
behaviours using the Adversary Lifecycle Model and the Diamond Model from the ICS-
CDTP:
“This was the first opportunity to show APT TTPs [tactics, techniques and
procedures] and projected actions as a graphical overlay. This, combined with
the situation and network boards, enabled the team to be able to look up and
gauge the current situation and operational tempo at a glance”
The wider challenges of a the team’s role, and the complexity of the incident
response situations they face was also discussed. The Team Leader focused on the need
to triage the Blue Terrain to prioritise defensive actions:
“The CPT deploys to networks with little to no prior knowledge of their con-
figuration, information flows or patch states. This is significant as the CPT
must understand the network as quickly as possible in order to develop situa-
tional awareness. A key discussion concentrated on where to direct analysis
and technical effort in the initial arrival stages with dissent around the net-
work boundary v Domain controllers. This is a valid conversation with no
right or wrong answer. There are, however a number of considerations. Fo-
cussing on the boundary requires there to be some understanding as to what
should and shouldn’t be crossing it and how internal assets route to it. This
is not always immediately obvious as the network configuration is not as it
should be. Concentrating on key services is good if there is an understand-
ing of how these should be running (which is not the same as how they are
running). Cognitive overload is a significant factor- the team are seeing the
network for the first time and it takes time and effort to understand what
they are seeing and then, crucially, to place it into the context of the situa-
tion and the adversary. No single person can do this and therefore the flow
of information around the team is essential. J2 [intelligence] and the man-
agement team need this information flow in order to develop their overall
situational awareness and understanding so that they can conduct their es-
timates and provide direction as the team moves into the PROTECT phase.
It is therefore suggested that initial ME [main effort] should be directed that
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the monitor team concentrate on the boundary whilst the hunt team focus
directly on the KCT [Key Cyber Terrain] Tier 1 assets – in this case the
Domain Controllers. The sub-teams can then increase their view outwards
as their SA increases. A horrible military analogy would be the monitor team
are acting as a sentry whilst the hunt team go forward and clear the Tier 1
location.”
The Team Leader concluded by summarising the effectiveness of the exercise, and
its applicability to further training:
“In Summary, a useful exercise that took a team with a lacklustre perfor-
mance on [INTERNATIONAL EXERCISE] to one that demonstrated key
skills and concepts required for DCO [Defensive Cyber Operations] in the
deployed space. Further work is required to develop team cohesion, informa-
tion flows, processes and procedures. The progressive format of the exercise
proved key to developing the team’s performance. It is recommended that
this serial should be repeated as a regular team activity as part of in-barracks
training.”
8.9.4 Experiment Outcomes
The nature of the CPT’s operations requires a prioritised approach to data ingest. Sub-
teams were observed in the early stages of the exercise to be ignoring the Team Leader’s
direction and working to ingest data outside of the stated priorities. It was agreed that
data acquisition would be shaped by time boundaries as a means to ensure consistency
in setting sensors and log collectors against agreed priorities. An outline set of priorities
was agreed:
1. Priority 1: Installing a Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) with passive
traffic taps.
2. Priority 2: Integration of the NIDS feeds to a Security Event and Information
Management (SIEM) tool.
3. Priority 3: Deployment of Host Intrusion Detection Systems (HIDS) and log
collectors on key network terrain assets, such as Domain Controllers, Boundary
Firewalls etc., with feeds to SIEM.
4. Priority 4: Deployment of HIDS and Log Collectors on all remaining network
assets.
Based on the principle of ‘assumed breach’, this prioritisation was defined to allow
the team to begin to assess network behaviours almost immediately and start to acquire
a critical mass of network traffic to start to identify anomalies. The feeds integrate into
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a SIEM to allow for more ready access to, and analysis of, this data. Priority 3 activities
deploy HIDS and log collectors onto key network terrain assets to allow monitoring of
triaged, likely targets. Priority 4 encompasses the rest of the network, brought under
the monitoring of the SIEM as resources and time permit.
8.10 Cyber Exercise Training Programme, November 2017
A DCO MST training programme (described in Section 7.5.7) for participants for the
exercise described in Section 7.5.8 was held, educating 36 individuals over three, one-
week training programmes, each including SCIPS and a TTX.
For the SCIPS element, a total of 36 questionnaire responses were received. From
these, four themes emerged:
1. ‘Adversary Understanding’
2. ‘Defensive Planning’
3. ‘Network Understanding’
4. ‘Stakeholder Priorities’
For the TTX component, a total of 38 questionnaire responses were received. Four
themes were apparent:
1. ‘Adversary Understanding’
2. ‘Defensive Operations’
3. ‘Network Understanding’
4. ‘Stakeholder Priorities’
The resulting, merged, thematic results are summarised below. They are elabo-
rated in Appendix A.7.
8.10.1 Adversary Understanding
This was again the strongest of the themes, and encapsulated the participants’ under-
standing of the APT actor represented in the SCIPS game. Seven related sub-themes to
the theme were apparent within the theme, those of attack ‘intent’, ‘impact’, ‘methods’,
‘lifecycle’, ‘courses of action’, ‘capability’, and ‘threat intelligence’.
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Attack Intent: The intent theme discussed the strategic goals of the antagonist,
including how this intent may be focused to apply wider political pressure by an asym-
metric adversary:
“Political coercion on the bigger scale, however, also a show of force from a
below-peer potential enemy”
Attack Impact: The impact of the attack reflected the manifestation of the antago-
nists actions in the SCIPS game:
“It made me more aware of how an attack can snowball over time”
Attack Methods: Attack methods described the participants’ understanding of the
techniques employed by APT actors, and how they would behave in an intrusion into
an ICS network. They included the initial attack vector through to lateral movement
and wider impact, linking this sub-theme strongly to the adversary lifecycle:
“Dropping malware onto the computer and branching out using peer-to-peer
connections”
Attack Lifecycle: This sub-theme reviewed the game participants use of the adver-
sary lifecycle and Purdue Model to assess the attacker’s progress through a network,
triaged using the CARVER matrix:
“Be less reactive, but predict what the adversary will do next. Take into
consideration CARVER matrix”
Adversary Courses of Action: The assessment of the possible courses of action an
adversary could pursue whilst on an ICS network was inherently linked to the use of
the adversary lifecycle. However, this sub-theme emerged as a distinct element within
overall adversary understanding:
“Trying to figure out where the attacker was and trying to plan. What to do
next to prevent the attacker from damaging the network and infrastructure”
Adversary Capability: In discussing the capability of the adversary, the experiment
participants differentiated between intent and capability:
“Just because they have the capability doesn’t prove malicious intent”
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Threat Intelligence: This theme discussed the exploitation of using intelligence to
shape network defence activities.
“Intelligence feeds, news, social media”
8.10.2 Defensive Operations
Defensive operations encompassed ‘communications’, ‘information flows’, ‘roles and re-
sponsibilities’, ‘situational awareness’, and ‘operating procedures’.
Communications: The communications between members of the team emerged as a
sub-theme of defensive operations:
“It highlighted the importance of communication and that to be aware of what
each team is doing will mean as a whole you can work together better”
Information Flows: The participants were advised to adopt the role of Blue Terrain
Manager within their TTX team structure, to manage activities on the network and
prevent ‘blue on blue’ incidents caused by a lack of coordination:
“Helped me understand to communicate the information to the BTM [Blue
Terrain Manager] to keep team operations smooth”
Roles and Responsibilities: The TTX emphasised the definition of clear role de-
scriptions within the team:
“TTX has highlighted the individual roles and responsibilities of each mem-
ber. Also it has contextualised the training to the degree that all members of
the team feel more confident going into the [next] exercise”
Situational Awareness: As the TTX progressed, the participants became far more
aware of the need for maintaining SA:
“vastly improved my knowledge of cyber and has introduced many new con-
cepts which will now feed directly into my situational awareness and improve
my overall ability as a Team Leader”
“Visual situational awareness is always better”
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Operating Procedures: One of the key outcomes of the TTX was to highlight the
need for standard operating procedures:
“The TTX was one of the most useful exercises this week and allowed me to
pull together the techniques and tools learnt and place them in the appropriate
point of the SOPs. It gave me a good overview of how the team members fit
together and highlighted the interchangeable nature of skill sets”
8.10.3 Defensive Planning
Defensive planning, in this instance, focused on defensive ‘triage priorities’, ‘preparatory
activities’, and ‘security architecture’.
Triage Priorities: The participants of the SCIPS game highlighted the need to assess
the network under defence to determine the likely targets of interest to the attacker:
“It brings to bear the meaning of prioritisation and the long-term impact
of triaging based on the services that are more important in relation to the
posed risks”
Preparatory Activities: The pre-incident preparatory process was cited as a sub-
theme of the defensive planning theme:
“Mitigation is better than reaction”
Security Architecture: Participants of the SCIPS game highlighted the need for a
robust security architecture as an sub-theme of the overall defensive planning process:
“Ring fence our assets and capabilities with layer of security”
8.10.4 Network Understanding
Understanding the network being defended focused on ‘network baselining’ and ‘network
monitoring data’.
Network Baselining: A focus on creating a foundational understanding of recognised
assets, traffic flows, and behaviours, against which anomalies could be assessed:
“[with] hindsight the order in which we implemented the defence was wrong.
Highlighted the need for a full understanding of the network processes and
functions”
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Network Monitoring Data: This sub-theme of network understanding was related
to the exploitation of information acquired from sensors and logs:
“Source and destinations in order to determine where they are and what box
they are operating from”
Network Terrain Analysis: The questionnaire respondents focused on network ter-
rain analysis in particular:
“By categorising the network and its importance”
8.10.5 Stakeholder Priorities:
The financial implications and constraints of an organisation’s expenditure on cyber
security emerged.
Financial Constraints: This sub-theme focused on the relationship between security
and financial expenditure limitations:
“It gave a deeper understanding how money is a large aspect of cyber defence”
8.10.6 Experiment Outcomes
The intent of the DCO MST was to assess if the training provided to the purposeful
sample of the CPT could be condensed and delivered within a reduced timeframe, and
to allow the assessment of the effectiveness of the training in the subsequent exercise
described in Section 7.5.8. A subset of exercise participants were trained in the DCO
MST, with the teams not attending the training acting as the control group. The results
of the exercise are discussed in Section 8.11.
8.11 Cyber Defence Exercise, December 2017
Following on from the training provided in Section 7.5.7, the author attended the 10
day CIRT4 CDX that the DCO MST was provided for, to evaluate the performance
of the Blue Teams, and compare the levels of SA achieved by those who attended the
MST versus those who did not. The exercise was already designed to be measured
using a quantitative set of metrics by a third party. As such, the assessment performed
in this experiment, wherever possible, fitted within the established evaluation metrics,
although independent, qualitative observations were made and recorded by the author.
These are recorded in memos at Appendix C.
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8.11.1 Team Profiles
The exercise comprised 12 teams. Each is profiled below. Detailed characterisations
from memos and observations are included at Appendix C.
Team 1: Team 1 comprised a mixed team of five individuals from the UK who had not
worked together before, and five from an international partner. No members of the team
attended the DCO MST. After arrival at the exercise, the team chose adopt a structure
similar to that recommended on the MST, comprising a Team Leader, a second-in-
command (2IC), with the rest of the team forming 1 x Intelligence, 2x Protect (their
own definition that included network hunt activities), 2x Monitor, 2x Harden. The UK
personnel described themselves as having a low level of technical competency, with the
international partners exhibiting more experience.
Team 2: A subset of the team attended the DCOMST, but were joined on the exercise
by a Team Leader, 2IC, and an intelligence embed, none of whom had any training prior
to the exercise and had no previous cyber experience. The team claimed a low level
of technical competency. They comprised 9 personnel in total, and formed into the
team structure recommended on the DCO MST (Figure 7.7), with a Team Leader, Blue
Terrain Manager (BTM), 1 x Intelligence, 2 x Hunt, 2x Monitor, 2x Harden.
Team 3: The team claimed a low level of technical competency at the DCO MST,
which was supplemented by additional individual training to raise their overall under-
standing of DCO tools. They comprised 8 personnel in total, and formed into the
recommended team structure (Figure 7.7), with a Team Leader (also managing threat
intelligence), BTM, 2x Hunt, 2x Monitor, 2x Harden. They were not a formed team
before the exercise.
Team 4: The five-person team described themselves as having a mix of cyber technical
competencies, from mid- to high-level. They organised themselves based on the networks
to be defended, with two personnel assigned to each network. They demonstrated a
dynamic approach to work; they regularly came together for planning sessions, then
broke away to carry-out assigned tasks. The team did not attend the DCO MST and
were not a formed team prior to the exercise.
Team 5: The team described themselves as having a low level of cyber competence,
and were not a formed unit before the exercise. Part of the team attended the DCO
MST, including the Team Leader. They aligned themselves to the force structure similar
to that taught in the DCO MST (Figure 7.7), providing 1x Team Leader, 1x BTM, 2x
Hunt, 2x Monitor and 1x Harden. They integrated an intelligence embed who had not
received any training prior to the exercise and had no previous cyber experience.
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Team 6: The team described themselves as having a very low level of cyber compe-
tence, and were not a formed unit before the DCO MST and exercise. They aligned
themselves to the structure taught in the DCO MST (Figure 7.7), providing 1x Team
Leader, 1x BTM, 2x Hunt, 2x Monitor and 2x Harden.
Team 7: Team 7 comprised personnel from the CPT that formed the purposeful
sample for this research. They attended the exercise with a relatively high level of
training and experience. The team comprised 1x Team Leader, 1x BTM, 3x Monitor,
3x Hunt, 2x Harden and 1x Intelligence.
Team 8: The 11-person team was not formed prior to the exercise, but comprised
a significant element from an established network operations team. They claimed a
medium level of technical competence in the cyber domain. The team appeared to
adopt the methods of working used by the network operations team and chose not to
use any of the DCO MST. Only one (junior) member of the team attended the DCO
MST.
Team 9: The team comprised four international partners who described themselves
as competent with cyber technologies, although they had not worked together prior
to the exercise. They also integrated an intelligence embed who had not received any
training prior to the exercise and had no previous cyber experience. None of the team
attended the DCO MST and did not adopt any of the methods taught.
Team 10: The team was not formed prior to the exercise. Only one member of the
team, the Team Leader, attended the DCO MST, but not for the whole course duration.
The team claimed a low-to-medium level of cyber competence. The team was structured
along the lines of the DCO MST, with 1x Team Leader/BTM, 2x Hunt, 2x Monitor,
2x Harden, 1x Intelligence, with individuals focusing on different network segments to
allow concurrent activity.
Team 11: The team comprised five personnel. They described their technical com-
petence as low to medium. Given the small size of the team, the Team Leader adopted
a flexible structure to allow resources to be deployed as required. None of the team
attended the DCO MST.
Team 12: The team described themselves as having a low level of cyber competence,
and were not a formed unit before the DCO MST and exercise. They aligned themselves
to the structure taught in the DCO MST (Figure 7.7), providing 1x Team Leader, 1x
BTM, 2x Hunt, 2x Monitor and 2x Harden. The majority of the team attended the
DCO MST, including the Team Leader.
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8.11.2 Development and Application of Mental Models
Each of the teams were assessed for their effectiveness during the exercise. The struc-
ture provided by the mental models proposed in this research was used to frame their
performance.
Team 1
APT Attack Behaviours: The team did not attempt to model the attack behaviours
identified on their network to provide a greater understanding of the nature of the an-
tagonists. They retained a reactive approach to incidents that did not use the previous
intrusions to shape their network hunt capability.
Team Interaction: As a team of individuals from two nations, the team had little
time to fuse. As a result, the team structure, roles, responsibilities, and interactions
were under development for almost the whole exercise.
Team Understanding: They international partners provided a greater technical depth
of understanding of networks than their UK counterparts. This led to an imbalance
in the distribution of effort, and the effectiveness of the 10 personnel in the team was
reduced as a result.
Operational Priorities: The team did not produce a coherent triage of the systems
under management on their networks. Much of the team’s early focus was to request
changes to their RoE, which were repeatedly rejected.
Operating Environment: The team maintained a reasonable understanding of their
network, but Team SA was observed to be repeatedly poor.
Team 2
APT Attack Behaviours: Team 2 were disadvantaged by a poor level of individual
technical skills that limited their ability to identify and interpret Red Team behaviour on
their networks. Their mental model started to coalesce towards the end of the exercise,
but only on activities identified at the start of the exercise.
Team Interaction: The team adopted the structure and information flows recom-
mended in the DCO MST, and despite only coming together as a team for this exercise,
they maintained a reasonably high level of Team SA and overall C2.
Team Understanding: As a team coming together just for this exercise, and with
poor levels of individual technical skills, their team understanding did not reach suffi-
cient levels of team understanding until the end of the exercise. The time together on
the DCO MST did appear to contribute to a collective understanding of team member
capabilities.
Operational Priorities: The team collectively understood the operational priorities of
the exercise, and reprioritised based on the evolving scenario.
Operating Environment: The team maintained a reasonable level of understanding of
their operating environment, albeit constrained by their poor individual technical skills.
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This understanding was maintained for the whole of the exercise.
Team 3
APT Attack Behaviours: The team demonstrated a high level of understanding of
APT behaviours and were proactive in attempting to assess their courses of action, and
as a result, means to mitigate their threats. Despite an initially poor level of individual
technical skills on the DCO MST, the remedial training provided, plus follow-on activi-
ties prior to the exercise, had increased their abilities to an intermediate level. This was
reflected in their technical understanding of Red Team activities.
Team Interaction: The team were not a formed unit before the exercise. The team
adopted the structures and techniques taught on the DCO MST rigorously. Team inter-
action was well managed, with strong C2 and information flows. Team SA, in particular,
was high, with continuing improvements observed over the whole exercise.
Team Understanding: The majority of the team had a week together on the DCO
MST that clearly assisted with cohesion and understanding of capabilities. Team 3 were
observed to work well together.
Operational Priorities: The team adapted to the changing operational priorities well,
assessing and re-assessing likely Red Team COAs and targets.
Operating Environment: Team 3 spent a significant amount of time understand-
ing their networks. Once achieved, they leveraged this knowledge extensively in their
monitoring and hunt activities.
Team 4
APT Attack Behaviours: Team 4 focused primarily on network hardening as their
primary means of defence, and did not focus on Red Team behaviours as indicators of
likely actions.
Team Interaction: Team interaction was ad hoc, but to a large extent it was effective.
The team did not adopt a recognisable structure until day 3 of the exercise.
Team Understanding: Although a team formed solely for the exercise, they meshed
well. This may have been a factor of their relatively small team size. Team members
were observed to be cognisant of other team members’ strengths and weaknesses.
Operational Priorities: Team 4 maintained an approach based on hardening of the
network infrastructure, irrespective of changing operational demands. However over-
hardening, in some instances, denied their networks to their users.
Operating Environment: The team maintained a reasonable technical understanding
of the networks under their management, but did not demonstrate a similar level of
understanding of the needs of the user community operating on those networks.
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Team 5
APT Attack Behaviours: The team maintained a continuous assessment of Red
Team activities and likely COAs. Although limited by their individual technical skills,
these assessments were realistic, and acknowledged the probable changes in targets as
the exercise progressed.
Team Interaction: The team comprised a lower level of manning than many other
teams. Despite this, they managed to adhere to a structure in-line with that taught on
the DCO MST. This provided a clear set of roles and responsibilities for team members,
and an operational cycle that maintained acceptable levels of Team SA.
Team Understanding: Team understanding was acceptable. Although only formed
for the exercise, team members were observed to be aware of each others’ technical com-
petencies.
Operational Priorities: Team 5 maintained a detailed view of operational priorities,
and adjusted as the exercise progressed.
Operating Environment: The low level of individual technical skills initially ham-
pered the team’s understanding of the networks under their control. Once enumerated,
however, they used their understanding to full advantage.
Team 6
APT Attack Behaviours: Despite a low level of individual technical skills, the team
used their observations of Red Team activity to shape subsequent actions. This level of
understanding, however, was not included in formal reporting within the exercise.
Team Interaction: The team adopted the structures, information flows and C2 rec-
ommended on the DCO MST, providing clear definitions of roles and responsibilities.
Team Understanding: The team started with probably the lowest level of individual
technical skills on the exercise, but compensated by solely focusing on the skills required
for their assigned role. This allowed a rapid development of capability, as well as a clear
understanding of which skills sat with which team member.
Operational Priorities: The team maintained strong Team SA, and a solid under-
standing of the priorities of the networks under their control.
Operating Environment: The team’s limited individual technical skills constrained
their ability to enumerate their networks quickly, but once complete, they maintained a
continuing understanding of the detail.
Team 7
APT Attack Behaviours: Team 7 developed a full IPCE with assessments of key
terrain, avenues of approach, and Red Team COAs which informed their operations on
the exercise. This provided the basis for their proactive approach to network defence.
Team Interaction: As an established CPT, the roles and responsibilities of the team
members were well understood, and established processes were followed.
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Team Understanding: It was observed that the technical skills of each team member
were well understood.
Operational Priorities: Team 7 displayed a clear understanding of the priorities of
each phase of the exercise.
Operating Environment: The team rapidly enumerated their networks and main-
tained an ongoing brief to check for changes.
Team 8
APT Attack Behaviours: Team 8 focused their efforts on network hardening and did
not attempt to maintain an assessment of Red Team COAs.
Team Interaction: The nucleus of the team was based around an existing network
support team, with a medium level of technical competence. The team adopted a struc-
ture based around the existing nuclei’s normal operations. This proved effective, and
allowed newer personnel to be integrated. However, it was noted that C2 and Team SA
were centred around the Team Leader, who whilst efficient, was a potential single point
of failure.
Team Understanding: Team understanding was governed by the Team Leader, who
operated as a hub for the team. It was observed that when the Team Leader was not
available, the operations of the team reduced in efficacy.
Operational Priorities: The team focused on hardening, and this approach did not
alter over the course of the exercise.
Operating Environment: Team 8 maintained a strong understanding of their net-
works.
Team 9
APT Attack Behaviours: The team did not maintain a view of Red Team activities.
Team Interaction: The team had not worked together prior to the exercise. The
maintained an informal team structure, and operated with limited levels of Team SA.
They used a OneNote database to record data, rather than visual aids, which it was
observed reduced verbal communications within the team.
Team Understanding: The team maintained a high level of understanding of each
others’ technical expertise.
Operational Priorities: The team did not demonstrate a high level of understanding
of operational priorities during the exercise.
Operating Environment: Team 9 understood the networks under their control, but
did not prioritise any elements as a defensive priority.
Team 10
APT Attack Behaviours: Team 10 maintained strong Team SA, and conducted on-
going assessments of Red Team activities.
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Team Interaction: The team adopted the structure and techniques taught in the DCO
MST. Roles and responsibilities were observed to be clearly defined with clear C2 and
information flows.
Team Understanding: The team demonstrated an understanding of each others’ skills
despite only coming together for the exercise.
Operational Priorities: An ongoing assessment of priorities was maintained through-
out the exercise, allowing reprioritisation as necessary.
Operating Environment: The team maintained a technical understanding of their
networks, but lacked awareness of the impact of particular actions on the user commu-
nity that resulted in significant loss of service.
Team 11
APT Attack Behaviours: Team 11 did not maintain a view of Red Team activities
or TTPs. Their focus was primarily focused on hardening.
Team Interaction: The team was amongst the smallest on the exercise and did not
adopt any recognised structure. Team SA was low. Roles and responsibilities were un-
clear.
Team Understanding: Team members appeared cognisant of each others’ general
technical abilities, although it was not always clear who was assigned to which task.
Operational Priorities: Initially the team maintained an acceptable level of under-
standing the exercise mission priorities, but this reduced over time as the team’s focus
shifted to the purely technical aspects of the networks.
Operating Environment: The team’s understanding of their networks grew at a
slower rate than many of the other teams. It is assessed that the team size may have
been a contributory factor.
Team 12
APT Attack Behaviours: The team maintained a continuing assessment of Red
Team activities that informed a highly-developed level of Team SA. This, however, was
limited in its efficacy due to an overall low level of individual technical skills.
Team Interaction: The team fully adopted all of the structures, tools and techniques
taught on the DCO MST, and displayed solid C2 with a strong understanding of roles,
responsibilities, and information flows.
Team Understanding: The team was observed to understand the technical competen-
cies of the members.
Operational Priorities: The team maintained a high level of understanding of the
operational priorities, with this competence only dropping below average for one of the
exercise days.
Operating Environment: The team successfully enumerated their network, but levels
of understanding were constrained by their limited individual technical skills.
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Overall Summary of Use of Mental Models
It was observed that where the Team Leader or BTM had attended the DCO MST, the
team adopted the structure recommended in the training. The structure was based upon
the CPT SOPs specifically to accelerate the development of mental models, and had
been demonstrated to deliver such coherence over the CPT development timeframe.
The structure, however, required a minimum of 8 technical staff for it to be viable,
which automatically precluded three of the teams attending. For those teams that
adopted the structure, they organised faster than those teams that arrived without an
organisational plan. These teams also had pre-planned their immediate activities on
the networks, which was a major element of the teaching on the DCO MST, and further
contributed to their increased performance during the early stages of the exercise.
Of the teams that did not adopt the structure, it is notable that none of the Team
Leaders attended the DCO MST. Interviews with Teams 1 and 8, who had the manning
profile necessary to adopt the structure, but chose not to, highlighted that Team 1
intended to maintain a dynamic structure, whereas Team 8 adopted the structure of
the team that comprised the majority of its team members were already a part of.
Discussions with the Team Leaders of the teams that did adopt the structure
(Teams 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 10 and 12) all felt it provided a framework in which to operate,
and reduce cognitive overload.
8.11.3 Assessment of Performance Using the Derived Themes
The overall exercise, including the 12 Blue Teams, along with the Red and White Teams,
are now reviewed against the themes that emerged during this research.
Adversary Understanding
The theme of Adversary Understanding was used to assess the Blue Teams’ performance
on the exercise, to determine if this contributed to their defensive posture.
Attack Intent: Teams 1, 4, 8, and 11 did not maintain an understanding of the
Red Team activities on their networks, or only adopted such techniques late into the
exercise. In particular, they did not attempt to identify the Red Team’s intent to shape
defensive activities. This was observed to be a caused by a combination of two factors;
firstly the belief that network hardening was sufficient to address Red Team actions,
and secondly, a lack of understanding that DCO teams must be proactive to defend
against an adaptable adversary. These behaviours were not observed in Blue Teams
that attended and adopted the DCO MST (Teams 2, 3, 5, 6, 10, and 12), Team 7
(CPT) who were trained during this research, or Team 9, who displayed high levels of
cyber experience.
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Attack Impact: The same teams (1, 4, 8, and 11) that did not maintain an assess-
ment of attack intent also struggled to articulate the risks carried by the (White Team)
commander as a result of Red Team activities. This was assessed to be as a result of
a lack of understanding of adversary intent, and resulted in a subsequent inability to
project an outcome of such antagonistic behaviours.
Attack Methods: It was observed that many teams lacked an understanding of net-
work attack techniques (Teams 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12). Whilst this subject was covered
during the DCO MST, insufficient time was available to adequately correlate attack be-
haviours to data in sensors and logs. This inability to translate Red Team activities
recorded by sensors and logs was raised a number of times during discussions with the
Blue Teams.
Adversary Capability: The lack of understanding of attack methods extended to
impact the ability to assess the adversary’s capabilities. All teams, except Team 7,
failed to characterise the nature of the threat actor and use this to shape their defensive
posture and COAs.
Adversary Lifecycle: Those teams that attended and adopted the DCOMST (Teams
2, 3, 5, 6, 10, and 12) utilised adversary lifecycle modelling to assess where in the kill-
chain the Red Team were. When combined with visual aids, this made a significant
contribution to Team SA and the prioritisation of defensive activities.
Adversary Courses of Action: The teams that chose to adopt the Diamond Model
of Intrusion Analysis (Teams 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 10, and 12) were observed to fuse their
analyses with the adversary lifecycle modelling and outputs from the CARVER matrix,
to determine the likely next steps by the Red Team.
Threat Intelligence: The intelligence embeds in Teams 2, 5, 8, and 9 had no cyber
experience. The assumption by the exercise planners (without consultation with the
author) was that general intelligence analysis expertise would be sufficient to support
cyber defence operations. Teams 2, 3, 4, 9 used intelligence reporting from the White
Team to their advantage, but generated no actionable intelligence reporting based on
Red Team activities on the networks they were defending. Only Team 7 demonstrated
the production of detailed intelligence reporting based on their observations of Red
Team intrusion behaviours on their networks. This was assessed to be as a result of
detailed technical training provided for intelligence operators within the CPT.
Adversary Understanding Summary
It was observed that teams that did not attempt to understand the adversary did not
undertake a comprehensive analysis of Red Team intent and likely targets, and did not
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therefore triage their defences and resources against Red Team COAs appropriately.
Discussions with Blue Teams highlighted that, for the duration of the exercise, a belief
that focus on network hardening was sufficient to survive the limited attacks provided by
the Red Team. In reality, the approach would not have stopped a capable threat actor.
This was assessed as a factor of training on exercises where inter-team competition was
promoted, and behaviours were shaped by a desire to move up the league table, rather
than work as they would need to in a real-world situation.
Defensive Operations
The theme of Defensive Operations was used to assess the operations of the Blue Teams
during the exercise, to determine if this contributed to improved defensive impact.
Situational Awareness: The SA of Blue Teams was assessed against Level 1-3, as
well as Team SA. Against a mean average of mediated, subjective scores (illustrated in
Figures C.2 to C.13), Teams 1, 7, 8, and 11 demonstrated high levels of Level 1 SA,
whilst Teams 2, 4, 5, 6, 10, and 12 were observed to demonstrate poor Level 1 SA.
No correlation between Level 1 SA and skills or experience was observed. However, it
should be noted that the measures of skills and experience, illustrated in Figure C.1 were
self-assessed against measures provided by the existing exercise White Team, without
strong controls over the selection criteria.
Level 2 SA was observed to be high (against a mean average of mediated, subjective
scores) in Teams 3, 7, and 11. It was low in Teams 1, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, and 12 (illustrated
in Figures C.2 to C.13). As with the Level 1 SA, no correlation between self-assessed
skills and experience was apparent, nor between Level 1 SA and Level 2 SA.
High levels of Level 3 SA (against a mean average of mediated, subjective scores)
was observed in Teams 2, 3, 5, 7, 10, and 12, whereas low levels were seen in Teams 1, 4,
6, 8, and 9. No correlations were apparent between self-assessed skills and experience,
or Level 1 or 2 SA.
Team SA was assessed as high (against a mean average of mediated, subjective
scores) in Teams 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 10, and 12, whilst it was low in Teams 1, 4, 8, 9, and 11.
No correlation was apparent between Team SA and Levels 1-3 SA, or self-assessed skills
and experience. However, there was a correlation with those teams that attended and
adopted the DCO MST (Teams 2, 3, 5, 6,10, and 12) or were previously trained using
its techniques (Team 7).
Communications: The teams that attended and adopted the DCO MST (Teams
2, 3, 5, 6, 10, and 12), as well as the CPT (Team 7) were observed to demonstrate
more effective team interactions than those teams that did not attend. The efficacy
of the communications was based on clear, established information exchange patterns.
The teams that demonstrated these effective communications were all observed to have
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adopted the role of combined BTM and SA Manager, as recommended in the DCO
MST (Figure 7.7).
Roles and Responsibilities: Discussions with the Team Leaders of teams that at-
tended the DCO MST indicated that they believed their teams performed better as a
result of the training than if they were to have attended the exercise without it. Teams
that did not attend the DCO MST determined their structure, roles, responsibilities
dynamically upon arrival at the exercise. This was observed to be an inefficient process,
and detracted from network defence activities. The CPT (Team 7) used their estab-
lished and model developed as a result of the activities described in this thesis. This
model formed the basis of the team structure, and roles and responsibilities, taught on
the DCO MST (Figure 7.7). Those teams with significantly less than eight personnel
(Teams 4, 9 and 11) were unable to adopt this structure.
Operating Procedures: All of the teams attending the exercise were provided with
the CPT SOPs developed by Team 7 (the purposeful sample) as a result of the experi-
ments described in this thesis. Team 7 naturally adopted the these SOPs. Team 8 used
the operating procedures used by the majority of the team in their day-to-day roles.
Those teams that attended and adopted the DCO MST (Teams 2, 3, 5, 6, 10, and 12)
had developed operating procedures as a result of the TTX undertaken at the training
sessions that were based upon the CPT SOPs. Those that did not attend the training
(Teams 1, 4, 8, 9 and 11) were observed to operate in an ad hoc manner (Teams 1, 8,
9 and 11) or adopt processes focused on network hardening (Team 4).
Command and Control: Teams with established operating procedures such as Team
7 (CPT), Team 8 (who were a largely formed team), and those that attended and
adopted the DCOMST (Teams 2, 3, 5, 6, 10, and 12), demonstrated coherent C2. Teams
4, 9 add 11 all adopted dynamic models of C2, with varying degrees of effectiveness
throughout the exercise. As the level of Red Team activity increased towards the end
of the exercise these models were assessed to be less effective.
Operational Priorities: The teams that attended and adopted the DCOMST (Teams
2, 3, 5, 6, 10, and 12) demonstrated effective operating procedures and the ability to
adapt to the changing operating priorities of the exercise. Those that did not attend the
training (Teams 1, 4, 8, 9 and 11) were observed to demonstrate an inflexible approach
to deal with changing operational priorities. These teams were observed to ignore the
provided CPT SOPs and chose to develop their own.
Defensive Operations Summary
It was observed that where the Team Leader had attended the DCO MST, their team
adopted the structure recommended in the training. The structure was based upon
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the CPT SOPs developed throughout this research, cognisant of the limitations of an
eight-person team, but covering all of the essential roles (Figure 7.7). Team size was
a factor of team effectiveness, and for the scope of this exercise a team of less than
eight personnel degraded performance. The combined role of BTM and SA Manager
was observed to contribute to Team SA, effective communications, and the ability to
respond to changing operational priorities. The use of established, tested SOPs, was
also observed to contribute to effectiveness of the Blue Teams. Those that adopted
ad hoc processes were observed to operate with reduced effectiveness as the Red Team
increased their network activities.
Incident Response Training
The Incident Response Training theme was used to assess the effectiveness of the learn-
ing opportunities provided by the exercise.
Adversary Training Realism: The Red Team provided a range of attack options
intended to provide a realistic adversary. The primary delivery mechanism for malware
was phishing attacks that were enabled by simulated user activity by White Team
users. These initial implants beaconed to Red Team C2 infrastructure in the exercise
greyspace using a variety of Reverse HTTP and HTTPS connections. Lateral movement
was facilitated via SMB, with data exfiltration delivered via HTTPS and DNS. Attacks
on the exercise ICS utilised Siemens Step-7™and Modbus. The activities of the Red
Team were managed by a Team Leader to ensure compliance to behaviours consistent
with an APT.
Consistent Toolkit: The toolkit provided to Blue Teams was Security Onion™. This
was consistent with the tools taught on the DCO MST, although this training was
largely ad hoc and intended to fill gaps in individual skills. The tools did not reflect
the nature of software that teams would encounter if called upon to defend a network.
Training Reflection: The exercise execution period was between 9am and 3pm every
day, allowing time for reflection by the Blue Teams. However, due to the number of Blue
Teams, the Red Teams did not have time to individually debrief each day. Instead, the
Red Team Leader provided a collective debrief to all Blue Teams. This was observed to
be of limited value, as it did not provide details pertinent to each individual team. As
Blue Teams were operating with differing levels of skill and effectiveness, and intrusions
onto their networks were at differing stages and using varying Red Team techniques,
this collective debrief offered little opportunity for Blue Teams to focus their subsequent
efforts.
Progressive Training: For those teams that attended the DCO MST, they pro-
gressed from a CIRT2 TTX to a CIRT4 CDX in single step. For those that did not
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attend the DCO MST, they had no progression at all. Team 7 had experienced the
exercises described in Sections 7.5.1, 7.5.2, 7.5.4, 7.5.5, and 7.5.6, in a progressive build-
up to this exercise. The majority of the Blue Team personnel lacked the necessary
individual skills to maximise the value of this CIRT4 CDX, and would have benefited
from incremental learning opportunities beforehand. It should be noted that Team 7
won the exercise.
Table-Top Exercises: Those teams that attended the DCO MST participated in a
CIRT2 TTX intended to develop their SOPs prior to the exercise. Discussions with
attendees highlighted that they felt this was of significant value, and provided a frame-
work to define their C2, communications and information flows to manage the defence
of their networks and coordinate their incident response activities.
Training Structure and Pace: Whilst the structure of the exercise was well thought
through, with a pace intended to allow time for participant reflection, the planning had
not accommodated the levels of individual skills within the Blue Teams. The issue was
exacerbated by the lack of tailored Red Team feedback to the Blue Teams.
Incident Response Training Summary
The exercise was well-planned, but its execution suffered as a result of a lack of progres-
sion in training beforehand. Blue Teams did not have the opportunity to form cohesively
prior to the exercise, had significantly different individual technical skills, and did not
receive the detail of information in Red Team feedbacks to properly facilitate reflective
learning.
Exercise Management
The theme of Exercise Management was used to assess the effectiveness of the planning,
execution, and measurement of the exercise.
Training Objectives: The training objectives for the exercise were pitched at a high-
level by the White Team to allow for flexibility to adapt to the training audience, rather
than adherence to a strict Main Events List (MEL). However, it was observed that the
Red Team spent too long trying to adapt these into serials against which the Blue
Teams could be tested. This was an inefficient use of resources and resulted in the Red
Team being unavailable to provide detailed debriefs to the Blue Teams to facilitate their
reflective learning.
The Blue Teams were assessed on a number of metrics defined by the White Team
that included service availability, adherence to procedures etc. (defined in Section 7.5.8).
Each Blue Team was assigned an individual assessor to review their performance against
the metrics defined by the White Team. However, this review did not feed into any
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training coordinators to determine how to best stretch Blue Teams to maximise training
value. None of the Blue Team assessment metrics were linked to the training objectives
of the exercise, and therefore an objective assessment of the effectiveness of the training
curriculum was not possible.
Exercise Preparation: The Blue Teams were provided with two days to map their
networks and deploy security tools before the Red Team started attack activities. This
provided an adequate exercise preparation period.
Scenario Realism: The exercise was based on a comprehensive scenario that was
underpinned by realistic updates, injects, and cyber threat intelligence, that was coor-
dinated with Red Team activities. This allowed Blue Teams that adopted adversary
lifecycle modelling and used the Diamond Model to track and forecast Red Team ac-
tivities.
Exercise Control: The White Team was observed to maintain a strong grip on the
MEL and the coordination of Red Team activities to ensure they were aligned to the
scenario and were consistent with the threat actors described in the collateral materials.
Individual assessors were assigned to each Blue Team, and these fed back to the White
Team twice per day in a formal review of performance. This shaped the Red Team
activities undertaken against each Blue Team.
Exercise Duration: The duration of the exercise condensed a significant number
of attack activities into the seven days of execution. Given the low levels of individ-
ual skills within the Blue Teams, an extended execute phase would have allowed for
greater learning to be achieved. Potentially this could have been combined with further
education in the tools used on the exercise.
Exercise Management Summary
The exercise provided a comprehensive scenario, against which the Red and Blue Teams
were managed. The training objectives did not align to the metrics against which the
Blue Teams were measured by White Team, and as a result, an objective measure of its
effectiveness is not possible.
Defensive Planning
The Defensive Planning theme was used to review the pre-incident planning undertaken
by Blue Teams.
Preparatory Activities: Those teams that attended and adopted the DCO MST
(Teams 2, 3, 5, 6, 10, and 12), as well as Team 7 (CPT), had developed SOPs to
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address the pre-incident planning phase of a network intrusion. For those that did
not attend the DCO MST (Teams 1, 4, 8, 9 and 11), such preparatory activities were
undertaken on an ad hoc basis, even though they were provided with the CPT SOPs.
Discussions with these teams suggested they felt they did not have the time to read,
absorb and implement the processes described in the CPT SOPs.
Triage Priorities: The CARVER matrix proved effective for Teams 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7,
10, and 12 as a means of shaping the planning of defensive activities. Team 8 used a
prioritisation process focused on server hardening, whilst Team 11 adopted an ad hoc
approach.
Security Architecture: The cyber range used on the exercise was provided with
firewalls and monitoring tools that Blue Teams could request the Green Team deploy in
configurations of their choosing. Timescales prevented large-scale changes to the net-
works being defended, but they did allow a defence-in-depth architecture to be adopted.
ICS Understanding: ICS were new to nearly all exercise participants. A significant
element of the DCO MST was dedicated to ICS in order to try and address this, but
it is a large and complex field and could not realistically provide the necessary depth
of expertise required in the time available. Those teams that did not attend the DCO
MST, apart from Team 7, had no ICS experience. This was observed to limit the
effectiveness of their defensive planning, especially those with no knowledge of Siemens
Step-7™or Modbus.
Defensive Planning Summary
The exercise timeframe did not allow for detailed pre-incident planning processes to
be developed in parallel with network defence activities. Those teams who arrived
with established SOPs, an understanding of how to triage systems on the network, and
an understanding of ICS, were observed to significantly reduce their cognitive burden
during the early stages of the exercise.
Cyber Range Quality
The cyber range provided for the exercise ensured each Blue Team had access to their
own network enclaves that allowed them to operate independently of other Blue Teams
on the exercise. The Red Team was provided with a suitable greyspace infrastructure
to deliver attacks. The theme of Cyber Range Quality is now considered.
Stability: No significant exercise downtime was observed to be due to a lack of range
stability.
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Discrimination: The extent of the virtualisation of the networks on the range, and
the elements required to produce background network traffic etc., often caused range
discrimination issues for Blue Teams, who subsequently had to submit Requests for
Information (RFI) to the Green Team to determine the true nature of the network
elements they had observed. More comprehensive range documentation would have
alleviated this issue.
Activity Visualisation: No automated means to visualise the Red Team attack ac-
tivity was available on the exercise. However, at the end of the final day, the Red Team
demonstrated how a number of their attacks had been delivered. It was noted in com-
ments from the Blue Teams that an understanding of the detail of the attacks earlier
in the exercise would have enabled them to more adequately apply their defences.
Cyber Range Quality Summary
The cyber range provided was demonstrated to be robust and supported the exercise
with high levels of availability. The extent of the virtualisation used in the range
proved confusing for Blue Teams who lacked the necessary documentation to determine
whether issues with deploying and interpreting sensors were due to misconfiguration or
the nature of the architecture. This slowed defensive progress by the Blue Teams and
increased the Green Team workload.
Red Team Provision
To assess the efficacy of the cyber threat emulation, the theme of Red Team Provision
is considered.
Discipline: The Red Team displayed strong operational discipline and attempted
to remain within agreed RoE. Activities were not observed that were contrary to the
exercise scenario or behaviours of the threat actors fed to the Blue Teams via cyber
threat intelligence updates.
Capability: The Red Team were formed purely for this exercise, and displayed a range
of skills and technical competencies. It was observed that there was not a baseline set of
skills across the entire team, which resulted in key personnel having to work on attacks
on multiple Blue Team networks. This was inefficient and led to attack timing and
coordination issues.
Feedback: Feedback to the Blue Teams was limited to a collective debrief at the end
of each day. This was as a result of the requirement for the Red Team to prepare the
attacks for the next day and revise their execution in light of the Blue Team defensive
actions. Whilst this allowed for the next day’s exercise period to execute as planned, it
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was observed that the learning opportunities for the Blue Teams were limited by this
approach. The Red Team Leader indicated his ability to provide detailed feedback to
Blue Teams was a factor of the limited number of personnel within his team.
Rules of Engagement: As discussed above, the Red Team operated within agreed
RoE. However, although effective, the Red Team RoE were not formalised and required
significant interaction with the White Team to achieve the necessary outcomes. This
was assessed to be inefficient.
Red Team Provision Summary
The Red Team for the exercise maintained strong discipline, but their effectiveness as
a learning aid to the Blue Teams was of limited value. As the Blue Teams were the
training audience for the exercise, a greater emphasis on feedback from the Red Team
was required. The Red Team were unable to provide this feedback due to limitations
on their numbers and the premium of particular skills.
Stakeholder Priorities
The theme of Stakeholder Priorities considers how the requirements of an organisation’s
leadership are addressed.
Financial Priorities: Financial priorities did not form a part of this exercise scenario.
Strategic Viewpoint: The scenario that underpinned the exercise developed through-
out the execution phase, with notional mission commanders in the White Team being
forced to change their operational priorities as a result of a nation-state adversary’s
actions. These changes in priority required changes in defensive posture by the Blue
Teams. Those teams that attended and adopted the DCO MST (Teams 2, 3, 5, 6, 10,
and 12), and Team 7, were observed to accommodate these changes in priorities more
readily than other teams.
Return on Investment: Return on investment did not form a part of this exercise
scenario.
Stakeholder Priorities Summary
Established procedures that guide the prioritisation of assets to be defended allows the
accommodation of changing strategic priorities.
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Network Understanding
The theme of Network Understanding allows us to consider the time afforded to the
Blue Teams to review the networks under their defence.
Network Baselining: The first two days of the exercise had no Red Team activity
on the Blue Teams networks. This allowed time for the teams to understand the assets
they were to defend and establish a viable baseline.
Network Terrain Analysis: Teams that attended and adopted the DCO MST
(Teams 2, 3, 5, 6, 10, and 12), and Team 7, were observed to use the CARVER matrix,
as well as elements of Diamond Model Activity Thread models to forecast potential Red
Team activity against an adversary lifecycle model.
Network Monitoring Data: The first two days of the exercise allowed the Blue
Teams to deploy their sensors and logs, and establish a pattern of life of network traffic
prior to the Red Team starting their intrusion behaviours.
Network Understanding Summary
The two days permitted at the start of the exercise to assess the network architecture,
deploy defensive tools, and to establish a pattern of life for network traffic, allowed Blue
Teams to understand the networks they were to defend.
8.11.4 Experiment Outcomes
Attendance of the exercise allowed the themes developed over the experiments described
in Chapter 7 to be tested for applicability to exercise audiences beyond the purposeful
sample of the CPT. This applicability is discussed further in Chapter 9.
8.12 Summary of Themes
The themes developed as a result of the experiments described in Chapter 7, and elab-
orated in Appendix A, describe the common threads of commentary in interviews and
questionnaires. The themes were used to shape the assessment of the exercise described
in Section 7.5.8, and are reflected in Section 8.11 above. These themes, and their sub-
themes, are summarised below.
8.12.1 Adversary Understanding
Defensive cyber postures should be driven by an understanding of the nature and char-
acteristics of adversaries. In the case of this research, the stereotype of threat actors
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is APTs. Without an understanding of the adversary, organisations cannot proactively
plan their defensive policies or response strategies.
Table 8.2 summarises on the sub-themes that comprise Adversary Understanding.
Sub-Theme Description
Attack Intent The outcome that the antagonist wishes to achieve.
Attack Impact The consequences of the threat actor’s actions on the or-
ganisation that operates the services manipulated by the
attacker.
Attack Methods The tactics, techniques and procedures available to, or char-
acteristic of, the antagonist and a description of how they
may be employed.
Adversary Capability A wider consideration of the capabilities of the threat actor,
beyond the initial scope of the systems or services under
analysis.
Adversary Lifecycle An understanding of the nature of APT attacks, with
the ability to identify and classify antagonistic behaviours
within such a model.
Adversary Courses of Action A description of the various COAs available to an attacker
to achieve their intended aims.
Threat Intelligence The acquisition, production, and dissemination of informa-
tion likely to improve adversary understanding.
Table 8.2: Adversary Understanding Sub-Themes
8.12.2 Defensive Planning
Proactive defensive policies, procedures and plans allow an organisation to consider how
they will adjust to a changing threat landscape and respond to network intrusion inci-
dents, should they occur. The sub-themes within Defensive Planning are summarised
in Table 8.3.
Sub-Theme Description
Preparatory Activities Pre-incident planning that supports procedural and techni-
cal threat mitigations.
Triage Priorities A determination of which systems and services are essential
to the continued operations of the organisation.
Security Architecture The definition and implementation of mechanisms designed
to impede the progression of an attacker through a network.
ICS Understanding The detailed descriptions of the ICS elements within an
organisation, their operating requirements, connectivity to
IP-enabled devices, vulnerabilities, and current configura-
tion.
Table 8.3: Defensive Planning Sub-Themes
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8.12.3 Defensive Operations
The theme of Defensive Operations is concerned with the coordination and execution of
activities once an incident has been identified. Its sub-themes are summarised in Table
8.4.
Sub-Theme Description
Situational Awareness The establishment and maintenance of levels 1-3 of SA, as
well as Team SA.
Command and Control The management of the response to an incident.
Communications The requirement for regular, clear and concide communica-
tions within the team, and outside its boundaries to other
teams and stakeholders.
Roles and Responsibilities The definition of, and adherence to, a set of defined scopes
for personnel involved in responding to an incident.
Operational Priorities An understanding of the static and dynamic priorities of an
organisation to maintain its continued services, and those
systems that underpin them.
Operating Procedures A definition of a set of SOPs that define how an incident
will be responded to.
Table 8.4: Defensive Operations Sub-Themes
8.12.4 Stakeholder Priorities
Defending an organisation from cyber attack involves more than technical teams, and is
usually governed by a leadership structure with a wider perspective of the requirements
of managing risk. The sub-themes within Stakeholder Priorities are summarised in
Table 8.5.
Sub-Theme Description
Financial Priorities An understanding of the fiscal imperatives of an organisa-
tion, and the risk-prioritised facets of cyber security that
impact them.
Strategic Viewpoint A perspective of the superordinate goals of an organisation,
and how they may be affected by a cyber attack.
Return on Investment A measure of the perceived benefits that investment in cy-
ber security will bring.
Direction of Investment A prioritised view of where cyber investment should occur,
and how this aligns with wider stakeholder priorities.
Table 8.5: Stakeholder Priorities Sub-Themes
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8.12.5 Network Understanding
Network Understanding encompasses a comprehension of all aspects of the networks to
be defended. This includes the sub-themes in Table 8.6.
Sub-Theme Description
Network Baselining The creation of an understanding of the nature of the net-
work, its assets, configurations, traffic profiles, deficiencies
and constraints.
Network Terrain Analysis The assessment of the network baseline to establish a view
of the vulnerabilities that arise as a consequence.
Network Monitoring Data A determination of the source and quality of sensor and log
data in order to support network monitoring.
Table 8.6: Network Understanding Sub-Themes
8.12.6 Incident Response Training
The theme of Incident Response Training discusses the requirements for a successful
cyber defence education programme. The associated sub-themes of such training are
summarised in Table 8.7.
Sub-Theme Description
Adversary Training Realism The Red Team in any exercise should adhere to the be-
haviours of representative threat actors likely to target the
organisation’s systems or services.
Consistent Toolkit The need for training programmes to use the tools that
incident responders will use in a real-world intrusion.
Training Reflection The requirement for feedback and periods of reflection
within training programmes, so that mental models can be
anchored in the minds of participants.
Learning Environment Training is achieved better in an environment that is not
judgemental, allows mistakes, and encourages exploration.
Progressive Training With a subject as complicated as cyber incident response,
educational programmes should adopt a crawl-walk-run ap-
proach to incrementally developing skills and team cohe-
sion.
Table-Top Exercises TTX provide a mechanism to develop and test operating
procedures in a relatively stress free environment, that does
not incur the costs of a cyber range.
Training Structure and Pace Educational programmes should be developed with the
training audience in mind, and structured to deliver the
training objectives at a pace commensurate with their cur-
rent level of understanding.
Table 8.7: Incident Response Training Sub-Themes
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8.12.7 Exercise Management
For CDX to be successful, they must be coordinated and executed in a controlled manner
to deliver the required outcomes to the training audience. The Exercise Management
theme encapsulates the requirements of such control, as well as the characteristics of
exercises that support effective experiential learning for participants. The sub-themes
of Exercise Management are included in Table 8.8.
Sub-Theme Description
Training Objectives Cyber exercises must be developed with clear training au-
diences and objectives to ensure their effectiveness.
Exercise Preparation The training audience must be allowed time to prepare for
exercises. This should include time to read background
materials as well as scheduling range time to understand
the networks they will defend, and to setup sensors and
logs.
Scenario Realism It is essential that the scenarios used for exercises are based
in reality and, wherever possible, are representative of the
environments and characteristics they will have to deal with
should an incident arise.
Exercise Control The White Team of an exercise must maintain strict man-
agement of the planning and execution phases to ensure the
training objectives are met.
Exercise Duration The execution phase of the exercise must be sufficient to en-
sure the training objectives are met, and that participants
have adequate time to reflect on experiences and adjust
their activities.
Table 8.8: Exercise Management Sub-Themes
8.12.8 Red Team Provision
The skills and behaviours of the Red Team are critical to the success of a CDX. They
must ensure they deliver the attack activities necessary to provide the opportunities for
the Blue Team to experience the planned training serials in the MEL, in accordance
with the training objectives. The sub-themes of Red Team Provision are summarised
in Table 8.9.
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Sub-Theme Description
Discipline The Red Team must ensure their activities are intended
to deliver the training requirements of the exercise, rather
than simply demonstrate the attacking team’s network in-
trusion skills.
Capability The skillset of the Red Team must be sufficient to deliver
the training requirements, and must be distributed across
the team to prevent bottlenecks.
Feedback The Red Team must be scaled to provide regular, detailed
feedback to the Blue Teams to ensure they have the oppor-
tunity to learn from their previous actions or failures.
Rules of Engagement The Read Team must engage with the Blue Teams within
strict criteria, to remain in the character of the threat ac-
tor they are portraying, and to align to exercise training
objectives.
Table 8.9: Red Team Provision Sub-Themes
8.12.9 Cyber Range Quality
The complexity, resilience, flexibility and documentation of a cyber range is a critical
factor in delivering CDX. The Cyber Range Quality theme addresses these characteris-
tics. The sub-themes that address these facets are included in Table 8.10
Sub-Theme Description
Stability The range must be designed to maintain high levels of avail-
ability whilst the Red Team attempt intrusions and the
Blue Team modify configurations to defend against these
activities, with rollback facilities in the event of accidental
misconfiguration by exercise participants.
Discrimination The use of virtualisation to construct the range must be
supported by appropriate briefings to the Blue Teams,
along with the provision of appropriate design documen-
tation to allow Blue Teams to determine whether issues are
due to in-game activities, or as a result of features of the
range implementation.
Activity Visualisation Wherever possible, tools to capture traffic and intrusion
behaviour should be used to support the Red Team debriefs
to Blue Teams.
Table 8.10: Cyber Range Quality Sub-Themes
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9.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses the results from the experiments described within this thesis,
assessing their impact, and critically reviews their applicability and generalisability
within the cyber domain. Specifically, it considers the following seven aspects of the
research:
1. Thematic Analysis: An assessment of the themes, their development and their
relationships.
2. Mental Models: An analysis of the models proposed, their applicability to IR,
and their relationships with the results of the thematic analysis.
3. Research Questions: A discussion of whether or not this thesis has answered
the questions posed.
4. Effectiveness of the Experiments as an Experiential Learning Platform:
A review of the serious games and exercises developed during this research, and
an assessment of their efficacy as a platform to deliver experiential learning.
5. Limitations of Research: A consideration of the experiments and an assessment
as to how generalisable the results are.
6. Alignment to Related Work: How this research addresses the identified gaps
in literature.
7. Contribution: A proposal of the novelty of this research.
9.2 Thematic Analysis
The thematic analysis was conducted using the results from the experiments described
in Sections 7.5.2, 7.5.5, and 7.5.7, iteratively developing the themes from participant
feedback. The purposeful sample provided data from the experiments in Sections 7.5.2
and 7.5.5, with a wider audience drawn from across a military audience in the exper-
iment described in Section 7.5.7. This distinction of training audience is essential to
understanding the context of the results, and to allow us to draw meaning from them.
The pre-exercise questionnaire results, summarised in Section 8.5.1 and elaborated
at Appendix A.2 resulted in a limited set of themes, those of ‘adversary understanding’,
‘defensive operations’ and ‘defensive planning’. The content of the sub-themes within
these themes highlighted a narrative with little reference to the detail of the specifics
of the adversary’s intent or potential impact, and simply included a general commen-
tary on the nature of defensive cyber operations and planning, without reference to the
adversary or ICS. This contrasts significantly with the results of the thematic analysis
of the post-exercise questionnaires. Two sets of questionnaires were provided to par-
ticipants, one immediately after playing SCIPS, the other at the end of the CDX. An
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analysis of the feedback after playing SCIPS, summarised in Section 8.5.2 and elabo-
rated in Appendix A.3, resulted in four themes; ‘adversary understanding’, ‘stakeholder
priorities’, ‘defensive planning’, and ‘network understanding’. Whilst ‘adversary under-
standing’ and ‘defensive planning’ arose in the pre-exercise questionnaire, their content
was much richer in the post-SCIPS feedback, demonstrating an increased understand-
ing of the nature of the adversary’s intent, the impact of their actions, the benefits of
threat intelligence, the need for pre-incident preparatory actives and an overall secu-
rity architecture. The latter two facets, encompassed in the ‘defensive planning’ theme
are significant as SCIPS does not include a hands-on technical aspect in the game.
The change in perspective arose from projection of events in the game into the real
world. The new themes that emerged, those of ‘stakeholder priorities’ and ‘network
understanding’ demonstrated further changes in the perspectives of the participants.
‘Stakeholder priorities’ saw an acknowledgement of business priorities that may be su-
perordinate to cyber security issues, and the requirement to consider how the leadership
of an ICS organisation will perceive and act upon investment requirements. ‘Network
understanding’ highlighted the need to understand the nature of an ICS network, and
the assets it contains, in order to adequately consider its defence.
This enhanced understanding of ICS and its defensive context was developed fur-
ther in the post-CDX results, summarised in Section 8.5.3 and elaborated at Appendix
A.5. Eight themes emerged from the results. Four focused on the nature of ICS cy-
ber defence; ‘adversary understanding’, ‘defensive operations’, ‘defensive planning’, and
‘stakeholder priorities’, and four discussed the nature of CDX, their planning and ex-
ecution; ‘incident response training’, ‘exercise management’, ‘cyber range quality’, and
‘red team provision’. ‘Defensive operations’ highlighted the need for improved com-
munications, C2, priorities and SOPs to efficiently defend against an intrusion into an
ICS network, whilst ‘defensive planing’ extended the theme to encompass the need for
greater ICS understanding and the necessity to have triaged the critical systems and
services of an ICS as an element of pre-incident planning. The themes that focused
on the planning and delivery of CDX highlighted a range of issues and requirements
surrounding the effectiveness of CDX as an experiential learning platform.
The nature of CDX was further discussed in the interviews undertaken during the
experiments. Of the seven themes that emerged from the interviews, four focused on the
characteristics of poor exercises. Much of the commentary described the shortcomings
experienced by the participants, and drove the requirements for strong exercise man-
agement, a disciplined Red Team with defined RoE, a resilient cyber range on which to
conduct the exercises, and the necessity to incrementally develop the complexity of the
training to maximise the training benefit to participants.
The next experiment from which feedback was provided, described in Section 7.5.5,
included a subset of the purposeful sample. The experiment was conducted after the
CPT participated in an international exercise, described in Section 7.5.4, whose out-
put (described in Section 8.7) highlighted the need to develop documented, repeatable
SOPs for DCO. The focus of the experiment was to drive these SOPs as an output of
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a TTX (Section 7.5.5), which was influenced by the corporate TTX that the author
participated in (described in Section 7.5.3). The results of the experiment, perhaps un-
surprisingly, focused on SOPs within the ‘defensive operations’ theme. This highlighted
the requirement for clearly defined roles and responsibilities, along with the means to
share information and maintain SA during an incident. The TTX resulted in the de-
velopment of a set of SOPs that were used as the basis for subsequent CPT operations,
and for the DCO MST, described in Section 7.5.7.
The DCO MST involved 36 participants, none of whom were a part of the pur-
poseful sample. They had limited technical experience, and were to take part in a trial
held by the British Army to assess the transferability of general networking skills to
DCO. During the three, one-week sessions of the DCO MST, participants played SCIPS
and took part in a TTX. The results of gathered from questionnaires conformed to the
previously-defined thematic model, aligning to the themes of ‘adversary understanding’,
‘defensive planning’, ‘network understanding’, and ‘stakeholder priorities’. ‘Adversary
understanding’ repeatedly demonstrated over the three weeks that participants recog-
nised the intent, impact, methods and capability of an adversary, and could identify
their behaviours using an attack lifecycle and determine their possible courses of ac-
tion as a result. The narrative of ‘Defensive operations’ provided a richer commentary
that aligned to the sub-themes previously identified. It described the requirements for
clear communications and information flows between defined roles, each with bounded
responsibilities. Specifically, it discussed SOPs and the mechanisms to maintain SA
during an incident. ‘Defensive planning’ articulated the need to triage the systems of a
network to determine which elements required prioritised defence, and how the prepara-
tory activities of an organisation would mitigate the impact of a targeted cyber attack.
This supported the contents of the ‘network understanding’ theme, that highlighted
the requirement for an analysis of the network terrain to be defended, the baselining of
traffic and behavioural analysis, fed by network monitoring data that is delivered in a
form understood by network defence personnel.
To articulate the themes that emerged from the analysis of the feedback from the
experiments described above, figure 9.1 illustrates the themes, their sub-themes, and
the nature of their relationships in a class diagram.
The themes are inter-related, and together describe a holistic view of cyber de-
fences, shaped by adversary understanding and stakeholder priorities, the use of this
understanding to direct defensive posture, and the elements of effective training for
incident response teams.
The emergence of this rich set of themes, given the far smaller set derived from
the pre-exercise questionnaires of the initial data gathering exercise (Section 7.5.2),
illustrates a far greater comprehension of the nature of DCO and incident response
training. The alignment of commentary from the two separate samples demonstrates a
consistency of understanding from the audiences as a result of the training provided.
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Stakeholder Priorities
Direction of Investment
Return on Investment
Financial Priorities
Adversary Understanding
Adversary Courses of Action
Attack Intent
Adversary Lifecycle
Adversary Capability
Attack Methods
Attack Impact
Defensive Operations
Operating Procedures
Operational Priorities
Roles and Responsibilities
Communications
Command and Control
Situational Awareness
Defensive Planning
ICS Understanding
Security Architecture
Triage Priorities
Preparatory Activities
Incident Response Training
Training Structure and Pace
Table-Top Exercises
Progressive Training
Learning Environment
Training Reflection
Conistent Toolkit
Adversary Training Realism
Exercise Management
Exercise Control
Scenario Realism
Exercise Preparation
Training Objectives
Red Team Provision
Rules of Engagement
Feedback
Capability
Discipline
Cyber Range Quality
Activity Visualisation
Discrimination
Stability
Threat Intelligence
Guides Informs
Informs
Underpins
Scopes
Informs
Shapes
Prepares
Prioritises Prioritises
Rehearses
Informs
Controls
Controls
Strategic Viewpoint
Exercise Duration
Network Understanding
Network Monitoring Data
Network Terrain Analysis
Network Baselining
Relies Upon Relies Upon
Informs
Figure 9.1: Class diagram of themes and their relationships
9.2.1 Critical Review
Whilst the themes described above suggest encouraging results, there are a number of
influencing factors that must be considered before drawing conclusions. These can be
summarised into three critical questions:
1. Did the questions in the questionnaires influence the respondents’ answers?
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2. Do the themes simply represent the structure of the training provided?
3. How generalisable are the themes?
Did the questions in the questionnaires influence the respondents’ answers?
The pre-exercise questionnaire used to establish the baseline before the first full exercise
(Appendix A.2) asked general questions to assess the participants perceptions of SA,
the nature of the adversary, and their approach to cyber defence. In that respect, the
focus of a question on the nature of the adversary likely drove the responses that folded
into the subsequent ‘adversary understanding’ theme. However, the sub-themes of ‘at-
tack intent’ and ‘attack methods’ differentiated the nature of the responses. Similarly
the question that discussed SA was likely to have influenced the development of the
‘situational awareness’ sub-theme of ‘defensive operations’. The ‘defensive planning’
elements that arose may possibly have been influenced by the question that asked how
participants would go about cyber defence if it was under their control, although the
diversity of answers does not suggest a direct correlation. Questionnaires from subse-
quent experiments do not use such leading language, and asked wider questions. These
were not perceived to influence the answers in the same way.
It should be noted that the themes did not coalesce from the numerous candidate
themes that the thematic analysis process generates until far later in the experiment
schedule. Given the limited number of themes and sub-themes that arose from the
initial pre-questionnaire, and the subsequent strengthening and extension of these as a
result of further questionnaires, the influence of the early responses is assessed to have
not overly affected the final thematic model.
Do the themes simply represent the structure of the training provided?
The themes were developed from interviews, observations and questionnaires. The
interviews focused on the characteristics of past exercises, but did not ask the same
questions as the questionnaires used to gather feedback from TTX and CDX particpants.
The observations of the author were used as part of the triangulation process to limit
biases in interpretation. The questionnaires focused on asking questions to assess the
effectiveness of the training, so the answers are likely shaped by the training, but there
is no evidence they are a simple representation of the structure.
There is a possible researcher bias in the generation of the themes. The immersion
of the author in the series of experiments with the purposeful sample (the CPT) may
had introduced a narrowed perspective. However, as Merriam and Tisdell (2015) [235]
point out;
“Because human beings are the primary instrument of data collection and
analysis in qualitative research, interpretations of reality are accessed directly
through their observations and interviews. We are thus “closer” to reality
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than if a data collection instrument had been interjected between us and the
participants.” [235].
The use of triangulation of data limits the cognitive biases of the author, and
combined with the volume of data gathered, the nature of themes developed does not
appear to exhibit any overt adverse influences.
How generalisable are the themes?
Qualitative research based on a limited sample potentially reduces the generalisability of
results [235]. However, in the case of this research, the use of the separate sample for the
final analysis (as part of the DCO MST), and the consistency of the fit of the data into
the themes, suggests a wider generalisability of the results. The correlation of the themes
to the mental models, discussed in the next section, further suggests a consistency with
wider concepts. Empirically, the DCO themes (‘adversary understanding’, ‘stakeholder
priorities’, ‘network understanding’, ‘defensive planning’, and ‘defensive operations’ )
fit with established concepts within cyber security. The novelty of the progressive
training methods used within this research provided a contrast for participants to the
requirements for exercises that drove the themes of ‘incident response training’, ‘exercise
management’, ‘red team provision’, and ‘cyber range quality’. The use of the DCO
themes as a structure to assess behaviours of teams during an exercise, and of the
exercise themes to assess the exercise itself, as demonstrated in Section 8.11, displays a
coverage of subject matter to suggest wider generalisability of the results. Confirmation
of this theory requires further work.
9.3 Mental Models
Shared mental models are essential to the performance of a team operating under con-
ditions where time pressures, complexity of tasks, or excessive workloads limit the op-
portunities to develop coherent coping strategies. Such models allow teams to predict
their information and team requirements and act on the basis of an understanding
of the demands of the tasks at hand, allowing the team to adapt quickly in dynamic
environments [149].
The models proposed in this research, described in Table 6.1, span three distinct
domains:
1. The characteristics of antagonist (APT Attack Behaviour)
2. The nature of the cyber defence operations (Operational Priorities, Operating
Environment)
3. The interplay between team members (Team Understanding, Team Interaction)
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They are an extension and augmentation of the four models of ‘Technology/Equip-
ment’, ‘Job/Task’, ‘Team Interaction’, and ‘Team’ described by Mathieu et al. (2000)
[149], that in turn, were built upon the works of Converse and Cannon-Bowers (1993)
[261] and Koehler and Castellan (1993) [262]. As such, there is a body of work that
underpins the theoretical foundations of the models. Our assessment is therefore fo-
cused on the appropriateness and applicability of the extended model to DCO, and how
the experiential learning and coping strategies proposed in this research develop these
models.
As discussed in Section 3.9, the characteristics of effective performance amongst
incident responders are not well understood [187]. However, several social processes
and dynamics that contribute to high-performing incident response teams have been
identified, summarised in Table 3.2. The ten areas proposed by Tetrick et al. (2016)
in this table are cross-referenced to the five mental models proposed in this research in
Table 9.1.
Ref. Development Areas for IR Teams Shared Mental Models
1. Social maturity of the teams. Team Understanding
2. Methods of performance evaluation. Not addressed
3. Decision-making processes. Operational Priorities, Team Interac-
tion
4. Communication effectiveness. Team Interaction
5. Information sharing. Team Interaction
6. Collaborative problem-solving. Team Interaction, Team Understanding
7. Understanding of team expertise. Team Understanding
8. Trust between teams. Team Understanding
9. Sustainable attention management and focus
over time.
Not addressed
10. Continuous education in incident response Partially addressed
Table 9.1: Ten development areas for incident response teams, defined by Tetrick et. al
(2016), mapped to shared mental models
As can be seen in Table 9.1, two of the ten development areas are not addressed in
the shared mental models proposed in this research, with a further area only partially
addressed. ‘Continuous education in incident response’ is an element of the progres-
sive collective training model described in Chapter 6 and used during the experiments
described in this thesis. ‘Sustainable attention management and focus over time’ and
‘methods of performance evaluation’ are beyond the scope of this research programme,
and identified for further work.
The development of the shared mental models by teams in the exercise described
in Section 8.11.2, and elaborated at Appendix C, demonstrated how early development
of the models though the use of operational procedures and techniques for incident re-
sponse teams improved overall performance. Those teams that attended and adopted
the DCO MST displayed far earlier Team SA, and despite low levels of technical ex-
pertise, demonstrating that the tools and techniques of the ICS-CDTP (elements of
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which are included in the IPCE process described in Appendix D) provide a framework
to maintain these models during situations where cognitive overload is likely. This is
significant, as to date, the works of Mathieu et al. (2000) [149] and Endsley (1988-
2015) [263, 147, 264, 265, 148, 266, 267, 268] have not been fused. The performances
of teams who attended and adopted the DCO MST indicate that the shared mental
models proposed by this research support the development of Team SA. The purpose-
ful sample (the CPT) have demonstrated in experiments described in Sections 8.9 and
8.11 that with appropriate individual technical training, the models, supported by the
ICS-CDTP, develop SA across levels 1-3.
The relevance of each of the five shared mental models is discussed in Sections 9.3.1
to 9.3.6.
9.3.1 APT Attack Behaviours
A shared knowledge of antagonistic cyber behaviours, driven by threat intelligence,
allows a continual analysis of the threat landscape and recognised intrusion sets to de-
termine the probable intent, impact, and characteristics of a targeted intrusion. The
acknowledgement of such threats introduces the safeguard recommended by Kaplan and
Garrick (1981) [74] that, by recognising the possibility of a hazard, it poses less risk
than if we have no understanding of its potential impact. The use of SCIPS drives the
strategic understanding of antagonists, HILF events, and targets the three characteris-
tics of a cyber risk proposed by Biener et al. (2015) [17], described in Table 2.1. TTX
and CDX, using the ICS-CDTP in a progressive collective training environment, itera-
tively develops a detailed understanding of how attacks would manifest themselves on an
ICS network, and steer the development of incident response policies, procedures, and
playbooks driven by a synthetically-derived understanding of APT attack behaviours.
The use of synthetic environments, fused with threat intelligence, drives an increase in
background information, K, and through exercising the scope of unconsidered scenarios,
sn+1, can be reduced.
9.3.2 Team Interaction
Shared knowledge about team interactions drives operational effectiveness. In partic-
ular, the development of Team SA and the understanding of the rate of change of
information and its relationship to the dynamic nature of incident response is essential
[147]. Levels 1-3 of SA, plus Team SA are developed through the progressive collective
training framework described in Chapter 6, building adaptability through defined C2,
roles and responsibilities, communications and information flows, using the common
lexicon and tools prescribed in the ICS-CDTP (chapter 5). In particular, the TTX
described in Section 8.8 illustrates how the ‘Team Interaction’ model can be driven
through the development of SOPs.
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9.3.3 Team Understanding
Much of the understanding of a team comes from time spent working with each other,
and training. The development of a strong ‘Team Interaction’ model can compensate
for a lack of time together if team members are allocated defined roles and responsi-
bilities, with clear control and information flow channels between them, as observed in
Section 8.11. Training is an essential element of developing team understanding. The
progressive collective training framework described in Chapter 6 provides a basis for
this, as demonstrated in Section 8.10.
9.3.4 Operational Priorities
The understanding of the operational priorities of an ICS operator is essential to deter-
mining which elements must maintain assured availability during a cyber attack. The
ICS-CDTP provides a means to determine which systems and processes are a high pri-
ority for defence, using the output of a CARVER matrix (section 5.3.3). This supports
a triaged prioritisation of where to deploy defensive mechanisms and incident response
resources.
9.3.5 Operational Environment
The appreciation of the operational environment is necessary to ensure that an ICS
operator understands all of the assets under its management, and determine how these
may be exploited by an attacker. The ICS-CDTP addresses this specifically, as described
in Section 5.3.2.
9.3.6 Relationship Between Themes and Mental Models
Many of the facts of the mental models relate to the sub-themes that emerged within
the thematic analysis described in Section 9.2. The themes and mental models provide
mutual support to each other; the themes describe how the mental models can be
developed, and an understanding of gaps within the mental models can be used to target
which areas of the themes require development within a specific training audience.
The relationship between the themes and mental models is illustrated in Figure
9.2.
9.3.7 Critical Review
The mental models proposed in this thesis are based on initial work by Mathieu et al.
(2000) [149] that built on research by Converse and Cannon-Bowers (1993) [261] and
Koehler and Castellan (1993) [262]. As such, there is a body of work that underpins
the theoretical foundations of the models. However, we must consider the novelty and
value of the findings of the experimentation.
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What is the value of the extension of Mathieu et al’s work?
Mathieu et al. (2000) [149] sought to examine the influence of convergence, or ‘shared-
ness’, of team members’ mental models as related to team processes and performance by
using 56 undergraduate dyads to undertake a series of low-fidelity personal-computer-
based flight-combat simulations. The research focused on whether sharedness, as well
as team processes and performance, developed over time. The results, whilst positive
(and cited in over 2,300 articles) did not use a representative sample of participants ex-
perienced in the field of the experiments (i.e. they were not pilots) or used simulations
based on a known and characterised adversary. The research in this thesis has extended
Mathieu et al’s models and tailored them for DCO, then tested them in a series of
incident response scenarios based on real-world threats using a purposeful sample of ex-
perienced personnel to establish their appropriateness and applicability. Furthermore,
the introduction of the ICS-CDTP provides mechanisms to develop the mental models
in the minds of participants of SCIPS, TTX and CDX, incrementally improving the
quality of the models through the use of the progressive collective training framework.
The value of the extension of Mathieu et al’s work is that we have defined mental models
to accommodate the cyber domain and demonstrated that a focused training structure
can improve the performance of experienced professionals in representative simulations.
Are the themes and models simply two views of the same concepts?
As discussed in Section 9.3.6, the themes and models are mutually supporting. Figure
9.2 demonstrates the relationships, and importantly, illustrates where the themes extend
beyond the models. In that respect, the themes can be considered a further development
of the aspects of the mental models. Further work is required to determine any further
cohesiveness between the themes and mental models.
How generalisable are the mental models?
The research sample used for Mathieu et al’s experiments [149] were, as previously
discussed, not representative of the professionals who would undertake flight combat
missions in real-world situations. They also used a low-fidelity simulation, with no
defined relationship to recognised adversaries. The research described in this thesis,
however, has used representative samples in exercises that use complex scenarios based
upon real-world adversaries. In this respect, the results are broadly applicable within
the cyber defence domain when considering APT attacks on ICS.
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9.4 Research Questions
Section 1.4 posed six questions to assess the efficacy of the models, tools and techniques
proposed in this research. We shall now consider each of these in turn.
9.4.1 Which factors influence the development of mental models to
provide cyber SA?
The relationships between themes and mental models highlights that it is a contextu-
alised understanding of the real-world aspects of the adversary, ICS defences, and how
these interrelate to deliver structured incident response training, that develop the men-
tal models. This is significant, as Endsley (2000) [148] points out that SA is essentially
the current state of the mental model in the context of a particular situation [148].
Therefore, the realism of a scenario can be considered the most critical aspect in the
development of mental models to provide cyber SA. However, as discussed in Section
6.4, this reality must be delivered within a progressive cycle to incrementally develop
mental models [152, 165, 166]. The development of mental models for cyber SA should
be developed using a progressive framework of training based on realistic scenarios.
9.4.2 Does the adoption of coping strategies increase SA?
A comparative analysis of the team performances in the exercise described in Section
8.11 highlighted a difference in Team SA between teams that attended and adopted the
DCO MST, and those that did not.
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Figure 9.3: Team SA of teams that did not attend and adopt the methods taught on
the DCO MST
Figure 9.3 summarises the Team SA of teams that did not attend the DCO MST.
As can be seen, Team SA in the early stages of the exercise is poor. Team performances
improved towards the latter stages of the exercise, but it should be noted that this
coincided with a summary of the techniques taught on the DCO MST being presented
to the entire exercise audience in an extra-curricular session. Subsequent adoption of
these techniques resulted in an overall improvement Team SA.
By contrast, the Team SA of those that did attend and adopt the DCO MST,
illustrated in Figure 9.4, achieved higher levels of Team SA from the outset. The
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observed drop in Team SA by Team 7, the CPT, was as a result of them not sharing
their SA with the White Team. Within the team, however, their SA was consistently
high.
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Figure 9.4: Team SA of teams that did attend and adopt the methods taught on the
DCO MST
From these observations it is apparent that adopting the coping strategies of the
ICS-CDTP, taught on the DCO MST, resulted in increased Team SA.
9.4.3 Can serious games change the risk perceptions of participants
and establish a foundational level of SA?
The difference in strategic risk perceptions between respondents to the pre-exercise
questionnaire (section 8.5.1) and post-SCIPS questionnaire (section 8.5.2) highlighted a
marked change. The narrative in the ‘adversary understanding’ theme shifted from an
initial description of high-level, non-specific, technical threats, to strategic descriptions
that focused on adversary intent and impact, and the need for intelligence to adequately
maintain an understanding of the threat landscape. Similar strategic comprehension was
seen in the results from the DCO MST (section 8.10).
A far richer set of themes were observed at the end of training at both experiments
(sections 8.5.3 and 8.10), showing a shift in overall understanding and resultant SA
as a consequence. These results demonstrate that serious games can change the risk
perceptions of participants and establish a foundational level of SA.
9.4.4 How can we increase the efficacy of the serious games to deliver
the change in risk perceptions?
Section 3.6.4 discusses the characteristics of effective serious games, and in particu-
lar the requirement for games to have agency ; the ability to influence the situation
through meaningful decision-making and coping strategies. It further reviews experien-
tial learning [111] as an educational technique that proposes that active engagement in
a realistic scenario develops personal experiences that form the basis of understanding.
Subsequent iterations of game experiences, followed by periods of reflection, promotes
the formation of ideas, with the testing of these ideas solidifying the understanding in
the mind of the participant [110]. This cycle is illustrated in Figure 3.3. This cycle
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should include the opportunity to experience failure, as during a serious game, most
of the learning occurs during debriefing, when participants have the opportunity to re-
flect on their experiences, allowing them to develop the mental models of the situation,
against which they could refine their understanding.
SCIPS exhibits the characteristics of an effective serious game, as well as addressing
the seven aspects of cyber SA defined by Barford (2010) [21] (illustrated in Table 4.5),
and the three characteristics of a cyber risk proposed by Biener et al. (2015) [17], as
portrayed in Table 2.1.
The results discussed in Section 9.4.3 above, suggests that SCIPS, as a serious
game, is effective at changing risk perceptions. Similarly, the feedback following the
CDX described in Section 8.5.3 suggests that the realism of the exercise scenarios, using
a progressive crawl-walk-run approach to the execution of the exercise, with sufficient
time allocated for reflection to allow the formation of ideas for subsequent testing,
significantly increases the effectiveness of serious games.
The structure of the progressive collective training framework, using SCIPS, TTX
and CDX, demonstrates significant, tangible results, increasing the effectiveness of stan-
dalone training packages.
9.4.5 As a result of serious games, can participants recognise the char-
acteristics of a cyber attack and determine the possible intent
and courses of action?
SCIPS has been used to present an end-to-end cyber attack within a serious game.
The evolution of the game to include periods of reflection based on adversary models
and the Purdue Model anchors the development of the ‘APT Attack Behaviour’ men-
tal model, based on the assessed relationship between ‘APT Attack Behaviour’ model
and the ‘Adversary Understanding’ theme. It was observed at the CDX described in
Section 7.5.8 that those who attended and adopted the DCO MST were aware of the
characteristics of an attack, mapped these characteristics to adversary lifecycle models
and projected courses of action. Based on the triage processes of the ICS-CDTP, and
the identification of the key network terrain, these same teams were able to assess the
likely intent of the attackers.
Similarly, at the CDX described in Section 7.5.6, the members of the CPT that
had played SCIPS and used the same scenario on a TTX (section 7.5.5), were able to
develop detailed SOPs that formalised the assessment of the network terrain, identify
intrusion events, and work to forecast and future courses of action.
The results from the experiments described in Sections 8.9 and 8.11 demonstrate
improved Level 2 and 3 SA, indicating the mix of didactic and experiential learning
aspects of the serious games used in this research support the development of recognition
of characteristics of a cyber attack, and the derivation of intent and future courses of
action.
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9.5. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE EXPERIMENTS AS AN EXPERIENTIAL
LEARNING PLATFORM
9.4.6 Are participants of serious games able to assess the immediate
and longer-term impacts of cyber attacks?
The observed increases of Level 2 and Level 3 SA in experimentation results, partic-
ularly those described in Sections 8.9 and 8.11, demonstrate that participants of the
serious games used in this research were able to assess the immediate and longer-term
impacts of cyber attacks. Much of the understanding that underpinned this capability
was derived through the use of the CARVER matrix, Diamond Model, and adversary
lifecycle techniques structured within the ICS-CDTP. The experiential learning aspects
of the SCIPS, TTX and CDX facilitated the development of the mental models that
allowed this understanding to be exploited.
9.5 Effectiveness of the Experiments as an Experiential
Learning Platform
Feedback from the research samples, acquired through questionnaires and interviews,
and combined with observations of behaviour and performance on TTX and CDX, indi-
cates that the requirements defined in the proposed framework provide a comprehensive
structure in which to develop progressive collective training exercises. Whilst research
exists that suggests that crawl-walk-run training may occur out of sequence [151], the
evidence compiled within this evaluation of the framework indicates that adherence
to crawl-walk-run through sequential collective training levels 1 to 5, across TTX and
CDX, provides maximum training value. Furthermore, the data highlight how TTX pro-
vide advantages in developing SA using the mental models of ‘operational priorities’,
‘team interaction’, and ‘team understanding’. CDX, on the other hand, provide strong
support for the development of ‘operating environment’ and ‘APT attack behaviour’
mental models.
The samples used for the experimentation in this research were IT professionals
in the process of transitioning to the cyber domain. As such, the experimentation
allowed the real-world impact of the training and experiential learning techniques to be
assessed. The observations of the CPT at the CDX described in Section 8.4, drove the
establishment of a baseline understanding of the team’s mental models, and identified
the subsequent areas for improvement that framed the experimentation programme.
The use of SCIPS and the integration of its scenario into a novel CDX, described in
Section 7.5.2, drove the addition of the role of Blue Terrain Manager (BTM) to the
CPT’s organisational structure, to coordinate all network terrain analysis and defensive
activities, based on an understanding of the adversary. The TTX described in Sections
7.5.3 and 7.5.5 drove the development of new operational processes to drive efficient
and effective incident response. In particular, the adoption of a new SA Manager role
(section 8.8) established the maintenance of SA as critical to effective cyber incident
management. This led to the definition of a prioritised approach to data ingest in the
early stages of an incident (section 8.9), targeted to drive team efficiencies and increased
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understanding. Ultimately, the performance of the CPT and the teams that attended
and adopted the DCO MST at the CDX described in Section 7.5.8 demonstrated the
effectiveness of experiential learning as an educational platform.
On the basis of these results, it is assessed that the experiments demonstrated that
experiential learning is an effective educational platform for cyber security.
9.6 Limitations of Research
The logistics of coordinating the large numbers of personnel required for the experiments
described in this thesis, along with the complexity of maintaining a cyber range for CDX,
limited the experimental window of this research to a one-year period. Availability of
personnel and equipment could not be guaranteed outside of this timeframe. As such,
the results are limited to a restricted sample. Whilst the final experiments were framed
to assess the validity of the previous results, the repeatability cannot be demonstrated.
Therefore, the results are restricted to a military sample within a defined training cycle.
9.7 Comparison to Related Work
The literature review in Chapter 3 cited many works that influenced the scope of this
thesis. The following sections discuss the alignment of the results of this research to
those publications most closely related.
9.7.1 Risk Assessment
The paucity of a qualified dataset to support probabilistic risk models is not solved by
this research. Through the use of the ICS-CDTP and the application of threat intelli-
gence, however, an individual ICS operator can assess the Intent and Capability of an
adversary to inform Lewis’s (2014) model [76] that proposes that Threat=Intent x Capa-
bility. Similarly, the ICS-CDTP supports the NRC model [79] that incorporates threat
T, vulnerabilities V, and capabilities C, as factors of risk Risk=f(T,V,C), if threat can
be treated at the output of the CARVER matrix. The use of synthetic environments
aligns with Sommestad and Hallberg’s (2012) [106] view that cyber security exercises,
conducted on dedicated infrastructure, can generate valuable data for security research.
This has been extended to focus on ICS to provide data for an ICS operator model
to include in their risk models. In particular, this includes the consideration of back-
ground knowledge, K, and what evidence exists for Kaplan and Garrick’s (1981) [74]
unconsidered scenarios of type sn+1. The research is complementary with Sommestad
and Ekstedt (2009) [103] who combined attack trees [88] with Bayesian methods [78]
and expert assessment, but did not consider the industrial processes under control or
their safety characteristics. In particular, the use of the Purdue Model [35] allows an
industrial enterprise to be assessed, rather than solely the OT. This permits the per-
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ceived limitations of IT security mechanisms in ICS to be viewed holistically, to provide
a mechanism to address the concerns raised by Sommestad et al. (2010) [29], illustrated
in Figure 3.1.
9.7.2 Mental Models and Team Performance
This research extends the shared mental models proposed by Mathieu et al. (2000) [149]
and the characteristics of high performing teams reviewed by Mathieu et al. (2008) [153]
into the cyber domain, to demonstrate their effectiveness in incident response. This is
aligned with the development areas for incident response teams proposed by Tetrick et
al. (2016) [187]. In particular, this research demonstrates how incident response teams
can develop targeted mental models and organisational structures through experiential
learning, to accelerate their pre-incident planning and response capabilities.
9.7.3 Situational Awareness
Endsley’s work in SA, from 1988 to 2015, is extensive [263, 264, 147, 265, 148, 266,
267, 268] and forms the basis of the SA elements of this research. Endsley’s work is
extended in this thesis through the application of techniques to drive the prerequisites
of ICS network understanding and threat analysis, described in the ICS-CDTP, and
the adoption of the crawl-walk-run approach [152, 165, 166] within the progressive
collective training framework. It is further extended through the integration of Barford
et al. (2010) [21] seven aspects of cyber SA and Biener et al. (2015) [17] characteristics
of a cyber risk.
9.7.4 Serious Games
The SCIPS serious game is complementary to both Cyber CIEGE and Tracer FIRE. Cy-
berCIEGE [269, 270, 271, 272], whilst effective, does not provide scenarios based upon
real-world, capable threat actors following an established network intrusion methodol-
ogy. Tracer FIRE [136] focuses on the forensic aspects of a cyber attack. Neither of
the games include ICS in their scope. SCIPS provides an end-to-end attack on an ICS
operator from an APT actor, following an established kill-chain.
The focus on constraining the Red Team’s RoE within the novel CDX included in
the progressive collective training framework developed during this research provides
detail to support Brynielsson et al. (2016) [157] proposition that exercises can be used
to capture data to improve attacker profiling, and provides an alternative to competitive
cyber exercises [169, 170, 171, 168, 172, 173, 174, 106, 175, 136, 176, 177].
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9.8 Contribution
The research described in this thesis is novel in that it combines and extends concepts
found in risk assessment, intrusion detection, education and exercising, with safety and
process models that are known within the operations of many ICS facilities. As such,
this research:
1. Proposes a progressive collective training framework in Chapter 6 that incremen-
tally develops the content of the five mental models defined in Section 6.3 (with
analysis in Section 9.3), necessary for SA and incident response to address Ques-
tion 1 - Which factors influence the development of mental models to provide cyber
situational awareness?
2. Characterises the results of a qualitative analysis in Chapter 8 within a set of
themes summarised in Section 8.12 that shapes the nature of experiential learn-
ing within a serious gaming environment, further addressing Question 1 - Which
factors influence the development of mental models to provide cyber situational
awareness?
3. Focuses on the identification and defence of critical ICS equipment from malicious
manipulation in Chapter 5, with results in Chapter 8, allowing ICS operators to
actively identify and attempt to thwart malicious attacks based on an incident
response ‘playbook’ developed from analyses of antagonistic intent, addressing
Question 2 - Does the adoption of coping strategies increase situational awareness?
4. Delivers a serious gaming environment in Chapter 4 with experimental results
described in Sections 8.5 and 8.10 that addresses Question 3 - Can serious games
change the risk perceptions of participants and establish a foundational level of sit-
uational awareness?, Question 5 - As a result of serious games, can participants
recognise the characteristics of a cyber attack and determine the possible intent
and courses of action?, and Question 6 - Are participants of serious games able to
assess the immediate and longer-term impacts of cyber attacks?, to allow partici-
pants to experience the simulated impact of a cyber attack on an ICS enterprise,
demonstrating how it can strategically affect shareholder value, and support the
development of mental models to frame wider cyber security operations.
5. Provides a framework in Chapter 6 with experimental results described in Chap-
ter 8 that addresses Question 4 - How can we increase the efficacy of the serious
games to deliver the change in risk perceptions?, that provides a progressive, cost-
effective establishment and maintenance of situational awareness and skills profi-
ciency through cyber range and table-top exercises that incorporate the scenarios
played out in the strategic serious game environment.
6. Introduces a novel CDX structure in Section 7.5.2, with experimental results in
Sections 8.5 and 8.9 to maximise training value to participants and further address
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Question 4 - How can we increase the efficacy of the serious games to deliver the
change in risk perceptions?
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10.1 Introduction
This thesis has explored the use of experiential learning through serious games to pro-
gressively build a set of shared mental models that describe the nature of an adversary
and establish enterprise situational awareness. This is underpinned by a set of coping
strategies to identify attractive targets for advanced threat actors and assess their future
courses of action.
The possible directions of research that emerge from a consideration of this thesis
are divided into two categories:
1. Directly related themes
2. Broader research areas
The directly related themes in Section 10.2 proposes future scope to address topics
that have arisen from a review of the research results and limitations. Broader research
areas in Section 10.3 considers the potential wider perspectives of further work that
arise from the techniques proposed in this thesis.
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10.2 Directly Related Themes
10.2.1 Theme Generalisability
The themes described in this thesis developed as a result of the analysis of feedback
from experiments, and was used to successfully assess the effectiveness of the CDX
described in Section 8.11. As discussed in Section 9.6, the logistics and complexity of
coordinating personnel and cyber ranges limited the number of experiments that could
be realistically undertaken during this research. The results, therefore, only reflect the
comprehension of the research sample. Further analysis is required to confirm the wider
generalisability of the results.
10.2.2 Development Areas for Incident Response
Table 9.1 shows that three of the ten development areas for IR, as proposed by Tetrick
et al. (2016) [187], are not fully addressed in the shared mental models proposed in
this research. Whilst ‘Continuous education in incident response’ can in some part be
related to the progressive collective training framework described in Chapter 6 and used
during the experiments described in this thesis, ‘Sustainable attention management and
focus over time’ and ‘methods of performance evaluation’ were beyond the scope of this
programme. Further research is required to integrate these areas within the framework.
10.2.3 ICS-CDTP Support Tooling
The use of the CARVER matrix and the Diamond Model within the ICS-CDTP, whilst
demonstrated to be effective, was resource-intensive. Tools are required to support
the initial development of these models, as well incorporate safety information where
available, to make effective use of the data during a cyber attack.
10.3 Broader Research Areas
10.3.1 Driving Cyber Security Cultural Change Within Organisations
As discussed in Section 3.6, the majority of educational programmes within the cyber
security domain have been awareness campaigns which have achieved mixed results
[108, 109, 110]. In instances where training has delivered an immediate increase in
understanding, it has been demonstrated that this does not necessarily reflect the long-
term perspective of the audience [20]. This has an impact on peoples’ adherence to
organisational security policies [108].
Coventry et al. (2014) [108] analysed the factors that contributed to employees
not following cyber security policies, citing poor threat perception, incorrect or incom-
plete mental models, and no clear link between security decisions and consequences as
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significant [108].
Whilst literature describes the advantages of developing appropriate mental models
to support cyber security understanding [273, 274, 18] no detail of the content of the
models has been observed. This thesis has demonstrated that multi-player serious games
can aid in the formation and solidification of mental models in the minds of participants.
This, however, requires the metal models to be well-defined and their characteristics
understood.
The scope of the mental models described in this thesis has been focused on
enterprise-level situational awareness to address the APT threat to ICS organisations.
Future research is recommended to focus on the development of mental models to ad-
dress the factors described by Coventry at al. (2014) for more general users, in a con-
figurable serious gaming environment that is representative of the real-world situations
personnel may face, describing the consequences of their actions in a game economy
they are familiar with.
10.3.2 Integrating Gaming Techniques to Improve Cyber Threat In-
telligence Assessment
ICS operators, and businesses more generally, face a dynamic threat landscape with
evolving capabilities increasingly available to antagonists. Cyber threat intelligence
analysis is a discipline that integrates established techniques with the cyber domain
[275]. In a rapidly changing threat environment, intelligence analysts must analyse
reported information and assess its potential impact on the networks, systems and pro-
cesses they protect. Strategic intelligence assessment involves a number of stakeholders
[276] and can be delayed by extended analysis and review cycles, or be assessed by ana-
lysts without a detailed knowledge of the impact of antagonistic activities. This affects
either its timeliness or its accuracy.
Serious gaming can engage a community of participants to consider the possible
courses of action and impact that antagonistic activities may cause. Such gaming tech-
niques offer potential opportunities to provide a framework for stakeholders from diverse
parts of an organisation to come together to assess intelligence reports and determine
possible strategic impact in a reduced timeframe.
Structured game frameworks that integrate the operations of an organisation, in-
tegrated into the intelligence cycle, may offer an efficient means to consider the wider
implications of threat reports. Further work in this area is recommended to determine
its effectiveness.
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10.3.3 Driving Architecture Improvements Through Design Red Team
Methods
Techniques such as attack trees [88] model a potential antagonists progression through
a network to a specified target node. The Diamond Model of Intrusion Analysis [190]
proposes an extended alternative to this method that supports an analysis of compet-
ing hypotheses [277] and attacker potential courses of action. Such attackers can be
represented by Red Teams in post-implementation penetration tests or cyber defence
exercises, but they are rarely adopted at the design stage of an enterprise to determine
how an antagonist might exploit the architecture. If used, such techniques do not form
part of a formal and repeatable assessment of security design coherence in enterprise
approaches such as TOGAF [278] and SABSA [279].
The ICS-CDTP, described in Section 5, proposes a triage method to consider the
impact of loss or degradation of key systems and processes to an ICS operator, based
on an understanding of the deployed architecture. It is feasible that similar techniques
could be adopted at the design stage of an enterprise architecture to consider antagonis-
tic courses of action directed at critical systems to drive cyber security improvements.
For research in this area to be credible, the output should be a formal design stage,
following a defined, repeatable process that integrates an understanding of the strategic
cyber risks affecting an organisation into a threat-centric view of the architecture.
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11.1 Introduction
In this, the closing chapter of the thesis, we summarise the conclusions of the research,
restate the contribution, and reiterate the proposed further work that results from this
analysis to date.
11.2 Summary Conclusions
In response to the research questions posed in Section 1.4, this thesis concludes that:
1. A progressive training programme that incrementally delivers realistic scenarios
based on real-world threat actor characteristics is the key factor that influences the
development of the mental models described in this research to provide cyber situational
awareness.
2. The adoption of coping strategies that support the identification of attractive ICS
targets for antagonists, and frames the development of defensive and incident response
strategies that can be rehearsed prior to a cyber attack, increases enterprise situational
awareness.
3. Participants of serious games that use realistic scenarios were observed to demon-
strate a significant shift in risk perceptions and situational awareness, moving from
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initial high-level, non-specific threat commentary, to focused strategic descriptions that
described adversary intent and impact, and the need for intelligence to adequately
maintain an understanding of the threat landscape.
4. The efficacy of serious games is increased through providing agency to the partic-
ipants to influence a realistic scenario through meaningful decision-making and coping
strategies, underpinned by iterations of gameplay that provide periods of reflection
based on imagery that solidifies acquired understanding in the minds of the partici-
pants, to promote the formation of mental models that can be subsequently tested in a
crawl-walk-run model.
5. Following participation in serious games, participants have been observed to demon-
strate increased situational awareness, perceiving information elements in a scenario,
comprehending their consequences and likely intent, and projecting future antagonistic
courses of actions that were used to shape proactive defensive activities to mitigate
cyber attacks.
6. It has been demonstrated that participants of serious games, if provided with the
necessary formalised coping strategies, including role definitions, communication and
information flows, and operating procedures, are able to develop shared mental models
and use the generalisation of this understanding to allow them to assess the immediate
and longer-term impacts of adaptive cyber attacks.
11.3 Contribution
The research described in this thesis is novel in that it combines and extends concepts
found in risk assessment, intrusion detection, education and exercising, with safety and
process models that are known within the operations of many ICS facilities.
1. The progressive collective training framework provides an educational construct
that incrementally develops the content of the five mental models necessary for situa-
tional awareness and incident response.
2. The qualitative analysis derived from the experiment results of this research char-
acterises a set of themes that shapes the nature of experiential learning within a serious
gaming environment.
3. The coping strategies described in this thesis provide a focus on the identification
and defence of critical ICS equipment from malicious manipulation, allowing ICS oper-
ators to actively identify and attempt to thwart malicious attacks based on an incident
response ‘playbook’ developed from analyses of antagonistic intent.
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4. The SCIPS serious game delivers an environment that allows participants to expe-
rience the simulated impact of a cyber attack on an ICS enterprise, demonstrating how
it can strategically affect shareholder value, and support the development of mental
models to frame wider cyber security operations.
5. The progressive collective training framework provides a structure for the progres-
sive, cost-effective establishment and maintenance of situational awareness and skills
proficiency through cyber range and table-top exercises that incorporate the scenarios
played out in the strategic serious game environment.
6. The novel CDX format derived in this research focuses the efforts of the Red and
White teams to deliver learning outcomes focused on the identified needs of the Blue
Team training audience.
11.4 Further Work
This thesis, whilst delivering a coherent set of results and conclusions from the research
undertaken, also highlights six areas for further analysis.
1. The themes developed from the qualitative analysis should be used to assess further
cyber exercises to ascertain their wider generalisability beyond the samples used in this
research.
2. Methods are required to determine how to sustain attention management and focus
over time during an incident response, as well as defining methods for evaluating the
performance of incident response teams beyond the themes defined in this thesis.
3. Software applications to support the use of the CARVER matrix and Diamond
Model would be beneficial to reduce the intensity of resources required to develop and
maintain these analytical tools.
4. Consider the promotion of cyber security cultural change by developing broader
mental models to address general IT users, supported by real-world scenarios in a serious
gaming environment to underpin experiential learning for participants.
5. Integrate gaming techniques to improve cyber threat intelligence assessment, pro-
viding a framework for stakeholders from diverse parts of an organisation to come to-
gether to assess intelligence reports and determine possible strategic impact in a reduced
timeframe.
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6. Drive cyber security improvements to enterprise architectures by introducing formal
Red Team analyses of antagonistic courses of actions at the design stage to determine
how an attacker might exploit the technology estate and operational processes.
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A.1 Introduction
This appendix elaborates on the themes developed from the experimental results de-
scribed in Sections 8.5, 8.8, and 8.10 of the main body of this thesis. It provides a richer
description of the themes, using further narratives from interviews and questionnaires.
A.2 Pre-Exercise Questionnaire, April 2017
Questionnaires were completed at the start of the week-long experiment at DMU in
April 2017 that comprised SCIPS and a CDX. The responses established the baseline
of understanding of the experiment participants. Of the 26 participants, 11 described
themselves as having high technical competency, 12 as medium, with three as low. This
described general technical competency and was not necessarily cyber specific. The
particpants had a range of cyber exercise experiences; comprising nine participants with
no prior experience of cyber exercises, seven participants with experience of one prior
cyber exercise, ten participants with prior experience of more than one cyber exercise.
The pre-exercise questionnaire asked seven questions:
1. Describe your technical background.
2. Describe your experience with industrial control systems.
3. Describe your experiences of being on a Blue Team in the past, and the levels of
learning achieved.
4. In your opinion, how effective have these past exercises been, and why?
5. What do you perceive as essential to maintain situational awareness in a network
defence scenario, and why?
6. How would you characterise the threat and nature of a capable network attack
adversary?
7. If it were under your control, what measures would you put in place to address
the threat?
A total of 26 questionnaires were received. These identified three key themes;
‘adversary understanding’, ‘defensive operations’, and ‘defensive planning’.
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A.2.1 Adversary Understanding
The adversary understanding theme focused on the intent of the adversary, and the
attack methods employed. A total of 22 sources and 22 references were identified.
Attack Intent
This sub-theme discussed the intent of the antagonist. It was characterised by broad,
general statements that focused on generic actors, as opposed to those who would
specifically target ICS. Adversaries were stereotyped as:
“A person who is trying to gain information from an organisation for profit
or malicious use. This can be gained initially through social engineering to
target a weak point in an organisation”
Attack Methods
The attack methods sub-theme concentrated on the nature of the network intrusion:
“An individual or group that have conducted extensive research and recon-
naissance, and the ability to target very specific points of network success-
fully – all whilst creating minimal disturbance (to avoid detection). Leave no
trace, but leave open the route for future attacks. Has the use of, and access
to, high-end software/hardware and extensive knowledge of how to use it”
“Able to move quietly, using existing network capabilities or configuration
issues to move laterally and escalate privileges. 2. Ability to maintain per-
sistence, using volatile memory and injection. 3. Has a defined motive – a
reason to get in and be determined to stay there. 4. Can conduct reconnais-
sance quietly so the network boundary penetration is not discovered”
A.2.2 Defensive Operations
This theme focused on cyber defence operations, and almost exclusively discussed the
need for establishing and maintaining SA when responding to a complex incident. It
cited 25 sources and 25 references.
Situational Awareness
The sub-theme of defensive operations concentrated on the establishment and mainte-
nance of situational awareness during a network intrusion:
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“For a Team Leader situational awareness is maintained by constantly re-
ceiving updates from the various sub-teams and integrate with intelligence
and known methodologies”
“Good leadership. Communication and all informed awareness. A good net-
work monitoring tool, the ability of the team not to be drawn into one element
disregarding others. A solid understanding of ‘normal’ network activity and
quick recognition of any incidents or events that are abnormal. Without all
of these things, any team would never achieve full situational awareness”
A.2.3 Defensive Planning
The defensive planning theme focused on pre-incident activities and concentrated on
two sub-themes; ‘preparatory actions’ and ‘security architecture’. It was cited in 23
sources, with 23 references.
Preparatory Actions
A focus on the actions an organisation could undertake to prepare itself for a network
intrusion incident:
“Good system hardening. SIEM/log correlation across all systems. Well-
trained incident response team. Regular incident response drills and wash-
ups of past incidents. Threat intelligence team in-house”
“Boundary protection and management. 2. Centralised logging with appro-
priate heuristic and manual log sifting mechanisms. 3. Full packet capture
at key network points. 4. Network segmentation. 5. Restrict privileges. 6.
Timely J2 feed. 7. A dynamic and empowered incident response team”
Security Architecture
The sub-theme described the elements of an overall security architecture that would
improve an organisation’s security posture:
“The basics of cyber security are the best. For example, keeping the systems
patched, hardened, users trained and tested on good cyber security hygiene.
Defence-in-depth: defender with the right tools and skills to keep ahead of
threat actors. Most important is understanding you cannot be able to keep a
persistent threat all the time, but focus on being able to detect and track the
threat out of your system quickly. Reduce dwell-time (time from compromise
to detection). Motto: ‘Be breach ready’ ”
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“Baseline: IP and MAC mapping, open port discovery, software identifica-
tion, process identification, list authorised accounts, list admin/user permis-
sions, list authorised network shares, registry default identification. Harden:
firewall passwords, firewall ports, router passwords, password policy, group
permissions, tighten control of admin and server accounts, email settings,
shutdown null shares, disable IPv6, disable unidentified IP addresses until
checked. Monitor: firewall activity, sensor activity, authorised user activity”
A.3 SCIPS, April 2017
The characterisation of ICS understanding from the 26 participants of the experiment
was that 14 were beginners, nine were novices with very limited exposure, and only one
had any significant experience in the field. Two participants chose not to answer.
A total of 26 questionnaire responses were received, answering the following eight
questions:
1. Before playing that game, what was your understanding of industrial control sys-
tems did you have?
2. Before playing the game what was your understanding of the strategic issues
surrounding the cyber security of industrial control systems to be a strategic
issue?
3. How did the game shape your views regarding the immediate and longer-term
impacts of cyber attacks, and their evolution over time?
4. What do you consider to the intent of capable actors attacking ICS?
5. How will this attack likely manifest itself?
6. What information would you need to deal with the attack?
7. How would you obtain this information?
8. If it were in your remit, what would you do to protect ICS from cyber attack?
The four themes that emerged from the questionnaire were ‘Adversary Understand-
ing’, ‘Financial Priorities’, ‘Defensive Planning’, and ‘Network Understanding’. These
themes are discussed below.
A.3.1 Adversary Understanding
This was the strongest of the themes, cited in 26 sources, and with 92 references. The
theme encapsulated the participants’ understanding of the APT actor represented in the
SCIPS game. Five related sub-themes to the theme were apparent within the narrative,
those of attack ‘intent’, ‘impact’, ‘methods’, ‘lifecycle’, and ‘threat intelligence’.
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Attack Intent
Within intent there were two dimensions to the consideration of the attacker’s intent.
Firstly, there was the clear demonstration of cognisance of the strategic dimension of
an attack on critical national infrastructure:
“To force political change through disruption of public infrastructure”
“Ability to manipulate devices according to political or military conditions as
part of a wider strategic campaign’ ’
“Either corporate espionage or to have a wider political impact”
Secondly, there was an interrogative aspect of the intent consideration, where the
participants reflected on why the attack was occurring:
“What are their objectives? Why are they attacking us? Who are they?
What are they capable of?”
“What is the attacker’s goal? Service disruption or data exfiltration?”
Attack Impact
The intent, however, was intertwined with the impact of the attack. Inevitably, the
impact reflected the manifestation of the intent:
“Loss of control/view and availability of power generation/distribution sys-
tems”
“It can have a large scale effect on population and countries’ ability to func-
tion”
“to disrupt, damage or destroy ICS which will create panic, distrust in the
industry or government, as well as financial impedance”
Attack Methods
Attack methods described the participants’ understanding of the techniques employed
by APT actors, and how they would behave in an intrusion on an ICS network:
“This might involve (living off the land) using tools already available on the
targeted network. Such as compromising user without creating new ones.
Manipulating malicious traffic to look as normal, such as exfiltration using
DNS”
“ ‘Silently’. . . over time. Target vulnerabilities”
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Attack Lifecycle
Game participants reflected on their understanding of the adversary lifecycle, and its
efficacy to support the assessment of past, current, and future antagonistic courses of
action:
“It became apparent, as the game progressed, that the best way to defend was
to think where the next attack was going to be. Not just recreating previous
attacks”
“you can build up a hypothesis of what and where the attacker has been”
“Placed the threat in a logical framework following the phases of the attack
lifecycle”
“Showed the process of an attack and highlighted a longer-term plan is re-
quired to maintain a level of security”
Threat Intelligence
This discussed the exploitation of an understanding of the cyber threat landscape, and
its applicability to the network being defended.
“Intelligence on the threat actor”
“You can only be effective with the collection of relevant, accurate, and up
to date information about the threat”
“Participate in an ICS cyber intelligence programme in order to ensure de-
fensive activity is driven by relevant intelligence”
A.3.2 Network Understanding
The need to understand a network and its associated systems, as a prerequisite for
cyber defence, emerged as a strong theme, with 23 sources and 57 references. The
questionnaire respondents described this theme in two forms; ‘network baselining’ and
‘network monitoring data’.
Network Baselining
The sub-theme focused on creating a foundational understanding of recognised assets,
traffic flows, and behaviours, against which anomalies could be assessed:
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“Network baseline and information flows. Network ingress/egress points.
PLC/ICS process flows and critical points. Zone 0-5 boundaries and cross-
boundary information flows”
“How your ICS is configured? Normal ICS traffic. What are your vulnera-
bilities? How do you mitigate them? How do you detect them? What to do
next?”
“This attack requires a good understanding of the network, normal activities
and simple/minor diversion from normal must be investigated, i.e. a single
DNS query to an unusual domain”
Network Monitoring Data
Network understanding was strongly related to supporting incident response, but the
language of this sub-theme focused on the exploitation of information acquired from
sensors and logs. It discussed the use of such understanding in the pre-incident planning
stage, as well as during a network intrusion:
“From the game, I guess understanding your own network, awareness and
profiling traffic is vital to dealing with any attack”
“Any info relevant to the attack. What systems were affected? How were the
systems attacked?”
A.3.3 Defensive Planning
The requirement to proactively defend an ICS network, and plan ahead, emerged as a
theme that encompassed both ‘preparatory actions’, and the development of a ‘security
architecture’. The theme was apparent in 23 sources, with 46 references.
Preparatory Actions
Questionnaire respondents considered the need to plan ahead of a cyber incident, and
ensure that appropriate plans were in place to address such a situation:
“demonstrated the importance of planning defences in an integrated manner,
taking account of the interdependencies of control measures”
“It highlighted the need to strategically plan and adopt a long term approach,
as well as taking advantage of short term goals”
“By the time you have to react it is already too late”
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“I think early planning does make a big impact on the upcoming incident.
So many things we would have done in the earlier stages won’t work after
certain time because the enemy is already in and implementing those systems
is a waste of time and money”
Security Architecture
As many of the participants playing the game had a technical background, it is un-
surprising that a consideration of security architecture was discussed as a pre-incident
requirement:
“In an ideal world: Secure-by-design architecture”
“Limit access. Separation of the network. Defence in depth”
“Segment IT and OT networks”
A.3.4 Stakeholder Priorities
The priorities of the leadership within an organisation emerged as a theme, with three
sub-themes; ‘financial constraints’, ‘return on investment’, and ‘direction of investment’.
The subject was observed in 14 sources, with 22 references.
Financial Constraints
Participants recognised, many for the first time, the financial constraints imposed by
the necessity to maintain a viable, profitable business, and the limits this places on
cyber security investment:
“had not deeply considered financial balancing act required of executives”
“Increased awareness of budget constraints to directors”
“Didn’t realise how much of an impact the cost of implementing security
defence had on an organisation”
Return on Investment
In a similar vein, participants started to acknowledge the requirement to demonstrate
a return on security investments:
“Assess the risk in order to identify the best return on investment for money
spent”
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“Consider how long each prevention technique will take to deploy and what
might be the financial impact on the company”
Direction of Investment
Some participants acknowledged the value of using adversary understanding to direct
investment to mitigate the threats of cyber attack:
“Utilising expertise and investing in the right places”
“Spend wisely. Try to predict the worst attack and find a solution for it.
Find the vulnerability in the system and think from the attacker’s point of
view”
A.4 DMU Range Interviews, April 2017
A series of eight interviews were conducted with seven individuals, all of whom had
previous CDX experience. The interviews highlighted seven themes:
1. ‘Incident response training’
2. ‘Exercise management’
3. ‘Red team provision’
4. ‘Defensive operations’
5. ‘Threat intelligence’
6. ‘Cyber range quality’
7. ‘Network understanding’
Throughout this section, the names of the exercises that the interviewees have
been obfuscated. This does not detract from the accuracy or understanding of the
commentary.
A.4.1 Incident Response Training
The theme of incident response training emerged as the strongest theme from the in-
terviews, with five sources and 69 references. It encompassed the need for ‘adversary
training realism’, a ‘consistent toolkit’, time for ‘feedback and reflection’, the need for the
provision of a suitable ‘learning environment’, the advantages of ‘progressive training’,
and the use of ‘table-top exercises’.
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Adversary Training Realism
Interviewees discussed the requirement for adversary understanding to translate into a
realistic adversary that incident responders could train against:
“We don’t really train according to individual adversaries”
“we’ll go on an exercise and maybe it’s a case of them starting off with
hacktivists then evolves into an APT in that classic way that is always kind
of predictable, rather than having separate training periods where you discuss
a threat from X adversary”
“or if you had to defend against a particular adversary, what would your
priorities be etc?”
Consistent Toolkit
This sub-theme focused on the need to train as the team would respond in real life,
and the requirement to use the tools that they would have access to should an incident
occur:
“for example, have Cisco firewalls – we never train with Cisco firewalls..., so
it’s usually PFSense or Vyatta on exercises. So people are tested on different
tools to those we need in the real world, and it also increases the number of
tools people have to learn, and we already have overload on that”
“We got told to take our sensor array, which was based on SourceFire, En-
dace and Splunk. We turned up three days into the exercise, connected to
a network which was already compromised – badly compromised – and then
had to try and engineer-in an enterprise solution for a sensor array”
Training Reflection
Interviewees commented on the requirement for time to reflect on the events that have
unfolded within an exercise, to make sense of them, and adjust their behaviours as a
consequence:
“ It gives us an opportunity to go back and look at things like the logs and
see when that happened, what it looked like on the sensor. So then, from
a sensor perspective, see what it looked like if it happens again, potentially
write signatures for it, and stuff like that. And then also, from a Harden
perspective, what can we do to remediate against it should they come in?
What can we do to remediate to stop that data from being exfilled? What
can we put on the firewall, what can we do on the server?”
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“having that time to have a brief think in-between the stages of an attack and
how you’d defend each stage of that, has been the best learning experience.
Especially down a stream where we’re not given formal training, so it gives
us time to think, maybe do a bit of research in-between the stages”
Learning Environment
The interviewees commented on the learning environment at DMU, and drew compar-
isons to previous exercises:
“Whereas what we’re doing here is conducive to learning, no-one feels indi-
vidually at threat”
“This is probably very pink and fluffy, but I just wrote down on a piece
of paper this morning, part of the value of being here, in civvies, in an
environment which is comfortable and conducive to learning”
“I do think you could significantly improve individual’s abilities by putting
them in a more academic environment; a non-adversarial, mentored envi-
ronment”
Progressive Training
The sub-theme of incident response training discussed the need for a programme that
included individual training that develops skills through a series of progressively complex
scenarios:
“I don’t think skills is a massive thing. I mean keyboard skills can be taught.
The fundamental thing in anything within the cyber domain would be the
inquisitive and analytical thinking aspect. More the mental aspects. You
could have someone who’d sit and look at a computer screen and look at a
Squil output on a Security Onion, for example, and something would flag up
and go‘that looks bad’, and then move onto the next. Then you could have
the person that we want, that looks at it and goes ‘that doesn’t look right,
there something about that that I’m not happy with, right, I’m going to look
into that, why is this machine talking to that machine?’ It’s that inquisitive,
deep analytical thinking over the base computer skills that, I think, can be
taught”
“In an ideal world we would have a persistent range where we could train as
individuals, so that by the time you get to a high-level exercise you’re not
worrying about simple things like the syntax for specific commands, you’d
have learnt that in your individual training. But we’re kludging all that into
one opportunity to be on a range”
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“So, in general terms, we have been doing CT1 through to CT5 [collective
training levels 1 to 5] in one exercise, so we never get to train as individuals
or as a team before [the exercise]. We tend to be doing our individual and
team training on a CT4 or CT5 level exercise , so either an international or
national exercise, where it’s high tempo. Even if you’re not being formally
validated, there’s an understanding that it’s a test, and that it’s a reflection
on the capability or readiness of the team and the individual, which is not
ideal because we’ve not had prior opportunity to iron-out any issues, or even
to rehearse or exercise basic things”
“The CT1 all the way up to CT5 methodology still works really well; you
train as an individual, your individual skills, but then you do it in your small
teams, and then you add that together. Consequently it builds up towards
your big validation exercises”
Table-Top Exercises
In discussing options for incident response training, the applicability of table-top exer-
cises emerged:
“I think we could get a huge amount of value out of just table-topping and
just taking away all that technical expense issue and just discussing, verbally,
how you would deal with issues. It forces us to think, as well. Even in this
scenario today, we’ve got sucked straight into “are the sensors working?”,
it’s always the engineering issues that suck up the first few days or week, or
however long, of an exercise. If that was taken away and we were just speak-
ing in theory about how you would recognise and defend against particular
kinds of threats it would force us to focus on the theory, and a more rigorous
approach, and we could focus on documenting those lessons and putting them
into our SOPs, rather than always just going on an exercise and just fighting
through, and just trying to keep our heads above water, and then breathing
a sigh of relief and going home”
A.4.2 Exercise Management
All of the interviewees had experience of previous cyber exercises and reflected on the
issues they had encountered on these. The resultant theme had five sources, with
63 references. It comprised four sub-themes; ‘objectives’, ‘preparation’, ‘realism’, and
‘control’.
Training Objectives
The subject of exercise objectives was highlighted, as the interviewees had experience
unclear objectives in the past, with confusion over the training audience. This led to
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the perception that Blue Teams were never going to be put in a position where they
could adequately defend against Red Teams:
“Initially it was quite a hard concept to get used to because on my first one I
didn’t get that Blue Team’s set-up to lose. The network boys always find that
the network infrastructure that you’re given to defend is always inherently
weak”
“I think there’s quite often a perception that if you give too much intelligence
away, that’s helping the Blue Team too much”
“I think there’s different types of exercise here. I think with some of the
training you genuinely want a bit of Red versus Blue, where Red are following
their defined path and you are defending against it”
“So you’re put into that environment, yes, the attacks are escalating, but if
you’re not training toward a defined objective, how do you get there?”
Exercise Preparation
The exercise preparation sub-theme is closely associated with the consistent toolkit sub-
theme of the incident response training theme. Interviewees cited how the preparation of
exercises had not considered the requirement for the Blue Team to baseline the network
they were defending, or supply the tools necessary for their objectives:
“So [EXERCISE] was a case of we turned up about four or five days into
it, because of other training commitments, so there was no identify phase –
there was not an opportunity to baseline the network, to identify what should
be talking to what, and when we asked, that information wasn’t there. They
didn’t know. And yes, there’s a degree of that in reality, but not to the point
at which that they did it on that exercise. So you can’t defend that, because
you don’t know what you control, you don’t know what’s there, and then the
attacks were just coming in”
“Other exercise points; probably another point would be admin stuff lead-
ing up to deploying – there’s either not enough information, or we get in-
formation too late to act on it. For example, [EXERCISE], it’s probably
unavoidable because it’s international so we’re at the behest of our [INTER-
NATIONAL] partners’ decisions, but not only do we not often get to choose
and deploy our own tools, we don’t even know what tools we’re going to have
until we get there”
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Exercise Realism
For cyber exercises to be of benefit to incident responders, the interviewees commented
on the need for realism in terms of scenario. This included a discussion of which aspects
of a network they would realistically be able to change during an incident response:
“Not just a broad brush scenario, but a detailed J2 [intelligence] picture.
Quite often what we come up against is people thinking that an intelligence
picture means just a broad brush scenario, ‘oh, you’re in whatever country
doing whatever thing’, what they don’t understand is that the J2 picture
includes all the technical intelligence”
“So there’s always been that unrealistic aspect where we’ve had to make all
these network changes, and engage with these people, that either don’t exist
in reality or would not give you permission in reality. So it makes you wonder
what the point is, because what would you do in the real world?”
Exercise Control
The control of the exercise by the White Cell emerged as a strong sub-theme, with
interviewees highlighting the need for strong management of the exercise to deliver the
training objectives:
“those skills are deployed during the exercise in a controlled manner, and
in a manner that is consistent with the training needs, and with the overall
scenario”
“there’s a lack of a management layer that understands both the requirements
of the training serials and the Blue Teams, the training audience, and has
enough knowledge of Red Team activity that they can actually control it”
“There was also a conflict between the Red and Blue teams, in that, who was
the training audience? You can’t have Red and Blue training at equal pace,
because as soon as one gains an advantage over the other, where does that
go? The Red Team, by definition, need to get in, but it may take months,
well you can’t run it - so you need to condense it. So that involves some
sort of shortcut somewhere. Well that then steps against the Blue doesn’t it?
And so it doesn’t work, and they were quite naive in thinking that it would
all work harmoniously, and that Blue would be able to kick them out, and
Red would have to get in again”
A.4.3 Red Team Provision
The provision of a Red Team for cyber exercises, and their rules of engagement, was
an emotive issue for the interviewees. The theme encompassed the ‘discipline’ of the
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Red Team, their ‘capability’, and the nature of how they provide ‘feedback’ to the Blue
Team. It was cited in four sources, with 33 references.
Red Team Discipline
The sub-theme of Red Team discipline encompassed both the positive and negative
aspects of Red Team behaviour, and the requirement for them to play within agreed
rules of engagement.
On the positive side, interviewees commented on:
“Red Team activity was scripted to match the intelligence function, which
means that training audience getting realistic, managed serials”
“Because there was a lot of build-up, we were still quite a new team, that
the training objectives that were written were very clear, the attacks were all
pre-planned, and at the end of every day there was a shotval [evaluation and
reflection period] with the Red Team”
“But at least those exercises were controlled from the perspective of the Red
Team, in that there was an OPFOR, and they were doing defined things in
order to meet a certain scenario”
However, on the negative side, interviewees cited the following experiences:
“The Red Team weren’t managed very well, I don’t think. They were almost
allowed to go rogue”
“Because there was no-one reigning them in, they weren’t staying within
their arcs [agreed limits of responsibility], and were doing things they really
shouldn’t be doing. Because there was no control of the Red Team that then
meant that they were able to go and do it. Not so much the guy sat at the
keyboard’s fault, there was no overarching layer of control to reign people in”
“They lost control of the Red Team pretty early on, and I couldn’t understand
why they allowed that to happen. That’s a command and control thing.
So they couldn’t control what they were doing, there was no pre-scripted
methodology, there were no defined objectives, and there were no hard lines
either. There was no ‘once you get on the DC don’t destroy it, but do this
to indicate you own it’. There were so many things they could do, but what
they were doing was destroying everything, and then, ’oh no, that takes eight
hours to rebuild it’ ”
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Red Team Capability
This sub-theme encompassed the capabilities of a Red Team, including their availability,
skillset, and agreed attack playbooks:
“It would have been helpful to have a persistent OPFOR, or a persistent set
of SOPs that applies to OPFOR, which means that there is a catalogue of
skillsets for Red Teams, and we can call upon that in a consistent manner,
and say that for this exercise we want a Red Team that can do X, Y and
Z skills to X, Y and Z level, and then those skills are deployed during the
exercise in a controlled manner, and in a manner that is consistent with the
training needs, and with the overall scenario”
“At the moment, if we do that ourselves, and we tried it, it’s very much
‘script kiddy’ because we don’t concentrate on the same sort of skills. People
say ‘you’re Blue Team you can do Red Team’ – I disagree entirely. It’s a
completely different point of view, I think, in the way you look at your net-
work. A different set of skills really. It absolutely is. I want good network
engineers, whereas a good pen tester doesn’t actually have to be a good engi-
neer himself. He just needs to know how he can exploit stuff and understand
more coding and underlying structures rather than understanding what he
needs to make the service work”
“Also, the threat that comes against us is properly defined against real world
stuff, so it’s not this uncontrolled Red Team penetration-test type stuff, where
just because it’s possible from one aspect, it doesn’t mean is actually going to
be deployed. The Americans are quite good at that in the way they get into
character for that piece, even down to little fragments of the code modified
to make it look like a state actor, and we’ve not had that level of detail in
the UK”
Red Team Feedback
Interviewees discussed the requirement for the Red Team to provide feedback to the
Blue Team, so that the Blue Team had the opportunity to learn from their experiences.
In particular, the comments focused on the need for a shotval, a military term that
describes a period evaluation and reflection period delivered immediately after the end
of a day’s play on the exercise range. They also commented on the benefit of Purple
Teaming (a combination of Red and Blue), where the Red Team actually demonstrates
their attacks to the Blue Team as part of the feedback process:
“We didn’t have any shotval wash-up with the Red Team players, so it almost
felt like we were sailing into the wind. We didn’t know where we were going”
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“Because there was a lot of build-up, we were still quite a new team, that
the training objectives that were written were very clear, the attacks were
all pre-planned, and at the end of every day there was a shotval with the
Red Team. That enabled us to see where our strengths were, but also where
our weaknesses were, so where we missed things like data being exfilled, but
actually we’d spotted reverse-shells and blocked those and caused the Red
Team to re-engage another route into the network”
“It enabled us to see, almost to ratify, what we’d done. So the way it worked
was we broke down into our individual teams and explained what we saw,
what we though happened, how we think something had manifested, and our
immediate actions, and then the Red Team would basically talk about what
they did, what we’d actually spotted, what we’d blocked. It was almost like
having a marking guide there at the end of an exam. Your being put to the
test, at the end of the day, and then to not know how well you’ve done on
that test is, well, you’ve never walked out of an exam and not known whether
you’ll get the answers at some point”
“But there’s also a really good place for the Purple Teaming where the Red
Team show you how they do stuff, because their job is to get through with
penetration tests, but the way they see the network and the way we see it is
very different, and so understanding that just because they’ve done a certain
action doesn’t mean we’ll see it without looking for it, and the way that could
be presented is in an event log, or a single stream of data within a packet
capture, that you wouldn’t necessarily think of”
A.4.4 Defensive Operations
The defensive operations theme encapsulated the ‘roles and responsibilities’, ‘commu-
nications’, and ‘situational awareness’ of the incident response team. It was cited in
four sources, with 16 references.
Communications
The ability to maintain effective communications during a network intrusion, where
there are multiple concurrent defensive activities in progress, was seen as essential.
Interviewees discussed the need for such interaction:
“Something we found quite useful in terms of maintaining situational aware-
ness for the whole team outside this [the DMU April 2017 exercise] was
having a collaborative chat group within our team, so we’d have our own
collaborative working space essentially, which we could use so that any con-
versations we were having even internally within our own sub-team, as op-
posed to having them sat immediately next to you, you’d actually type all
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that information up – specific things such as IPs, and what you though was
occurring, so you’d end up having a log. But also, anyone else in the team
who might have been out of the room for five minutes, or notable to listen
in, would be able to visibly see that. In that regard, not only would you be
able to speak to people, but there would be a log”
Roles and Responsibilities
Another opinion that emerged was the need for clearly defined roles and responsibilities
within an incident response team, and the requirement for effective leadership:
“Slimming is down to one word, it’s ‘leadership’. The breakout of that is
by having defined roles in the team, and equally even in small teams of
10 individuals or so, having a defined team leader (TL), but also sub-team
leaders, and in front of them, analysts, when something of interest is found
that should be immediately flagged-up to the sub-team leader, and in turn,
the team leader if it’s deemed to be interesting. And the TL probably having
an overarching view of that, possibly assisted by a watchkeeper who helps him
mark his own homework and keep a record of what’s going on”
Situational Awareness
Underpinning the whole of the Defensive Operations theme was the requirement for
situational awareness, and how this was maintained. It included not only the techniques
to maintain situational awareness, but also how the layout of the room used by the
incident response team affects such cognisance:
“Another very useful thing to do is every hour or two, force everyone to have
hands-off keyboard and the TL or watchkeeper if necessary, would point at
individual respective teams and they would brief quickly what below was going
on. Very often we would find that two teams that were working in the same
room, suddenly someone would join the dots all of a sudden and realise that
actually they were working on the same thing. Arguably, every hour or so,
just that five minutes to chance have a chat rather than people going down
a certain, specific tasking can be very useful”
“You don’t need to overload the team with unnecessary information because
there’s always going to be a wealth. If you’re having an ‘around the table’
every hour or so, each speaker is giving to the rest of the team exactly what
they need to know”
“Not only do we need to maintain our own situational awareness, but we
can help others. In that regard, actually having integrated threat intelligence
253
A. Cook A.4. DMU RANGE INTERVIEWS, APRIL 2017
personnel on the team is very useful, as opposed to just not quite so qualified
customers who can potentially ingest that intelligence to a degree, although I
would argue less effectively than actually being able to produce it. So actually
having credible threat intelligence analysts who can actually look at the work
our team is doing, understand out of all the vast array of network activity
and information you have, what specific elements will actually be useful to
other teams and other members”
“So what we find is there’s a couple of factors that will affect how infor-
mation passes around the team and overall situation awareness. The first
one is where everyone’s sitting. So if you look at [INTERNATIONAL EX-
ERCISE], everyone will sit facing each other in a circle [open square]. The
layout of that room [the room at DMU used for the April 2017 exercise] is all
these little islands, and you’ll find that the people will naturally drop into the
macro problem, they’ll start looking at their logs, they’ll work on the Splunk
server, but they won’t talk across each other”
A.4.5 Adversary Understanding
Within the context of understanding the threat actors that face an organisation, the
sub-theme of ‘threat intelligence’ was discussed, with four sources and 17 references.
Threat Intelligence
The theme of threat intelligence described the use of threat intelligence as an element
of adversary understanding to improve the effectiveness of incident response teams:
“Many things affect cyber situational awareness, and I supposed the overar-
ching wording or terminology would be that ‘threat intelligence’ is absolutely
critical to maintaining cyber situational awareness. Not just on your own
network, but beyond. Essentially that’s the sharing of information”
“So actually having credible threat intelligence analysts who can actually look
at the work our team is doing, understand out of all the vast array of network
activity and information you have, what specific elements will actually be
useful to other teams and other members”
A.4.6 Cyber Range Quality
The interviews highlighted the dependency of cyber exercises on the quality of the ranges
on which they they operate. The theme was cited in four sources, with 12 references. It
focused on two distinct sub-themes, those of ‘range stability’ and ‘range discrimination’.
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Range Stability
The subject of range stability covered the reliability of the cyber range, and minimising
the downtime that resulted from a lack of testing or resilience:
“Yes, they had some issues with reliability, which seems to a common feature
of all cyber exercises. I don’t know how we get rid of that”
“it’s always the engineering issues that suck up the first few days or week,
or however long, of an exercise”
Range Discrimination
The sub-theme of range discrimination refered to the consequences of using a heavily
virtualised architecture, and the inability of the Blue Team to determine whether char-
acteristics of the network were as a result of a network intrusion, or simply a feature of
the infrastructure:
“the layers of the matrix that you dive into because your virtualised infras-
tructure and range issues, which are very difficult to get around without
spending a lot of money”
“I have done another exercise, and there’s always going to be a ‘rangeism’,
there’s always going to be something that, you think, well that’s unfair or
whatever”
A.4.7 Network Understanding
The defensive analysis theme, in this instance, focused on the ‘network terrain analysis’.
It was cited in three sources, with five references.
Network Terrain Analysis
Interviewees highlighted the need to proactively assess the valuable network assets that
would be attractive to an attacker:
“and that evolves into integrating a genuine Cyber IPE [ICS-CDTP] key
terrain analysis”
“Also, having a good network understanding, in terms of the vulnerabilities,
the way traffic moves around the network, will help the teams who are re-
mediating to prioritise. There might be specific points on your network that
are particularly vulnerable. If you have an understanding of the potential
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enemy’s intent as well, clearly that helps you identify which parts of the net-
work they’re more likely to be targeting, so when you’re going through your
remediation process in terms of mapping left and right [of the Kill-Chain]
and the intent behind the hostile activity, while you might see a random IP
on a random box potentially, if it seems indicative of lateral movement, log-
ically, as opposed to trying to look across the whole network to see if they’ve
move around, you can start triaging and prioritising in certain areas that
they may be trying to move to next”
A.5 Post-Exercise Questionnaire, April 2017
Questionnaires were completed at the end of the week-long experiment at DMU in April
2017. It comprised SCIPS and a CDX, and was participated in by the same sample who
completed the pre-exercise questionnaire from Section A.2. The responses discussed the
participants understanding of ICS, APT actors, and the nature of SCIPS and the CDX.
The post-exercise questionnaire posed 13 questions:
1. Describe your understanding of the key elements of the cyber threat to industrial
control systems.
2. Describe your understanding of the tactics, techniques and procedures of a nation-
state cyber actor intent on attacking industrial control systems.
3. Describe your role within the Blue Team, and how the behaviours of nation-state
actors would influence your activities during an incident response?
4. If you were to deploy to an industrial facility to defend its network from a malicious
actor, how would you prioritise the defence of its assets? How would your approach
provide protection from an attack?
5. Should any aspects of your standard operating procedures be revised as a result
of this exercise, and if so, how?
6. How did the use SCIPS game and the integration of the same attack scenario into
the range exercise influence your training?
7. Has the constrained rules of engagement for the Red Team been of benefit you
your training, and if so, how?
8. Ignoring any issue with the range, with hindsight, if you were to repeat this exer-
cise again, how would you change your response to the scenario and the attacker?
9. Which areas of this exercise have been of value to the effectiveness of your team?
10. In which areas do you think this exercise has been of value to you personally?
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11. Have you identified any training gaps as a result of this week, and if so, what are
they?
12. How does this exercise compare to previous cyber exercises you have participated
in?
13. How would you suggest we could improve this training programme?
A total of 25 questionnaires were received. These resulted in eight key themes; ‘ad-
versary understanding’, ‘defensive operations’, ‘defensive planning’, ‘incident response
training’, ‘exercise management’, ‘cyber range quality’, ‘red team provision’, and ‘stake-
holder priorities’.
A.5.1 Adversary Understanding
The adversary understanding theme focused on the ‘attack lifecycle’ and the ‘attack
methods’ employed. A total of 24 sources and 42 references were identified.
Attack Lifecycle
The subject of the adversary lifecycle discussed its efficacy to help predict attack be-
haviours:
“By using the cyber kill chain it will prevent and provide protection as this
is how the attacker operates”
“The SCIPS game followed the stages of the exercise very closely, so by
understanding what technology was required for each round of the game, we
could then understand where to focus our efforts during each stage of the
exercise”
“ At the different stages of the attack once the Red Team where known to
be somewhere on the network – you realise that at each stage after how the
consequences would affect the next stage beyond”
Attack Methods
The sub-theme of attack methods considered the ways and means by which an attack
would be executed, and as a consequence, how this understanding would shape defensive
actions:
“The attacker would have to have done their research and realise the conse-
quences of what they were about to do, so if their intent was to disrupt a
nation state’s infrastructure, this kind of attack would make sense. If it is
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just a ‘script-kiddie’ type of hacker who was just looking at what they can
find ‘for kicks’ they might not get as far (but may, by chance, due to poor
security infrastructure with respect to cyber intelligence)”
“Look for suspicious traffic in ports we cannot close or systems we cannot
block e.g. port 80, 53, DMZ (web server, email server)”
A.5.2 Defensive Operations
The theme of defensive actions was cited in 25 sources with 55 references. It concen-
trated on four sub-themes; ‘command and control’, ‘operational priorities’, ‘communi-
cations’, and ’operating procedures’.
Command and Control
This focused on the impact of poor leadership during exercise, and incident response in
general:
“Designated leadership, oftentimes when people were lost/confused/doing their
own thing”
“I think I would implement a central command and control team to have
overall situational awareness”
“ Too many people shouting out identified ‘threats’ with only a cursory in-
vestigation into that incident having being done at that point”
Operational Priorities
The sub-theme of operational priorities discussed how an incident response team would
determine where to focus resources and effort:
“Prioritise defence based on commander’s mission, critical assets and valu-
able assets, and likely enemy intent drawn from threat intelligence. Solution
may not defend all, but would defend most critical assets”
“Based on a discussion with the business area regarding their critical systems
and services, and including the critical network and systems and hardware
that support it. Then work outwards from the critical systems towards the
network boundary to try and define zones of security thorough segmentation,
privilege control, and protection devices”
“Critical business processes would take priority”
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Communications
Questionnaire respondents commented on the need for effective communications be-
tween team members:
“Communicate more regularly within the different areas of the team”
“Keep responses simple and record them”
“better information flow and logging of activity”
Operating Procedures
The sub-theme of the requirement for clear, detailed, SOPs to guide incident responders
arose:
“It would be advisable to have a clear, concise ‘threat analysis’ SOP, some-
thing easy to follow, especially useful to new members of the team”
“We have identified some particular detailed SOP points to amend/create”
“SOPs evolve every time they are used. Points have been added to a number
of SOPs during this exercise”
A.5.3 Defensive Planning
Within the defensive planning theme, four sub-themes emerged; ‘preparatory actions’,
‘security architecture’, ‘ICS understanding’, and ‘triage priorities’. It was cited in 22
sources, with 23 references.
Preparatory Activities
This discussed those activities that would better prepare an organisation for a cyber
attack:
“We would baseline our systems more thoroughly before attacks commenced”
“A better baselining of assets and having a greater awareness of OS’s and
applications”
“Patching systems. Set-up firewall logs straight away”
259
A. Cook A.5. POST-EXERCISE QUESTIONNAIRE, APRIL 2017
Security Architecture
A description of the elements of an overall security architecture that would improve an
organisation’s security posture, and in particular, network segmentation:
“Segment the network better to make it harder to get to the ICS”
“Segregate the ICS network from the IT network”
ICS Understanding
The requirement to accurately understand the nature of ICS was highlighted as a key
defensive planning requirement:
“There are many threats to ICS, such as external threats (politically mo-
tivated, industrial espionage etc.), internal threats (employees with an axe
to grind), human error, security challenges, securing ICS networks. Most
ICS were built prior to cyber threats existing and therefore not designed with
built-in security controls. Goals would be operational disruption, physical
damage, theft of intellectual property”
“Systems are old and not everyone understands how they work, so a simple
network scan can cause them to fall over. Due to availability being the
most important and not all data flows being known, it is hard to implement
security rules and procedures.”
“With many of the ICS being legacy equipment and unable to be shutdown
and restarted, it brings new challenges”
Triage Priorities
A key element of triage priorities was seen as system availability:
“The key element is the availability of the system. This restricts the action
that Blue Team can make, providing a unique challenge”
“Threat to availability is more critical for ICS than for standard computer
networks. Threat actors include: nation-states, individuals, criminals, po-
litical/activist groups (all with varying levels of sophistication). Any of the
above may seek to steal data, modify data or deny services from/of ICS”
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A.5.4 Incident Response Training
The theme of incident response training was cited in 16 sources and 21 references. It
included the need for a ‘learning environment’, a focus on ‘training structure and pace’,
time for ‘feedback and reflection’, and the advantages of ‘progressive training’.
Learning Environment
A clear sub-theme of Incident Response Training was the nature of training environment,
and its conduciveness to learning:
“Good to work in an academic, non-military environment, as this promotes
learning”
“All areas have been of value as a lot of us are new and this is a far better
way to learn than self-study or non-real-time events”
“specific ‘arcs of fire’ from the Red Team really helped a structured defence
strategy, and better understanding”
Training Structure and Pace
Linked to the nature of the learning environment, the structure and pace of the training
emerged as a consistent narrative:
“Slow pace of Red Team activity. Being told about the Red Team activity at
the end of each stage”
“The pace is much better. It allows for a greater learning environment”
“The staged approach has allowed a better learning experience”
Training Reflection
Experiment participants also commented on the feedback and periods of reflection across
SCIPS and the CDX:
“The visual feedback was brilliant”
“non-judgemental, structured learning environment. Sensible pace and reg-
ular discussions/debriefs. Collaboration with new individuals and academia
enriches our knowledge and understanding”
“it has allowed us to look at all stages of the attack cycle. It has also been
helpful for improving team cohesiveness and internal information flows”
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Progressive Training
Incident response training reiterated the need for a series of progressively complex sce-
narios:
“able to focus in a progressive way on each phase of the attack cycle”
“Knowing which phase of the attack we were about to face at each stage, as
opposed to a set range window with a small scenario update each day”
A.5.5 Exercise Management
The management of CDXs emerged as a strong theme, with 25 sources and 75 refer-
ences. It encompassed ‘exercise objectives’ in terms of positive outcomes, and ‘exercise
duration’, with a focus on requests to extend the exercise execution window.
Exercise Duration
Exercise participants, whilst apparently enjoying the exercise, felt that greater training
benefit could have been achieved if a longer exercising period was adopted:
“More time to develop stages and not rush”
“ Make it longer so we have more time to learn the range. We could come
the week before to help build the range so we understand our network better”
“Longer time period for all (2 weeks would be great)”
Exercise Objectives
Participants reflected that the exercise had clear training objectives that delivered a
positive learning outcome:
“This exercise had massive educational value as it enabled Blue Team to have
an insight on how some of the Red Team activities would look like”
“this was a very good exercise with much better training value. The exercise
was, in my view, Blue Team focused, not just how good the Red Team is.
Work and getting a better understanding of each stage of the kill chain en-
hanced our understanding of the required procedures in security/defending a
network”
“Better, as didn’t just get ‘smashed’ by Red Team”
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A.5.6 Cyber Range Quality
Feedback from participants described issues with the range. Their comments continued
the two sub-themes; ‘range stability’, ‘range discrimination’, and introduced ‘activity
visualisation’. It was cited in 15 sources with 16 references.
Range Discrimination
The requirement to understand the nature of the range was reiterated:
“Accurate network diagram. Documented configuration”
“Provide us with a network diagram, password sheets and other assorted
information prior to attending so we can hit the ground running”
Range Stability
The comments on rang stability largely referred to period of remediation on the network
as a result of a power outage:
“ensure the range is completely working without issue, and make it longer so
we can cover more training areas”
“Test stability of range more prior to exercise”
Activity Visualisation
Participants requested the ability to record and replay attack traffic, to allow review
and reflection, to aid learning:
“watching a video of the screen so the traffic can be matched up might be
useful”
“Also, some sort of video replay of what the Red Team have done would be
beneficial”
A.5.7 Red Team Provision
The provision of a Red Team for cyber exercises, their ‘discipline’, frequency of ‘feedback’
to the Blue Team, and their ‘rules of engagement’ continued in the commentary. The
theme was cited in 25 sources, with 37 references.
263
A. Cook A.5. POST-EXERCISE QUESTIONNAIRE, APRIL 2017
Red Team Discipline
Feedback from participants focused on the benefits of the discipline of the Red Team
on the exercise at DMU, as compared to previous exercises they had experienced:
“The exercise was, in my view, Blue Team focused, not just how good the
Red Team is”
“Undisciplined Red Team activity (on other exercises) is not only not useful,
but actually destructive”
“From experience, cyber exercises seem to be a show-off of how good the Red
Team is”
Red Team Feedback
Participants considered the feedback provided by the Red Team to the Blue Team on
the exercise at DMU:
“Each phase then concludes with feedback so Blue Team know if their actions
had an effect (good or bad)”
“Very good pace, very good feedback from Exercise Lead and Red Team”
“The pace and explanation from the Red Team each day as to which actions
they took was very useful”
Rules of Engagement
The constrained rules of engagement for the Red Team on the DMU exercise were
reflected upon by the participants:
“Usually the Red Team will go out of scope or advance too quickly for any
benefit to be gained. The constrained rules of engagement (ROE) for the Red
Team allowed us to gain more from the exercise by understanding more at
each phase”
“The constraint of the Red Team was the key component in slowing down
the required Blue Team response. This added a level of proactiveness and
learning to the activity, rather than being behind the curve and therefore the
exercise becoming a purely reactive activity”
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“This ensured learning outcomes, rather than just a survival mentality. Split-
ting the exercise into discrete, identified phases enabled us to focus on un-
derstanding particular methodologies, rather than worrying about everything
at once, which dilutes training value. Regular wash-ups between phases were
also very useful to check understanding before moving on. This controlled
exercise has given us more learning value in a week than many less-controlled
scenarios over longer periods. Understanding and learning has also improved
morale and motivation – the intangible factors which are too often overlooked
and which have an important impact on operational effectiveness”
A.5.8 Stakeholder Priorities
The priorities of the leadership within an organisation again emerged as a theme, this
time with two sub-themes; ‘financial constraints’ and ‘strategic viewpoint’. The subject
was observed in 17 sources, with 17 references.
Strategic Viewpoint
Participants discussed how SCIPS, in particular, shaped their understanding of the
strategic issues surrounding cyber security:
“The SCIPS game gave a high-level understanding of how security is viewed
by COs [commanding officers] and company directors”
“Good baseline for less experienced members on how cyber warfare could
occur at a strategic level”
Financial Priorities
Additionally, participants reflected on the financial constraints that they experienced
playing SCIPS:
“It helped to see cyber security from the business owner’s perspective – why
they wouldn’t want to spend money, make changes or increase their risk”
A.6 Incident Response TTX, June 2017
Questionnaires were completed at the end of one-day TTX with 12 participants from the
purposeful sample (CPT), that took the scenario from SCIPS and used it to frame the
experiment. The intent was to assess the coverage of operating procedures within the
team’s defensive operations. As such, the responses focused on this theme. A post-TTX
questionnaire asked five questions:
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1. What is your role in the team?
2. How did the TTX influence your situational awareness and communications within
the team?
3. Which of your existing processes require updating as a result of this TTX?
4. How has the TTX changed your comprehension of your team operations?
5. How will you change your individual processes as a result of this TTX?
A total of 12 questionnaires were received.
A.6.1 Defensive Operations
As the TTX focused on operating procedures, it is perhaps unsurprising that the re-
sponses focused purely on this theme. It was cited in 12 sources, with 47 references.
It encompassed ‘communications’, ‘information flow’, ‘roles and responsibilities’, ‘situ-
ational awareness’, and ‘operating procedures’.
Communications
The TTX participants emphasised the need for effective communications:
“It has highlighted parts we take for granted that we perceive people should
already be aware of – how ‘things’, ‘tasks’ are carried out. Also that we need
to feed or record all events so they can be correlated for the bigger picture”
“Talking through the process helps to reinforce what needs to be done, and
ensures everyone knows what is happening. Communication is key!”
“highlighted the fact that all teams must feed one another to fill the big picture
which will allow for full team understanding”
Information Flow
The TTX highlighted shortcomings in the informations flows around the team:
“my comprehension has increased, especially around the gap analysis and
information flow”
“Better understanding of sub-team information dependencies”
“It has further solidified the importance of information flows both to and
from the J2 [intelligence] cell, to inform actions for all sub-teams and to
provide J2 with the information to perform some actual in-house analysis
on our own data and incidents”
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Roles and Responsibilities
Questionnaire respondents highlighted an increased understanding of team roles and
responsibilities at the end of the TTX:
“It has clarified who sits under what team and how they are likely to operate
in an operational/exercise environment”
“Within Hunt we have identified that on the initial ‘Find and Analyse’ phase
it would be more effective to work with the Harden team to baseline/enu-
merate the network to help update/validate the IPE [ICS-CDTP] faster, so
we can fully understand our environment quicker, to get on with the Hunt
phase”
“how the other teams link into the bigger picture and what they need to do”
Situational Awareness
SA again emerged as a sub-theme. In particular, the CPT Team Leader and sub-team
leads commented on the need to maintain SA:
“Has made me think a great deal more as to what the processes should be. I
will need to have oversight on all areas, as well as the big picture, and ensure
that communications up and down happen regularly to keep an all-informed
net”
“While I understand the basic needs of J2 [intelligence] to direct activity,
the TTX has helped to really understand the value of J2 during the initial
UNDERSTAND phase of a deployment”
Operating Procedures
As the focus of the TTX was to drive-out the detail of the team’s operating procedures,
it emerged as a strong sub-theme, and resulted in the scoping of seven new standard
operating procedures:
“Our SOPs [standard operating procedure] are massively outdated and mostly
unfit for purpose -> the new seven consolidated SOPs will be much more
appropriate and useful for new teams starting up”
“We knew we had many SOP gaps, and many of them were documented, but
this has provided a formalisation of gap analysis, and offered a structure for
the leadership to use in order to prioritise future work”
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“Several newly identified SOP gaps. Focus more on standardisation and
repeatability of processes. Regularly reassess progress in SOP/team devel-
opment and demand formal acknowledgement of progress and outstanding
gaps going forward. Treat situational awareness as a function with SOP in
its own right, rather than as a part of other functional areas. More emphasis
on developing management (OC) [officer commanding] SOPs”
“Fill-in the many obvious gaps. As a new TL, I would not know my role
completely by following the in-place paperwork. The SOPs need looking at,
rewritten in a way that someone with limited knowledge and experience can
follow”
A.7 SCIPS - DCO MST Programme, November 2017
The experiment comprised three, one-week training sessions, with each session includ-
ing playing SCIPS. Thirty-six (36) participants attended over the three weeks, whose
experience was characterised as 30 with no ICS knowledge, five novices, and only one
with significant ICS understanding.
A total of 36 questionnaire responses were received, answering the following eight
questions:
1. Before playing that game, what was your understanding of industrial control sys-
tems did you have?
2. How did you articulate the attack activities you identified to your team?
3. How did the game shape your views regarding the immediate and longer-term
impacts of cyber attacks, and their evolution over time?
4. What do you consider to the intent of capable actors attacking ICS?
5. How will this attack likely manifest itself?
6. What information would you need to deal with the attack?
7. How would you obtain this information?
8. If it were in your remit, what would you do to protect ICS from cyber attack?
Four themes emerged from the responses; ‘adversary understanding’, ‘defensive
planning’, ‘network understanding ’, and ‘stakeholder priorities’.
A.7.1 Adversary Understanding
This was again the strongest of the themes, cited in 35 sources, and with 118 references.
The theme encapsulated the participants understanding of the APT actor represented
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in the SCIPS game. Seven related sub-themes to the theme were apparent within
the theme, those of attack ‘intent’, ‘impact’, ‘methods’, ‘lifecycle’, ‘courses of action’,
‘capability’, and ‘threat intelligence’.
Attack Intent
The intent theme discussed the strategic goals of the antagonist, including how this
intent may be intended to apply wider political pressure by an asymmetric adversary:
“Intent was to cause instability to the country via the means of power loss
and media backlash”
“Political coercion on the bigger scale, however, also a show of force from a
below-peer potential enemy”
“To disrupt UK infrastructure to apply political pressure to remove the UK
from operating in the area”
Attack Impact
The impact of the attack reflected the manifestation of the antagonists actions in the
SCIPS game, specifically the impact on electric power generation:
“Physical loss of power eventually”
“It made me more aware of how an attack can snowball over time”
“Attack the things required to produce electricity”
Attack Methods
Attack methods described the participants’ understanding of the techniques employed
by APT actors, and how they would behave in an intrusion into an ICS network. They
included the initial attack vector through to lateral movement and wider impact, linking
this sub-theme strongly to the adversary lifecycle:
“First find information about your network, find weaknesses, then expose
them to penetrate deeper and gain more control“
“Worked out spearphishing would be a large risk factor”
“Dropping malware onto the computer and branching out using peer-to-peer
connections”
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Attack Lifecycle
This sub-theme reviewed the game participants use of the adversary lifecycle and Purdue
Model to assess the attacker’s progress through a network:
“It showed the linear way in which attacks progress”
“By traversing through the levels of the model, as well as the adversary life-
cycle analysis”
“In terms of the Purdue Model and attack chain position”
Adversary Courses of Action
The assessment of the possible courses of action an adversary could pursue whilst on
an ICS network is inherently linked to the use of the adversary lifecycle. However, this
sub-theme emerged as a distinct element within overall adversary understanding:
“Trying to figure out where the attacker was and trying to plan. What to do
next to prevent the attacker from damaging the network and infrastructure”
“To plan several steps ahead to try and prevent incidents”
“The game makes you think a lot more about what the hackers have access
to currently and where they are likely to go next”
Adversary Capability
In discussing the capability of the adversary, the experiment participants differentiated
between intent and capability:
“The level of attacking team (previous experience, attributed attacks etc.)”
“A full understanding of the triad of capability (skill set), intent (on network
and ground effect), and ground (network)”
“Just because they have the capability doesn’t prove malicious intent”
Threat Intelligence
This sub-theme discussed the exploitation of using intelligence to shape network defence
activities.
“Intelligence feeds, news, social media”
“Receiving intelligence on enemy”
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A.7.2 Defensive Planning
Defensive planning, in this instance, focused on ‘defensive triage priorities’, ‘preparatory
activities’, and ‘security architecture’. It was observed in 32 sources, with 57 references.
Triage Priorities
The participants of the SCIPS game highlighted the need to assess the network under
defence to determine the likely targets of interest to the attacker:
“Prioritise what is immediately needed and what can wait”
“Prioritisation of system defences is important, but the need for immediate
defence is imperative”
“It brings to bear the meaning of prioritisation and the long-term impact
of triaging based on the services that are more important in relation to the
posed risks”
Preparatory Activities
The pre-incident preparatory process emerged as a sub-theme of the defensive planning
theme:
“Mitigation is better than reaction”
“Understand that there are limits to what you can do and you’ll probably be
successful in some areas, so put procedures in place to deal with that”
Security Architecture
Participants of the SCIPS game highlighted the need for a robust security architecture
as an sub-theme of the overall defensive planning process:
“Ring fence our assets and capabilities with layer of security”
“Harden external/internal borders. Segregate ICS/OT levels. Deploy robust
IDS/AV. Implement effective reporting procedures”
“Defence-in-depth”
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A.7.3 Network Understanding
Understanding the network being defended, emerged with 22 sources and 43 references.
The questionnaire respondents predominately focused on ‘network baselining’ and ‘net-
work monitoring data’.
Network Baselining
This sub-theme focused on creating a foundational understanding of recognised assets,
traffic flows, and behaviours, against which anomalies could be assessed:
“Accurate information about network and full vulnerability scan of systems”
“[with] hindsight the order in which we implemented the defence was wrong.
Highlighted the need for a full understanding of the network processes and
functions”
“Knowledge of the network would be vital”
Network Monitoring Data
Network understanding was related to the exploitation of information acquired from
sensors and logs, in the minds of the participants:
“You would have to monitor the networks and look for traces left behind”
“Source and destinations in order to determine where they are and what box
they are operating from”
A.7.4 Stakeholder Priorities
The implications and constraints of an organisation’s expenditure on cyber security
emerged as a theme, with 12 sources, and 12 references in the Financial Constraints
sub-theme:
Financial Constraints
“It gave a deeper understanding how money is a large aspect of cyber defence”
“Shaped towards CEO stakeholders, and how they are impacted monetarily”
“Balance of spending money due to the reflection on shares / business part-
ners”
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A.8 TTX - DCO MST Programme, November 2017
The experiment comprised the same period as the Section A.7, with three, one-week
training sessions. Each session including an incident response TTX that simulated the
first three days of a major incident. Two additional participants joined the TTX after
the SCIPS game had been played, increasing the overall number to 38
A total of 38 questionnaire responses were received, answering the following five
questions:
1. What is your role in the team?
2. How did the TTX influence your situational awareness and communications within
the team?
3. Which of your existing processes require updating as a result of this TTX?
4. How has the TTX changed your comprehension of your team operations?
5. How will you change your individual processes as a result of this TTX?
Four themes emerged from the responses; ‘adversary understanding’, ‘defensive
operations’, ‘network understanding’, ‘defensive planning’.
A.8.1 Adversary Understanding
Understanding the adversary again emerged as a theme, with 13 sources and 17 refer-
ences. It encompassed ‘attack intent’ and ‘attack lifecycle’.
Attack Intent
Attack intent focused on considering what the antagonist was trying to achieve, rather
than simply reacting to observed network activities:
“Focusing more on the intent rather than getting sucked into the initial find-
ings”
“developed my understanding of the importance of situational awareness and
especially the need to understand the intent of the adversary”
Attack Lifecycle
The use of adversary lifecycle modelling allowed the participants to think about the
attacker’s next steps:
“think what would the attacker do next to prevent a further attack”
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“Be less reactive, but predict what the adversary will do next. Take into
consideration CARVER matrix”
A.8.2 Defensive Operations
Defensive operations was the strongest theme in the responses received from the par-
ticipants, with 38 sources and 118 references, covering ‘communications’, ‘information
flows’, ‘roles and responsibilities’, ‘situational awareness’, and ‘operating procedures’.
Communications
The communications between members of the team emerged as a facet of defensive
operations:
“Highlighted the importance of passing information around the team”
“It highlighted the importance of communication and that to be aware of what
each team is doing will mean as a whole you can work together better”
“It has taught me how to liaise with the other roles in my team in order to
be more efficient”
Information Flows
The participants were advised to adopt the role of Blue Terrain Manager within their
team structure, to manage activities on the network and prevent ‘blue on blue’ incidents
caused by a lack of coordination. This control of information flow highlighted how team
interaction could be improved:
“Helped me understand to communicate the information to the BTM [Blue
Terrain Manager] to keep team operations smooth”
“One task may involve more than one team, and using BTM to control our
actions correctly, rather than going and disabling the immediate threat to
investigate”
“How to think when enemy activity has happened, the processes to escalate
the information to the BTM and then the way of thinking of what the attacker
would do next”
Roles and Responsibilities
The exercise emphasised the definition of clear role descriptions within the team:
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“TTX has highlighted the individual roles and responsibilities of each mem-
ber. Also it has contextualised the training to the degree that all members of
the team feel more confident going into the [next] exercise”
“It allowed me to understand the different job roles and what initial on day
one what we will be doing”
“Extremely useful to discuss in the open how each team operates, as well as
specifically clarifying exactly what is expected of us”
Situational Awareness
As the TTX progressed, the participants became far more aware of the need for main-
taining SA:
“It worked very well confirming all topics covered as well as tying it all
in together, giving a better understanding of the situational awareness and
where that SA information comes from”
“TTX has greatly opened up my situational awareness and understanding for
what to look for, and more importantly act upon. Communication within the
team is vital and this exercise has definitely highlighted it to me”
“vastly improved my knowledge of cyber and has introduced many new con-
cepts which will now feed directly into my situational awareness and improve
my overall ability as a Team Leader”
“Visual situational awareness is always better”
Operating Procedures
One of the key outcomes of the TTX was to highlight the need for standard operating
procedures:
“It has highlighted areas of weakness in procedures”
“I hadn’t fully developed a set of processes due to no previous experience
before. However, the TTX helped me start to form a clear picture of my
own processes that I will follow”
“Written SOPs with team input. Develop SOPs that visually illustrate net-
work and events and enable clear passage of information to the team. Ensure
during briefs that I ask each team for their input or suggestions”
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“The TTX was one of the most useful exercises this week and allowed me to
pull together the techniques and tools learnt and place them in the appropriate
point of the SOPs. It gave me a good overview of how the team members fit
together and highlighted the interchangeable nature of skill sets”
A.8.3 Network Understanding
The exercise participants acknowledged that an understanding of the network they were
defending was critical to their ability to respond to incidents. The theme was cited in
20 sources with 29 references.
Network Terrain Analysis
The questionnaire respondents focused on network terrain analysis in particular:
“By categorising the network and its importance”
“creating an audit to see changes in the future rather than relying on my
memory or looking for something that doesn’t look right”
A.8.4 Defensive Planning
The participants cited defensive planning in 14 sources, with 19 references. They focused
on the need to triage network assets in order to plan defensive activities.
Triage Priorities
The TTX participants made strong use of the CARVER matrix and the Purdue Model:
“Coupling my understanding of the Purdue Model along with CARVER, I
will now be able to tailor my individual processes to reflect the prioritisation
of tasks to support the Team leader and BTM’s [Blue Terrain Manager’s]
strategy”
“Yes, priorities and incident response. Certain systems need to be hardened
before other, although they sit further inside the network. Not going and
wiping the threat immediately, but studying and tracing the threat and where
it might move to next”
“Priorities – my priorities do not fully align to the team, so we need to sit
down as a team and use the CARVER system”
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B.1 Introduction
As a follow-on training activity from the exercise described in Section 7.5.4, and to test
the emerging SOPs emerging from the TTX described in Section 7.5.5, 16 members
of the sample attended a four-day CDX designed to further build their mental models
of APT Attack Behaviours, Team Understanding, and Team Interaction. The CDX
involved the Blue Team repeatedly defending the Domain Controllers in the network
described in Figure 7.6, from the same attack. The intent was that the Blue Team would
start to identify the attack behaviour in their sensors and logs, and with progressive
use of covert techniques using a crawl-walk-run approach, the CPT would improve their
understanding of how an APT takes control of a Domain Controller, and what such
activities look like when interpreted via sensors and logs.
The results described below highlight the key network events by Red and Blue
Teams during the CDX. They are contextualised in Section 8.9 of the main body of this
thesis. Text in bold highlights intrusion detection activity by the Blue Team.
B.2 Key Network Events
Ref. Date Time Description
1 30/08/17 0900 START DAY
2 30/08/17 0959 Initial beacon (reverse HTTPS) dropped to WIN7-2
(172.16.2.10) talking to core-upgrade.co.uk (122.129.50.43)
and injected into process 964
3 30/08/17 1000 Malicious WMI events created on WIN7-2 (172.16.2.10)
277
A. Cook B.2. KEY NETWORK EVENTS
4 30/08/17 1007 Mimikatz deployed on WIN7-2 (172.16.2.10)
5 30/08/17 1007 Initial SMB connection fromWIN7-2 (172.16.2.10) to WIN7-
3 (172.16.2.12) established
6 30/08/17 1007 Mimikatz deployed on WIN7-3 (172.16.2.12)
7 30/08/17 1023 Initial beacon (reverse HTTP) dropped on SHAREPOINT
(172.16.1.40) talking to core-upgrade.co.uk (122.129.50.43)
by WIN7-3 (172.16.2.12) via Service Control Manager
8 30/08/17 1025 Malicious WMI events created on SHAREPOINT
(172.16.1.40)
9 30/08/17 1034 Mimikatz deployed on SHAREPOINT (172.16.1.40)
10 30/08/17 1039 SHAREPOINT (172.16.1.40) scanned ports 139,445 on
172.16.1.10
11 30/08/17 1042 Initial beacon (reverse HTTP) dropped on DC1 (172.16.1.10)
talking to core-upgrade.co.uk (122.129.50.43) by SHARE-
POINT (172.16.1.40) via Service Control Manager
12 30/08/17 1044 Initial beacon (reverse HTTP) dropped on DC1 (172.16.1.10)
talking to core-upgrade.co.uk (122.129.50.43) by WIN7-2
(172.16.2.10) via Service Control Manager
13 30/08/17 1046 Initial beacon (reverse HTTPS) dropped to DC1
(172.16.1.10) talking to core-upgrade.co.uk (122.129.50.43)
and injected into process 1568
14 30/08/17 1047 Mimikatz deployed on DC1 (172.16.1.10)
15 30/08/17 1118 Review and modification of GPO on the DC.
16 30/08/17 1153 Initial beacon (reverse HTTP) dropped on DC1 (172.16.1.10)
talking to core-upgrade.co.uk (122.129.50.43) by WIN7-3
(172.16.2.12) via Service Control Manager
17 30/08/17 1155 Malicious WMI events created on DC1 (172.16.1.10)
18 30/08/17 1200 Client WIN7-3 (172.16.2.12) established SMB com-
munications to DC1 (172.16.1.10) and SHARE-
POINT (172.16.1.40). Initiating events: 7, 16. Time
to detection: 1hr 37 mins (from event 7).
19 30/08/17 1204 Initial oci.dll upload to SHAREPOINT (172.16.1.40) and
timestomped with cmd.exe attributes
20 30/08/17 1206 DC1 (172.16.1.10) scanned ports 139,445 on 172.16.1.11
21 30/08/17 1211 Initial beacon (reverse HTTP) dropped on DC2 (172.16.1.11)
talking to core-upgrade.co.uk (122.129.50.43) by DC1
(172.16.1.10) via Service Control Manager
22 30/08/17 1243 DC2 (172.16.1.11) scanned ports 139,445,3389 on 172.16.1.20
23 30/08/17 1246 DC2 (172.16.1.11) scanned ports 139,445 on 172.16.9.0/24
24 30/08/17 1249 Mimikatz deployed on DC2 (172.16.1.11)
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25 30/08/17 1305 SMB connections identified between DC1
(172.16.1.10) and SHAREPOINT (172.16.1.40)
connecting to WIN7-3 (172.16.2.12) via SMB port
445, then connection between WIN7-3 (172.16.2.12)
and WIN7-2 (172.16.2.10), also via SMB. WIN7-2
(172.16.2.10) observed to be communicating with
122.129.50.43:80 (core-upgrade.co.uk). External IP
blocked on firewall. Initiating events: 5, 7, 11, 16.
Time to detection: 2hrs 58 mins (from event 5).
26 30/08/17 1500 Communication detected from DC2 (172.16.1.11)
to 122.129.50.43:80 (core-upgrade.co.uk). Initiating
event: 21. Time to detection: 2hrs 49 mins (from
event 21).
27 30/08/17 1530 FINISH DAY
28 31/08/17 0900 START DAY
29 31/08/17 1000 Hardening activity to ensure all client firewalls are
active, clients have blocked ports 445 and 139. Re-
view of GPO (Group Policy Objects) to protect do-
main controller (DC).
30 31/08/17 1000 Connection from DC1 (172.16.1.10) to external IP
5.154.128.20:443 (butterblue.com) identified via Bro
logs. NOTE: buttlerblue.com identified as a result
of spurious Red Team activity.
31 31/08/17 1008 Connection detected from clients 172.16.2.10 and
172.16.2.12 to 122.129.50.60:80 (powerman.fr).
NOTE: powerman.fr identified as a result of spuri-
ous Red Team activity.
32 31/08/17 1023 Process Beacon out to 122.129.50.60:80 (core-
upgrade.co.uk) from WIN7-2 (172.16.2.10). NOTE:
DNS resolution for core-upgrade.co.uk changed by
Red Team. Process beacon still active on WIN7-2
(172.16.2.10).
33 31/08/17 1100 Malware identified on DC1 (172.16.1.10): msf.exe
md5 083b5ed3e33f3d89bcc4cd49b1ab20e.
34 31/08/17 1206 Initial beacon (reverse HTTP) dropped to WIN7-5
(172.16.2.14) talking to powerman.fr (122.129.50.70)
35 31/08/17 1208 Mimikatz deployed on WIN7-5 (172.16.2.14)
36 31/08/17 1209 Initial beacon (reverse HTTP) dropped on WIN7-4
(172.16.2.13) talking to powerman.fr (122.129.50.70) by
WIN7-5 (172.16.2.14) via Service Control Manager
37 31/08/17 1213 Initial beacon (reverse HTTPS) dropped to WIN7-1
(172.16.2.20) talking to butterblue.com (5.154.128.74) and
injected into process 1080
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38 31/08/17 1217 Initial SMB connection fromWIN7-5 (172.16.2.14) to WIN7-
1 (172.16.2.20) established
39 31/08/17 1217 Initial SMB connection from WIN7-1 (172.16.2.20) to DC1
(172.16.1.10) established
40 31/08/17 1217 Initial beacon (reverse HTTP) dropped on WIN7-9
(172.16.2.18) talking to powerman.fr (122.129.50.70) by
WIN7-5 (172.16.2.14) via Service Control Manager
41 31/08/17 1218 Initial beacon (reverse HTTP) dropped on WIN7-8
(172.16.2.17) talking to powerman.fr (122.129.50.70) by
WIN7-5 (172.16.2.14) via Service Control Manager
42 31/08/17 1218 Initial beacon (reverse HTTP) dropped on WIN7-7
(172.16.2.16) talking to powerman.fr (122.129.50.70) by
WIN7-5 (172.16.2.14) via Service Control Manager
43 31/08/17 1219 Malicious WMI events created on WIN7-1 (172.16.2.20)
44 31/08/17 1219 Malicious WMI events created on WIN7-5 (172.16.2.14)
45 31/08/17 1220 Malicious executable HTML file identified (bad.hta)
on WIN7-5 (172.16.2.14) communicating with
5.154.128.74, resolved to butterblue.com. Initiating
event: 34. Time to detection: 11 mins.
46 31/08/17 1220 122.129.50.70 (powerman.fr) via WIN7-5
(172.16.2.14) identified performing DNS requests
to DC1 (172.16.1.10) being routed to 172.16.3.10
(DMZ DNS) to complete lookup to 8.8.4.4 (Google).
Initiating event: 34. Time to detection: 11 mins
(from event 34).
47 31/08/17 1220 WIN7-5 (172.16.2.14) scanned ports 445 on 172.16.1.0/24
48 31/08/17 1223 Initial beacon (reverse HTTP) dropped on SHAREPOINT
(172.16.1.40) talking to powerman.fr (122.129.50.70) by
WIN7-5 (172.16.2.14) via Service Control Manager
49 31/08/17 1224 Mimikatz deployed on SHAREPOINT (172.16.1.40)
50 31/08/17 1224 WIN7-5 (172.16.2.14) scanned ports 445 on 172.16.2.0/24
51 31/08/17 1227 Initial beacon (reverse HTTP) dropped to SHAREPOINT
(172.16.1.40) talking to powerman.fr (122.129.50.70) and in-
jected into process 1316
52 31/08/17 1227 Initial beacon (reverse HTTP) dropped on WIN7-10
(172.16.2.11) talking to powerman.fr (122.129.50.70) by
WIN7-5 (172.16.2.14) via Service Control Manager
53 31/08/17 1230 Initial beacon (reverse HTTP) dropped to WIN7-10
(172.16.2.11) talking to powerman.fr (122.129.50.70) and in-
jected into process 1156
54 31/08/17 1231 Initial SMB connection from WIN7-10 (172.16.2.11) to
SHAREPOINT (172.16.1.40) established
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55 31/08/17 1232 Initial beacon (reverse HTTPS) dropped on WIN7-2
(172.16.2.10) talking to butterblue.com (5.154.128.74) by
WIN7-1 (172.16.2.20) via Service Control Manager
56 31/08/17 1233 Malicious WMI events created on WIN7-2 (172.16.2.10)
57 31/08/17 1236 Initial beacon (reverse HTTPS) dropped on DC1
(172.16.1.10) talking to butterblue.com (5.154.128.74)
and injected into process 3204
58 31/08/17 1237 Initial beacon (reverse HTTP) dropped on DC1 (172.16.1.10)
talking to powerman.fr (122.129.50.70) by SHAREPOINT
(172.16.1.40) via Service Control Manager
59 31/08/17 1239 Mimikatz deployed on DC1 (172.16.1.10)
60 31/08/17 1239 Initial beacon (reverse HTTP) dropped to DC1 (172.16.1.10)
talking to powerman.fr (122.129.50.70) and injected into pro-
cess 1548
61 31/08/17 1241 Initial SMB connection from SHAREPOINT (172.16.1.40)
to DC1 (172.16.1.10) established
62 31/08/17 1242 Malicious WMI events created on DC1 (172.16.1.10)
63 31/08/17 1257 WIN7-2 (172.16.2.10) identified communicating with
122.129.50.60:80 (powerman.fr). Initiating event:
55. Time to detection: 25 mins (from event 55).
64 31/08/17 1311 Malicious WMI events created on DC1 (172.16.1.10)
65 31/08/17 1335 SHAREPOINT (172.16.1.40) identified performing
HTTP GET requests to 122.129.50.70:8080 (pow-
erman.fr). Potentially malicious files identified as
mIOW.html. Initiating event: 49. Time to detec-
tion: 1hr 11 min (from event 49).
66 31/08/17 1346 Blocked all traffic from 122.129.50.70 (powerman.fr)
to 172.16.0.0/16 on DMZ interface
67 31/08/17 1349 Initial SMB connection from WIN7-10 (172.16.2.11) to DC1
(172.16.1.10) established
68 31/08/17 1355 Mimikatz deployed on WIN7-10 (172.16.2.11)
69 31/08/17 1355 Initial beacon (reverse HTTP) dropped on SHAREPOINT
(172.16.1.40) talking to powerman.fr (122.129.50.70) by
WIN7-10 (172.16.2.11) via Service Control Manager
70 31/08/17 1405 Initial beacon (reverse HTTP) dropped on WIN7-3
(172.16.2.12) talking to powerman.fr (122.129.50.70) by
WIN7-10 (172.16.2.11) via Service Control Manager
71 31/08/17 1444 SysInternals Suite deleted from DC1 (172.16.1.10)
72 31/08/17 1500 Hardened DNS entries on DC01 to sinkhole rogue
DNS domains; gameaholic.com, butterblue.com,
powerman.fr, and subsequently flushed DNS cache
for all clients
73 31/08/17 1500 Process Hacker deleted from DC1 (172.16.1.10)
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74 31/08/17 1515 Initial beacon (reverse HTTP) dropped on DC1 (172.16.1.10)
talking to powerman.fr (122.129.50.70) by WIN7-10
(172.16.2.11) via Service Control Manager
75 31/08/17 1515 FINISH DAY
76 01/09/17 0823 Initial beacon (reverse HTTP) dropped on WIN7-5
(172.16.2.14) talking to catchme.com (122.129.50.199) and
injected into process 1148
77 01/09/17 0831 Initial beacon (reverse HTTP) dropped on DC1 (172.16.1.10)
talking to catchme.com (122.129.50.199) and injected into
process 3400
78 01/09/17 0828 Mimikatz deployed on WIN7-5
79 01/09/17 0838 Initial beacon (reverse HTTP) dropped to WIN7-1
(172.16.2.20) talking to catchme.com (122.129.50.199) and
injected into process 1080
80 01/09/17 0900 START DAY
81 01/09/17 0900 Initial SMB connection fromWIN7-1 (172.16.2.20) to WIN7-
5 (172.16.2.14) established
82 01/09/17 0908 Initial SMB connection from WIN7-1 (172.16.2.20) to DC1
(172.16.1.10) established
83 01/09/17 0920 Unrecognised traffic between 122.129.50.199:80
(catchme.com) and WIN7-5 (172.16.2.14) identified.
Initiating events: 76, 80. Time to detection: 20 mins
(from event 80).
84 01/09/17 0924 Initial oci.dll upload to WIN7-1 (172.16.2.20) and
timestomped with cmd.exe attributes
85 01/09/17 0925 Initial oci.dll upload to DC1 (172.16.1.10) and timestomped
with cmd.exe attributes
86 01/09/17 0943 Initial SMB connection from WIN7-5 (172.16.2.14) to DC1
(172.16.1.10) established
87 01/09/17 1000 SMB traffic between 172.16.2.20 (WIN7-1),
172.16.2.14 (WIN7-5), and DC1 (172.16.1.10)
identified and SMB traffic starting to be blocked
between user space and DC1. Traffic chain traced
from DC1 (172.16.1.10) to WIN7-1 (172.16.2.20)
to WIN7-5 (172.16.2.14) to 122.129.50.199:80
(catchme.com). Initiating events: 81, 82. Time to
detection: 1 hr (from event 81).
88 01/09/17 1000 Blocked traffic to 122.129.50.199. Added
catchme.com to local DNS and resolved to 127.0.0.1
(sinkhole)
89 01/09/17 1017 Mimikatz deployed on WIN7-1 (172.16.2.20)
90 01/09/17 1125 Data exfiltration from DC1 (172.16.1.10) starts
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91 01/09/17 1200 Malicious processes on WIN7-5 (172.16.2.14) and
WIN7-1 (172.16.2.20) in spooler.exe, rundll32 and
SC.exe. Malicious DLL oci.dll injected into a legit-
imate process identified on DC1. Initiating events:
76, 79, 80, 85. Time to detection: 3hrs (from event
80).
92 01/09/17 1300 FINISH DAY
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C.1 Introduction
Questionnaires were not provided for the attendees of of the exercise described in Section
7.5.8. Instead, observations were made by the author on the performances of the Blue
Teams involved. The results of the exercise are summarised in Section 8.11. This
appendix is provided to offer further detail to the assessments.
C.2 Assessment and Evaluation Criteria
The exercise was subject to a formalised set of quantitative evaluation metrics defined
by the overall exercise White Team, outside of the influence of the author. As such, the
assessment performed in this study, wherever possible, fitted within these established
evaluation metrics. These overall exercise assessed the Blue Teams against five criteria:
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1. Service Availability: A measure of the levels of availability of systems defined as
critical by the White Team.
2. Procedures: The adherence of the Blue Teams to procedures defined within the
exercise.
3. Red Team Evaluation: A measure, by Red Team, of the levels of defence provided
by an individual Blue Team.
4. Mission: An evaluation of Blue Teams’ overall cognisance of the changing exercise
scenario and its impact on DCO priorities.
5. Out of Game: A measure of altruistic or extra-curricular activities by Blue Teams
that benefited the exercise overall.
These measures were gauged by the exercise assessments team, with scores medi-
ated by the White Team to maintain a consistency of scoring throughout the exercise.
Each day, a baseline score was assigned to each criteria, then each team’s performance
was mediated against this to determine how far above or below the standard score their
performance was judged to have been.
The assessment of Blue Teams’ SA, team structures and information management
techniques taught on the DCO MST, described in Section 7.5.7 was undertaken by the
author, independently of the White Team assessment of the metrics above. SA was
measured using a mediation model in line with the methods used above. It measured
three levels of SA (level 1 - 3), plus an overall Team SA. A qualitative measure was
used to assess the teams’ development of the five mental models defined in Table 6.1.
C.3 Individual Team Performance Analyses
Whilst many working methods are available for DCO teams to operate within, this
research focuses on the development of a repeatable model to train incident response
within organisations, with interoperable manning and information exchanges. The focus
of this assessment is not to measure the overall effectiveness of DCO activities on the
network (although this is a factor), but to determine which techniques contribute to an
efficient DCO team, and are repeatable. Specifically, it assessed:
• Team SA
• C2
• Information flows
• Understanding of adversary activities and intent
Assessments were based on an average time with each team of 30 minutes per day.
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C.4 Technical Skills Self-Assessment Criteria
Figure C.1 illustrates the self-assessed skills of the teams participating in the exercise,
using a questionnaire provided by the White Team, as well as presenting the number
of participants in each team, which influenced the mean average calculations. No data
was recorded for Team 4, who declined to contribute. The intelligence embeds within
the team were not asked to contribute to the self-assessment. Members of Teams 5, 7
and 10 arrived late to the exercise and are not reflected in the data.
The author had no input into the assessment criteria, but the results
are included as an indicative metric of relative technical competence.
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Figure C.1: Self-assessed overall skills of Blue Teams
Teams were asked to assess their formal education in cyber-related subjects, as well
as detail their hands-on expertise using a subjective numeric schema. Formal education
was recorded using the following values for the presented in Table C.1. It was observed
that where exercise participants held more than one degree, they added the values to
achieve a score higher than 3. This value was added to a further assessment of whether
the exercise attendee had prior experience of cyber exercises. These values are presented
in Table C.2.
Education Value
Relevant undergraduate degree or higher 3
Irrelevant undergraduate degree, BTEC qualifications, or similar 2
Other qualifications 1
No qualification 0
Table C.1: Formal education self-assessment guidelines, defined by the exercise White
Team, without input from the author.
Exercise participants were further requested to assess their overall individual tech-
nical skills, using the criteria in Table C.3. These were aggregated and used to produce
a mean value for each team.
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Education Value
Experience of more than two cyber exercises 3
Experience of up to two cyber exercises 2
Experience of one cyber exercise 1
No experience of cyber exercises 0
Table C.2: Prior cyber exercise experience self-assessment guidelines, defined by the
exercise White Team, without input from the author.
Technical Skills Range
Use of established SOPs 0 (no experience) - 10 (significant experience)
Configuration and use of Firewalls and
Routers
0 (no experience) - 10 (significant experience)
Configuration and use of Sensors 0 (no experience) - 10 (significant experience)
Configuration and use of Logs 0 (no experience) - 10 (significant experience)
Network and Server Hardening 0 (no experience) - 10 (significant experience)
Incident Response 0 (no experience) - 10 (significant experience)
Table C.3: Individual technical skills self-assessment guidelines, defined by the exercise
White Team, without input from the author.
C.4.1 Team 1
Summary Data
Overall Exercise Position: 12th
Manning: 10
DCO MST: The team did not attend the DCO MST.
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Figure C.2: Team 1 Performance
287
A. Cook C.4. TECHNICAL SKILLS SELF-ASSESSMENT CRITERIA
4 December 2017
Team 1 comprised a mixed team of five individuals from the UK who had not worked to-
gether before, and five from an international partner. No members of the team attended
the DCO MST. After arrival at the exercise, the team chose adopt a structure similar to
that recommended on the training, comprising a Team Leader, a second-in-command
(2IC), with the rest of the team forming 1 x Intelligence, 2x Protect, 2x Monitor, 2x
Harden. The UK personnel described themselves as having a low level of technical com-
petency, with the international partners exhibiting more experience. The stated plan
for Day 1 was to form as a team, map the network, and set-up the SIEM. They did
not have any stated plans for any outcomes on the network at 1115hrs. Later they had
established a routine, but no details were made available. No means to convey team
situational awareness (SA) was observed, and no Intelligence Preparation of the Cyber
Environment (IPCE) had been started. They stated their operational cycle included
a team meeting at 1130. They sent Requests for Change (RFC) for Kali™ tools and
arranged a meeting with the legal team to request RoE to perform counter-operations
against Red Team.
In their daily report to White Team they made no forecast of Red Team activities
on their network.
5 December 2017
The intent for day 2 was to harden the network segment prioritised by the exercise
commander in White Team, and to submit a change to the RoE to allow counter-
operations against Red Team activity. The preparation for this was the team’s main
effort (ME). The request was assessed against mission priorities, and declined.
A task list was visible for the team to track progress against. Network diagrams
were being displayed as the network enumeration activities completed. A conversation
with the UK team members highlighted that most of the technical effort was being
delivered by the international partners, and that the UK team were being mentored as
the work progressed. It was apparent during the conversation that the SA resided with
the international partner personnel.
The daily report to White Team focused on risks to technical hardening operations,
and did not assess likely Red Team actions.
6 December 2017
The team planned to finish hardening and start on their incident response process. An
interview with team members highlighted that SA still resided with Canadian personnel.
The team had attended the a DCO MST summary training session the evening before
and competed a CARVER matrix to articulate priorities within their networks. No
forecasts of Red Team activities were made verbally or in their daily report to White
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Team.
7 December 2017
Suspected network intrusions were being investigated. No visual aids were used to
articulate the state of Red Team intrusions into their network. The plan for the day
was to finish their incident response process and consolidate their sensor feeds into
Splunk ™. Although the team commented in their daily report to White Team that Red
Team activity had increased, they maintained their focus on network hardening. No
assessments of Red Team COAs were made.
8 December 2017
The team were observed to recover quickly from a confirmed Read Team intrusion on
their network. Interviews with the team highlighted that they acknowledged the need
for greater Team SA.
9 December 2017
The team adopted tools and techniques observed in other teams, that were based on
the DCO MST. This included overall SA boards and the status’ of various Red Team
intrusions. An interview with the 2IC highlighted that Team SA, whilst improving, was
still low.
10 December 2017
The team demonstrated a continued increase in Team SA, and were using more of the
DCO MST tools such as the CARVER matrix in an attempt to integrate a G2 picture
into their SOPs.
C.4.2 Team 2
Summary Data
Overall Exercise Position: 8th=
Manning: 9 (plus one intelligence embed)
DCO MST: The majority of the team attended the DCO MST, including the 2IC.
4 December 2017
A subset of the team attended the DCO MST, but were joined by a Team Leader, 2IC,
and an intelligence embed, none of whom had any training prior to the exercise and had
no previous cyber experience. The team claimed a low level of technical competency.
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Figure C.3: Team 2 Performance
They comprised 9 personnel in total, and formed into the team structure recommended
on the DCO MST (Figure7.7), with a Team Leader, Blue Terrain Manager (BTM), 1 x
Intelligence, 2 x Hunt, 2x Monitor, 2x Harden. They had a clear objective stated for Day
1, which was to understand their network. By the end of play they had enumerated and
documented two network segments, begun to triage their key terrain using a CARVER
matrix, and had started to create a network hardening plan based on their triaged
priorities. They maintained an operating cycle that included an hourly heads-up brief
to maintain Team SA. The intelligence embed had no cyber experience, and did not
attended the MST, so did not understand how to undertake IPCE and fuse this with
the Adversary Lifecycle and Diamond Model of Intrusion Analysis. He subsequently
attended a summary class that included ICS-CDTP and IPCE at the end of the day
that included an explanation of these techniques. The daily report to White Team
contained an assessment of forecast Red Team activity on the network, highlighting
probable reconnaissance and malware delivery, using the Adversary Lifecycle Model
taught on the DCO MST.
5 December 2017
The priorities for Day 2 were to start to harden the networks, perform a vulnerability
scan, apply patches and updates, configure sensors, and conduct a CARVER analysis
of available systems to triage the key network terrain.
Observation of one of the hourly briefs demonstrated a high level of Team SA
and understanding of individual team members’ roles and responsibilities. The BTM
managed the deconfliction of activities on elements of the networks, with the team
making use of the visual representations of the current state of the network and intrusion
models to explain the current status of their tasks.
The daily report to White Team contained an assessment of likely Red Team ac-
tivity on the network.
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6 December 2017
The team had completed a CARVER matrix. The plan for the day was to finish
hardening and setup their sensors. The team assessed the likely Red Team activity for
the day was phishing. The team had a Prioritised Defended Asset List (PDAL) on the
wall that articulated their (White Team) commander’s priorities. The team had started
their network hunt and monitoring activities, focusing on the key network terrain.
An observed hourly brief demonstrated excellent team communications and SA.
Two intrusion incidents had been identified and were being investigated. The BTM
was maintaining control of team activities, centred around activities on the key network
terrain.
7 December 2017
All confirmed intrusions were displayed on the attack model. The team’s sensors were
active and the BTM had articulated a clear technical plan which included a proactive
view of likely Red Team activity. This was reflected in their dailyreport to White Team.
8 December 2017
Splunk™was observed to be installed on all servers and their overall SA picture had
improved as a consequence. The team were observed to be recovering from the over-
hardening of various devices. They had identified a number of potential Red Team
intrusions on their networks and were assessing likely COAs as a consequence.
9 December 2017
While interviewing members of the team it became apparent that individual technical
skills was the constraining factor for Team 2. They maintained strong C2, information
flows and Team SA, but lacked the abilities to identify sophisticated Red Team intru-
sions or remediate their consequences. As a result, the team were limited in their ability
to defend their networks.
10 December 2017
The team maintained their high levels of Team SA and continued to assess Red Team
COAs based on received cyber threat intelligence.
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C.4.3 Team 3
Summary Data
Overall Exercise Position: 3rd
Manning: 8
DCO MST: The majority of the team attended the DCO MST, including the Team
Leader.
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Figure C.4: Team 3 Performance
4 December 2017
The team claimed a low level of technical competency at the DCO MST, which was
supplemented by additional individual training to raise their overall understanding of
DCO tools. They comprised 8 personnel in total, and formed into the recommended
team structure (Figure 7.7), with a Team Leader (also managing threat intelligence),
1x BTM, 2x Hunt, 2x Monitor, 2x Harden. They were not a formed team before the
exercise. They had a clear objective stated for Day 1, which was to understand their
network. By the end of play they had enumerated an unspecified number network
segments and performed a preliminary analysis of their key terrain using a CARVER
matrix. They intended to maintain an operational cycle of an hourly heads-up brief to
maintain Team SA, but admitted that in practice this had slipped to a two-hourly brief.
A Team SA visual aid was observed, displaying the Adversary Lifecycle and Diamond
Model analysis frameworks. No IPCE had been undertaken.
In their daily report to White Cell they assessed the likely Red Team activity
anticipated in the next 24-48hrs to focus on phishing campaigns and the establishment
of a foothold on the network. This was in line with techniques taught on the DCO
MST.
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5 December 2017
The Day 2 objectives were to continue with enumerating their networks and start to
setup sensors. The team detected two possible network intrusion events and represented
these using the Adversary Lifecycle and Diamond models, permitting an assessment
of likely next steps by Red Team. Diagrammatic representations of the networks, and
associated system availability, were mounted on the surrounding walls, along with clearly
marked task priorities.
The daily report to White Team contained an assessment of likely Red Team ac-
tions.
6 December 2017
The team had assessed that Red Team were on their networks and as a consequence,
had implemented processes to limit the use of administrator credentials in case of key
logging being used. The team had also refined their roles and responsibilities, and
continued to harden the network. Their priority for the day was to ensure the sensors
were properly configured. The Hunt team were still providing additional resources to
the harden function.
An observed hourly brief demonstrated that team activities were being shaped by
an assessment of likely Red Team activities. These assessments were also reflected in
their daily report to White Team.
7 December 2017
Whilst network intrusions were being detected, the team were not being distracted from
defending their key network terrain. An assessment of Red Team COAs was made in
the daily report to White Team.
8 December 2017
The team had successfully identified a number of Red Team intrusions and were recov-
ering from them. They used this identification to inform a wider assessment of Red
Team COAs on their network.
9 December 2017
The team continued to identify and remediate Red Team intrusions, repriortising de-
fences based on changing exercise scenario priorities.
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10 December 2017
Strong overall SA based on continuing assessment of Red Team COAs using intrusion
behaviours and fusion with cyber threat intelligence reporting.
C.4.4 Team 4
Summary Data
Overall Exercise Position: 5th
Manning: 5 (plus an intelligence embed who joined late in the exercise)
DCO MST: The team did not attend the DCO MST.
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Figure C.5: Team 4 Performance
4 December 2017
The team described themselves as having a mix of cyber technical competencies, from
mid- to high-level. They organised themselves based on the networks to be defended,
with two personnel assigned to each network segment. They demonstrated a dynamic
approach to work; they regularly came together for planning sessions, then broke away
to carry-out assigned tasks. They were not a formed team prior to the exercise. They
stated their objectives for Day 1 were to understand and baseline their networks. They
enumerated the various network segments they were responsible for, followed by run-
ning a vulnerability scan that highlighted areas of operating system weaknesses. These
vulnerabilities guided their plans to harden their networks in the following days.
The team had no established operational cycle, and displayed no forward assess-
ment of likely Red Team activities on their network during their verbal briefs or daily
reports to White Team.
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5 December 2017
Enumeration has been completed and the team moved to harden their networks. Once
this has been completed the team intend to restructure to follow the Hunt, Monitor,
Harden structure taught on the DCO MST. The team culture continued to permeate
however, and appeared an effective vehicle for their ways of working. The team were
clearly relaxed and working collaboratively. An observation of one of their informal
briefs demonstrated good use of cyber threat intelligence reporting and understanding
of Red Team techniques. However, no assessment of likely Red Team activities was
made in this, or their daily report to White Team.
6 December 2017
The team had produced a map of their networks on a whiteboard as an SA visual aid.
They continued to harden their networks and planned to configure their sensors. They
believed they had intrusions on their networks. No forecasts of Red Team activity were
made.
7 December 2017
Team SA was still being maintained verbally, and the team expressed that they felt
they were currently operating reactively. With the addition of an intelligence embed,
the team had restructured as 2x Monitor, 2x Server Hardening, 1x Intelligence, 1x
floating resource.
A number of intrusion events were detected. All views of risks were expressed
technically, with no reference to likely Red Team COAs.
8 December 2017
Various Red Team intrusions had been identified and were being remediated. This was
the main effort of the team, with no wider SA beyond this.
9 December 2017
The team were hampered by a lack of sensor coverage that restricted their ability to
identify further intrusions. The team dynamic was observed to be positive, and the team
were working well together and an understanding of each others’ capabilities. However,
Team SA remained poor, with isolated pockets of understanding of Red Team intent
and likely COAs. No changes to priorities were made based on changes in the exercise
scenario.
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10 December 2017
The team remained focused on technical detail, with no attempts made to pre-empt Red
Team COAs. As such, the team remained purely reactive and focused on hardening as
their primary defence mechanism. Team SA remained poor.
C.4.5 Team 5
Summary Data
Overall Exercise Position: 4th
Manning: 7 (plus one intelligence embed)
DCO MST: Part of the team attended the DCO MST, including the Team Leader.
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Figure C.6: Team 5 Performance
4 December 2017
The team described themselves as having a low level of cyber competence, and were not
a formed unit before the exercise. They aligned themselves to the force structure similar
to that taught in the DCO MST (Figure 7.7), providing 1x Team Leader, 1x BTM, 2x
Hunt, 2x Monitor and 1x Harden. They integrated an intelligence embed who had not
received any training prior to the exercise and had no previous cyber experience. Their
intent for Day 1 was to understand their network, in accordance with with the DCO
MST. This included enumerating the network segments, auditing user accounts on the
Domain Controllers, and inspection of the firewall rulesets. They adopted an operating
cycle of hourly briefs to maintain Team SA, and prioritised their immediate actions
on the Domain Controllers whilst the network enumeration took place. In their daily
report to White Team they provided an assessment of likely activity on their network
by Red Team, including phishing and malware delivery within 24 hours, and possibly
ransomware within 48-72 hours.
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5 December 2017
A CARVER matrix was completed and was used to shape the placement of sensors on
the network. They had submitted RFCs to limit user internet access and a PAAL. The
team were still attempting to understand their network. Hourly briefs were maintained,
and with the delivery of whiteboards the team were able to create a visible network
map and task deconfliction register. Their daily report to the White Team contained
an assessment of likely Red Team activities.
6 December 2017
The team planned to finish hardening their networks then configure their sensors. The
key network terrain was identified. The roles and responsibilities of team members
appeared clear in a team brief, and the hourly brief operational cycle was maintained
and demonstrated a high level of Team SA. A lack of sensors meant the team could not
detect any intrusions. However, their daily report to the White Team displayed a clear
view of the Red Team activities they assessed were taking place on their network.
7 December 2017
The team were monitoring their network and hunting for Red Team activity. In line
with DCOMST, the team had isolated the ICS on the network. They maintained hourly
briefs, using boards to display intrusion activities using the attack model. The team
were maintaining a list of priority actions, which were assessed when intrusions were
detected, and a risk assessment based on the key network terrain made to determine
the priority of the team’s response. The team maintained an excellent assessment of
risks to continued operations and likely Red Team activities.
8 December 2017
Based on identified intrusions and an assessment of likely Red Team COAs, the team
were implementing changes to the router rules to limit Red Team freedom of action
on their networks. The team demonstrated an ability to articulate the risks carried by
the mission owner as a result of the intrusions. The team had experienced issues with
over-hardening caused by limited individual technical skills.
9 December 2017
The team demonstrated excellent Team SA when a junior member of the team was
randomly selected by the assessors to brief on the condition of Team 5’s networks, the
status of the various intrusions, and which team members were working on defined tasks.
Subsequent questioning of all team members highlighted the high level of overall Team
SA.
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10 December 2017
The team maintained their overall Team SA, but were unable to provide a detailed
assessment of Red Team probable COAs. They demonstrated limited technical under-
standing of Red Team intrusion techniques.
C.4.6 Team 6
Summary Data
Overall Exercise Position: 11th
Manning: 8
DCO MST: The majority of the team attended the DCO MST, including the Team
Leader.
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Figure C.7: Team 6 Performance
4 December 2017
The team described themselves as having a very low level of cyber competence, and
were not a formed unit before the DCO MST and exercise. They aligned themselves
to the structure taught in the DCO MST, providing 1x Team Leader, 1x BTM, 2x
Hunt, 2x Monitor and 2x Harden. Their intent for Day 1 was to understand their
network, in accordance with the DCO MST. By the end of the day they had established
an operational cycle of hourly briefs to maintain Team SA, and had produced a blue
terrain deconfliction chart (to prevent blue-on-blue incidents on the network), an attack
lifecycle structure in which to model intrusion events on their networks (using the
Adversary Lifecycle Model and the Diamond Model of Intrusion Analysis), and had
started a preliminary CARVER assessment. They had also sent an RFC outlining their
requests for a Pre-Approved Actions List (PAAL) for network changes to the White
Team. All of these products and techniques were taught on the DCO MST. Their
daily report to the White Team threat analysis focused on issues relating to network
hardening, and did not contain a forecast of Red Team activities on their network.
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5 December 2017
The team were still attempting to understand their network, with the enumeration
process estimated to be 85 percent complete. They assessed their DCs were at risk, and
planned to undertake a full IPCE once the enumeration was finished. Hourly briefs were
maintained. By the afternoon the enumeration was completed and a network diagram
visible. Hardening had started on the DC, with the setup of the sensors in progress.
Their daily report to the White Team contained an assessment of likely Red Team
activity on their network.
6 December 2017
The team had completed a CARVER matrix and were hardening their networks. They
had submitted RFCs to deploy their sensors in positions based on their CARVER ma-
trix. They maintained an operational cycle including hourly briefs and a deconfliction
board to manage their blue terrain.
7 December 2017
As per the DCO MST, the team were prioritising intrusion events against defensive
activities on the key network terrain to avoid becoming reactive. They maintained an
ongoing assessment of likely Red Team activities.
8 December 2017
The team’s focus was on hardening, particularly routers and implementing tighter
GPOs. A number of Red Team intrusions were identified and remediation was in
progress. An assessment of risks was maintained, but this was purely technical. This
was assessed to be as a consequence of individual technical skills and a lack of ability
to forecast based on technical indicators.
9 December 2017
The Team SA remained high, but poor individual technical skills continued to limit an
assessment of Red Team COAs.
10 December 2017
Overall SA was observed to have reduced as poor individual technical skills continued
to limit an assessment of Red Team COAs.
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C.4.7 Team 7
Summary Data
Overall Exercise Position: 1st
Manning: 10
DCO MST: Team 7 were the purposeful sample of this research, the CPT. None of
the team attended the DCO MST, but elements of their previous training were based
on the contents of the DCO MST.
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Figure C.8: Team 7 Performance
4 December 2017
Team 7 were the CPT that formed the purposeful sample for this research. They at-
tended the exercise with a relatively high level of training and experience. The team
comprised 1x Team Leader, 1xBTM, 3x Monitor, 3x Hunt, 2x Harden and 1x Intelli-
gence. Their SOPs include an operational cycle of hourly briefs, the development of
IPCE, a PAAL, and immediate actions for each of the sub-teams within the CPT. Their
intent for Day 1 was to understand the networks, produce a baseline IPCE, submit their
standard PAAL and RFIs. By the end of the day they had mapped and documented
their networks, hardening had commenced, and sensors were being deployed. A prelimi-
nary IPCE had been produced and the CPT intelligence operator was assessing possible
adversary COAs.
Their daily report to White Team contained no assessment of likely adversary
activity, despite this being included in the team’s IPCE.
5 December 2017
A network diagram was visible and was shaping the final version of the IPCE. Hardening
of the networks had started, along with the submission of a number of RFCs. Sensors
had been deployed and the team described themselves as transitioning to ‘business as
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usual’. The team had identified that the operating cycle and blue terrain management
was slipping, and so enforced greater control over these aspects of operations.
No assessment of Red Team activity was included in their daily report to White
Team.
6 December 2017
The team had one incident under investigation which was being assessed in technical
detail for reporting to the exercise intelligence cell and to White Team. Hardening
continued, and an ongoing assessment of Red Team activity was maintained in the
updated IPCE and CARVER matrix. The team displayed a high level of individual
technical skills, with adherence to established SOPs apparent. A deep level of Team SA
was observed, with tools such as a network traffic map being used to track Red Team
intrusion behaviour.
This level of assessment was not reflected in the daily report to White Team.
7 December 2017
Two further intrusions had been identified, with probable persistence attained and at-
tempts made to compromise the Domain Controller. The impact of these intrusions
was not made apparent in the daily report to White Team.
8 December 2017
The team continued to identify and remediate Red Team intrusions. Team SA, C2 and
information flows were all identified as well-defined and effective. Full use of the team’s
established SOPs were apparent.
9 December 2017
Team SA was observed to be excellent, with all details of the statuses of the network
segments clearly displayed on visual aid boards, along with individual team member
taskings, and an assessment of projected Red Team COAs.
10 December 2017
The team maintained adherence to their established processes and continued their high
level of Team SA.
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C.4.8 Team 8
Summary Data
Overall Exercise Position: 2nd
Manning: 11
DCO MST: Only one junior member of the team attended the DCO MST.
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Figure C.9: Team 8 Performance
4 December 2017
The team was not formed prior to the exercise, but comprised a significant element
from an established network operations team. They claimed a medium level of tech-
nical competence in the cyber domain. The team appeared to adopt the methods of
working used by the network operations team and chose not to use any of the DCO
MST. Their Day 1 objective was understand their networks, harden, and update the
permissions available to users and services via Group Policy Objects (GPO). They had
not established a clear operating cycle during the day, other than the external meetings
required by the White Team. The team was organised into 1x Team Leader, 1x 2IC, 2x
Evaluate and Discover, 4x Harden, 1x Security Onion, and 1x floating resource to be
deployed as required. They also integrated an intelligence embed who had not received
any training prior to the exercise and had no previous cyber experience. The team did
not develop an IPCE or forecast any Red Team activity on their networks.
5 December 2017
Network enumeration was completed, and hardening was in progress. The team main-
tained informal briefs as required. No forecast of Red Team activities was expressed
either verbally or in their daily report to White Team.
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6 December 2017
The team’s main effort was to apply patches across the networks then, as a secondary
activity to finalise the sensor setup for monitoring. The team has re-mapped the network
to look for changes, with none identified.
It was apparent from interviews with the team that SA resided with the Team
Leader, and team members only retained SA of their own areas.
No assessment of Red Team activity was made verbally or in the daily report to
White Team.
7 December 2017
The team had identified possible intrusions and had located malicious files.
8 December 2017
Multiple network intrusions were detected and were being remediated. Some forecasting
of Red Team COAs was observed, but only at a superficial level.
9 December 2017
The team remained focused on hardening, but with an improvement in Team SA. Some
limited forecasting of Red Team COAs was observed, but lacked technical depth.
10 December 2017
Overall SA was observed to have improved, across levels 1 to 3. Team SA was also
observed to have improved, with a greater distribution of understanding across the
team, and as a consequence, reduced the potential risks of a single point of failure in
the Team Leader.
C.4.9 Team 9
Summary Data
Overall Exercise Position: 8th=
Manning: 4 (plus one intelligence embed)
DCO MST: None of the team attended the DCO MST.
4 December 2017
The team comprised four international partners who described themselves as competent
with cyber technologies, although they had not worked together prior to the exercise.
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Figure C.10: Team 9 Performance
They also integrated an intelligence embed who had not received any training prior
to the exercise and had no previous cyber experience. Their Day 1 priority was to
understand their networks, as an initial step in a planned schedule that comprised active
defences, passive defences, and the development of a security baseline. No consistent
operational cycle was established. The team used informal briefings to communicate
priorities. Team members appeared to understand what was required of each of them.
The tasks were executed effectively, although no means of displaying information to
maintain Team SA were apparent. The team made effective use of the cyber threat
intelligence feeds, but did not produce an IPCE. Their daily reports to White Team
included an assessment of Red Team likely activity on their networks.
5 December 2017
Network enumeration was still in progress, and hardening planned as the next step.
Whilst specific networks had been prioritised, servers within them had not. They main-
tained informal briefs, with no established operational cycle. No IPCE was created and
no visible representations of their networks were apparent. However, they were assessing
likely Red Team activities, both verbally and in their daily report to White Team.
6 December 2017
The team had enumerated their networks, but were still waiting for approval on RFCs
to deploy sensors. Their plan for the day was to finish drawing their network diagrams
and continue hardening.
It was observed that few verbal communications were used by the team.
7 December 2017
The team reported an intrusion. They used Microsoft OneNote™to maintain Team SA,
and the details were contained within.
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8 December 2017
The team reported an ability to detect intrusions with their sensors finally online and
reporting to Splunk™. Hardening continued as the primary means of network defence.
Some Red Team intrusions were identified and were in the process of being remediated.
9 December 2017
Interviews with the team highlighted a focus on intrusions, but lacked technical detail.
Overall SA was minimal.
10 December 2017
Further interviews with the team highlighted a lack of technical detail on the intrusions
detected, resulting in a concern that they had not been fully remediated.
C.4.10 Team 10
Summary Data
Overall Exercise Position: 10th
Manning: 9
DCO MST: Only one member of the team, the Team Leader, attended the DCO MST,
but not for the whole course duration.
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Figure C.11: Team 10 Performance
4 December 2017
The team was not formed prior to the exercise. They claimed a low-to-medium level of
cyber competence. The team was structured along the lines of the DCO MST, with 1x
Team Leader/BTM, 2x Hunt, 2x Monitor, 2x Harden, 1x Intelligence, with individuals
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focusing on different network segments to allow concurrent activity. Their intent for Day
1 was to understand their network and to have audited their Domain Controllers. By
the end of the day they had established an operational cycle of hourly briefs to maintain
Team SA, and an attack lifecycle structure in which to model intrusion events on their
networks (using the Adversary Lifecycle Model and the Diamond Model of Intrusion
Analysis). The daily report to White Team, however, contained no assessment of likely
Red Team activity on the network.
5 December 2017
A CARVER matrix was complete, and the networks were visible on a whiteboard. The
team had identified two possible intrusion events, which were displayed on the attack
model on the wall. An observed hourly brief highlighted a high level of Team SA and
clearly defined roles and responsibilities. However, it appeared that an error in the
configuration of the DC had locked users out of the network.
Whilst an assessment of likely Red Team activity was made verbally, it was not
reflected in the daily report to White Team.
6 December 2017
The team maintained excellent Team SA with various visual aids and whiteboards in
use. No verbal briefing was required to ascertain the status of their networks and the
level of intrusions.
The team reported they had locked themselves out of their Domain Controller.
7 December 2017
Further intrusions detected and under investigation. As per the DCO MST, these events
were prioritised against activities to defend the key network terrain before allocating
resources.
The team maintained an assessment of likely Read Team activities.
8 December 2017
The team were suffering from over-hardening and were locked-out from key systems.
Multiple intrusions had been detected and were being remediated. The team maintained
an assessment of likely Red Team COAs.
9 December 2017
The team demonstrated excellent Team SA when team member was randomly selected
by the exercise assessors to brief on the condition of the team’s networks, the status
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of the various intrusions, and which team members were working on defined tasks.
Subsequent questioning of all team members highlighted the high level of overall Team
SA.
10 December 2017
The team maintained an overall high level of Team SA, but were observed to be being
drawn into responding to incidents too quickly and were starting to become reactive,
rather than proactive.
C.4.11 Team 11
Summary Data
Overall Exercise Position: 6th=
Manning: 5
DCO MST: None of the team attended the DCO MST.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
04/12/2017 05/12/2017 06/12/2017 07/12/2017 08/12/2017 09/12/2017 10/12/2017
Team 11
Availability
Procedures
Red Team
Mission
L1 SA
L2 SA
L3 SA
Team SA
Figure C.12: Team 11 Performance
4 December 2017
The team comprised five personnel. They described their technical competence as low to
medium. Given the small size of the team, the Team Leader adopted a flexible structure
to allow resources to be deployed as required. The intent for Day 1 was to understand
the networks, although resource limitations deprioritised one of the segments. The team
used no methods to maintain Team SA and supplied no report to White Team.
5 December 2017
The team had started hardening after enumeration was completed. No network maps
or Team SA tools were displayed.
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6 December 2017
The team had their sensors active. They maintained an overall task management board
to deconflict activities, and were resetting passwords as part of an operational cycle
to degrade Red Team activities on the network. The team maintained a focus on
hardening. No IPCE had been conducted.
7 December 2017
The team remained focused on further hardening of the network. The team also forecast
Red Team progress toward the Domain Controller and detected unusual activity on the
server.
8 December 2017
Multiple Red Team intrusions were detected and were in the process of being remediated.
Hardening was continuing. Some assessment of Red Team COAs was being undertaken,
but limited to specific team members. Overall Team SA remained low.
9 December 2017
It was observed that the team lacked C2 and cohesion, and relied on the Team Leader
too much, creating a potential single point of failure. No overall view of the Red
Team network intrusions was available and Team SA remained low, despite individual
assessments of Red Team COAs demonstrating technical understanding.
10 December 2017
Assessment of Red Team behavioural indicators remains poor within the team, al-
though individual assessments of Red Team COAs continue to demonstrate technical
understanding. The relatively small size of the team, along with poor C2 and team
understanding was assessed as the root cause.
C.4.12 Team 12
Summary Data
Overall Exercise Position: 6th=
Manning: 8
DCO MST: The majority of the team attended the DCO MST, including the Team
Leader.
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Figure C.13: Team 12 Performance
4 December 2017
The team described themselves as having a low level of cyber competence, and were
not a formed unit before the DCO MST and exercise. They aligned themselves to the
structure taught in the DCO MST, providing 1x Team Leader, 1x BTM, 2x Hunt, 2x
Monitor and 2x Harden. Their intent for Day 1 was to understand their network, in
line with DCO MST. By the end of the day they had established an operational cycle
of hourly briefs to maintain Team SA, and an attack lifecycle structure in which to
model intrusion events on their networks (using the Adversary Lifecycle Model and
the Diamond Model of Intrusion Analysis), an external traffic map, and had started a
preliminary CARVER assessment. They had also sent an RFC outlining their requests
for a Pre-Approved Actions List (PAAL) for network changes to the White Team. All
of these products and techniques were taught on the DCO MST.
The daily report to White Team contained an assessment of forecast Red Team
activity on the network, highlighting probable malware delivery.
5 December 2017
A CARVER matrix had been completed, and the team had moved on to harden their
network. They had submitted an RFC to deploy sensors. Hourly briefs were maintained.
The team maintained a clear assessment of likely Red Team activities, both verbally
and in their daily report to White Team.
6 December 2017
The team finished enumerating the networks and had started setting up their sensors.
Hardening continued, with a strategy of enforcing the ‘principle of least privilege’ in use.
They had identified a potential Red Team implant on the network. The detail of this
was maintained on the Team SA boards, and interviews with various team members
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indicated a deep level of Team SA, and mutual assessments of likely Red Team activities.
7 December 2017
Further intrusions detected and under investigation. As per the DCO MST, these events
were prioritised against activities to defend the key network terrain before allocating
resources.
The team maintained an assessment of likely Red Team activities.
8 December 2017
The team suffered from over-hardening of firewall configurations and slowed overall
defensive actions. Multiple Red Team intrusions were identified and recovered. The
team maintained a sound assessment of Red Team COAs and likely actions.
9 December 2017
Further intrusions were detected and remediations were in progress. Overall Team
SA remained excellent, with a full understanding of the changing exercise scenario
demonstrated.
10 December 2017
The team’s SA remained excellent, but the Level 2 assessment continued to suffer from
a poor levels of individual technical skills which limited the ability to contextualise the
meaning of particular network attack behaviours.
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D.1 Introduction
The ICS-CDTP has been used to develop the Intelligence Preparation of the Cyber
Environment (IPCE) process for the intelligence teams involved in incident response
to structure it into their existing processes. IPCE is an embryonic development of
Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (IPE) which is the process used for military
planning at the tactical level.
D.2 IPCE
IPCE is an approach to modelling contested cyber environments in order to support
the achievement of a commander’s objectives, determine which areas of network terrain
must be defended, and assess adversary COA. It comprises 3 stages:
1. Battlespace Area Evaluation (BAE): Focuses on the effect of the features
and constraints the network will have on operations and determines key terrain
and adversary attack surfaces.
2. Threat Evaluation (TE): Characterises how an adversary would move across
the network.
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3. Threat Integration (TI): Brings together the features and constraints of the
network terrain with adversary scheme of manoeuvre, to determine their probable
COA.
D.2.1 Battlespace Area Evaluation (BAE)
BAE is used to understand the ‘battlespace’, in this case, the networks on which oper-
ations will take place. This incorporate Stages 2 - ‘Investigation of Deployed Architec-
ture’ and Stage 3 - ‘Antagonistic Target Determination’ from ICS-CDTP, described in
Sections 5.3.2 and 5.3.3, shaped by an understanding of the adversary from Stage 1 -
‘Attack Behaviour Modelling’ in Section 5.3.1.
D.2.2 Threat Evaluation (TE)
TE considers how an adversary would move across a network to the key terrain defined
in BAE. This uses the techniques described in Stage 4 - ‘Attack Options Analysis’ of
ICS-CDTP, described in Section 5.3.4.
D.2.3 Threat Integration (TI)
TI fuses the BAE and TE, producing a Situational Overlay and Named Areas of Interest,
that drive the required security monitoring on a network, and provides a framework for
the commander’s decision-making. It includes elements of Stage 4 - ‘Attack Options
Analysis’, Stage 6 - ‘Security Monitoring’, and Stage 7 - ‘Incident Response Planning’,
described in Sections 5.3.4, 5.3.6, and 5.3.7 respectively.
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E.1 Introduction
The following questions, and the associated guideline narrative, were developed for use
in the TTX described in Section 7.5.3 and illustrated in Figure 7.5.
E.2 TTX Questions
1. What is the extent of the incident?
1.1.1 Which customers have been affected? The incident response process should
include procedures to determine which customer data has been exfiltrated. At worst,
the security policy should highlight where customer data is held and describe how access
to the data is achieved. For replicas of customer data the policy should describe which
subsets of data are held what subset of data is held. Therefore, at worst, they should
be able to list the list of potentially impacted customers from this data.
1.1.2 Which staff will undertake the analysis of the extent of the incident?
This should be described in the incident response plan.
1.2.1 Does a documented process exist to determine the extent of the inci-
dent? Linked to 1.1.1, this should be part of the incident response plan.
1.2.2 Has the process been rehearsed or exercised? Requires documentary of
evidence of testing of the incident response plan and evaluation metrics.
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1.2.3 How long will it take to determine the extent of the incident? The
incident response plan should include manpower resources and allow an evaluation of
time required based on potentially impacted systems.
1.3.1 Which sensors, mechanisms or logs will determine the affected systems?
Security documentation and network architecture documentation should describe where
sensors are located, what they are recording, and where these data are held.
1.3.2 Which data repositories have been affected? Linked to 1.1.1, but looks
beyond just customer data. The same guidelines apply as in 1.1.1.
1.4.1 What data has been exfiltrated? Linked to 1.1.1 and 1.3.2, and refers to
the entirety of information exfiltrated. The same guidelines apply as in 1.1.1.
1.4.2 What forensic data is available for investigation? 1.3.1 describes the
mechanisms for monitoring affected system. This question refers to how long the logs
are maintained, whether they are alterable, and whether they support Association of
Chief Police Officers of England, Wales & Northern Ireland (ACPO!) guidelines. This
should be described in the security policy.
1.4.3 Does the published customer information match the data held in cor-
porate repositories? The incident response process should include an assessment of
any published customer data to determine whether it is a) accurate, and b) from the
repository it has been assessed it was exfiltrated from.
1.5.1 Has any DPA sensitive data been exfiltrated? The security policy should
describe where data that is sensitive within the description of the Data Protection Act
(DPA) is held. An assessment based on the results of 1.3.2 can determine whether
sensitive data has been leaked.
1.5.2 Is there a resulting risk to personal safety, or, of fraud? The incident
response plan should include an assessment of impact of the data loss to customers.
2. How will the incident be contained?
2.1.1 Who are the members of the technical incident response team? The
incident response plan should identify those personnel who are suitably qualified and
experienced to undertake incident response activities, and in which capacity.
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2.1.2 What training have the technical incident responders received? Linked
to 2.1.1, a training needs analysis should have been conducted to identify skills gaps in
the incident response team.
2.2.1 Does a documented incident response containment process exist? The
incident response plan should contain processes to contain the incident prior to reme-
diation.
2.2.2 Are critical systems identified, prioritised, and documented, including
policies on permissible downtime? The business continuity plan should identify,
prioritise and describe critical systems, guidelines for system modification during an
incident, and permissible downtime.
2.2.3 What service levels apply during an incident? The business continuity
plan should include changes to acceptable service levels during an incident.
2.3.1 Which systems or tools will be used to prevent further data exfiltra-
tion? The incident response plan should have guidelines on which systems and tools
are authorised to be deployed during an incident.
2.3.2 How will persistent malware be identified across the corporate technol-
ogy infrastructure? The incident response plan should include processes to identify
malware propagation across the enterprise.
2.4.1 How will access to the data repositories be limited during the incident
response? The business continuity plan and incident response plan should describe
the minimum available service levels for data, including reversionary modes, to ensure
further data is not exfiltrated during the containment phase.
2.5.1 To what standards does the incident response process comply? Ex-
amples include ISO 22320 - Specifies requirements for incident response. ISO 22399
- Provides generic guidelines that organisations can follow in order to develop their
own management system to ensure incident preparedness and operational continuity.
ISO 27035 - Details a best practice approach to information security incident manage-
ment.
3. How will the incident be remediated?
3.1.1 What is the required recovery effort? The incident response plan should
contain a view on what size incidents it can resource an incident response team inter-
nally, and when external resources are required.
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3.1.2 How are technical personnel split across the investigation, containment
and remediation functions? The incident response plan should not over-allocate
roles to technical personnel.
3.2.1 How does the incident response process guide incident remediation?
The incident response plan should include guidelines to assist the responders to contain
and remediate the situation.
3.2.2 How does the incident response process determine if the organisa-
tion remains vulnerable to the same attack? The incident response plan should
include guidelines to ascertain how the attack was achieved, and steps to determine
whether the attack paths are still exposed.
3.2.3 How will the affected systems be restored to a known state? The
business continuity plan should include approved procedures to restore systems to a
known state, and include any cross-system synchronisation activities that are required.
3.3.1 Which tools are available to analyse the logs? The incident response plan
should describe how to access the system and network logs, and which tools should be
used.
3.3.2 Are stand-by servers and devices available to provide operational con-
tinuity whilst affected equipment is investigated? The business continuity plan
should describe which stand-by devices are available for which systems and data reposi-
tories in order to maintain service levels, particularly if systems need to be taken offline
for forensic examination.
3.4.1 What metrics are captured during an incident response to measure
the effectiveness of the processes and teams? The incident response plan should
include performance metrics and KPI.
3.5.1 How will the remediated systems be assessed for compliance to stan-
dards the organisation is required to comply with (e.g. PCI-DSS)? The
business continuity plan should describe to which standards systems should be restored
to, and where recertification may be required as a consequence.
4. How did the incident occur?
4.1.1 Was the attacker operating remotely, or was it an insider? The incident
response plan should investigate how the attack was achieved, this should include not
only remote attacks, but the insider threat, and threats from the supply chain.
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4.2.1 Does the incident response process include steps to determine methods
used to access and compromise the data repository? The incident response plan
should include steps to analyse how access to data repositories was achieved.
4.2.2 Does a log retention policy exist? The security policy should state how
longs will be retained for, to support forensic analysis of incidents on the network that
may have been initiated in the past.
4.3.1 Are the clocks across the corporate technology infrastructure synchro-
nised to provide consistent timestamps for forensic analysis? The security
policy should require all clocks to be synchronised to a common time source.
4.4.1 Does the data in logs record querying of corporate data repositories?
Access to key critical information assets should be logged. The security policy should
state which accesses to the critical data repositories are logged for forensic examination.
4.4.2 Would the data exfiltration show up in any network traffic logs? The
security policy should guide the deployment of sensors to identify data exfiltration.
4.5.1 Which external organisations should be informed of the incident? Does
the incident response plan specify who needs to be informed about incidents, and in
what time timescale?
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QRA Quantitative Risk Assessment
RAGAGEP Recognised and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practice
RFC Request for Change
RFI Request for Information
RLL Relay Ladder Logic
RoE Rules of Engagement
RPC Remote Procedure Call
RTU Remote Terminal Unit
SA Situational Awareness
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
SCIPS Simulated Critical Infrastructure Protection Scenarios
SHPT Microsoft SharePoint Server
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SLA Service Level Agreement
SMB Server Message Block
SIEM Security Information and Event Management
STRIDE Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Ser-
vice, Elevation of Privilege
SOP Standard Operating Procedures
TCP/IP Transmission Control Protocol / Internet Protocol
TPB Theory of Planned Behaviour
TTP Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
TTX Table-Top Exercise
UK United Kingdom (of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)
US United States (of America)
USD United States Dollars
VAM Vinyl Acetate Monomer
VM Virtual Machine
VPN Virtual Private Network
WMI Windows Management Instrumentation
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